Al Jazeera English: margins of difference in international 

English-language news broadcasting by Bigalke, Nina
  1 
 
 
 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Al Jazeera English: Margins of Difference in International 
English-language News Broadcasting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nina Bigalke 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Media and 
Communications at the London School of Economics for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 
2013 
  
  2 
Declaration 
 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree 
of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work 
other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case 
the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly 
identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made.  This thesis may not be reproduced 
without my prior written consent. 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights 
of any third party. 
 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 99.899 words.  
 
 
 
 
Statement of use of third party for editorial help  
 
I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and 
grammar by Jean Morris.   
  3 
Abstract  
 
 
Launching in 2006, Al Jazeera English (AJE) set out to challenge the dominance of Western-based 
organisations in the field of international English-language news broadcasting. Ambitions of 
‘balancing the current typical information flow by reporting from the developing world back to the 
West’ directly link the organisation to longstanding debates on asymmetric global news flows (AJE 
Website, Corporate Profile, 04/09/2008).  
 
In this context, the aim of my thesis is to develop a theoretical framework that allows to conceptualise 
two related aspects: 1) assessing degrees of both similarities and differences between AJE and 
established Western-based news broadcasters and 2) addressing underlying mechanisms that begin to 
explain degrees of difference that AJE has managed to carve out in the field of international television 
news.  
 
On the basis of a critical realist ontology, I combine Bourdieu’s concepts of field, habitus and capital 
with an understanding of agency as advanced by Archer. While the first allows me to conceptualise 
the relational nature of questions of news flows on the level of journalistic practices (which in the 
past have primarily been the domain of macro-theory), the latter serves to acknowledge the role of the 
reflexive powers of the individual when it comes to professional trajectories and editorial decision-
making. Combined, these approaches are uniquely positioned to explore the complexities of a news 
organisation aiming to be simultaneously similar enough to be on a par with established networks and 
different enough to live up to aims of ‘reporting back’.  
 
My findings suggest that overall, in accordance with its remit, AJE focussed on the global South and 
on people outside the realms of power to a greater extent than BBC World News, while in other areas 
asymmetries at odds with AJE’s remit (such as gender imbalances or an association of the South with 
conflict) were found to be reproduced. This dialectic was reflected in the channel’s organisational 
environment, where a relatively autonomous position, characterised by a largely non-commercial 
outlook, provided actors with a rare degree of autonomy, the utilisation of which, however, continues 
to be contingent on an ongoing negotiation between AJE’s twin aims of (professional) similarity and 
(editorial) difference.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
It is a commonplace to state that many of today’s key challenges are global in scope. 
Climate change, pandemics, poverty, precarious working conditions, regional 
conflicts, financial and banking crises all have in common that in order to understand 
their causes and address their effects we need to understand how conditions and 
decisions in geographically, culturally and geo-politically divergent locales are 
causally interlinked. On the surface, the proliferation of media, including a rapid 
increase in international news channels, appears to match this need. However, more 
international media does not by default equate to a more pronounced international 
outlook (Hafez, 1999; Berglez, 2008) – a point arguably of particular relevance to the 
cost-intensive and hierarchically stratified field of news broadcasting, where 
competitive pressures and increasing commercialisation have led in recent years to 
reductions in foreign bureaus, withdrawal of foreign correspondents and less airtime 
for foreign news and current affairs (Burman, 2009; Franks, 2004). Moreover, if 
foreign news and broadcasting in general are in trouble, foreign news from the global 
South are arguably disproportionally affected in a journalistic field traditionally 
dominated by a relatively small number of organisations based in the global North. 
 
Enter Al Jazeera English (AJE). A sizable news and current affairs broadcaster 
originating and based in the global South. A channel, as an AJE presenter asserted, 
that comes to the field ‘without baggage’ (personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). 
Investing in bureaus in locations that other broadcasters have left or where they have 
never had a permanent presence. Designed to upset the traditionally Western-
dominated hierarchy of international news and to ‘give a voice to the voiceless’. And 
equipped with the financial wherewithal to challenge the dominant players in the 
field. But how free and how able is this channel to deliver on its ambitions? Only to 
some degree, this thesis will argue, but a degree that nonetheless critically matters in 
this increasingly interconnected world of ours. And a degree that, if we ask the right 
questions, can tell us much about the margins of difference in the current set-up of 
the international broadcasting news and current affairs ecology. 
 
More specifically, in organisational terms, AJE’s aim of challenging the dominance 
of broadcasters based in countries of the global North – notably BBC World 
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(BBCW) and CNN International (CNNI) as the two channels that have dominated 
the field since the early 1990s – has been underscored by the channel’s ambitious 
official objective of balancing ‘the current typical information flow by reporting 
from the developing world back to the West’ (AJE Website, Corporate Profile, 
04/09/2008). In short, AJE has aimed at nothing less than challenging the ‘taken-for-
granted nature of media representation, in which we in the West do the defining, and 
in which you are, and I am not, the other’ (Silverstone, 2007: 3). As such, it 
epitomises longstanding aspirations of achieving a more balanced field of 
international news. In the words of Painter (2008: 6):  
 
There has been plenty of discussion around the existence or desirability of a 
“non-Western” or “Southern” perspective on news. For the first time since 
the beginning of that debate, a well-funded channel exists, Al Jazeera 
English, which promises to mark a radical change by offering a version of the 
“non-Western” or “Southern” take on the news’ (emphasis added).  
 
 
Part and parcel of this challenge is the ambition of AJE’s leadership for the channel 
to be on a par with the leading organisations of the field. As I will argue, the 
implication of this ambition is that AJE needs to navigate a very thin line: on the one 
hand, in order to stand a chance of challenging the likes of CNNI and BBCW, it 
needs to be similar enough to compare and therefore to compete in the first place, 
notably in terms of journalistic practices. On the other hand, it needs to be different 
enough to fulfil its remit of ‘reporting […] back’ (AJE Website, Corporate Profile, 
04/09/2008).  
 
It would be tempting, as periodically happens in literature concerning AJE, to simply 
conclude that the channel has variously failed to live up to its counter-hegemonic 
remit or succeeded in revolutionising the industry. This temptation is not unique to 
debates concerning AJE. In his televised lecture, ‘On Television’, Bourdieu 
cautioned against a danger in sociology of succumbing to one of two opposite 
illusions: ‘On the one hand, “there is the sense of something that has never been seen 
before […] And on the other hand […] there’s the opposite”, “the way it has always 
been”, “there’s nothing new under the sun,” […] “there’ll always be people on top 
and people on the bottom”’ (Bourdieu, 1998b: 43). In the case of AJE, neither view 
on its own would do justice to the complexity of the channel and, as I will argue, 
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would only convey part of a multidimensional (and at the time of writing still 
unfolding) story. And so, in the spirit of avoiding either announcing “the appearance 
of incredible phenomena”’ (Bourdieu, 1998b: 43) or opting for the other pole of the 
spectrum and discarding any novelty as an old principle in a new guise, I will argue 
that what characterises AJE as an organisation is a constant negotiation of 
professional similarity (in terms of journalistic practices) and editorial difference in 
relation to its main competitors in the field of international English-language TV 
news and current affairs. This dialectic of similarity and difference is reflected both 
in its organisational environment and in its output. 
 
As I will further argue, these ‘structural contradictions’ (Figenschou, 2012: 354), 
while characteristic of AJE, are not purely of the organisation’s making. Rather, they 
also throw into relief persisting inequalities within the field of international broadcast 
news. To analyse the degree to which AJE is part of a media ‘contra-flow’, it is 
therefore important to take into consideration both decision-making processes within 
the organisation and characteristics of the wider organisational field that impinge on 
the organisation and, by so doing, enable or limit its potential for change. This 
relational character of questions of imbalances in international news is acknowledged 
in the macro theory around media imperialism, cultural imperialism and news flows. 
In addition, an acknowledgment on the level of overarching theoretical models is 
routinely cited in individual case studies concerned with unequal news flows, but 
rarely reflected in the concrete theoretical frameworks that underpin the particular 
empirical research. In this thesis I am therefore proposing a theoretical framework 
that is apt for conceptualising, on the basis of a critical realist foundation, the 
relational character of news flows on the level of journalistic practices within AJE. 
These features are reflected in the following central research question: 
 
In how far and in what ways does AJE deliver on the channel’s declared aim 
of challenging asymmetric global news flows and how is this aim aided or 
obstructed by the interplay of agential forces and structural mechanisms 
residing within both the organisational field and the wider professional field? 
 
In order to arrive at a framework that allows me to address this question, I based the 
theoretical positions advanced in this thesis on a critical realist ontology that runs 
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like a thread through the various chapters and functions as a kind of ‘conceptual 
glue’. Firstly, critical realism’s non-determinist view of causation enables me to 
conceptualise potential effects of field-specific structures, which in turn allows me to 
analyse some of the underlying mechanisms behind patterns of news content. It also 
allows me to link the level of structural (macro) theory of news flows with the level 
of journalistic practice and to combine aspects of the theoretical frameworks of 
Bourdieu and Archer in order to theorise the dynamics described above between 
structure and agency in the organisational environment of AJE.  
 
Secondly, critical realism offers a way of differentiating between the theoretical 
claims of (moderately) constructivist accounts and the anti-realist ontological 
assumptions that are often attached to these – unnecessarily so, as I will argue in line 
with Elder-Vass (2012a; 2012c). This is particularly relevant in the context of media 
studies, since the discursive and often so very obviously constructed nature of the 
subjects studied has been accompanied by a dominance of anti-realist positions 
within the discipline. What critical realism has to offer to the field of media studies, 
as I hope to demonstrate in this thesis, is an alternative that acknowledges the 
referential relation between reality and the way it impinges on and is being made 
sense of in the media, without sacrificing the vital arguments brought forward by 
constructivist accounts that stress the contingency of social aspects of reality.  
 
 
1.1 Chapter Outlook Part I: Theoretical and Methodological 
Framework 
 
Being underpinned by a critical realist ontological foundation, critical realist 
concepts will surface throughout the thesis. As a conceptual bridge, this theoretical 
body helps to bridge macro-theory and empirical approaches, as I will discuss in 
Chapter 2. As I will outline in Chapter 3, it also allows to combine the positions of 
Archer and Bourdieu (Elder-Vass, 2007). And as will become apparent in Chapter 4, 
it serves as a basis for discussing the analytical status of the data generated in the 
empirical research conducted for this thesis. Following this introduction, I will 
therefore begin Chapter 2 by briefly outlining some of the main concepts of critical 
realism to provide some ontological groundwork for the discussions of the following 
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chapters. The second part of the chapter will serve to contextualise the most apparent 
characteristic of AJE – its remit of ‘rebalancing’ the dominance of Western news 
organisations in international news – with an overview of the theoretical implications 
of this remit. In so doing I will focus on the historical dimension of the debate, as 
well as on more recent concepts of news flows, including the global structural 
inequalities theorised in concepts of media and cultural imperialism, imbalances with 
regard to representational aspects of news content, asymmetries in the dispersion and 
interpretation of the notion of professionalism and the concepts of ‘contra-flow’ and 
‘counter-hegemonic news’ as challenges to dominant news flows. Again, the 
combination of a channel that qualifies as ‘contra-flow’ (in the basic sense that it is 
based in the South and exports its content to countries of the global North) and 
advocates a counter-hegemonic editorial perspective while also pursuing global 
ambitions means that questions of whether or not AJE qualifies as a counter-
hegemonic contra-flow or has become part of (and possibly altered the composition 
of) mainstream news are best addressed by analytically separating aspects of news 
content, journalistic practices and AJE’s position in the field (as I will discuss in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 respectively). 
 
After discussing the academic (and indeed political) trajectories implied in AJE’s 
aim of ‘reporting back’, I will outline in Chapter 3 a theoretical framework based on 
the work of Bourdieu and Archer in order to explain how the relative persistence of 
unequal structures within the field of international news and the potential for change 
can be conceptualised on the level of journalistic practice. As I will argue, 
Bourdieu’s theory is uniquely positioned to explain many of the phenomena 
emerging from my data in that it 1) provides a relational context that allows the 
conceptualisation of links and disparities between the journalistic field and related 
fields as well as between divergent expressions of professional habitus as emergent 
properties of divergent journalistic (sub)fields and 2) allows the explanation of 
certain kinds of change and difference in practice (namely the kinds of change and 
difference that stem from changes in related fields or mismatches between the 
organisational field and habitus of individuals reminiscent of the wider professional 
field). In addition, I will argue that, while practices brought into the organisational 
field of AJE from rival channels inevitably carried the liability (which differs form a 
predictable effect) of causing a steady drift back to old habits, they significantly also 
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had the power to provide a basis for measuring – and ultimately realising – 
difference. As Bourdieu remarks, in order to stand in competition, people – and 
organisations for that matter – ‘have to agree on areas of disagreement’ (Bourdieu, 
2005: 36). Therefore, comparability of practice could, maybe counter-intuitively, be 
precisely what allows AJE to ‘report back’. 
 
In turn, Archer’s framework allows individual decision-making to be related to social 
structures – and it does so in a much more explanatory and precise way than 
Bourdieu’s mere assertion that social structure, by virtue of some undefined 
mechanism, impacts on the individual by materialising as embodied practice or 
habitus. Therefore, critical realism – and Archer’s account of reflexivity specifically 
– help to explain why (and the ways in which) people’s actions are constituted by 
more than social structures, by focussing on the mediating role of agency between 
social entities and human individuals. This is of particular relevance in the context of 
a relatively novel news channel that, at the time of my fieldwork, did not yet have an 
editorial track record as a reference point for editorial decision-making processes. 
And while it was clear what AJE did not want to represent (given a remit formulated 
in opposition to existing news conventions), questions about the precise editorial 
nature of this journalistic experiment were very much subject to discussion during 
the early years of the channel. In this environment, journalists’ imagination about 
what would be possible had an impact that can hardly be overstated, for it was to a 
great extent their own experiences and reflexivity that created the very editorial 
precedents that would be recognised by journalists joining the channel in later years 
as core characteristics of AJE. Unravelling this process is crucial not merely as a 
contribution to the understanding of the early years of AJE, but more generally and 
perhaps more importantly, to highlighting the mechanisms through which difference 
on screen is potentially obstructed or enabled in the field of international news 
production.  
 
After the theoretical foundation of the thesis has been outlined, Chapter 4 will 
provide the methodological framework to match both theory and the empirical 
necessities and limitations associated with studying AJE. This will include an 
outlining of the research questions, the multi-method approach chosen to address 
these, the research context of studying AJE and the analytical status of qualitative 
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and quantitative data generated. The main methodological elements of this study 
include a comparative content analysis of the news programming of AJE and BBCW 
News, an analysis of external and internal organisational documents, as well as 28 in-
depth interviews that I conducted with AJE staff in London, Doha and Kuala Lumpur 
between late 2007 and early 2010. As with the different theoretical elements, 
quantitative methods (content analysis) and qualitative methods (analysis of research 
interviews) are combined by virtue of a critical realist framework. Here, an 
analytically stratified model of reality serves to relate descriptive and explanatory 
analysis by acknowledging that the content analysis focuses on the (limited) realm of 
the empirical, while the analysis of interviews investigates mechanisms that are part 
of the domain of the real and may or may not bear effects in the domains of the 
actual and the empirical (for more detail on the analytical stratification model of 
reality in critical realism, see Chapter 3). 
 
Furthermore, in order to understand both the complex research context of AJE and 
the organisational context in which the empirical results are to be situated, it is 
crucial to understand the intricate ways in which AJE is linked to the state of Qatar 
and to its parent channel, Al Jazeera Arabic (AJA). Put simply, AJE would be 
inconceivable without the ambitions of Qatar’s ruling family or its parent channel, 
AJA, and it continues to be subject to the environment that gave rise to it. In order to 
provide background on the multiple contexts that led to the foundation of AJE, 
Chapter 5 will describe the history, politics and journalistic endeavours that preceded 
(and continue to shape) AJE. This background includes the rootedness of the Al 
Jazeera Network (AJN) in the (limited) reform politics of Qatar, the implications of 
the network’s financial dependence on the state, AJA’s role in the region and 
beyond, and the backlash from regional and Western governments with which the 
network was confronted throughout its existence, and the launch and important early 
post-launch junctures in the history of AJE.  
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1.2 Chapter Outlook Part II: Empirical Research and Analysis 
 
As the first of the three empirical chapters of this thesis, Chapter 6 draws on shared 
assumptions emerging from interviews with AJE staff as a basis for quantitatively 
assessing the channel’s news content in comparison with equivalent BBCW News 
content. This serves to provide a glimpse of the ways in which AJE staff engaged in 
constructing difference, both actively and passively, through their interpretations of 
the editorial remit of the channel as well as some of the manifestations of the 
resulting practices in the actual content. Importantly, results from this content 
analysis can only ever offer examples out of several possible effects of the 
underlying mechanisms involved. Given that causal powers in the critical realist 
sense are powers that may or may not become effective depending on context, the 
results presented in Chapter 6 are tendencies. Notwithstanding this essential 
qualification, I found that as examples of news content produced in AJE’s early 
years, the patterns identified reflected the tension between similarity and difference 
that also emerged from the interview data. As such, results from the content analysis 
serve to give an indication of areas where AJE was prone to delivering on its remit 
(for example by emphasising the global South) and areas where the emerging picture 
was less consistent (for example with regard to AJE’s aim of ‘giving a voice to the 
voiceless’).  
 
In Chapter 7, I will explore the relevance of habitus and journalistic agency for any 
difference that potentially materialises on screen. As I will argue, AJE as an 
organisation is endowed with causal powers and liabilities that can help to explain 
what ends up on screen as news without presuming a static or predictable causal 
relationship between mechanisms and news content. In particular, AJE’s decision to 
follow the dominant professional habitus of the field brought with it limitations for 
the channel’s recruitment strategy that in part ran counter to its remit. On the other 
hand, the causal powers of human individuals acting within an organisational 
environment that encourages reflexivity counteracted some of the influences of the 
wider professional field that were impinging on the organisation as a direct result of 
the competitive aspirations of AJE.  
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In journalism, the professional habitus and journalistic agency of individual 
journalists do matter, but so does the business model that makes their endeavours 
financially feasible – not least when aiming to alter geo-politically asymmetric 
historical practices. Therefore, in Chapter 8, I will discuss AJE’s position within the 
field as an international, state-funded channel endowed with the structural liability of 
(self)censorship, but without an immediate need to break even and – and this I will 
argue is of particular relevance with regard to its ability to ‘report back’ – with the 
ability to prioritise what Bourdieu called ‘cultural capital’ over ‘economic capital’. 
Here, the rather exceptional circumstance that AJE, as a sizable international news 
channel, operated (throughout the years analysed) without using audience ratings as a 
measurement of success, offers a rare opportunity to analyse a relatively autonomous 
organisational (sub)field within the weakly autonomous field of television news and 
current affairs.  
 
To summarise, this thesis will provide a theoretical framework that allows the teasing 
out, on the level of an organisational case study, of the simultaneously deeply 
relational and reflexive nature of questions of news flows. And it will contribute to 
existing research on Al Jazeera by providing an understanding of AJE’s early years 
that includes an appreciation of the limitations and enablements of the professional 
field as well as the dynamics within the organisation itself. Finally, in Chapter 9, I 
will bring together the theoretical and empirical findings to discuss the value of 
analysing AJE’s capacity to ‘report back’ (and questions of news flows more 
generally) on the level of journalistic practice through the concepts of field theory 
and reflexivity.  
 
 
1.3 Some Caveats 
 
Crucially, although considering an Arab news channel – as a unique example of a 
sizable new entrant in the field of international broadcasting – this thesis cannot 
justifiably be said to be about the field of Arab media or to be aiming to contribute to 
Arab media studies. While making sure to incorporate the fundamental inheritance 
and continuing influence on the channel of AJA, Qatar and AJN as a whole (backed 
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by four research visits to Doha), the thesis is limited to analysing the English-
language channel of Al Jazeera and its relation to other English-language channels. 
 
In addition, it is also important to note that the thesis explicitly explores the early 
years of AJE (mainly 2007, 2008 and early 2009), since the main fieldwork was 
concluded prior to more recent developments such as the Arab Spring and AJE’s 
coverage thereof, to recent managerial changes at Al Jazeera, the purchase of Current 
TV and the creation of Al Jazeera America (AJAM) or the political succession in 
2013 of the Emir of Qatar and founder of Al Jazeera by his son. Again, these 
relatively recent developments will not go unmentioned, but are not part of the main 
data analysed. Rather, by analysing the early years of the channel, the thesis focuses 
on dynamics at play in the formative (and arguably most flexible) phase of AJE in 
order to gauge the margins of difference available to the then young media 
organisation within the wider field of international English-language television news. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis specifically focuses on the television platform of the 
English-language side of the AJN. And while Al Jazeera has been proactive in 
exploring digital strategies – in part to compensate for the initial lack of distribution 
deals in the United States and other global areas and in part by incorporating and 
encouraging citizen journalism as part of the channel’s Arab Spring coverage – the 
thesis is not about new media (which are beyond the scope of this project and a 
subject for further research). In contrast, this thesis is about AJE’s core business of 
television news, how that is situated within the field of international English-
language television news, and the kind of journalistic practices that are potentially 
enabled or constrained within this particular setting.  
 
Finally, although employing a critical realist ontology is a central element of this 
thesis, it is crucial to point out that the scope and nature of this thesis do not allow to 
discuss critical realism as a philosophical tradition in any depth or to incorporate an 
exhaustive discussion of critical realism in relation to the empirical study presented 
here. At the very best, I hope to be able to begin to demonstrate some of the 
conceptual benefits of critical realism for the empirical subject at hand and to use this 
research project as a kind of ‘trial run’ for the application of a critical realist ontology 
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in the discipline of media and communication studies – with all the insufficiencies 
and limitations this implies.  
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Chapter 2 An Unequal Playing Field: News from 
North to South? 
 
 
The continuing dismay with which Al Jazeera is received in Western societies, most 
especially in the United States, is not only because of the graphic horror of some of 
its images (we provide those on a daily basis) or the ferocity of its political rhetoric 
(likewise). It is much more fundamental. It is based on the breaking of a media taboo 
and the reversal of the taken-for-granted nature of media representation, in which 
we in the West do the defining, and in which you are, and I am not, the other. 
 
Roger Silverstone, Media and Morality, (2007: 3) 
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2.1 Introduction  
 
In any discussion of AJE, it is hard to overstate the relevance of academic, and 
indeed political, debates on unequal media flows. A central claim formulated from 
the outset in the corporate profile of AJE is that they seek to balance ‘the current 
typical information flow by reporting from the developing world back to the West 
and from the southern to the northern hemisphere’ (AJE Website, Corporate Profile, 
04/09/2008) – almost literally echoing debates from the 1970s onwards that were 
‘primarily directed toward achieving a balance in the flow of information between 
the North and the South’ (Thomas, 1997: 165). As such, the channel’s stated 
ambition explicitly taps into decades of discussions about the asymmetric character 
of global communications. As I will outline in the following, over time the character 
and terminology of the debates changed from notions of cultural and media 
imperialism to the more contemporary terminology of media flows – a change 
indicative of developments in theory as well as of the international media landscape 
as new media hubs emerge around the world and the advance of more accessible 
technology continues to change global power dynamics (Silverstone & Georgiou, 
2007: 33; Cunningham et al., 1998: 178-179).  
 
However, the wider argument that, notwithstanding a more complex and 
multidirectional exchange of media, in some fields the majority of content continues 
to originate in relatively few Western-based organisations has retained its relevance 
to this day. This has particularly been the case with regard to news organisations with 
a widespread international reach, such as international English-language news 
channels.1 In a (sub)field of journalism described as ‘largely an outgrowth of 
Western news media’ (Hachten & Scotton, 2002: 32), Al Jazeera’s financial clout 
combined with the broadcaster’s aim of ‘reporting back’ from the South to the North 
struck a chord with journalists and academics alike. As Sakr put it around the time Al 
Jazeera was gearing up to try and emulate some of successes of its Arabic-language 
                                                
1 Another prominent example is the field of news agencies (Rantanen, 2009: 42-43).  
 
2 A different way of conceptualising inter-organisational professional habitus could 
be in terms of ‘norm circles’ that produce sets of beliefs amongst the people who 
constitute their parts (Elder-Vass, 2010: 156). Norm circles are closely interlinked 
with the causal powers of organisations that employ people who are simultaneously 
parts of norm circles, though not identical, as organisations ‘produce a further and  
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service in English: ‘If contra-flow occurs when countries once considered clients of 
media imperialism have successfully exported their output into the metropolis […], 
then Al-Jazeera offers a textbook example of the empire ‘striking back’ (Sakr, 2007: 
116). It becomes clear then that any discussion of AJE is always to some extent a 
discussion about the degree to which the channel lives up to its self-declared aim of 
‘reporting […] back’ – both in terms of content and in terms of what this might entail 
in the context of the organisational structure and journalistic day-to-day practice at 
AJE (AJE Website, Corporate Profile, 04/09/2008). In the following I will unravel 
the theoretical implications of AJE’s remit by addressing some of the characteristics 
of the academic and political debates that AJE has evoked through the choice of 
language in its official profile.  
 
In the first part of this chapter, I will give a brief overview of some of the basic 
concepts of critical realism. This serves to provide the ontological groundwork that 
will reappear as a unifying theme across theoretical, methodological and empirical 
parts of the thesis. The second part of the chapter outlines the historical and 
theoretical trajectories of discussions about global structural inequalities and the 
multiple ways in which the media are implicated in (and affected by) these, ranging 
from early debates on modernisation theory to media and cultural imperialism 
paradigms and concepts of counter-hegemonic media and media contra-flow. As I 
will argue, persisting structural inequalities in the field of international news can be 
looked at from the perspective of different constituent parts of the global news 
ecology, two of which – questions of representation and the dispersion of different 
kinds of journalistic practices – I will elaborate on in the latter part of the chapter.  
 
In this vein, the third part of the chapter focuses on issues of asymmetric patterns of 
representation of different world regions in international media. Here, I will discuss 
some of the ways in which the global South has been portrayed in dominant 
Western-based media in order to make explicit some of the patterns of under- or mis-
representation that AJE set out to alter. Finally, in the fourth part I will look at 
repercussions of asymmetric patterns of media flows for news production practices 
and notions of professionalism – and the ways in which these affect AJE’s ambitions 
of ‘reporting back’.  
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2.2 Ontological Foundations 
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the ontological foundation on the basis of 
which I seek to combine theories and methodologies discussed in the following 
chapters is grounded in critical realism. As Elder-Vass (2010: 11) noted, 
‘contemporary critical realism […] is a somewhat diverse school of thought.’ In the 
following I am going to outline some critical realist concepts and perspectives I will 
draw on to clarify ontological positions, as they relate to the issues addressed in 
thesis. This by no means comprises a comprehensive or in-depth discussion of 
critical realism as a philosophical tradition, which would be well beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 
The theoretical foundations of critical realism were originally developed by Roy 
Bhaskar with the aim of combining and going beyond empirical realist and 
transcendental idealist approaches (Bhaskar, 1975). Critical realists share with 
transcendental idealist positions the notion that it is important to be able to imagine 
generative mechanisms that do not necessarily result in observable regularities, while 
they differ from the latter in allowing for ‘the possibility that what is imagined need 
not be imaginary but may be (and come to be known as) real’ (Bhaskar, 1975: 15). 
The term ‘critical realism’ is derived by combining the concepts of ‘transcendental 
realism’ and ‘critical naturalism’, whereby ‘“critical”, like “transcendental” 
suggested affinities with Kant’s philosophy, while “realism” indicated the difference 
from it’ (Bhaskar, 1998: ix). A considerable part of Bhaskar’s concern in A Realist 
Theory of Science is the distinction between causal laws and patterns of events, a 
distinction he subsequently developed in The Possibility of Naturalism (1979).  
 
Central to this ontological framework is a non-deterministic view of causation. The 
complexity of social aspects of reality means that, as Andrew Sayer notes, ‘social 
science has been singularly unsuccessful in discovering law-like regularities’ (Sayer, 
1992: 2-3). At the same time, the fact that in the realm of social (aspects of) reality 
many phenomena are concept-dependent, does not rule out causal explanation, ‘a) 
because material change in society has to be explained, too and b) because reasons 
can also be causes, in that they prompt us to do things, think differently, etc.’ (Sayer, 
2000: 18). A critical realist theory of causation is therefore based on the concept of 
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causal powers as attributes of entities, as well as ‘the combination of causal powers 
of different entities to produce actual causation (Elder-Vass, 2010: 44, emphasis in 
original).’ In other words, events can be understood as ‘the outcome of interactions 
between a variety of causal powers (Elder-Vass, 2010: 7-8).’  
 
Causal powers and liabilities provide a basis to explain something about the nature of 
the entity that possesses them, its relations with other entities and the potential 
effects of these relations. Significantly, causal powers can be attributes of single 
objects or individuals as well as of social relations and structures (Sayer, 1992: 104-
5; Hartwig, 2007: 57). They potentially produce regularities, but exist (and can be 
described) independently of these, because their efficacy depends on the interplay of 
causal powers and liabilities of multiple intersecting structures and individuals in 
contexts which serve to activate some of these powers while restraining others. In 
short, they produce ‘tendencies’, but not ‘exceptionless regularities’ (Elder-Vass, 
2010: 46, emphasis in original). This allows observations to be made about structural 
mechanisms without being deterministic about the way that these may come to 
impact on social reality in different contexts.  
 
Avoiding the ‘virtual tautology’ of stating that ‘an object can do something because 
it has the power to do so’ (Sayer, 1992: 105-6), such accounts of causation also serve 
to explain what it is about an object that lends it its causal powers. Characteristic 
questions are: ‘What does the existence of this object/practice presuppose?’, 
‘Can/Could object A exist without object B?’ and ‘What is it about this object which 
enables it to do certain things?’ (Sayer, 2000:16). With regard to this study, this 
approach allows, for example, the identification of the causal powers of notions of a 
particular (historically constituted) kind of professionalism within the journalistic 
field2 , the causal powers of AJE as an organisation3  and those of individual 
                                                
2 A different way of conceptualising inter-organisational professional habitus could 
be in terms of ‘norm circles’ that produce sets of beliefs amongst the people who 
constitute their parts (Elder-Vass, 2010: 156). Norm circles are closely interlinked 
with the causal powers of organisations that employ people who are simultaneously 
parts of norm circles, though not identical, as organisations ‘produce a further and 
non-normative causal mechanism that gives the organisation its causal powers 
(Elder-Vass, 2010: 156, emphasis in original).’  
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journalists, as well as how the causal powers of all these elements interact to produce 
certain tendencies, for example in editorial outcomes. Here it is precisely the relation 
between themes that allows for an explanation of mechanisms inherent in the 
organisational environment of AJE as a whole.  
  
Another concept vital to this understanding of causation is that of emergence. In the 
words of Elder-Vass, the concept of emergence ‘expresses the idea that a thing – 
sometimes I will say ‘an entity’ or ‘a whole’ – can have properties or capabilities that 
are not possessed by its parts (Elder-Vass, 2010: 4).’ As such, the causal powers of a 
given entity – variously articulated as ‘emergent properties’ (Elder-Vass, 2010: 45) – 
are related, but, crucially, irreducible to, the causal powers of its constituent parts 
(Carter & New, 2004: 7; Sayer, 2000: 12). The way the parts relate to the causal 
powers of the whole is through causal mechanisms that are the product of the 
interactions of the parts (in themselves ‘wholes’) and in turn produce causal powers 
or emergent properties of the social entity in question (Elder-Vass, 2010: 66-67). It is 
characteristic of this relation that fundamental changes in one entity or whole may 
cause changes in the emergent property it gave rise to, but that the principle of 
irreducibility means that changes in the latter cannot be predicted or explained 
exclusively by changes in the first (Hartwig, 2007: 166).  
 
Likewise related, and fundamental to this view of causation, is a stratified 
perspective of reality based an ontological differentiation between the real, the 
actual and the empirical – the real being invested with causal powers and liabilities 
that, depending on the circumstances, may or may not become activated and have 
effects in the realm of the actual, and the actual in turn being irreducible to what can 
be observed empirically. This acknowledgment that events (the domain of the actual) 
and experiences (the domain of the empirical) are different categories renders 
empirical realism dependent ‘upon what is in effect a special case’ (Bhaskar, 1975: 
17) and on its own ultimately inadequate. Conversely, it also allows empirical data to 
be linked with wider observations, in so far as the empirical is part of the actual and 
                                                                                                                                     
3 For a detailed theoretical treatise of the argument that social entities, including 
organisations, possess causal powers as well as a discussion of how these causal 
powers can be delineated and assessed, see Elder-Vass, 2010. 
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both are part of the real. Therefore, it also allows empirically discernible patterns to 
be observed as one example of several potential effects of structural mechanisms. 
 
This last point will be of particular relevance in the following part of this chapter, as 
it provides a basis to resolve some overdrawn disagreements between more 
empirically-minded and more broadly theoretical approaches designed to theorise 
asymmetries in the global media, and specifically news, ecology. In the following I 
will outline the implications of the theoretical debates evoked (in part implicitly, in 
part explicitly) by AJE’s editorial remit and position in international news.  
 
 
2.3 Theoretical Trajectories of ‘Reporting Back’  
 
In this part of the chapter I will outline the relevance of theory that predates the 
terminology of ‘counter-hegemonic news’ and ‘contra-flow’ for the study of AJE – 
notably concepts of cultural and media imperialism. This area of theoretical work, 
which had been a prominent theme in media studies in the 1970s, has now largely 
been superseded by theory acknowledging more complex media flows. However, 
notwithstanding important criticisms, some of the core concerns first raised decades 
ago remain valid to contemporary reality. Despite ‘prominent examples’ of complex 
and multidirectional media flows, Thussu (2007: 27) stresses that to assume ‘that the 
world communication has become more diverse and democratic’ would be 
misleading, since to this day there remain significant discrepancies in terms of 
revenue and global impact between dominant Western-based media and ‘subaltern’ 
and ‘geo-cultural’ media flows. And theories of globalisation following in the wake 
of earlier debates – while functioning as a corrective to many of the shortcomings of 
cultural imperialism concepts – provided little to address the causes of persistent 
structural inequalities in the way previous discussions did (Hesmondhalgh, 2008; 
Sparks, 2009).  
 
In the context of international English-language TV news specifically, this means 
that – despite the fact that in the decades since these debates started ‘there has been 
plenty of discussion around the existence or desirability of a “non-Western” or 
“Southern” perspective’ – the emergence of AJE marked, in the words of Painter 
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(2008: 6), ‘the first time since the beginning of the debate’ that a channel with 
substantial and sustained financial clout had been launched with the explicit aim of 
balancing dominant news flows (emphasis added). Essentially, outlining this 
particular theoretical trajectory serves two purposes: 1) It helps to understand the 
theoretical implications of some of the language of ‘reporting back’ used in AJE’s 
official editorial profile. And 2) it helps examine some of the underlying mechanisms 
that to this day influence global media flows, in some sectors in fundamentally 
unequal terms. In other words, in order to know what factors might be involved in 
AJE’s aim of contributing to ‘balancing’ an asymmetric global media environment, it 
is necessary to understand what it is about this media environment that makes it 
‘unbalanced’ or unequal in the first place. 
 
Given continued global imbalances, there have been calls for a revival for the 
concept of imperialism (Hesmondhalgh, 2008; Sparks, 2009), albeit in a modified 
version in the light of the intellectual and practical failings that contributed to the 
defeat of the concept in the 1980s. One of these modification entails a separation of 
causal powers and their effects by acknowledging that while ‘symbolic systems 
[including TV programmes] enjoy their dominant position in the world as a direct 
consequence of the brute economic and military domination of imperialist powers, 
[…] that does not imply that they are themselves “imperialist” (Sparks, 2009).’ This 
approach helps to avoid essentialist and determinist assumptions about the nature of 
media products. Following Sparks (2009) with reference to the context of this thesis, 
I therefore understand inequalities in international English-language news as 
‘cultural consequences of imperialism (emphasis added)’ rather than conceptualising 
them as inherently imperialist in and by themselves. In addition, as I will argue, by 
questioning the counter-hegemonic character of different kinds of ‘contra-flow’ (see 
2.3.3), some of the critical clout that has been a defining feature of the concept of 
cultural imperialism (see 2.3.2), can be preserved without resurrecting earlier 
versions of cultural imperialism theory.  
 
In the following I will give a brief overview of theoretical developments, their 
weaknesses as well as their continued relevance for contemporary debates on 
inequalities in international news – ranging from modernisation theory to the debates 
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about a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and strands of 
media and cultural imperialism theory.  
 
 
2.3.1 Early Debates on Unequal Media Flows 
 
Early demands to counter Western media hegemony need to be understood in the 
context of their opposition to preceding models of modernisation theory. When the 
debates around imbalances in international communications first became prominent 
in the 1950s they did not initially focus on notions of domination. Rather, the media 
were seen as a means to ‘accelerate the process of development and modernization’ 
of developing countries (Fejes, 1981: 281). Modernisation theorists assumed a linear 
social evolutionary process, in accordance with which developing countries could 
improve their relatively disadvantaged position by following the path set out by 
‘developed’ Western countries (Fejes, 1981: 283-284). As such ‘it paid little 
attention to how media pluralism could be defended in traditional societies’ and had 
a tendency to perceive traditional aspects of local cultures ‘as something to be 
defeated’ for the sake of progress (Curran, 2002: 168). In subsequent decades, 
scholars departing from modernisation theories came to abandon this emphasis on 
the ‘internal processes of development’ and began to acknowledge the persisting 
structural inequalities inherent in the relations between the South and the North 
(Fejes, 1981: 283).  
 
Central to this change in focus was the realisation that, far from supporting self-
reliant development in countries of the South, the transfer of communication 
technologies and the export of media content from the North to the South added to 
existing dependencies and served primarily to strengthen foreign business and 
national elites (Hamelink, 1997: 70-71). From the beginning of the debate, UNESCO 
played ‘a leading role’ in the analysis and discussion of unequal global media flows 
(Boyd-Barrett & Thussu, 1992: 7). In the early 1950s, the international body funded 
the first study focussing on unequal global distribution of news (Boyd-Barrett & 
Thussu, 1992: 1; Rantanen, 2009: 43), and went on to generate instrumental studies, 
such as the first comprehensive investigation of the global distribution of television 
content conducted by Nordenstreng and Varis (1974: 7). More than three decades 
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before AJE set out to balance unequal information flows, their results corroborated 
claims of significant geo-political imbalances and (notwithstanding its 
methodological and conceptual limitations) provided an empirical basis for further 
discussions. A follow-up study conducted by Varis a decade after the initial 
UNESCO report on television flows found that ‘no major changes in the 
international flow of television programmes’ had taken place over that period of 
time, although ‘a trend towards greater regional exchanges along with the traditional 
dominance of few exporting countries’ also began to emerge from the data (Varis, 
1985: 53, emphasis added). 
 
Crucially, UNESCO also provided a forum for newly independent countries to voice 
their needs and objectives. In the 1960s and 1970s, members of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) began to articulate the challenge that an unequal flow of media 
posed for efforts to ‘decolonise’ and develop their countries on their own terms 
(Roach, 1997: 94-95).4 However, it was not until the mid-1970s, when ‘Third World 
voices’ gained traction at UNESCO, that the question of asymmetric communication 
flows became a ‘dominant discursive theme’ in international diplomatic circles. 
Efforts to highlight the role of unequal media flows culminated in demands for a 
New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) to complement the 
campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Tomlinson, 1991: 16). 
In 1980, a commission headed by Sean McBride supported the call for a NWICO in 
its final report (Boyd-Barrett & Thussu, 1992: 8). Its findings provided not least 
‘intellectual justification’ for a NWICO (Boyd-Barrett & Thussu, 1992: 25) and 
acknowledged a relation between ‘freedom for the “strong” and the “haves”’ and 
structural disadvantages ‘for the “weak” and the “have nots”’ (Boyd-Barrett & 
Thussu, 1992: 26). 
 
The empirical evidence of unequal media flows left little doubt that the media were 
an integral part of global imbalances between developing countries in the global 
                                                
4 The movement had been established in Belgrade in 1961. NAM members had in 
common that they were not formally aligned with either of the main powers of the 
Cold War era. Encompassing hugely diverse regions and political positions, they 
shared the challenge of having to develop their (often) newly independent countries 
amidst colonial legacies and continuing global economic inequalities.  
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South and developed countries in the global North. However, discussions about the 
political implications of these imbalances were less than straightforward. As Sparks 
(2009) noted, the fact that UNESCO – ‘a place where the only actors who count are 
states’ – served as a prominent platform for the debate, emphasised frictions 
informed by inter-governmental political considerations rather than a more 
comprehensive concern for those dominated by elites irrespective of national 
affiliation. This was not necessarily reflected in the more general aims of NWICO, 
which included restraining ‘the power of the transnational media lobby’ and 
encouraging ‘autonomous media policies in the developing world’ (Thomas, 1997: 
165). However, the diplomatic liabilities built into Cold War era inter-governmental 
debate quickly became apparent in the way these aims were received and discussed. 
In this geo-political setting, implicit and explicit critique of global capitalism and a 
debate centring on resistance to US hegemony played a central role in the unravelling 
of plans for a NWICO. 
 
What followed was a growing disengagement of Western powers from debates and 
demands that went against the grain of the ‘free flow’ doctrines supported by the US 
and others (Roach, 1997: 103-106; Boyd-Barrett & Thussu, 1992: 22). As a 
diplomatic initiative, the debate ultimately lost momentum when the US, and 
subsequently the UK, left the negotiating table in the mid-1980s, as ‘diplomatic 
ambiguities gave way to more direct challenges’ and ‘UNESCO became more and 
more forthright in condemning neo-colonialism’ (Tomlinson, 1991: 16). To this day, 
the NWICO debates are credited with putting the issue of global inequalities in 
media and communications on the international agenda, but are widely perceived to 
have achieved little to mitigate the imbalances they sought to address (Thomas, 
1997: 165; Vincent, 1997: 175).  
 
 
2.3.2 Reconciling Empirical and Theory-based Approaches 
 
Academic research on unequal media flows was both stimulated by and in turn 
informed political discussions at the time. Media scholars such as Nordenstreng and 
Schiller took an active part in the evolution of the NWICO debates, while also being 
concerned with issues somewhat removed from (if indirectly related to) the 
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practicalities of applied politics. In other words, not having to contend with 
international diplomatic ‘ambiguities’ in quite the same fashion, academic research 
on unequal media flows both complemented and (to a limited degree) outlived the 
diplomatic agenda of the NWICO discussions. This, however, did not mean that 
these discussions were free from divisions at the time. From the start, one key 
dispute within the academic field centred on the adequacy of empirical versus 
theory-based approaches to best encapsulate the issues at stake.  
 
On one side of the spectrum were those advocating detailed empirical investigations 
into media imperialism, with very specific foci on the dissemination and 
directionality of particular media technology and content in particular geo-political 
contexts. On the other side of the spectrum were those favouring more 
comprehensive theoretical arguments about notions of domination inherent in post-
Second World War incarnations of cultural imperialism (with the media but one 
element of continued and systematic inequalities benefitting the West). Again, the 
overarching geo-political influences of the time informed the fission between 
empirical and theoreticist approaches. In essence, the greater conceptual flexibility of 
empirical approaches tended to allow and account for a more pluralist, less 
pessimistic outlook than that represented by many of the radical political economists 
(in that sense it could be argued that it was conceptually closer to subsequent 
globalisation theories) – and for that very reason they were taken to task by the latter 
for lacking critical clout. 
  
For proponents of the cultural imperialism perspective, such as John Tomlinson, the 
empirical (or ‘anti-theoreticist’) media imperialism approaches crucially lacked the 
notion of domination that was an intrinsic element of the more inclusive concept of 
cultural imperialism (Tomlinson, 1991: 21). Consequently, he has argued that the 
comparatively narrow focus of media imperialism represented a sub-category of a 
larger debate – ‘a particular way of discussing cultural imperialism’  – and that as 
such its merits depended on its ability to include ‘all the complex political issues – 
and indeed the political commitments – entailed in the notion of cultural domination’ 
(Tomlinson, 1991: 22, emphasis in original). Others, far from considering themselves 
as ‘anti-theoreticist’, argued for the necessity of empirical evidence and detail. In 
Boyd-Barrett’s words: ‘[…] only by taking into account the full complexity of this 
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economic sector, by getting inside the “black box” of meaningful production, could 
we generate theory that was adequate to the task and take us beyond the fairly crude 
political rhetoric that was part of the NWICO debate then at its height’ (Boyd-
Barret, 1998: 165, emphasis added).  
 
Chin-Chuan Lee makes the point that empirical enquiries into media imperialism 
allow to map ‘variations in the kind and degree of media dependency’ in ways that 
have tended to be ‘glossed over by radical writers’ (Lee, 1980: 44-45). For Lee, a 
closer look at the impact of internal forces such as national regulation of media 
markets on the kind and degree of dependency (dismissed by many political 
economists, not least because of its resonance with a focus on national development 
within modernisation theory) allowed change and variation to be accounted for in 
ways that more determinist versions of cultural imperialism did not (Lee, 1980: 45).  
 
Research by those identifying themselves as at the more empirical end of the 
spectrum was designed to validate and corroborate claims of media imperialism, but 
also to show varying degrees of media imperialism in different geo-political settings. 
At the time, television technology and content were of particular interest, since the 
medium’s introduction in developing countries had been fairly recent, bestowing on 
the question of television flows the urgency of an issue where ‘so much remains to 
be decided, for good or ill’ (Katz & Wedell, 1977: v). For example, in an effort to 
test theoretical assumptions concerning media imperialism and television flows, 
Chin-Chuan Lee compares three very different national contexts, Canada, Taiwan 
and China (Lee, 1980). These examples were specifically chosen because they defied 
straightforward dependency models. His findings included the observation that, 
despite being a major industrialised country, the ‘threat of foreign media (television 
at least) in Canada is real and severe’ (Lee, 1980: 144). In contrast, Taiwan’s 
national context meant that ‘this seems to be less the case for Taiwan’ (Lee, 1980: 
144), while China ‘has been hailed as one of the few countries that has managed to 
be media-independent’ (Lee, 1980: 225-226).5  This plurality of effects in turn 
allowed him to highlight the conceptual risks of glossing over national difference for 
                                                
5 Crucially, he also warns against seeing China as a model for other developing 
countries, cautioning against the tendencies of neo-Marxist scholars to ‘romanticize’ 
China’s media self-sufficiency (Lee, 1980: 232).  
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the benefit of harnessing the critical capacity of overarching theoretical models (Lee, 
1980). 
 
In a similar vein, Katz and Wedell also underline the potential for variation in 
broadcasting industries in different national contexts. They point out that several of 
the homogenising effects of the medium came about as a result of the fact that 
television was being transferred from the West to developing countries as a package, 
not as distinctive technological, professional and organisational components, which 
had rendered the medium more rigid and less suitable for local adaptation (Katz & 
Wedell, 1977: 227-229). In other words, in their analysis, television as a medium is 
invested both with a liability to cultural homogenisation and with the power of 
cultural emancipation. This aspect is particularly relevant to AJE, which, as an 
organisation based in the Middle East, straightforwardly adopted some traits of 
Western-originated TV news journalism (such as a specific kind of professionalism, 
technological standards and tried and tested news and current affairs formats, see 
also Chapter 7), while eschewing others (for example rejecting so-called ‘soft news’ 
and a Western-oriented outlook on international news, see Chapter 6). As David 
Morley and Kevin Robins put it, ‘even if media technologies have, historically, been 
developed and controlled by the powerful countries of the West, they are, none the 
less, always capable of being appropriated and used in other ways than those for 
which they were intended’ (Morley & Robins, 1995: 127). 
 
In contrast, analyses with greater intellectual proximity to the theoretical models of 
cultural imperialism mostly do not focus in the same way on the potential role of 
(national) adaptation and regulation, but rather on the (international) inequalities at 
the root of asymmetric media flows. In this vein, one central element of the cultural 
imperialism approach is the critique of global capitalism. This critique has been 
rigorously promoted by a range of authors, who have in common their declared 
opposition to the concept of a ‘free flow of information’. They point towards global 
structural inequalities in order to stress that a ‘free flow’ could not possibly be ‘free’ 
under market conditions heavily skewed in favour of the developed countries of the 
global North (Nordenstreng, 2011: 79; Mattelart, 1980: xviii; Schiller 1998: 18). 
Consequently, it was argued, the concept of ‘free flow’ hindered rather than helped 
developing countries in establishing self-sufficient indigenous media initiatives. 
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More poignantly, it was seen as an ideological tool employed by the powers that be 
(in particular the US) to ‘naturalise’ the advancement of their economic interests at 
the expense of developing countries. 
 
In addition, this ideology was seen to be mutually constitutive of a system that was 
self-perpetuating in its very nature. For Herbert Schiller, the prevalence of the 
capitalist system in itself sufficed to guarantee the continued cultural hegemony of 
the United States, since it created an environment for individual actors and 
companies which made certain decisions and types of media content viable (those 
which lead to economic success) and precluded others. As Schiller puts it, ‘You 
don’t need a cultural police in a market system. The cultural system is the ‘KGB’ and 
it works very effectively’ (Schiller, 1998: 25, emphasis in original). Accordingly, 
critiques of his writings have tended to focus on the deterministic way in which ‘the 
notion of “the system” becomes reified and operates in a rather crude and rigid 
“functionalist” manner’ (Tomlinson, 1991: 38).6  
 
Another critique of research associated with cultural imperialism has been that its 
proponents did not do enough to avoid providing ‘pretexts used respectively by 
conservative, communist and theocratic regimes to justify repressive media 
censorship’ to curb the threat of Western influence through cultural imperialism 
(Curran, 2002: 169). In the words of Sparks (2009), by turning a blind eye to the 
repressive nature of some of the state actors opposing US cultural hegemony as part 
of the NWICO efforts at UNESCO, the cultural imperialism concept was ‘discredited 
by its own compromises with the indefensible.’ Furthermore, by not taking into 
                                                
6 As Sayer points out, to claim that social objects, for example markets, ‘have 
particular ways of acting as a consequence of their structure or intrinsic nature’ is 
compatible with critical realism, as long as the epistemological essentialist or 
foundationalist fallacy of equating the identification of essential attributes of an 
object with having ‘found the ultimate truth about it’ is avoided (Sayer, 1995: 21). In 
so far as Schiller stresses predictable outcomes of (individuals’ or institutions’) 
actions within the realm of (capitalist) social structures, his work differs from a 
critical realist perspective in that the latter differentiates between powers and 
liabilities as properties of social structures, on the one hand, and potential effects 
which are contingent on (the interaction of) a range of internal and external factors, 
on the other hand. In the words of Andrew Sayer: ‘in claiming that phenomena such 
as markets have certain essential features, we do not have to suppose that they 
always produce the same effects, whatever the circumstances’ (Sayer, 1995: 21).  
 
  41 
account media reception as part of the process by which power relations are exerted 
through media expansion, the political economy approach implies a straightforward 
‘hypodermic-needle’ model of audience effects. In the words of David Morley and 
Kevin Robins: ‘If we are concerned to understand the powers of cultural imperialism, 
our conceptual models of the absorption and indigenisation of “foreign” influences 
will need to be more subtle than those of traditional models of media effects’ 
(Morley & Robins, 1995: 7). Accordingly, an increasing interest in audiences and 
their abilities to resist hegemonic media messages played a significant role in the 
passing of cultural imperialism theory as a central theme in media studies. In short, if 
the keys to ‘decoding’ media content were culturally specific (Hall, 1999), then 
disproportionate quantities of imported content did not by default have a 
homogenising effect. 
 
Notwithstanding very relevant criticism of the determinist elements of cultural 
imperialism, Schiller’s basic arguments were supported by studies that provided 
examples of the specific ways in which inequalities in relations between 
industrialised and newly independent economies rendered the concept of ‘free flow’ 
a counter-productive mechanism if the aim was to achieve a more balanced flow of 
global media. For example, in one particular case study Samarajiwa focuses on 
business models in international news in order to unpick the structural obstacles in 
the way of market entry for financially viable alternatives to major Western-centred 
news organisations (Samarajiwa, 1984). Despite being raised more than two decades 
prior to the creation of AJE and in relation to international news agencies rather than 
international news channels, two points made by Samarajiwa resonate particularly 
with the project and mission of Al Jazeera.  
 
Firstly, he anticipates the argument (even if he thinks of the scenario as not very 
likely and potentially politically difficult) that ‘economic viability is not essential if 
the petroleum-exporting Third World countries can be persuaded to finance, on a 
continuing basis, the new news exchange mechanism or mechanisms’ (Samarajiwa, 
1984: 130) – an exemption from the pressures of the market without which AJE 
would not have been able to impact on the international news ecology in the way it 
did, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 8. And secondly, he maintains that access to 
stories in the developing world could play a vital role in establishing alternatives to 
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the Western-based international news organisations. His suggestion is for developing 
countries to collaborate and ‘sell’ access to entire regions by demanding, whenever 
Western news organisations set up offices in their part of the world, comparable 
access for their own news organisations in the home country or region of the Western 
organisation (Samarajiwa, 1984: 132). Even if this kind of reciprocity has never 
come about, superior access to stories in the global South has certainly been one of 
the main mechanisms by which Al Jazeera earned its recognition and carved out its 
space within the field as the first English-language 24/7 international news channel 
not based in a Western country.  
 
As the examples cited above demonstrate, both micro and macro approaches to 
analysing the international media ecology continue to resonate with the current 
make-up of international English-language news and current affairs broadcasting. As 
Sreberny and Khiabany pointed out in the context of the Iranian blogosphere, neither 
‘universalist approaches’ nor ‘theories of exceptionalism’ are entirely adequate to 
grasp the simultaneous distinctiveness and transnational resemblance of situated 
media practices. They appeal that ‘serious analytic work on the development of the 
media and communications environments of the global south have to work in 
between these two radical theoretical poles (Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010: 181).’  
 
In this spirit, I shall argue that elements of both approaches – modified to address 
practical and theoretical weaknesses and to accommodate cotemporary contexts – are 
compatible on the basis of a critical realist ontology. Instead of either solely 
presuming effects to be the results of social structures and systems (for example 
cultural imperialism as an effect of global capitalism) or limiting analysis to 
empirically observable patterns (for example the proportion of imported Western TV 
programmes in a given non-Western national context), a critical realist perspective of 
causation allows to take into account wider structural mechanisms independently of 
their effects in the realm of the empirical, while also conceptualising empirical cases 
as being linked to wider structural mechanisms, if not in simple and predictable 
ways.  
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2.3.3 Contra-flows of Media and Aspects of ‘Counter-hegemony’   
 
Since the debates on unequal media flows began, accounts of Western media 
hegemony have been challenged in several ways. In addition to an increased interest 
in ‘active’ audiences (see 2.3.2), a different perspective emerged through the 
acknowledgment of increasingly complex and multidirectional flows of media as 
regional media hubs such as India, Hong Kong, Brazil or Egypt gained in influence 
internationally. In ‘The Local and the Global in International Communication’ 
(2000), Sreberny maps reverse flows of non-Western media expanding to reach 
European and North American audiences. The expansion of non-Western media 
industries beyond the global South, such as India’s Bollywood boom (Govil, 2007; 
Kavoori & Punathambekar, 2008) or the export successes of Brazilian telenovelas 
(Rogers & Antola, 1985; Rego & La Pastina, 2007) have brought home the fact that 
the entertainment sector, comprising by far the largest portion of global media flows, 
can no longer be described as a one-way flow.  
 
Others have commented on the spread of television, a medium originally very 
national in its outlook and purpose, across borders (Chalaby, 2005; Thussu, 1998, 
2005, 2007). Online and satellite technology has transformed the reach and potential 
applications of the media and created an environment where national regulation can 
be circumvented in ways that were previously impossible. In particular, the highly 
regulated and censored environment of state broadcasting in the Middle East was 
suddenly faced with uncensored competition from broadcasters based outside their 
realms of influence, causing Nasser Judeh, then Jordan’s information minister, to 
coin the phrase ‘offshore democracy’ (Sakr, 2001: 4). As an aspiring journalist at the 
American University in Cairo explained: ‘“I can’t criticize from within my country,” 
but Arab satellite channels made it possible for her ‘to criticize from outside and 
make things different” (Pintak, 2006: 140).’  
 
Amidst an increasingly internationalised media environment, media flows defying 
dependency models and a more or less mono-directional flow from the global North 
to the global South came to be loosely subsumed under the label of ‘contra-flow’. Al 
Jazeera in particular became wedded to the concept as journalists and academics 
pinned their hopes (and their scepticism) on the broadcaster’s ability (or inability) to 
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break the mould and challenge the Western-dominated field of global TV news.7 
However, there are a couple of central issues that require further clarification if 
‘contra-flow’ is to be used as more than a buzzword signifying an increase in 
alternatives to historically dominant media. Firstly, definitions of different types of 
contra-flow need to be narrowed down in order to arrive at a working concept against 
which Al Jazeera’s ambitions can be measured in a meaningful way. In ‘Media on 
the Move’ Thussu does just that when he divides contra-flows into transnational and 
geo-cultural contra-flows (Thussu, 2007). According to this categorisation, 
transnational contra-flows are described as having a strong regional presence 
expanding beyond their core region and aiming at broad international audiences, 
while geo-cultural media caters to specific cultural-linguistic audiences across the 
globe.  
 
With regard to Al Jazeera it could be argued, as Thussu (2007: 13) does, that it falls 
into the category of transnational media, since its international significance has 
grown out of a strong regional presence. It is also legitimate to ask, however, 
whether AJA and AJE qualify as the same category of contra-flow, given their 
different target audiences and remits. As I will explain in more detail in Chapter 5, 
having its headquarters in the Middle East is a crucial element not only of AJE’s 
heritage, but also of its ongoing development. At the same time, other than its parent 
channel (which originally focussed on bringing a confrontational Western-style of 
news reporting to the Middle East, when its unique access began to also impact on 
audiences based in Western countries), AJE started out on a global basis with its 
main hubs spread across four continents and its language and recruitment practices 
placing it in direct competition with dominant global, rather than transnational or 
geo-culturally specific, media.  
 
                                                
7 It is important to note here that AJE is not the only channel to declare as its 
trademark opposition to and competition with the dominant international news 
channels. Channels explicitly challenging the dominance of CNNI and BBC World 
in the realm of international news include the French channel France24, Iranian Press 
TV, China’s CCTV-9, Russia Today and the Venezuelan-based pan-South American 
channel La Nueva Televisora del Sur (Telesur). All of these channels differ 
substantially from AJE and from one another (see also Painter, 2008), yet share with 
AJE their declared aim of ‘rebalancing’ a field dominated by Anglo-American news 
media. 
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In the basic sense that AJE’s headquarters is physically based in a country of the 
global South, while its content is received across the world including in countries of 
the global North, AJE qualifies as contra-flow. However, its global ambitions, 
international staff and financial backing render it a type of contra-flow that is closely 
connected with the dominant traditions of Western media organisations – a point that 
has already been argued with regard to its parent channel, AJA (Iskandar, 2005). In 
essence, AJE walks a fine line between conventional media traditions and contra-
flow, and is indeed perceived by different people variously to belong to one or the 
other of these categories. The issue becomes less ambiguous once the distinction is 
made between media contra-flow and ‘counter-hegemonic’ media.  
 
The notion of contra-flow, in particular in literature on AJE, is often coupled with the 
terminology of ‘counter-hegemony’. AJE’s remit of reporting ‘from the South’ as 
well as challenging the dominant news channels within the field of international 
broadcasting, means that elements both of contra-flow and of counter-hegemonic 
ambitions play a role. The presence of these two interrelated ambitions does not, 
however, mean that they can be viewed as synonymous. As Thussu (2007: 28) points 
out, one should resist the temptation of blurring the boundaries between contra-flows 
and counter-hegemonic media, since, for example, the hegemony of a ‘commodified 
media system’ can be reinforced by commercially-oriented contra-flows.  
 
In order to understand how hegemony and counter-hegemony relate to the media, it 
is useful to refer briefly to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony ‘as a means to 
understand the processes through which certain conceptions of reality come to hold 
sway over competing worldviews’ (Mumby, 1997: 343). To explore the social 
dimension of (capitalist) power, Gramsci develops the concept of hegemony to 
denote ‘soft’ instruments of domination that engender consent between those 
dominating and those dominated by existing relations of power. In Gramsci’s own 
words (Forgacs, 2000: 194), the assertion of a ‘moment of hegemony’ is essential ‘to 
the “accrediting” of the cultural fact, of cultural activity, of a cultural front […] 
alongside the merely economic and political ones’ (emphasis added). Moreover, and 
with particular relevance to research on AJE, Gramsci also comments in his Prison 
Notebooks on what he perceives to be the hegemony of ‘Western culture’ over the 
rest of the world (Hoare & Smith, 1971: 416).  
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As a source of ‘soft’ power that is part of the realm of culture (in the broadest sense), 
the media are potentially both affected by hegemonic forces and complicit in their 
continued dominance. Inversely, ‘counter-hegemonic’ media potentially serve to 
corrode and deconstruct hegemonic interpretations of world events by unmasking 
taken-for-granted views serving economically, politically and culturally dominant 
elites and the ideologies that underpin their position. Asking whether AJE qualifies 
as counter-hegemonic, therefore, goes beyond the notion of directionality embedded 
in the concept of contra-flow, because it means asking how far AJE has managed to 
unsettle taken-for-granted global hierarchies of place, class, gender and geo-political 
alignment.8 As such, the notion of counter-hegemonic media is conceptually much 
closer to notions of a ‘bottoms-up’ approach advocated by Sparks (2009) as a way of 
tackling cultural consequences of imperialism (see also 2.3.1) – an approach that 
serves to ‘articulates the views and values of the poor and oppressed’ by cutting 
across notions of ‘foreign’ and ‘native’ media. 
 
Crucially, ‘hegemony is not an either/or condition’ (Mumby, 1997: 364-365). 
Consequently, ideological struggles over hegemony ‘work not only when people try 
to contest or rupture an established ideological field in favour of an entirely new one 
(in the case of revolutionary struggles), but also when they disrupt the existing 
ideologies by transforming their meanings’ (Bailey, Cammaerts & Carpentier, 2008: 
16-17, emphasis added). The fact that hegemony is a matter of degree opens up a 
range of positions. One suitable approach, I will argue, is to analytically separate 
different areas of investigation. This will allow a more ‘complex interplay of power 
and resistance’ (Mumby, 1997: 344) to be accounted for than could be accomplished 
by situating AJE either as purely ‘counter-hegemonic’ or as purely ‘mainstream’.   
 
To this end, the next section of this chapter (2.4) will be dedicated to questions of 
news content – a theme regarding (im)balances in international news that will be 
contextualised empirically in Chapter 6. Following on from there, the final part of 
this chapter (2.5) will deal with the implications of the global news ecology for 
                                                
8 For an analysis of ‘hegemony as a process’ in the context of the media, see also 
Gitlin (1999). 
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questions of professionalism and journalistic practices – a theme that will find its 
empirical equivalent in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8, meanwhile, I shall turn to the issue 
of potential difference as a result of market pressures, which, as shown earlier in this 
chapter, has been an overarching theme of political economy approaches to 
asymmetric media flows.9  
 
 
2.4 News Content: Historical and Present Patterns of Inequality 
 
Crucially, questions concerning unequal news flows are about more than a 
geographically uneven distribution of news. They are about representation. As Sakr 
points out (2007: 118)10 ‘for […] assertions of a challenge to be justified, it needs to 
be demonstrated that Al-Jazeera consciously pursued a distinctive news agenda […]’ 
(emphasis added). This immediately opens up the question: distinctive from what? 
Or, more precisely: what does ‘distinctive’ potentially entail in the realm of foreign 
news and, in the case of AJE, in particular in the context of news from and/or about 
the global South? In order to answer that question, it is necessary first to look at how 
the developing world is portrayed in various Western news media.11 This necessity 
                                                
9 Throughout the empirical chapters mentioned above, I shall relate the theoretical 
implications of unequal news flows as outlined in this present chapter to the level of 
AJE as an organisation (and the journalistic practices it can sustain). This 
organisational dimension of news flows will be outlined in the following chapter 
(Chapter 3) by expressing the issues at stake in terms of Bourdieu’s field theory and 
complementing this focus on structure with an appraisal of the causal powers of 
journalistic autonomy. 
 
10 Here Sakr refers to AJA, writing as she was at a time when AJE was in the works, 
but still barely researched. However, given the central role AJA’s emergent remit as 
a challenge to Western networks had for the way AJE’s editorial remit has been 
conceived (see also Chapter 5), her observation carries weight for the analysis of 
AJN as a whole.  
  
11 I am referring to ‘Western news’ as a means of gaining an understanding of who 
and what AJE set out to challenge, acutely aware that this distinction entails a 
generalisation that is predominantly analytical and not intended to presume 
homogeneity across Western news (for differences between and within Western 
media systems see also Hallin & Mancini, 2004 and Cottle & Rai, 2008). At the 
same time it is worth noting that just as national television ‘construes the nation as 
an “imagined community” by homogenising differences internal to the nation state 
[…] transnational news flows construe a “beyond the nation” community by 
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again throws into sharp relief the inherently relational aspect of questions of news 
flows (which I will address in more detail in the next chapter in the context of 
Bourdieu’s field theory).  
 
 
2.4.1 Bad News from Far-away Places: The Global South and Selection 
Criteria in Foreign News 
 
One of AJE’s core aims is to represent the global South more adequately than its 
Western-based competition by ‘reporting from the developing world back to the 
West and from the southern to the northern hemisphere’ (AJE Website, Corporate 
Profile, 04/09/2008). As mentioned above, this aim presumes an existing imbalance 
in the way the southern hemisphere has been covered by Western media – an 
imbalance that has been the subject of academic attention for many decades. One of 
the first studies to systematically examine factors of newsworthiness in foreign news 
coverage was Galtung and Ruge’s study of ‘the structure of foreign news’ (Galtung 
& Ruge, 1965). Despite critique regarding the generalisability of empirical data from 
one particular news sector (print) of one particular country (Norway), their study still 
bears some relevance in current contexts, because many of the factors identified 
remain prevalent throughout the journalistic field. Selection is an inevitable, 
recurring and formative part of news production. The simple fact that ‘we cannot 
register everything’ (1965: 65) has much less simplistic consequences for news 
production, since the rules governing selection processes influence the degree of 
resemblance between events and their depiction as a news product.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
establishing a sense of a broader “we”. This “we” […] is the “imagined” community 
of the West, which inhabits the transnational zone of safety and construes human life 
in the zone of suffering as the West’s “other”’ (Chouliaraki, 2006: 10, emphasis 
added). In other words, notwithstanding notable exceptions and substantial 
differences within and between various Western news platforms, there is a sense that 
what national and transnational Western news networks tend to have in common is 
that neither have entirely succeeded in superseding a dependence on interpretative 
frameworks that are informed by geo-political hierarchies in order to turn complex 
aspects of reality into news.  
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Many of the news factors that Galtung and Ruge identify are not specific to foreign 
news, but, as I will explain below, nonetheless carry weight for the selection of 
foreign news (in many instances a disproportionately weight). For example, factors 
such as ‘negativity’, a tendency to personalise stories and to focus on elite 
protagonists are present in domestic and foreign news alike (1965: 68).12 Other 
factors go a long way towards explaining geo-political asymmetries in traditional 
news production. Perhaps most evidently, a focus not only on elite persons, but also 
on ‘elite nations’ as protagonists whose ‘actions […] are, at least usually and in 
short-term perspective, more consequential than the activities of others’ has the 
potential to significantly distort the proportionality of coverage from or of different 
world regions (1965: 68). Reinforcing this tendency is the factor of ‘cultural 
proximity’ (1965: 67). Tendencies of ‘countries with similar cultures [to] report each 
other more frequently or more in-depth’ (Hanusch & Obijiofor, 2008: 15) mean that 
Western dominance in the field in terms of volume and directionality of news flows 
inevitably also carries subjectively predisposed perspectives of the world.  
 
Some of these perspectives are expressed in misrepresentations, but often they take 
the much less obvious form of silences and absences. The latter in particular will be 
tested in the comparative content analysis in Chapter 6 with regard to the relative 
emphasis on stories from and/or about the global South on AJE and BBCW News 
respectively. Importantly, preferential selection of culturally proximate events does 
not by implication mean that journalists consciously favour culturally more familiar 
aspects of reality over culturally less familiar aspects. Rather it is a question of what 
comes across journalists’ radar, what they notice and, importantly, what they notice 
instantly enough to integrate it into fast-paced news production processes.  
 
Critically, all factors potentially correlate and have cumulative effects, arguably 
causing those factors not specific to foreign news (such as frequency, amplitude, 
clarity or negativity) to be of greater relative importance to the selection process for 
culturally distant events than for culturally familiar events. For example, the more 
distant a nation is, the less ambiguous, more consonant, negative and/or personalised 
the event will have to be in order to be selected (1965: 81-83) – a process endowed 
                                                
12 For a detailed delineation of further news factors, see Galtung and Ruge (1965).  
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with the causal liability of producing systematically skewed accounts of countries 
considered culturally distant. The result is that news from or about 
 
nations that are culturally distant and nations that are low in international 
rank […] will have to refer to people, preferably top elite, and be preferably 
negative and unexpected but nevertheless according to a pattern that is 
consonant with the “mental pre-image”. […] This will, in turn, facilitate an 
image of these countries as dangerous, ruled by capricious elites, as 
unchanging in their basic characteristics, as existing for the benefit of the 
topdog nations, and in terms of their links to those nations (Galtung & Ruge, 
1965: 83-84). 
 
Since the mid-1960s numerous studies have confirmed predispositions in Western 
news - national and international - to neglect (or depict distorted representations of) 
developing countries, which are triggered by the news values expressed through 
these factors. Many authors have found that, instead of gaining in volume in times of 
increasing global interrelatedness, ‘the perspectives of the great mass of the world 
population are under-represented in global news’ (van Ginneken, 1998: 143). In a 
study of Reuters’ coverage of a WTO conference where ‘nearly all the world’s 
countries were represented’ and ‘treated equally’ as part of the proceedings, Chang 
(1998: 537-538) found that, amongst the nations that were being mentioned in the 
dispatches, the agency ‘underscored the activities of core countries [of the West] at 
the expense of other nations’, with the latter mainly featuring ‘through their 
interactions with the core nations’ (Chang, 1998: 552). With reference to Anglo-
American broadcast media, researchers found that ‘there is a distinct shift away from 
programmes featuring developing countries’ (Franks, 2004: 425) in the case of the 
UK, while with regard to US media ‘a revival of foreign news’ was considered ‘more 
necessary than ever’ (Gans, 2011: 4). In short, news media in general and television 
in particular have been found to provide ‘less and less world coverage’ (Miller, 2007: 
1). 
 
Moreover, where coverage of developing countries does take place, there has been 
criticism that ‘news from poor countries is nearly always bad news’ (Franks, 2004: 
426-427), with an ‘almost total neglect of positive news’ (Hafez, 1999: 50, emphasis 
in original) and that coverage ‘tends to focus on crises, with repetitive imagery of 
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famine, war and disease and death’ (Miller, 2007: 64).13 In addition, news coverage 
of disasters has been criticised by scholars for rarely addressing complex structural 
deficiencies and causes. In other words, there is a risk inherent in the synchronic 
nature of news of depicting suffering without providing the context that would allow 
and encourage audience members to understand how disasters, natural or otherwise, 
relate to human action. Again these factors are not specific to foreign news, but 
arguably particularly relevant in circumstances where – other than in domestic news 
– the protagonists of news reports and potential audience members do not necessarily 
share similar interpretative frameworks and knowledge about events. As a 
consequence of this focus on decontextualised disasters, criticism has been voiced 
aobut the largely passive roles in which those affected by the events covered are 
often depicted (Miller, 2007: 64). In the words of Seaton, ‘representing suffering 
more adequately hardly seems the real problem at all. We have far too many victims 
and not enough agents on TV […] as it is. The urgent challenge is to find ways of 
showing the political processes that cause terrible humanitarian catastrophes (as well 
as those that may ameliorate them)’ (Seaton, 2001: 502, emphasis added).14 
 
Of course, several studies cited above draw on news in particular national contexts, 
such as Norway (Galtung & Ruge, 1965), the UK (Miller, 2007; Franks, 2004) or the 
US (Golan & Wanta, 2003).15 The question arising then is whether transnational 
Western networks have outgrown geo-politically specific, nation-based perspectives. 
On the one hand, transnational channels differ in crucial ways from national 
                                                
13 For empirical case studies, see for example Kalyango’s analysis of CNNI’s 
coverage of Uganda (2011) or Golan and Wanta’s study analysing selection criteria 
for US-based coverage of elections across the world (2003). 
 
14 Again, this particularly refers to news and arguably applies less to current affairs 
programming, which provides greater scope for explaining and unraveling potential 
causes of conflict and disasters. At the time of writing, however, programming 
remains under-researched with respect to AJE, in part because such research is 
methodologically less straightforward than news, complicating any direct 
comparisons with Western-based broadcasters (see also suggestions for further 
research in Chapter 9.4.1). 
 
15 Arguably this is in partly symptomatic of the fact that news follows patterns of 
globalisation to a significantly lesser extent than other media. As a result, ‘the 
overwhelming majority of news outlets – whether they be television, radio or the 
press – are still national or local’ (Curran, 2002: 179).  
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channels. As Thussu notes, ‘nationality scarcely matters in this market-oriented 
media ecology, as producers view the audience principally as consumers and not as 
citizens’ (Thussu, 2007: 12). Consequently, the geographical range and scheduling of 
transnational channels is adapted to the (perceived) requirements of international 
audiences, ‘[…] tearing apart the old relationship between place and television that 
has traditionally prevailed in broadcasting history’ (Chalaby, 2003: 464). On the 
other hand, transnational television, rather than opening up the market for new 
competitors, largely benefits existing media groups with business models well 
positioned to compensate high entry costs through vertical and horizontal integration 
(2003: 464). As Hafez argues, these kinds of technological and organisational 
expansions beyond national media systems have emerged at a different pace than 
content development in news (Hafez, 1999). He maintains that geo-politically 
specific characteristics of news are present in national as well as transnational news 
organisations, as many ‘transnational programmes are really made by multinational 
institutions with a clearly defined Western home base’ (1999: 50, emphasis in 
original).16  
 
Essentially, ‘foreign news’ as a term in itself denotes a separation between domestic 
and foreign issues that can only be meaningful in the context of a defined domestic 
base. With this distinction in mind, Berglez suggests defining global journalism – 
‘supposedly foreign journalism’s younger cousin’ (Berglez, 2008: 845) – as a distinct 
news style that differentiates itself from foreign news by virtue of a ‘global outlook’ 
that emphasises ‘how economic, political, social and ecological practices, processes 
and problems in different parts of the world affect each other, are interlocked, or 
share commonalities’ (2008: 847). In the context of AJE this is not least significant 
because, as Williams, Meth and Willis (2009: 10) note, ‘the South is a vital and 
active part of processes of globalisation’. This significance of global 
interconnectedness, and the mutual effects it creates between and across countries of 
the global South and North, has not, however, been reflected in editorial structures in 
international media. Just as for Hafez, for Berglez, geographical expansion in news 
                                                
16 Morley and Robins (1995: 126) likewise argue that media globalisation ‘is no mere 
technological phenomenon, not least in so far as the media technologies in question 
have a very particular (Western or Euro-American) point of origin and are controlled 
by identifiable interests.’ 
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coverage on the one hand and a genuinely global orientation in content on the other 
hand are two separate matters that evolve at different speeds. In the words of 
Berglez, ‘it is one thing to rapidly report news from all parts of the world (the CNN 
approach), but something else entirely to journalistically explain and understand the 
world as a single place (the global outlook), and it is therefore not possible to say that 
CNN International is, in all cases, more global in its outlook than a national 
newspaper’ (Berglez, 2008: 848, emphasis added). 
 
 
2.4.2 Who Gets a ‘Voice’ on TV News?: Mechanisms of Source Selection 
 
AJE’s aim of challenging hierarchies in global news has implications beyond 
geographical connotations of the global South, in particular since the channel also 
claims and aims to be the ‘voice of the voiceless’. There is, of course, an overlap 
between ambitions to represent ‘the voiceless’ and aiming to be the ‘voice of the 
South’ – precisely where the underrepresentation of countries from the global South 
described above renders their potential representatives comparatively ‘voiceless’.17 
However, aiming to offer a platform for ‘the voiceless’ differs in several important 
ways from aiming to represent the South more proportionally. Firstly, in the global 
North there are likewise groups of people systematically underrepresented in the 
media – including mainstream parts of societies such as women, ‘ordinary’ citizens 
or ‘illegal’ immigrants. And secondly, there are elite voices from the South that are – 
far from being considered ‘voiceless’ – comparatively well positioned to make 
themselves heard internationally. In short, power imbalances and the way these are 
being reflected in terms of who gets to speak in international news (arguably always 
have and increasingly will) cut across North/South categorisations.  
 
In the context of AJE, the ambition to give a ‘voice to the voiceless’, again, fell on 
fertile ground with academics and journalists alike, since questions of who gets to 
                                                
17 Following Gans (2011: 5-6), I use the term ‘representative’ in a symbolic way 
rather than to indicate any formal form of representation. In this sense, 
representatives include anyone, including journalists and news sources, whose on-
screen presence is symbolically linked to the characteristic or variable she or he can 
validly be said to stand for in the context of a particular broadcast.  
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speak on TV – quite literally whose voice has an on-air presence – have time and 
again exposed inequalities that were out of step with ambitions to fairly represent 
traditionally underrepresented sectors of the world population. More specifically, 
literature on news sources in particular has elaborated on how questions of power 
imbalances are being expressed through choices of who gets to speak in the news 
(Gans, 1980, 2011; Tumber, 1999; Hall et al., 1999; Gitlin, 1999; Manning, 2001, 
2013). Just as with geographic imbalances more generally, this link between power 
imbalances and news sources is as much about who does not get to speak as it is 
about who does, because inequalities in representation find their expression in 
silences and absences. As Gans (1980: 116) puts it in his early work on news 
sources, ‘a complete study of the news should therefore include an investigation of 
both the individuals who become sources and the 99 per cent of the population that 
does not’.  
 
This often becomes particularly evident when in the lead-up to a conflict or crisis 
independent and alternative sources – which do not benefit from the status quo and 
might be comparatively well positioned to point out early signs of a looming crisis – 
turn out to have been largely ignored by the very media that prides itself on 
providing ‘checks’ on the powerful on behalf of ‘ordinary’ people. Two prominent 
examples include the overall reluctance of US media ahead of the US invasion of 
Iraq to report ‘a wide-ranging debate that offered analysis and commentary from 
different perspectives’ (Hayes & Guardino, 2010: 59, emphasis added) and the global 
media’s ineffectiveness in warning of signs of an impending international financial 
crisis in 2008 (Manning, 2013). As the authors of the case studies cited above 
emphasise, sources contradicting the conventional wisdom of the time and place in 
question would have been accessible to journalists, but failed to be adequately 
considered.  
 
As the difference in context of these two examples indicates, some of the 
mechanisms behind them appear to apply in general. One such mechanism 
emphasised in the literature is that journalists and their sources often appear to share 
‘a common set of assumptions’ (Manning, 2013: 186). In other words, there is 
inevitably a danger of a degree of ideological congruence between journalists and 
their sources, which causes journalists not to notice important factors that fall outside 
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assumptions that appear to be commonly accepted and that therefore become 
‘naturalised’. As Gitlin argues (1999: 272), it is not least the ensuing reciprocal 
relationship that means that even where journalists challenge and criticise 
authorities (as they routinely do as part of their job), there is a structural liability to 
remain within the dominant hegemonic framework in which the powers that be set 
‘unspoken outer limits’ for controversial debates. 18  In addition, the ideal of 
objectivity, ironically, sets the scene for partiality in source selection, since it 
increases journalists’ dependence on the verification of information by officials or 
other ‘insiders’ with special knowledge of political or economic processes that 
cannot (or cannot in the timeframe available) be independently verified.  
 
In this context it is also relevant to note that any imbalance in this regard is 
potentially exacerbated by the fact that journalists and their sources are engaged in a 
relationship that is itself not necessarily balanced. Sources seek positive coverage or 
avoidance of negative headlines and journalists need sources they can approach for 
confirmations and comments at short notice – but which way the power within such a 
relationship tips (and the likelihood of its continuation in a mutually helpful way) is 
contingent not least on the scarcity of the knowledge that the source can access.  
Thus, ordinary citizens are inherently disadvantaged compared with government 
officials or industry leaders, who can draw on internal information that is otherwise 
not readily available. One result of such power imbalances is that journalists need to 
put more effort into maintaining crucial relations with official sources than they 
would have to with many other types of source. This does not mean that they are not 
prepared to be critical of official sources – access does not equate in any simplistic 
way with positive coverage – but it does mean that it takes attention and time away 
from alternative approaches and sources in an already time-pressured environment. 
In the words of Hall (Hall et al., 1999: 254), ‘[…] the practical pressures of 
constantly working against the clock and the professional demands of impartiality 
and objectivity – combine to produce a systematically structured over-accessing to 
the media of those in powerful and privileged institutional positions’ (emphasis in 
original). 
 
                                                
18 There are of course laudable exceptions and at times even a shift in perception that 
causes a breakdown of previously shared sets of assumptions. 
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Absences can affect a range of groups, but there are three common cases that have 
been identified in the literature, which are of particular relevance in relation to AJE’s 
remit. Firstly, given the over-exposure in news – as described above – of official 
sources, being the ‘voice of the voiceless’ would require AJE to focus more on 
people speaking in their capacity as ‘ordinary’ citizens, those opposing the powers 
that be or simply those affected by the decisions of authorities. And secondly, the 
reduction in foreign bureaus as major Western networks are cutting back, combined 
with the tendencies of national and international Western media to view global news 
through nationally or geo-culturally specific prisms (which often means linking 
foreign stories with the implications ‘at home’, see also 3.2.1) means that sources 
from geographically and culturally proximate regions usually enjoy greater exposure 
than local, non-Western sources.  
 
As Cottle (2000: 20) puts it in the context of reporting on minority voices, ‘the 
bureaucratic nature of news production is geared to privilege the voices and 
viewpoints of (white) social power holders […]’. Here, in order to fulfil its ambitious 
remit, AJE would need to feature non-Western voices in a more proportional way 
than its competitors. And 3) AJE’s ambition to give a voice to people under-
represented in mainstream Western news would need to extend to a greater gender 
equality than is practiced by its competition. Over the years, news source literature 
has documented an unmistakeable gender inequality that, despite a massive influx of 
female graduates into the industry and despite the fact that news is no longer seen as 
a male domain, appears to this day to resist change to a significant degree (Cann & 
Mohr, 2001: 172).19 This apparent relative ‘voicelessness’ of women in international 
news (see also Franks, 2013) speaks directly to AJE’s ambition to cover ‘views and 
voices that are rarely invited onto mainstream news media programs’ (Figenschou, 
2010a: 86).20 
                                                
19 As recently as 2010, De Swert and Hooghe suggested that ‘usually women account 
for no more than 20-25 percent of total time devoted to people speaking in the news 
(2010: 69)’. Furthermore, the quality of this apparent underrepresentation displays all 
the signs of a culturally embedded stereotype, expressed both quantitatively and 
qualitatively from the on-air time allocated to women to statistically significant 
differences in the topics they get to speak about (De Swert & Hooghe, 2010: 70). 
 
20 In the context of this study, it is necessary to point out that AJE did not explicitly 
make it its mission to address this particular inequality in news. However, the 
  57 
 
As described above, imbalances in the selection of news sources are often not the 
product of deliberate partialities, but reflect wider power asymmetries (Manning, 
2013: 180) that play out on all levels, from local to global contexts. In the light of 
AJE’s wide-ranging aim of being a ‘voice of the voiceless’, in Chapter 6 I will look 
at patterned presences and absences of sources in AJE’s news compared with those 
appearing on BBCW News. In addition to analysing absences and presences of the 
above-mentioned categories of sources (those not endowed with socially sanctioned 
attributes of power, non-Western sources and female sources), another relevant 
question will be whether these three categories of traditionally underrepresented 
groups interact – meaning whether or not there are systematic patterns of correlation 
in source selection that further inform and intensify existing asymmetries in 
international news. Therefore, in the content analysis conducted for Chapter 6 (see 
also Chapter 4 for a methodological discussion), I will cross-reference results for all 
three categories of sources in order to understand better some of the dynamics of 
who gets to speak on international news and whether and how exactly AJE diverts 
from established inequalities. Furthermore, as will become apparent in Chapters 7 
and 8, new voices and old silences on screen are directly linked to the proactivity of 
AJE’s journalists with regard to some aspects of AJE’s remit (driven by journalistic 
agency), as well as inactivity or ‘blind spots’ with regard to other implications of 
AJE’s remit (reproduced through professional habitus). 
 
 
2.5 News Practices: Transfer of Specific Professional Ideals from North 
to South 
 
The problem of under- and mis-representations of the global South in Western news, 
as well as structural obstacles in the way of financial viability of news from the 
                                                                                                                                     
organisation’s official aim of giving a voice to those underrepresented in 
‘mainstream’ television news, underlined by the fact that AJE journalists I 
interviewed for this thesis spontaneously included gender in their interpretations of 
this very remit, as well as previous research highlighting the relevance of assessing 
the relative prevalence of female and male voices in AJE’s news content 
(Figenschou, 2010a: 101) make gender equality one of several relevant variables for 
assessing questions of diversity in the context of AJE. 
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South, has been at the heart of discussions about news flows. Featuring less 
prominently in the debate, but likewise of significant consequence, is the question of 
the transfer of professional practices21 from North to South. In the context of AJE – 
as an organisation consciously opting for a dominant form of professionalism while 
simultaneously aiming to fulfil a counter-hegemonic remit – it is important to point 
out that the dominant form of professionalism is not a ‘natural’ choice without 
alternatives (Carpentier, 2005) and, more importantly, that to follow this dominant 
form of professionalism carries a range of causal liabilities as well as powers. 
 
As with other factors impacting on the directionality of media flows, this transfer of 
practices has historically been linked to (and continues to be perpetuated by) larger 
geo-political inequalities. In the case of broadcasting, institutions and practices in 
developing countries originally ‘grew as extensions and imitations’ of pre-existing 
organisational and technological structures in Britain, France or North America 
respectively (Golding, 1977: 294). In the first half of the 20th century, broadcasting in 
the South evolved as a ‘service to [colonial] settler communities’ (Golding, 1977: 
294). This meant that early on, at a time when the specific use of broadcasting 
technology was being shaped in the developing world, professional ideals and 
conventions historically associated with the global North ‘came to displace 
discussion of possible preferences and alternatives’ (Golding, 1977: 295). Once the 
‘colonial experts’ left, newly independent countries were left with a skills gap and 
often relied heavily on training schemes, which – not least because of the speed with 
which broadcasting was developing – more often than not were again ‘dependent on 
the same expatriate experts whose presence the training was intended to render 
unnecessary’ (Golding, 1977: 195). For example, between 1950 and 1960 alone, the 
BBC sent nearly 60 broadcasting experts to the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation  
                                                
21 There has been considerable debate about whether journalism qualifies as a 
profession in the traditional sense of the term as associated with fields like law or 
medicine (Tumber & Prentoulis, 2005; Witschge & Nygren, 2009). Given the lack of 
standardised formal entry requirements, journalism has often been categorised as a 
craft or a ‘semi-profession’. In the following, and for the purpose of arguments about 
past and present transfers of journalistic practices from North to South, the terms 
‘profession’, ‘professional’ and ‘professionalism’ will be used to signify practices 
historically associated with Western-based media institutions, predominantly in the 
tradition of the Anglo-American or liberal model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), rather 
than referring to traditional interpretations of ‘profession’ as an entry-controlled 
occupational realm with a specific body of abstract theoretical knowledge. 
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in a training and advisory function. In addition, from the 1950s onwards hundreds of 
journalists from developing countries attended radio and TV courses at the BBC’s 
home base in the UK. Similar efforts were made by French institutions with regard to 
broadcasting development in their former colonies (Golding, 1977: 296-297). In 
short, broadcasting in the developing world started out with an ideal of 
professionalism that appeared to come with the territory, but was not of their own 
making and to a degree precluded alternatives. 
 
 
2.5.1 The Historical Baggage of Professionalism 
 
Crucially, professionalism in the case of journalism has implied ‘the acquisition not 
merely of competence, but also of values and attitudes thought appropriate to the 
implementation of media skills’ (Golding, 1977: 292-293, emphasis added). The fact 
that journalism, as a semi-profession, is not shielded from outside interference by 
virtue of exclusive access to theoretical ‘esoteric’ knowledge has arguably further 
reinforced its dependence on idealistic and ideological qualities for the delineation of 
journalistic professionalism. A central tenet of this professional ideology – arguably 
the ‘main ideological commitment of the profession’ (Tumber & Prentoulis, 2005: 
64, emphasis added) – is the notion of objectivity.22  
 
Historically, this particular brand of professionalism developed in the early 19th 
century with the abolition of restrictive publishing legislation in England and a 
growing independence of the media (and autonomy of journalists) vis-a-vis the state 
(Tumber & Prentoulis, 2005: 62). This development is routinely associated with the 
emergence of business models based on advertising (Aldridge & Evetts, 2003: 549; 
Hardy, 2008: 38). Providing a market-driven source of income rather than a 
politically supported model of financing, this new approach has been credited with 
making non-partisan coverage more profitable (since it appealed to a wider cross-
section of the public), stimulating a shift in newspaper editors’ perceptions of their 
readers from ‘voters’ to ‘consumers’ (Rantanen, 2009: 45) and allowing journalists 
                                                
22 For other elements of the ‘professional self-definition’ of journalists see also 
Deuze (2005: 446-447). 
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to distance themselves from party politics – although, as James Curran points out, 
newspaper ownership by Members of Parliament or party loyalists preserved strong 
links between the political and the media system ‘well into the twentieth century’ 
(Curran & Seaton, 2010: 6). From the 1920s onwards, notions of objectivity became 
gradually more and more institutionalised in the US and the UK and increasingly 
featured in journalists’ day-to-day work (Allan, 1999: 25).  
 
This has had direct implications for the transfer of practices and notions of 
professionalism from the global North to the global South. Given the different geo-
political and economic circumstances within which journalists have striven to 
implement practices that over time came to be regarded in the West as ‘professional’, 
some have argued that what was indeed being transferred were not first and foremost 
actual practices (many of which proved difficult or even impossible to follow 
through financially and/or politically in often radically different circumstances), but 
primarily the ideology that came with this particular understanding of 
professionalism (Golding, 1977: 293). Essentially, while the free flow of information 
doctrine was seen by many as an ideological means to an (economic) end, the 
transfer of professionalism represented the transfer of a particular ideology in itself.  
 
 
2.5.2 Objectivity and Implications of Historically Western Concepts of 
Professionalism 
 
As Deuze maintains (2005: 444), ‘conceptualizing journalism as an ideology […] 
primarily means understanding journalism in terms of how journalists give meaning 
to their newswork’ (emphasis added). It is largely undisputed that, in the context of 
newswork, the concept of objectivity allows journalists to attribute to their work a 
relative importance and meaning that would otherwise be difficult to justify (see also 
Carpentier, 2005: 205). However, in journalism and academia alike, ‘the problems of 
basing professional practice on such an illusive concept have never ceased to 
challenge’ (Tumber & Prentoulis, 2005: 65). In-depth analysis of the subject would 
exceed the scope of this study. In the following, I will therefore largely limit the 
discussion to matters directly related to questions of news flows. In this particular 
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context, notions of objectivity in journalism matter mainly in two specific ways: 1) 
with regard to the perceived lack of objectivity in the representation of the global 
South in international news (and the implied ontological questions about the 
possibility of objectivity) and 2) with regard to the implications of objectivity as a 
professional ideal for degrees of homogeneity and heterogeneity of journalism(s) in 
different parts of the world. 
 
Firstly, debates about objectivity in news inescapably also are debates about bias. For 
decades, news sociologists in particular have cautioned against taking the concept of 
objectivity at face value at the expense of masking ideologically informed bias 
(Gieber, 1964; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Tuchman, 1972; Schlesinger, 1978; Golding 
& Elliot, 1979; Schudson, 1989).23 In the 1970s and 1980s, the statement of a 
reporter that ‘news and news programmes could almost be called random reactions to 
random events’ (Schudson, 1989: 264) owed much of the criticism it attracted to the 
fact that media scholars had started to focus on the structural constraints of news 
production in order to explain what they found to be news accounts often prone to 
explicitly or implicitly reflecting the interests of the respective political-economic 
elite. While news sociologists have frequently focussed on bias against (or in favour 
of) different social strata within a given national or regional context, the implications 
of bias in news are equally applicable to international contexts. Just as news 
sociologists have established that there is a risk inherent in the nature of the routines 
of domestic news-making processes of naturalising existing power relations at home, 
studies looking at international news items in Western news have pointed out how 
‘[…] news discourse normalises inequalities’ (Joye, 2009: 45) on a global scale. As 
Lilie Chouliaraki points out, ‘the idea that hierarchies of place and human life are 
                                                
23 These studies were instrumental in making visible structural mechanisms that 
impact on the composition and patterned (im)balances of news. However, the 
undisputed unlikelihood in practical news work of attaining neutrality and objectivity 
and the fact that even if, for the sake of argument, a news account was entirely 
neutral there would be no simple way of knowing that this was the case (an 
epistemological issue), has often  been unnecessarily coupled with presenting an 
anti-realist constructivist ontology as an inevitable consequence. There is, I would 
argue, no convincing reason why one should follow from the other. As Elder-Vass 
(2012a; 2012c) has demonstrated in his recent work, there are accounts of 
constructivism that – far from being by default anti-realist – are compatible with a 
critical realist ontology.  
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reproduced in Western news is not new in social research’ (Chouliaraki, 2006: 8, 
emphasis added).  
 
Importantly, detecting bias by virtue of empirical analysis is not the same as negating 
the theoretical possibility of objectivity, despite the fact that both are often alleged 
simultaneously. Rather, the sweeping way in which the very possibility of objectivity 
has come under attack from postmodern scholars suggests that different underlying 
understandings of the term are at least in part the cause of divergent arguments. In 
this context, Lichtenberg (2000) illuminates in her account ‘in defence of objectivity’ 
several core aspects of the debate by unravelling practical and theoretical 
implications of the terminology of objectivity, neutrality and bias.  Crucially, she 
does so without negating many of the most fundamental underpinnings of social 
constructivist thought. She readily agrees that ‘our culture, our political and other 
interests do much to structure and the determine the way we (whoever “we” may be) 
look at the world, and […] our news reports reflect, reinforce, and even create these 
biases’ (Lichtenberg, 2000: 242). She vividly describes how ‘at a certain point in our 
intellectual development […] we are struck with the realization that language plays a 
crucial role in shaping the experience and worldview of individuals and even whole 
cultures’ (Lichtenberg, 2000: 243). And she unreservedly accepts that news ‘can 
illuminatingly be said to construct reality’ a) in (comparatively rare) cases that ‘are 
genuine media creations’ and b) in (comparatively common) cases where coverage of 
an event has real consequences that the subject of the coverage itself would not on its 
own have engendered (Lichtenberg, 2000: 245).  
 
Yet Lichtenberg draws profoundly different conclusions from these truisms than do 
those denying the possibility of objectivity. One of her arguments is that, despite the 
fact that it is often difficult and sometimes impossible to objectively determine the 
truth about a matter – a situation that journalists will routinely encounter – ‘it is rare 
[…] that we have no guidance at all’ and people generally have methods of 
comparing sources and interrogating a subject that often will make them more likely 
to be able ‘to distinguish between better and worse, more or less accurate accounts’ 
(2000: 241). Greater and lesser degrees of accuracy, however, only make sense in 
relation to an external reality against which one can (fallibly) attempt to measure 
factual claims. This argument is further strengthened when exploring the 
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inconsistency whereby, in the field of communication studies, many of those who 
attack the theoretical validity and empirical possibility of objectivity do so with the 
underlying (and in many instances justified) critique that news claiming to be 
objective is in fact biased in one way or another. Yet to accuse an individual, 
institution or social system of bias is to assume that a more accurate rendition of 
events is possible. In the words of Lichtenberg (2000: 243):  
 
In so far as objectivity is impossible there can be no sense in the claim – 
certainly none in the rebuke – that the media are ideological or partial, for 
these concepts imply the possibility of a contrast. Conversely, in so far as we 
agree that the media serve an ideological function or bias our vision, we 
implicitly accept the view that other, better, more objective ways are possible.  
 
Likewise AJE’s aim to balance international news, as specified in their corporate 
profile (AJE Website, Corporate Profile, 04/09/2008), implies two things: a) a lack of 
balance within Western news in the way the developing world is routinely being 
covered that, at least hypothetically, runs deeper than mere issues of allocation of 
airtime. And b) the promise that a more balanced perspective on world events is 
possible, which only makes sense vis-à-vis an external reality that one can (fallibly) 
attempt to portray in more or less balanced ways (irrespective of the epistemological 
inconvenience of regularly not being able to confirm empirically the degree of 
balance achieved due to the inherent complexity of social aspects of reality).  
 
Secondly, many have gone further and perceive a bias in the very idea and ideal of 
objective reporting, not on the grounds of an alleged impossibility of objectivity, but 
on the basis that this ideal strikes them as a Western imposition, particularly where 
decidedly partisan opinion pieces in the media are historically linked to a spirit of 
standing up to colonial powers as part of hard-fought struggles for independence. It 
comes as no surprise then that accepting notions of objectivity as a hand-me-down 
from those very Western powers which in turn appear to be biased themselves in 
their coverage of the global South, has sat uncomfortably with realities on the ground 
in some journalistic fields. Consequently, in the context of institutions from former 
colonial powers transplanting their professional ideals to media institutions in newly 
independent countries, professionalism and the notions of objectivity it entailed have 
been perceived in some quarters as being ‘reflective of […] values of Western 
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society’ (Musa & Domatob, 2007: 320-321) and as ‘a prop for the status quo’ 
(Golding, 1977: 305).  
 
This heritage of journalism with an outright political function continued to have an 
impact on evolving journalistic cultures. O’Brian recounts that, in a seminar she 
directed for African broadcasters in the mid-1970s, ‘some felt that there was a need 
to re-define the role of journalist from being the “conscience of society” to being 
supportive of the government’s development programme’ (Cruise O’Brian, 1977: 
30). As Carpentier (2005: 206) notes ‘the majority of the more formal attempts to 
rearticulate the hegemonic journalistic identity are aimed at the nodal point of 
objectivity or its constituent parts’. As he goes on to explain (2005: 206): 
 
In development and emancipatory journalism, it is explicitly stated that 
neutrality does not apply when universal values, such as peace, democracy, 
human rights, (gender and racial) equality, (social) progress and national 
literation, are at stake.  
 
As an alternative to Western models of reporting stemming from the very context of 
historic and present global inequalities that AJE set out to counter, the rejection of 
dominant professional practices as part of a larger rejection of Western-dominated 
news posed an interesting conundrum for AJE’s management teams when seeking to 
recruit in the South. Notwithstanding past and present currents of partisanship within 
Western journalism,24 the concept of development journalism has continued to sit 
uneasily with the ‘fourth estate’ approach derived from Western media systems, 
which at the same time has also continued to have a strong influence on emerging 
media industries. This contrast of approaches has created a sense of ‘divided 
loyalties’ (Musa & Domatob, 2007: 326) and even ‘guilt’ (Cruise O’Brian, 1977: 30) 
                                                
24 There have traditionally been strong currents of partisanship, for example in 
Southern Europe, where the media was influenced by comparatively late transitions 
to democracy and resilient traditions of ‘political mobilisation’ as part of what Daniel 
C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini call the ‘polarized pluralist model’ (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004: 89-90). In addition, countries traditionally associated with the liberal model, in 
particular the US, arguably began to display – not least in commercial broadcasting – 
tendencies of ‘converging towards something much closer to the Polarized Pluralist 
model’ as commercial pressures began to rise and alignment with political camps 
increased (Hallin, 2009: 333). 
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on the part of development journalists, some of whom have found themselves torn in 
their work between divergent underlying principles.  
 
Decades after these issues had first been raised, this plurality of approaches also 
presented a case of ‘divided loyalties’ for AJE, if in a rather different manner than 
for development journalists. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 7, divergent 
attitudes towards a Western understanding of professionalism in various non-
Western broadcasting systems posed a particular structural problem for those 
recruiting for AJE. On the one hand, AJE as an organisation unambiguously 
subscribed to historically Western international journalism practices, while on the 
other hand, in order to fulfil its remit of ‘reporting back’ on an organisational level, 
AJE’s management urgently sought to recruit journalists in countries and regions 
where the broadcasting industries at times differed precisely in this regard due to 
high levels of ‘political parallelism’ (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 38).  
 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
In this Chapter, I situated AJE’s aim of ‘reporting back from the South to the North’ 
within theoretical and geo-political debates on unequal media flows – from accounts 
of modernisation and cultural imperialism to concepts of contra-flow as part of a 
multidirectional media ecology. I outlined how media flows diversify in an 
increasingly interconnected global sphere, yet remain intertwined with historical and 
present geo-political inequalities. In the context of longstanding discussions about 
the global concentration of media power (specifically in international news) and the 
resulting Western bias inherent in the professional field, a news channel that both 
challenges the established mainstream media and has the economic resources to 
pursue its aims makes for an interesting case on which to test claims of 
diversification.  
 
In the context of this thesis, three aspects of asymmetries in international news are of 
particular relevance: questions of news content, concepts of professionalism and the 
relative autonomy of AJE within a weakly autonomous field. These three aspects are 
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reflected in the three empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
Therefore, while the first part of this chapter dealt with overarching themes of news 
flows and global asymmetries in media, the second part of this chapter focussed on 
the implications of AJE’s editorial remit of aiming to be the ‘voice of the South’ and 
giving a ‘voice to the voiceless.’ Finally, the third part of the chapter elaborated on 
the structural challenge AJE faced as a result of the combination of following 
dominant interpretations of journalistic professionalism as endorsed by established 
Western-based news organisations, while at the same time seeking to build presences 
in regions where the local journalistic fields for historical reasons potentially differ in 
terms of political and economic influences as well as shared assumptions about 
journalists’ role in society.  
 
In the end, all of these factors affect and are affected by journalistic practices, which 
are endowed both with the liability to reproduce existing global inequalities and the 
power to reflexively bring about changes in what is considered newsworthy in global 
news. However, even within the most autonomous news organisation, journalistic 
practice does not play out according to the rules set by the intra-organisational 
environment alone. Rather, the organisation’s aim of competing within a given field 
intrinsically links it with the wider professional and organisational environment it 
operates in. In the next chapter I shall therefore develop a theoretical framework that 
allows the conceptualisation both of the inherently relational nature of AJE’s aims to 
‘balance’ international news and of the role played by journalistic routines and 
reflexivity.  
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Chapter 3 Journalistic Habitus and Agency: How 
Much Room for Manoeuvre? 
 
 
There are factors, and something like habitus is one of them, that condition the extent 
of difference between different contexts. The analytical interest lies in the extent to 
which such dispositions are challenged […] by different practices. 
 
Alistair Mutch, Communities of Practice and Habitus: A Critique, (2003: 397) 
  
 
When journalists themselves begin to express concern about the quality and 
reliability of news output from 24-hours, multimedia newsrooms the need is perhaps 
all the greater for adequately theorized sociological research that can give us a more 
complete understanding of journalists’ motivations and how these shape what they 
do at work and the ways they do it. 
 
Roger Dickinson, Accomplishing Journalism, (2007: 190) 
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3.1 Introduction – The Dialectic of Similarity and Difference 
 
In the previous chapter I outlined the relevance of academic debates on unequal 
media flows to AJE’s self-declared aim of rebalancing international news. 
Complementing that approach, in this chapter I shall look at factors in media 
production that influence AJE’s ability to achieve this aim. After all, balancing 
unequal media flows cannot be achieved purely by virtue of being based in the 
Middle East and aiming to be sufficiently successful to match the impact of Western-
based news organisations, but crucially also involves being sufficiently different 
editorially to ‘current typical’ news organisations dominating the field of English-
language international TV news and current affairs. In turn, being different 
editorially is a function, on the one hand, of journalistic routines and, on the other, of 
journalists’ abilities to reflect on these and modify their practices.  
 
Given the centrality of journalistic practice for questions of ‘reporting back’, it is a 
significant omission that, as Figenschou has pointed out recently, literature on media 
flows has been ‘largely ignoring’ aspects of news production (Figenschou, 2012: 
355). Particularly in the field of foreign news coverage, ‘researchers’ preoccupation 
with content analysis procedures may have […] blurred the importance of 
investigating the underlying reasons why foreign news editors and reporters select 
and report news the way they do’ (Hanusch & Obijiofor, 2008: 14, emphasis added). 
With the noteworthy exception of Figenschou’s work (2012), this overall tendency, 
possibly in part reinforced by methodological considerations, 25  is reflected in 
literature on Al Jazeera and AJE in particular.26 27 In her research, Figenschou looks 
                                                
25 As I will discuss in more detail in the methodology chapter, the complexities 
involved in acquiring extensive access to AJE’s newsrooms may mean that on a 
practical level content analysis (and to a lesser degree audience research) at times 
appears more feasible.  
 
26 Most studies of AJE focus on the evolution of the channel’s success story (Powers, 
2012; Rushing, 2007), its content in relation to particular conflicts or events (Fisher, 
2011; Merriman, 2012; Gilboa, 2012; Lynch, 2012; Kolmer & Semetko, 2009), as 
well as questions of distribution (Youmans, 2012), media diplomacy (Seib, 2008; El-
Nawawy, 2012) and audience effects (Fahmy & Johnson, 2007; Amin, 2012). While 
there are some studies that include interviews with AJE staff and therefore 
methodologically go beyond the analysis of AJE’s output and effects,  these studies 
are not primarily aimed at analysing organisational practices and structures, but 
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at editorial strategies of journalists and managers working at AJE and points towards 
‘structural contradictions’ inherent in the channel’s aim ‘to implement an alternative, 
southern news perspective while maintaining professional journalistic standards’ 
traditionally associated with Western news organisations (Figenschou, 2012: 354).  
 
As I will argue, these structural contradictions are also symptomatic of continuing 
imbalances within the wider field of international TV news. Thus, AJE’s hybrid 
approach of a ‘professionalization of alternative media production processes’ 
(Figenschou, 2012: 359) throws into sharp relief the degree to which AJE – as an 
organisation positioning itself within a given professional field – is limited in its aim 
of reversing asymmetric news flows by the very composition of that field. Therefore, 
in order to complement Figenschou’s research I shall introduce a relational 
perspective to the study of organisational factors of reporting back in the context of 
AJE. To this end I employ Bourdieu’s concepts of field, habitus and capital to arrive 
at a theoretical framework that will help to articulate existing dependencies within 
the field of international English-language broadcasting news and allow a 
highlighting of the room for manoeuvre and the obstacles involved in aiming to 
contribute to a more balanced international TV news ecology. In other words, what is 
missing is an approach that begins to explain how far organisational practices at AJE 
can sustain various degrees of difference vis-a-vis a larger professional environment 
endowed with powers and liabilities that variously enable and limit these practices.  
                                                                                                                                     
retain their focus on analysing AJE’s content (Barkho, 2007; Lawson, 2011) or 
effects (El-Nawawy & Powers, 2008) respectively. One study in particular does 
focus on organisational ‘key drivers’ of editorial content at BBCWN, CNNI and 
AJE – describing a correlation ‘between the tone, rhetoric, make up of staff and 
institutional culture on the one hand and the editorial decision making and allocation 
of resources on the other’ (Henery, 2010: 32). However, basing her preliminary 
findings on a single interview per organisation, Henery specifically calls for further 
research to support her tentative findings (2010).  
 
27 Another example of a study looking at organisational factors and practices is 
Mohamed Zayani and Sofiane Sahaoui’s research on The Culture of Al Jazeera, in 
which they combine their expertise in media studies and organisational studies 
respectively (Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007). However, they differ from the present study 
in crucial ways. Firstly, having conducted their fieldwork prior to the launch of AJE, 
they focus exclusively on its parent channel, AJA. And secondly, their outlook, 
derived from organisational studies, is predominantly strategic in its aim of 
determining how far AJA’s organisational culture has contributed to the network’s 
success in ways that make this success replicable and transferable (2007).  
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However, Bourdieu’s focus on the individual through the concept of habitus stresses 
the social orientation of individuals endowed with comparatively little margin of 
freedom, portraying change in practices as a consequence of changes in social 
context rather than any kind of deliberate reflexive effort.28 And while the relational 
nature of field theory and the explanatory value of field-specific habitus contribute 
significantly to the understanding of AJE’s position within the wider international 
news ecology, the concept of journalists’ reflexivity (which includes reflexive 
awareness of the limitations of their trade) is by no means marginal to the 
understanding of editorial decision-making processes at a news channel specifically 
designed to challenge pre-existing ideas of what constitutes news-worthiness, 
particularly in its formative years.  
 
Therefore, in order to incorporate not only the possibility of organisational and 
professional change, but also a sense of deliberation in the bringing about of 
potential change, it is necessary to introduce an understanding of agency on the basis 
of a critical realist ontology that is theoretically compatible with Bourdieu’s work. 
To this end, I will combine Bourdieu’s framework with Archer’s account of 
reflexivity as a form of subjectivity that incorporates the individual into the equation 
– not merely as a site of the embodiment of social structures, but as an agent 
‘pertaining to a different level of stratified reality’ (Archer, 2003: 2). In the following 
I shall outline these theoretical strands, their relevance for the study of AJE and their 
compatibility on ontological and theoretical grounds.  
 
 
                                                
28 A similar dependency on structure (and rejection of individual agency) as an 
explanatory force can be observed in the field of news sociology. While early 
studies, such as White’s ‘gatekeeper’ study (1999, reprint of article from 1950), still 
focussed on individual decision-making processes, from the mid-1960s to the 1980s 
news sociologists provided a growing awareness of the structural constraints and 
mechanisms that shaped production in journalists’ day-to-day work (Gieber, 1964; 
Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Tuchman, 1972; Schlesinger, 1978; Golding & Elliot, 1979; 
Schudson, 1989, see also 2.5.2). This is noteworthy not least because their approach 
grew to become an important one in the study of media production, thematically 
linking the study of journalistic practice with a string of sociological studies of 
newsroom behaviour (Cottle, 2003: 6).  
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3.2 A Relational Approach to Difference in International TV News 
 
AJE has the resources and the remit to address some of the imbalances in 
international news and to change significantly the ecology of international news 
broadcasting. To achieve the organisation’s ambitious aims, however, AJE cannot 
operate in an isolated fashion. The aim of rebalancing ‘the current typical 
information flow’ is meaningful only in relation to those channels from which AJE 
seeks to set itself apart. This is the case not least because, in order to be perceived as 
a different voice within a particular setting, AJE needs to be similar enough to be 
comparable with those organisations from which it seeks in the first place to 
differentiate itself. In the words of Bourdieu, to stand in a relationship of 
competition, ‘people have to agree on areas of disagreement’ (Bourdieu, 2005: 36). 
And in order to be similar enough to be comparable (and therefore to compete), the 
channel has depended (particularly in its early years) on outside experience and 
resources that implicitly link it to other organisations. Therefore the success of AJE’s 
aims depends on internal organisational factors as well as on factors residing within 
the wider professional field.  
 
Bourdieu’s work on practice and cultural production – while initially being slow to 
pervade the boundaries between the neighbouring disciplines of social science, 
cultural studies and media studies (Hesmondhalgh, 2006: 211) – has considerable 
explanatory potential with regard to the field of journalism. Characterised by a 
concern for the ways in which the field of journalism encroached on other fields, 
Bourdieu’s late work (1998b; 2005) began to explicitly address dynamics within the 
journalistic field, and within the field of television in particular. In the case of the 
journalistic field, one of Bourdieu’s main concerns has been to make explicit how 
economic pressures on journalism (and the resulting increasingly heteronomous, or 
commercial, nature of the journalistic field) not only pose a threat to the autonomy of 
the journalistic field, but also adversely affect the relative autonomy of related fields 
of cultural production, such as literary or sociological fields, as well as other adjacent 
fields, such as the political or juridical fields (Bourdieu, 1998b).29 Media scholars 
                                                
29 For example, in a given scientific field people are being judged by their scientific 
merits. When and where they begin to be also judged by rules particular to other 
fields, such as the journalistic field (for example their ability to look and sound 
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have taken up this conceptual groundwork to theorise media power in the sense of 
‘media’s impact on social reality’ (Couldry, 2003: 2) and generally to explain 
journalism as functioning within a matrix of external and internal forces 
(Champagne, 1999, 2005; Benson, 1998; 2005, 2006; Benson & Neveu, 2005; 
Hesmondhalgh, 2006; Duval, 2005; Jansson, 2012; Schultz, 2007; Willig, 2012; 
Markham, 2008, 2011; Thorpe, 2009).  
 
Analysis of journalistic fields has long expanded beyond its French origins, but is 
often applied to analyse national, rather than international, contexts. As Benson notes 
(2005: 86-88) field theory has much to offer to cross-national analysis on a 
theoretical level, but methodologically there are many factors that render such 
comparative in-depth analysis difficult to operationalise. In the particular context of 
this thesis, the inter-organisational professional migration of journalists offers an 
important cross-national comparative element – if not on the level of national 
journalistic fields but on the level of nationally-based international organisations – 
while the relevance of the state of Qatar introduces national political and economic 
fields to the equation (see also Chapter 5).  
 
Field theory has not been commonly applied to address questions of news flows – 
and even less so to study any part or aspect of Al Jazeera – but it is precisely the way 
Bourdieu’s concepts allow to establish links and highlight intersections between 
fields that makes it suitable for the study of an Arab news channel staffed with 
international journalists and competing in a subfield of journalism dominated by 
Western-based organisations. Furthermore, as I will argue, this approach allows, in 
line with the critical realist understanding outlined earlier, to mediate between 
overarching theories and situated practice. In the words of Benson (1998: 463): 
 
‘[…] the focus on the mezzo-level of the “field” offers both a theoretical and 
empirical bridge between traditionally separated macro-“societal” level 
                                                                                                                                     
convincing on television, which is different from and occurs independently of the 
ability to convince scientific peers in a presentation or a scientific publication), it 
essentially short-circuits ‘internal hierarchies’ (Bourdieu, 1998b: 56). Depending on 
the degree of autonomy of the field in question, this has the potential to decrease the 
relative value of field-specific cultural capital and to increase the field’s vulnerability 
to economic considerations, therefore threatening the continued emergence of 
achievements won by virtue of the field’s relative independence and specialisation. 
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models of the news media, such as political economy, hegemony, cultural and 
technological theories, and micro-“organizational” approaches.’  
 
In the following I will introduce Bourdieu’s concepts of field, habitus and capital as a 
theoretical framework allowing me to conceptualise linkages between intra- and 
inter-organisational factors in the case of AJE and its position within international 
news broadcasting.  
 
 
3.2.1 The Journalistic Field 
 
According to Bourdieu, to speak of the journalistic field is to understand ‘journalism 
as a microcosm with its own laws, defined both by its position in the world at large 
and by the attractions and repulsions to which it is subject from other such 
microcosms’ (Bourdieu, 1998b: 39). In other words, fields are governed by their own 
sets of implicit rules, but they are neither static nor isolated. In order to be able to 
explain what is happening within any given field, it is necessary to understand both 
the forces within its particular social environment and those impinging on the field 
from related fields. This is particularly significant with regard to journalism, because 
the dependence of the journalistic field on generating popular demand has the effect 
of making the journalistic field ‘much more dependent on external forces than other 
fields of cultural production, such as mathematics, literature, law, science […]’ 
(Bourdieu, 1998b: 53).  
 
Another central tenet of Bourdieu’s field theory is the stratified nature of fields. 
According to this, fields relate to one another not only laterally, for example in the 
way that political and journalistic fields mutually affect one another, but also 
vertically, in the sense that a field can be analytically divided into various subfields. 
As a ‘structured system of social positions’, a field can be occupied by individuals as 
well as by institutions (Jenkins, 1992: 85). For example, media organisations as well 
as individual journalists inhabit the journalistic field. In turn, a media organisation in 
itself can be conceptualised as a subfield of the journalistic field.  
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3.2.2 Delineating Professional and Organisational (Sub-)Fields with the 
Journalistic Field 
 
Bourdieu did not primarily develop the concept of the ‘field’ with formal 
organisations in mind, but it has proven to be a useful conceptual tool for the study of 
organisations which, in line with Richard Jenkins’s definition of a field, can be 
characterised as ‘a structural system of social positions […] the nature of which 
defines the situation for their occupants’ (Jenkins, 1992: 85). As Vaughan argues, 
‘given that [Bourdieu] developed [field] theory by comparing different forms of 
social organization, extending the theory’s relevance to formal organizations is a 
logical step’ (Vaughan, 2008: 65-66).30 Furthermore, Emirbayer and Johnson suggest 
that it would be of value to consider three separate levels of interrelated fields when 
analysing organisations.  
 
Firstly, there are fields consisting of clusters of organisations with related practices 
(it is not necessary for these organisations to interact directly in order for them to be 
identified through similarities in structural constraints and practices as belonging to 
the same field) (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008: 5ff). Secondly, there are related fields 
that shape the environment within which these organisations operate (such as 
political or economic fields) and that impact on organisational fields to varying 
degrees depending on the level of autonomy that an organisational field can maintain 
(2008: 3). And thirdly, there is the organisation-as-field as a concept that helps in 
understanding intra-organisational dynamics (2008: 22ff).  
 
                                                
30 It has been noted that, while Bourdieu’s theoretical work has gained some 
attention in the discipline of organisational studies, few analyses of organisations 
have made use of (or explored the connections between) all three related concepts of 
field, habitus and capital (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Vaughan, 2008; Swartz, 
2008).  
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Figure 1.1 – Stratification of Fields 
 
As shown in Figure 1.1, the following fields are relevant to understanding AJE’s 
position and the degrees of editorial difference and similarity that the channel has 
been able to carve out within the field of international English-language news 
broadcasting. On an overarching level are the interrelated areas of the journalistic, 
political and economic fields. In addition, there are a number of journalistic 
subfields, which in the context of AJE most importantly include what I will refer to 
in the following as the professional field of international English-language TV news 
and current affairs and the organisational field of AJE. In the context of this study 
the ‘professional field’ demarcates a cluster of English-language news channels with 
significant international reach, broadly subscribing to a shared implicit understanding 
of what constitutes professionalism in their field. Apart from AJE, organisations 
within this field most prominently include BBCW News and CNNI. 31  The 
organisational field – referred to by Emirbayer and Johnson as the ‘organization-as-
field (2008: 22)’ – denotes AJE as an organisational entity. Importantly, for the 
purpose of this study this does not entail the entirety of AJN, but only those functions 
of AJN which are directly related to its English-language television output.32 In order 
                                                
31 Emirbayer and Johnson refer to a field consisting of two or more organisations as 
an ‘organizational field’. However, in order to avoid confusion with the concept of 
AJE as an ‘organization-as-field’ – and to highlight the central role of notions of a 
specific kind of professionalism as the connecting tissue or ‘nodes’ between 
organisations within such a field (2008: 6) – I prefer the term ‘professional field’ for 
the purpose of the present study. 
 
32 While AJE is embedded within the wider organisational structure of AJN, the 
English-language channel differs structurally and editorially in significant ways from 
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to achieve its aim of ‘reporting back’, AJE as an organisation will have to 
significantly alter the composition of the professional field by introducing a 
sufficiently different editorial profile.  
 
 
3.2.3 Economic and Cultural Capital Specific to the Journalistic Field 
 
The degree to which a field is susceptible to influences from related fields – as well 
as a subfield’s relative position within a wider field – depends on the degree of 
autonomy that specific field can sustain. Bourdieu characterised the journalistic field 
as a ‘weakly autonomous field’ (Bourdieu 2005, 33). Any degree of autonomy 
‘means that one cannot understand what happens there simply on the basis of 
knowledge of the surrounding world’ (Bourdieu 2005, 33). At the same time, being 
‘weakly autonomous’ also means being vulnerable to influences from neighbouring 
fields, such as the economic field. However autonomous or heteronomous a field or 
subfield is, it can be described by the relative importance ascribed to different ‘forms 
of power’ or ‘capital’ – namely ‘economic capital’ and ‘cultural capital’ (Benson & 
Neveu, 2005: 3). Economic capital encompasses ‘money or assets that can be turned 
into money’, while cultural capital encompasses field-specific cultural skills, 
abilities, sensibilities and expertise (Benson & Neveu, 2005: 4).  
 
Fields dominated by economic capital are characterised by a high degree of 
heteronomy, while fields dominated by cultural capital display a high degree of 
autonomy (Benson & Neveu, 2005: 4). Within a field (such as the professional field 
of international English-language TV news and current affairs) economic capital 
tends to be more powerful than cultural capital. However, those individuals or 
organisations with large amounts of both kinds of capital or those able to 
successfully convert one kind of capital into the other are dominant within their field 
                                                                                                                                     
its Arabic counterpart and from other platforms (for more details please see Chapter 
4) and operates in competition with and in relation to the wider professional field of 
English-language international news broadcasting. A similar relational study on the 
basis of Bourdieu’s field theory could be conducted to analyse the relations between 
AJE, AJA and their position within AJN, but this lies beyond the scope of the present 
study. 
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(and exert greater influence over the habitus of the field) (Benson & Neveu, 2005: 4). 
In the case of the journalistic field, ‘economic capital is expressed via circulation, or 
advertising revenues, or audience ratings, whereas the “specific” cultural capital of 
the field takes the form of intelligent commentary, in-depth reporting’ or in other 
words ‘the kind of journalistic practices rewarded each year by the US Pulitzer 
Prizes’ (Benson & Neveu, 2005: 4).33 As I will outline in Chapter 8, in the case of 
AJE, the degree of autonomy that the organisational field can sustain vis-à-vis the 
professional field plays a crucial role in terms of the organisation’s ability to provide 
a different editorial outlook.  
 
 
3.3 The Role of Habitus in Journalistic Practice 
 
In order to gain an understanding of how fields impact upon journalistic practice it is 
necessary to introduce another of Bourdieu’s key concepts, namely that of habitus. 
Perhaps the most basic description of the concept is ‘habitus as a feel for the game’ 
(Bourdieu, 1998a: 80). Habitus relates to the concept of the field in that the 
conditions specific to a given field contribute to shaping how those inhabiting this 
particular field habitually go about doing things. In short, fields are generative of 
field-specific practices and habitus. Despite emphasising the habitual and collective 
nature of practice, the site of habitus as ‘an acquired system of generative schemes 
objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted’ (Bourdieu, 
1977: 95) inevitably has to be the individual. Jenkins describes habitus as ‘a bridge-
building exercise’ between understandings of practice ‘solely in terms of individual 
decision-making’ and practice as ‘determined by supra-individual structures’, which 
‘only exists in, through and because of the practices of actors and their interaction 
with each other and with the rest of their environment’ (Jenkins, 1992: 74-75). For 
                                                
33 Some of the specifics of the journalistic field, according to Ryfe, serve to counter 
its heteronomous tendencies, as they diminish the relative importance that actors 
within the field ascribe to the various incarnations of economic capital vis-a-vis other 
factors that may be at odds with economic imperatives. In his words, ‘political 
legitimacy is of more immediate concern to journalists’ than economic 
considerations simply because ‘economic considerations are too diffuse and remote 
from day-to-day activities of journalists to generate the kind of uniform, 
transorganizational routines identified by news scholars’ (Ryfe, 2006: 138-9). 
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example, with regard to AJE, the concept of habitus connects the level of the 
professional or organisational field with the level of the individual journalist. 
However, as I will outline later in this chapter, arguing that Bourdieu focuses on the 
role of the individual through the concept of habitus is not the same as maintaining 
that he ascribes reflexive agency to individual actors. After all, habitus according to 
Bourdieu is the embodied form of ‘the very basics of culture’ internalised by the 
individual more through experience than through active learning (Jenkins, 1992: 75-
76). 
 
 
3.3.1 Primary and Specific Habitus 
 
Essentially, habitus represents dispositions unconsciously acquired by individuals by 
virtue of being part of a particular environment. Therefore, a significant part of a 
person’s habitus is acquired early in life. However, it has also been argued in the 
context of professional practices that it is constructive to analytically distinguish 
between primary habitus acquired in early life and specific habitus that is obtained 
later in life, for example within a particular professional field. Brubaker argues for a 
stratified habitus, whereby a higher-order habitus transforms ‘without superseding, a 
primary familial […] habitus’ (Brubaker in Mutch, 2003: 392). Emirbayer and 
Johnson claim that Bourdieu distinguished between primary and specific habitus and 
paraphrase Vaughan in arguing that ‘people acquire the taken-for-granted 
understandings that inform their practical action not only in the class conditions 
surrounding their early lives but also in the organisational settings in which they are 
active later in life’ (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008: 29). And Jenkins remarks that ‘in 
places, [Bourdieu] writes as if each field generates its own specific habitus. 
Elsewhere, it seems to be the case that actors bring to whichever field they are part of 
their own, preexisting and historically constituted habituses. Both of these options 
may, of course, be true’ (Jenkins, 1992: 90). As I will argue, habitus specific to the 
professional field of international English-language news broadcasting is of 
particular relevance to the study of the early years of AJE, because of the initial 
relative weakness of the emerging organisational field vis-a-vis a mature professional 
field, from within which AJE was recruiting virtually its entire staff.  
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This is important not least because ultimately the specific habitus of a given field is 
generative of the practices within that field, which in the case of the journalistic field 
includes editorial decision-making processes. Practices and habitus are mutually 
constitutive, not in a determinist fashion, but in the sense that ‘practices are the 
product of the habitus, as well as serving to reproduce it’ (Jenkins, 1992: 80). In the 
case of AJE that means that shortly before and after the channel’s launch, at a time 
when the channel’s editorial profile was still being thrashed out in daily discussions 
over editorial preferences on all hierarchical levels of the organisation, professional 
habitus inevitably predominantly originated from practices which journalists had 
brought with them from previous employers, such as the BBC, CNN, ITV, SKY, 
ABC, CBC and other ‘mainstream’ Western-based broadcasters. In this particular 
setting, the concept of field provides a way of conceptualising the relation between 
the specific professional habitus of the individual and the organisational culture that 
shapes the environment in which the specific habitus is being applied and potentially 
modified. Furthermore, understanding the dynamics of specific habitus in relation to 
different fields, including organisational fields, paves the way to understanding ‘the 
differential distribution of practices’ (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008: 27) across fields 
and the potential effects of this distribution on specific organisational environments 
(as I outline in the empirical chapters) and on questions of ‘reporting back’ (as I will 
outline in the conclusion to the thesis). 
 
 
3.3.2 Conceptualising Change through Clashes of Habitus 
 
Another advantage of conceptualising habitus in the context of related fields of 
practice is that it helps in understanding some degree of difference. Thus, new forms 
of practice occur when ‘dissonances between the conditions under which the habitus 
was acquired or subsequently shaped and the current organizational setting allow 
organizational members to see windows of opportunity hidden […] to members of 
other organizations’ (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008: 30). Habitus, in other words, is 
key to the conceptualisation both of the reproduction of practices within fields (in 
that it serves to perpetuate habitual practice) and of organisational change (in that 
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‘misfits’ between habitus and field have the potential to break routines). As Benson 
and Neveu put it, ‘Bourdieu posits that influxes of new agents into the field can serve 
either as forces for transformation or conservation’ (2005: 5).  
 
Given that in the founding years of AJE virtually every journalist constituted a ‘new 
agent’ in the organisational field, there were two kinds of structural dissonance 
potentially generative of editorial difference. Firstly, clashes between habitus 
acquired within the wider professional field and AJE’s declared aim of altering the 
Western-oriented landscape of international TV news. And secondly, clashes 
between different kinds of habitus, where a course of action was habitually pursued 
by one or several journalists and subsequently changed not as a result of unprompted 
spontaneous reflection, but as a result of dissonances between this course of action 
and practices of colleagues who had acquired their professional habitus in different 
organisational settings. This explanation of change based on structural dissonances 
captures the relational aspect of difference in that it situates difference as a struggle 
over defining editorial policy within the organisational field resulting from diverging 
influences from the wider professional field.34  
 
 
3.4 Accounting for Agency as a Source of Editorial Difference 
 
However, habitus cannot explain how people arrived at the decision to join AJE in 
the first place, what motivated them to explore new editorial choices, or why they 
reacted in the way they did when clashes of habitus exposed differences between 
conflicting conventions amongst members of newly gathered editorial teams. These 
factors contributing to editorial difference in part at least precede clashes of different 
kinds of habitus within a given field and can only be satisfactorily explained by 
accounting for a kind of agency on the part of journalists that cannot be entirely 
reduced to shifting social forces.  
 
                                                
34 Here, it is worth noting that incorporating a temporal aspect into the continuous 
evolution of a person’s habitus as it is shaped by a succession of overlapping 
personal and professional environments also serves to ward off accusations of crude 
structural determinism (Benson & Neveu, 2005: 3). 
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Therefore, the following questions need to be addressed: a) Is Bourdieu’s theoretical 
framework flexible enough to account for the prevalence of reflexivity encountered 
at a news channel with a mission to defy at least some of the conventional wisdom of 
the industry?; If not, as I will argue in the following, b) which approach might be 
conducive to conceptualising reflexivity in this way?; And c), on what ontological 
and theoretical ground can a common basis can be found that renders compatible 
approaches focussing on habitus and on reflexivity respectively?  
 
 
3.4.1 Reflexivity as a Possibility in the Work of Pierre Bourdieu 
 
In order to answer the question of whether Bourdieu’s theoretical framework is 
flexible enough to account for the prevalence and nature of journalistic reflexivity 
encountered at AJE (Question a, see 3.4), it is important to first understand that 
Bourdieu did allow for some degree of agency in his work. As he points out, actions 
of individuals within fields are ‘partially preconstrained, but with a margin of 
freedom’ (Bourdieu, 2005: 30). In the words of Rodney Benson, ‘cultural rules 
operating in fields are constraining, not determining’ (Benson, 2006: 194). In 
particular, according to Bourdieu, a sociological approach to academic practice in 
general and social science in particular – a sociology of science – offers the 
opportunity to attain a degree of agential freedom by unmasking the social 
determinants that otherwise govern the habitual actions characteristic of academic 
traditions and actions. In the words of Derek Robbins, ‘by outlining the social 
conditions which create the educational institutions which socially condition our 
thinking, Bourdieu has tried, both reflexively and objectively, to create conditions 
within which people can transcend those conditions precisely because he has enabled 
them to recognize them as such’ (1991: 160).  
 
Bourdieu did not proceed, however, to claim that such reflexive ‘loopholes’ were 
frequently and readily available to actors in general, which is precisely where he 
differs from those defending the pervasiveness of reflexivity in our daily lives. With 
regard to the journalistic field, and specifically to the subfield of television, he does 
not go so far as to completely negate the possibility of reflexivity as a means of 
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overcoming structural constraints, but for him this remains a distant, even ‘utopian’ 
aspiration (Bourdieu, 1998b: 55-56). Reflexivity and conscious decision-making – as 
opposed to decision-making as a spontaneous enactment of the habitus (Jenkins, 
1992: 77; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008: 32) – certainly have been rather marginal to 
Bourdieu’s main theoretical objectives. In critiquing certain aspects of journalistic 
practice, his focus on structure has been – much like the approaches of news 
sociologists in the 1970s and 1980s – specifically designed to deflect the ‘simplistic 
criticism’ of individuals (Bourdieu, 1998b: 45, emphasis added) and instead to focus 
on (invisible) structures that impel people to act in certain field-specific ways. This 
has allowed him to describe and map ‘a host of properties that do not present 
themselves to intuition’ (1998b: 31). 
 
Consequently, in his televised lecture ‘On television’, Bourdieu went out of his way 
to stress that exposing the structural constraints of television production was ‘not a 
question of blaming or fighting journalists, who often suffer a good deal from the 
very constraints they are forced to impose’ (1998b: 14). For him, the pressures of the 
journalistic field, in particular in the subfield of television, are so powerful that ‘in 
some sense, the choices made on television are choices made by no subject’ (1998b: 
25). This becomes particularly evident when he replaces the subject with the concept 
of field, as he does when he begins his sentence with ‘Journalists – we should really 
say the journalistic field […]’ (1998b: 46). This perspective conveys the explicit 
objective of understanding the structures behind journalistic decision-making – ‘to 
let individuals off the hook’ (1998b: 17) – in order to be able to begin to grasp the 
power exerted by the rules that govern the field of TV journalism. For Bourdieu, 
laying the burden of responsibility for structural ills on the shoulders of individual 
journalists is both inadequate and dangerous, because it ‘takes the place of the work 
necessary to understand phenomena such as the fact that, even no one really wishes it 
this way, and without any intervention on the part of people actually paying for it, we 
end up with this very strange product, the “TV news”’ (1998b: 45).  
 
As such, Bourdieu’s concessions to the possibility of reflexivity do little to distract 
from the fact that the strength of his model is to show how individuals are subject to 
social forces not of their choosing and compelled to act in accordance with their 
relative position in a stratified system of social structures. In other words, in his 
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theoretical framework reflexivity remains a vague possibility, ‘an option open to 
certain agents’ (Archer, 2007: 46, emphasis in original) and under certain conditions, 
rather than an intrinsic part of human day-to-day activity. Therefore, to not merely 
describe but begin to explain the relative difference of TV content in the empirical 
context of AJE, Bourdieu’s approach needs to be complemented by and combined 
with a model that takes into account the conscious decisions of individuals who 
actively make career choices as well as editorial choices. Despite the relatively 
resilient influence of habitus, these choices, I will argue, cannot simply be reduced to 
shifting social forces without a risk of overlooking crucial factors contributing to 
balances and imbalances in the field of international television news.  
 
 
3.4.2 Reflexivity as Necessity in the Work of Margaret Archer 
 
This leads to Question b) (as specified in 3.4), which is the question of which 
approach might be conducive to conceptualising reflexivity in a way helpful to 
analysing news flows generally and the case of AJE more specifically. As I shall 
argue in this thesis, Archer’s approach is uniquely apt for understanding editorial 
difference in the context of AJE, not only because some of her empirical work 
focuses on people’s occupational concerns, but crucially because her theoretical 
framework facilitates an accounting for people’s motivations for joining AJE and 
their anticipation of both personal career opportunities and the opportunity to 
contribute to counter-acting geo-political asymmetries within the field of 
international English-language TV news (Archer, 2007: 12). One of the foremost 
proponents of the necessity of accounting in social theory for the pervasiveness of 
reflexivity in people’s lives, Archer’s critical realist approach (2003; 2007; 2012) 
defines reflexivity as ‘the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal 
people, to consider themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice versa’ 
(2007: 4).  
 
Central to Archer’s theoretical framework is the notion that people reflect on their 
personal and professional concerns and adopt ‘projects’ in an effort to realise 
concerns that are important to them. Projects, broadly defined as ‘any course of 
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action intentionally engaged upon by a human being’ are indispensable to human 
action, if one accepts reflexivity as an essential property of individuals that allows 
the transcending of naïve accounts of social determinism (2007: 7). The way people 
arrive at projects is through what Archer terms the ‘internal conversation’ (2007). 
Intra-personal dialogue or internal conversation is not entirely like natural language 
or external conversation, but includes shortcuts, symbols and imagery as well as 
natural language (2007: 67). Such internal dialogue can subsume a range of reflexive 
internal activities, from ‘daydreaming’ and ‘silently mulling things over’ to ‘thinking 
things through’ and ‘reaching concrete decisions’ (2007: 2-4). Archer specifically 
points out that not all kinds of inner dialogue are fully reflexive (2007: 2-3; 63). Of 
those internal dialogues that are intrinsically reflexive, the central characteristics are 
‘silently to pose questions to ourselves and to answer them, to speculate about 
ourselves, any aspect of our environment and, above all, about the relationship 
between them’ (2007: 63). Basically, this kind of internal conversation is another 
expression of reflexive thought, which is reflexive precisely because it entails a 
distinction between the subject and objective circumstances, which are being 
weighed and analysed in relation to one another. In Archer’s words:  
 
Reflexive thought is synonymous with internal conversation because 
reflexivity is not a vague self-awareness but a questioning exploration of 
subject in relation to object, including the subject as object, one which need 
not have any practical outcome or intent (Archer, 2007: 73, emphasis in 
original). 
 
At the core of Archer’s work is the position that in today’s globalised societies 
strongly reflexive ‘internal conversations’ concerning the realisation of personal 
projects are not exceptional, but, as she demonstrates in her empirical work, a 
common aspect of how people go about their daily lives.35  
                                                
35 Again, it is important to point out that this concept does not presume that people 
conceive and pursue their projects in circumstances of their own choosing (Archer, 
2007: 64; 88). Rather, material and social contexts ‘obstruct or facilitate our projects 
to very varying degrees’ (2007: 8). These contexts are part and parcel of the agency-
structure relationship that shapes the outcomes of human endeavours as causal 
powers of material objects or social structures are activated by (and become effective 
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Another main feature of her work on reflexivity is the argument that reflexivity is 
‘not a homogenous phenomenon’ (2007: 92), but that there are different modes of 
reflexivity. These modes of reflexivity, which range from intrinsically 
communicative to largely self-reliant, in part depend on the degree of contextual 
(dis)continuity that a person encounters in his or her life (2007: 84ff). This is the case 
because contextual continuity makes it more conducive and comfortable to discuss 
inner musings (and therefore more effortless to externalise the internal conversation 
in natural language) in the context of social surroundings that are aligned to the 
subject’s own perceptions and preferences. Contextual discontinuity, on the other 
hand, has the effect of throwing the subject back on her own mental resources, since 
her inner musings are out of sync with her social surroundings and discussing them 
with others is likely to lead to misunderstandings and little productive feedback. 
Different modes of reflexivity are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, all 
interviewees in Archer’s sample practiced different modes of reflexivity at different 
times. However, most of her interviewees displayed clear inclinations towards one 
mode or another (93%), with only 7% of the subjects in her sample of 128 
interviewees predominantly exercising two modes of reflexivity in equal measure 
(2007: 94). These modes of reflexivity are ‘communicative reflexive’, ‘autonomous 
reflexive’, ‘meta-reflexive’ and ‘fractured reflexive’.  
 
In their dominant use, two of these modes are of particular interest with regard to 
journalists who decided to leave various jobs at established news channels to join 
AJE prior to or around the time of the channel’s launch:  autonomous reflexives and 
meta-reflexives.36 These two modes have in common that they both characterise 
                                                                                                                                     
in relation to) the causal powers of our attempts to accomplish personal projects 
(2007: 8).  
 
36 The categories of ‘communicative reflexives’ and ‘fractured reflexives’ do not 
apply in their dominant forms to the context of the present study. Communicative 
reflexives use their reflexivity to work actively ‘at staying put’ instead of courting 
change (Archer, 2007: 158). For ‘fractured reflexives’ internal conversation does not 
tend to result in decisions aiding change in personal or professional settings either, as 
thinking things over ‘only serves to intensify their personal distress and social 
disorientation, without enabling them to determine upon a purposeful course of 
action to alleviate or resolve their problems’ (Archer, 2007: 96). Therefore, neither 
mode of reflexivity particularly fits a sample of interviewees who have in common 
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individuals who largely rely on their own mental resources for their deliberations and 
decision-making processes and who tend to be socially mobile in their endeavours to 
fulfil personal projects. These groups also differ in important ways. While 
autonomous reflexives are ‘firmly avowing themselves to be “lone thinkers”’, relying 
on their own conclusions and often quick to decide as they act without cross-
referencing their internal dialogues by consulting others, meta-reflexives tend to be 
more ‘self-interrogative’, imaginative and cautious in their reflexive deliberations 
(Archer, 2007: 129). As the term suggests, ‘meta-reflexives’ reflect on their own 
powers of reflexivity, which bears the risk of getting absorbed in their musings 
(2007: 127-128). Like autonomous reflexives, they tend not to seek external 
confirmation of their internal dialogues – but, unlike them, they refrain from external 
confirmation not because they are confident to the point of genuinely not feeling the 
need to consult others, but because they are aware of external influences in the shape 
of local norms and conventions and critical towards the potentially assimilative 
influence of these on their actions (Archer, 2007: 129). Another crucial difference 
between the two modes is that while autonomous reflexives tend to be task-oriented, 
meta-reflexives display a tendency to be value-oriented (2007: 130).  
 
Both modes are conducive to decisions and actions that lead to transformations in 
people’s personal and professional lives, since they actively seek out opportunities 
that fit their strategic aims and values and therefore are perceived as enablements to 
the fulfilment of personal projects. As I will argue, these modes closely match the 
profiles of journalists who decided to take professional risks and opportunities and 
reflexively engage in ‘reporting back’. In the following I discuss how far Archer’s 
account of reflexivity is compatible with Bourdieu’s relational approach of capital 
and habitus and the journalistic field.  
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                     
that they were interested in change within their professional field and prepared and 
able to take professional risks in order to more closely align their personal projects 
with their professional environments.   
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3.5 Combining the Concepts of Habitus and Reflexivity 
 
Several authors have argued the need for theoretical frameworks that allow both 
habitual and reflexive action to be accounted for (Sayer, 2009; Fleetwood, 2008; 
Elder-Vass, 2007; Mutch et al., 2006). Empirically there seems to be overwhelming 
evidence that we are living in times where contextual discontinuity has become such 
a regular feature of life that practices cannot satisfactorily be explained by reverting 
to a strong focus on structure. Similarly obvious, however, is the fact that this 
contextual discontinuity does not pervade all geo-political contexts, social strata or 
aspects of people’s lives in equal measure and that people continue to act within 
limitations not of their choosing, without at all times being aware of (or acting 
reflexively in relation to) the structures that enable or limit their decisions and 
actions. As a consequence, many authors ‘reject the implication that structure and 
agency represent a binary choice (Elder-Vass, 2010: 3).’ 
 
In the context of AJE, for example, the adaptation of professional routines 
appropriated from Western international ‘mainstream’ broadcasting suggests 
continuity and a principal role for habitus specific to the wider professional field. In 
contrast, a strong objective of altering the rules of the game by balancing the ‘current 
typical information flow’ presumes a readiness to reflect on what a ‘current typical’ 
habitus entails (in other words to reflexively review routines) in order to be able to 
challenge habitual practices where it is thought to be conducive to the channel’s 
editorial aims (AJE Website, Corporate Profile, 04/09/2008). I agree with Archer that 
a hybridisation of habitus and reflexivity in the shape of a routinised reflexivity or 
‘reflexive habitus’ in some respects misses the point. To state that ‘people now have 
a disposition to be reflexive’ says very little other than stating that reflexivity is 
considered to be very common in times of contextual discontinuity, but as Archer 
points out, it is hard to see what can be gained by forcing reflexivity into the 
conceptual mould of habitus (Archer, 2010: 288f). As I shall explain in the 
following, however, I disagree with Archer on the question of whether it is possible 
(and feasible to underpin theoretically) for actions to be either co-determined or 
alternately influenced by both habitus and reflexivity.  
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3.5.1 Ontological Compatibility  
 
In order to answer Question c) – on what ontological and theoretical basis can 
approaches focussing on habitus (Bourdieu) and reflexivity (Archer) be rendered 
compatible (see also 3.4) – a number of ontological and theoretical issues need to be 
addressed. Elaborating on the ontological basis for the compatibility of Archer’s 
account of reflexivity and Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, Elder-Vass argues that the 
two approaches could be brought together in a critical realist emergentist theory of 
action (Elder-Vass, 2007). He agrees with Archer on the realist ontological premise 
that structure and agency cannot be conflated, but also highlights the benefits of the 
incorporation of the concept of habitus into any theoretical discussion of structure 
and agency.  
 
On an ontological level, a critical realist understanding of the relation between 
structure and agency requires that the embodiment of social structures in the form of 
habitus – in the sense that structures reside within individuals as embodied residues 
of societal influence – cannot be accepted in a literal sense. Social structures do 
affect individuals on many levels, but quite simply people and social structures are 
endowed with different sets of causal powers and liabilities, irrespective of the 
multiple ways in which they impinge on one another, and so they have to be 
conceptualised ‘through analytical dualism’ as separate entities if the aim is to 
understand anything at all about the arbitrations and negotiating mechanisms 
between the two (Archer, 2010: 275). And, while Archer allows that in certain 
circumstances it ‘sounds quite plausible’ to focus on social context, she adds that 
what critical realism is offering is a way to ‘disentangle’ aspects of subjective 
properties of a person and a social context in relation to these dispositions (Archer, 
2003: 12).37  
 
In their outline of a relational sociology of organisations, Mutch, Delbridge and 
Ventresca suggest that Bourdieu’s theoretical framework is ‘compatible with a 
                                                
37 For Archer, Bourdieu is conflationist in the sense that his attempt to transcend the 
dualism of agency and structure through the concept of habitus as embodied social 
structure comes at the cost of conflating the ontologically separate entities of agents 
and the social world (Archer, 2007: 41-44). 
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broadly realist ontology’ (Mutch et al, 2006: 610). Here, the fact that there is a 
certain amount of uncertainty as to how Bourdieu’s concept of habitus produces 
practices and about the circumstances under which an ‘awakening of consciousness’ 
may or may not play a role in this transition (Jenkins, 1992: 82-83) is indicative of 
sufficient room for manoeuvre to reconcile Bourdieu’s approach with a critical realist 
understanding of the relation between structure and agency in social science. As 
Elder-Vass (2007: 329) points out: 
 
In the absence of a clear explanation of how dispositions produce practices 
and hence how consciousness might sometimes be involved in the process, 
it is understandable that there is confusion about the apparent conflict 
between Bourdieu’s stress on the subconscious operation of habitus and his 
heavily qualified acceptance of some role of conscious thought (emphasis 
added). 
 
For Archer, the question of how dispositions influence practices lies at the core of the 
debate. And the answer for her is that dispositions influence practices through the 
reflexive mediation of individuals who subjectively review their personal aspirations 
in the light of objective circumstances. Reflexivity, for Archer, therefore plays a vital 
role in converting social structures into practices. It is not an option available to 
certain agents under certain circumstances, but ‘indispensable to explaining social 
outcomes’ (Archer, 2007: 5, emphasis in original). Put differently, the causal powers 
of structures can only become effective in relation to agential powers of the 
individual (Archer, 2003: 5; 2007: 12).  
 
 
3.5.2 Theoretical Compatibility 
 
Basing his theoretical argument on the emergent relationship between 
neurophysiologic aspects of brain and thought – and in particular on findings that the 
synaptic networks in the brain that store knowledge and beliefs (dispositions) are 
conditioned, which means strengthened or weakened by the sum of our experiences – 
Elder-Vass continues to demonstrate how decision-making is co-determined by both 
habitual and reflexive mechanisms. He does so primarily by stressing the processual 
character of practices, which allows for both reflexive thought and (fully or partially) 
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habitual execution. In other words, while a decision may be conscious, its execution 
will often depend on unconscious behaviour based on past experience – leaving open 
the possibility of conscious ‘last minute’ amendments to the action.  
 
On the one hand, Elder-Vass agrees with Archer that as individuals ‘we possess the 
causal power to think consciously about our plans’ (Elder-Vass, 2007: 340). Here, 
reflexivity plays a role on two levels: firstly, actions are subject to deliberate 
decisions both when an initial decision is taken to do something in a given way 
(which may be split seconds or hours or weeks removed from a partially unconscious 
execution) and at the point of implementation in the form of a conscious ‘last 
minute’ review. And secondly, since past experience in part has been based on 
conscious decisions, deliberate acts contribute to the dispositions that are generative 
of the habitus. As Elder-Vass put it: ‘Our habitus at any one time is not the 
unmediated product of social structures, but the result of a lifetime of critical 
reflection upon our experiences, including our experiences of those structures’ (2007: 
344).38 
 
On the other hand, habitual practices continue to play an important role. The fact 
that, neurophysiologically speaking, (synaptic) dispositions are continuously 
modified by experience closely fits Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. In addition, there 
is an element to action of habitual practice that is present even in actions that 
originate in fully deliberate decisions, since only some aspects of the realisation of a 
decision or project are performed in a fully reflexive manner: ‘The conscious 
decision takes place at one time, and the execution is done nonconsciously at a later 
moment. Furthermore, the conscious decision only partially describes the behaviour 
to be undertaken, leaving other details to be “filled in” nonconsciously’ (Elder-Vass, 
2007: 338). In the context of AJE this is particularly relevant. For example, the 
motivation and decision of a journalist to join the channel and contribute to 
challenging established routines in international news is a deliberate act and forms 
part of an individual project that is reflexive in its very nature. Yet the 
                                                
38 This view of a co-existence of habitus and reflexivity at any given moment is also 
in line with Archer’s observation that ‘the “active agent” does not have a passive 
childhood or adolescence, which allows “society to get at them first” (Archer, 2007: 
90).’ In other words, dispositions stemming from earlier mediations of the social 
through the individual inevitably entail previous enactments of reflexivity.  
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implementation of this decision can have both reflexive and habitual elements, 
particularly in situations where time pressures mean that deadlines can only be met 
by reverting to tried and tested routines.  
 
To some degree, then, Archer’s account of reflexivity goes against the grain of 
Bourdieu’s theory in that she places agency, not structure, at the centre of her theory 
of practice – but, as Sayer argued, this should not per se preclude the possibility of 
‘combining concepts of habitus and individual reflexivity’ (Sayer, 2009: 122). On the 
contrary, as I have argued in line with Archer’s critique of Bourdieu, an 
understanding of the relevance of reflexivity is needed in order to conceptualise the 
ways in which habitus is generative of practices (Archer, 2007: 44f). Furthermore, 
Archer’s critique is in part based on the premise that there is, in her words, ‘a date-
stamp on Bourdieu’s theorizing’ (Archer, 2010: 300) as contextual discontinuity 
intensifies in increasingly globalised times, questioning the durability and continuing 
relevance of habitus (Archer, 2010: 296). For Archer, ‘[…] change is now too rapid 
and appropriate practices now too evanescent for inter-generational socialisation to 
take place’ (Archer, 2007: 41). However, putting a date-stamp on Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus is to acknowledge that there is a theoretically sound basis for his 
arguments, even if this is time-dependent. To say that today’s generations of young 
adults are no longer ‘Bourdieu’s people’ (Archer, 2007: 61; 2010: 287) is to concede 
that ‘Bourdieu may have been more or less right in practice for the period to which 
the bulk of his work relates’ (Archer, 2010: 287).  
 
Consequently, it becomes an empirical question of the degree to which habitus 
continues to play a role in today’s world (and indeed how far the continued relevance 
or disruption of habitus differs across social and geographical strata) - a question 
many answer by pointing out that ‘while there probably is an increase in contextual 
discontinuity there is still plenty of stability, and [children] could hardly become 
competent social actors if they did not develop a feel for familiar games’ (Sayer, 
2009: 122). Therefore, if Bourdieu can be accused of downplaying historical 
variability (Archer, 2007: 39), Archer can be accused of downplaying the contextual 
continuity of structures. For example, in the context of the present study, the 
durability of Western-oriented professional practices in international English-
language TV news and current affairs. In this study I will therefore seek to combine 
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Archer’s concept of agency with a Bourdieusian relational analysis in order to 
understand the dynamics between organisational and wider professional practices 
that has characterised the emerging organisational identity of AJE. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I argued that on the one hand the inherent ‘structural contradictions’ 
that Figenschou points out with regard to AJE’s strategy of a ‘professionalization of 
alternative media production processes’ (Figenschou, 2012: 359) are at least partially 
symptomatic of dynamics within the wider professional field of international 
English-language TV news and current affairs.39 On the other hand, AJE’s explicit 
aim to ‘challenge established perceptions’ highlights the necessity of a reflexive 
revaluation of the journalistic habitus prevalent within the professional field vis-à-vis 
the organisational field of AJE. I went on to argue that a combination of Archer’s 
critical realist approach to reflexivity and an understanding of the continuing 
relevance of Bourdieu’s concepts of field, habitus and capital are uniquely apt for 
conceptualising both practices linking AJE to the professional field and the reflexive 
deliberations of journalists aiming to change (some of) the rules of the game.  
 
To summarise, Bourdieu’s theoretical framework allows a conceptualisation of the 
link between AJE and the wider industry with regard both to practices (habitus) and 
to AJE’s position within the field (cultural and economic capital). As such, it helps to 
unravel the objective circumstances – material, social and symbolic – that impinge 
upon practices (including editorial decision-making processes). And it allows a 
                                                
39 Clearly, AJE has not only been influenced by the international field the channel 
competes in, but has been (and continues to be) very much a product of the national 
and regional context it emerged from. In other words, in order to understand AJE it is 
vital to understand the political and organisational environment that created it. As 
Khiabany (2010: 9) cautions, the ‘state has undoubtedly been one of the blind spots 
of media theory.’ And while this thesis is not about filling this particular gap, I 
nonetheless consider it crucial that I shall situate AJE in the context of its Qatari 
roots and the continued financial dependency on the state, as well as the 
achievements and international controversies of its parent channel, AJA, which 
essentially positioned AJE as a well-known brand and an ambitious yet controversial 
international player even before the English-language channel broadcast its first 
news programme (see Chapter 5).  
  93 
conceptualisation of change (and therefore of editorial difference) where these are 
the result of dissonances between habitus and field or of clashes between different 
kinds of habitus. In contrast, Margaret Archer’s concepts are not relational in the way 
that Bourdieu’s concepts are (she looks at processes of social conditioning, but her 
focus on the role of reflexivity in these processes means that she does not reflect on 
how social conditioning links different fields through shared practices).  
 
And while Bourdieu’s framework is underdeveloped when it comes to the question 
of what exactly happens at the interface between social structures and the individual, 
this question is pivotal for Archer, who focuses on the ways in which reflexivity is 
generative of practice by mediating between the two. In her words, ‘the specification 
of how social forms are influential also entails the reception of these objective 
influences, with their potential power to condition what people may do, by reflexive 
agents whose subjective powers ultimately determine what they do in fact do’ (2003: 
8, emphasis added). Therefore, by complementing Bourdieu’s core concepts with 
Archer’s account of agency, it is possible to gain an understanding of the crucial role 
that individual deliberation played in decision-making processes as reflexive as 
deciding to give up a job to join a different organisation or developing novel editorial 
practices in an emerging organisational environment.  
 
In short, in conceptualising an organisation as focussed on difference and change as 
AJE, it is indispensable to complement Bourdieu’s concepts with a theoretical 
framework that allows to account for deliberate action to a greater degree than 
habitus can satisfactorily explain. However, at the same time it is important to 
recognise that habitus does play a role in the execution of practices. Even 
consciously decided-upon projects are not acted upon in a purely reflexive fashion, 
as Elder-Vass pointed out in his work (2007). As some of the following chapter will 
show, this is particularly evident in a field as reliant on the efficiency of routines as 
24/7 news production.  
 
Exploring the above described dynamics empirically for the purpose of this thesis 
involved conducting in-depth interviews with AJE staff in various locations, 
considering external and internal AJE documents and analysing news content in 
comparison with the equivalent news content on BBCW News. In the following I am 
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going to outline how the multi-method approach presented here fits the overall 
objective and framework of this thesis – and what the results can (and cannot) validly 
and reliably say about the early years of AJE.  
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
 
Little can be said about method without taking into account the nature of the things 
which the methods are to be used to study. 
 
Andrew Sayer, Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach, (1992: 85) 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Methodology is a means to an end. As such it is not, however, secondary to its end, 
but on the contrary shapes in important ways the insights a study can deliver. As an 
intermediary between object of study and theory it determines whether what is being 
stated about the object can justifiably be said to be valid and reliable. In the case of 
an object that concerns social aspects of reality, being able to provide an explanation 
beyond description while also being able to judge explanations as more or less 
adequate poses a particular set of challenges. In this thesis, these challenges are met 
by underpinning the methodology with a realist ontology as well as an 
acknowledgment of the need to ‘take into account that its object is 
concept/discourse/text-dependent (though not concept/discourse/text-determined)’ 
(Shield, 2007: 308-9). The critical realist framework of this study entails an 
appreciation of the discursive nature of the data, in which discourse is defined as ‘an 
element of social practice, which constitutes other elements as well as being shaped 
by them’ (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: vii), referring ‘precisely to the capacity 
of meaning-making resources to constitute social reality […] within specific social 
contexts’ (Chouliaraki, 2008: 674). 
 
On the basis of this critical realist ontology, a combination of methods forms the 
basis for the empirical enquiry. In the context specifically of research on 
international news flows, Hanusch and Obijiofor (2008: 14) express their concern 
that ‘researchers’ preoccupation with content analysis procedures may have […] 
blurred the importance of investigating the underlying reasons why foreign news 
editors and reporters select and report news the way they do’. Consequently, they call 
for the application of mixed methods to questions of news flows, arguing that ‘a 
combination of content analysis and personal interviews with journalists would 
strengthen rather than weaken the quality of research on foreign news’ (2008: 14, 
emphasis added). Expressed in critical realist terms, ‘experiences may seem to 
“push” themselves upon researchers as evidence of events. However, the task of 
research is to mount a countervailing “pull” – to infer underlying mechanisms’ 
(Jensen, 2002: 269). And while different methods serve to answer different aspects 
of the main research question (see 4.2), they also help to triangulate the data and 
increase the validity of the findings (Riffe et al., 2005: 159).  
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Therefore, one element of the methodology is a quantitative comparative analysis of 
AJE and BBCW news programmes, designed to complement the interview data by 
providing examples of potential effects of generative mechanisms in AJE’s news 
output relative to that of one of its main competitors, BBCW. The second element is 
a qualitative enquiry into mutual influences between AJE’s remit, organisational 
factors and journalistic practice. For this purpose I conducted 28 in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with editors, correspondents, producers, presenters, researchers 
and management staff at the London, Doha and Kuala Lumpur offices of AJE. These 
interviews will be explored in a thematic analysis that focuses on patterns above the 
level of the clause, allowing an understanding of some of the ways in which debates 
within the channel play out in relation to AJE’s organisational identity and editorial 
line.  
 
I agree with Sayer (1992: 197) that, if quantitative analysis is to be meaningful in 
relation to this research, this relies on ‘conceptual preparation’, which ideally would 
‘precede statistical analysis.’ For the purpose of the present thesis, I first conducted 
and analysed interviews with AJE staff and then designed and conducted the content 
analysis. However, in terms of the order in which chapters are presented within the 
thesis, I decided to outline the results from the descriptive quantitative analysis 
before going into more detail in the qualitative chapters. This was done so as to 
provide anyone not familiar with the output of AJE during the period of analysis with 
a preliminary understanding of what the news on the channel looked like (compared 
with BBCW) before using ‘other “languages” […] needed to show’ (Sayer, 1992: 
180) how powers and liabilities inherent in journalistic practices and structures made 
certain outcomes more likely than others in the specific case of AJE. 
 
Also, since ‘reporting back’ is a relational concept that acquires meaning in contrast 
to other actors or organisations, the methodology contains comparative elements on 
several levels. Apart from the content analysis (which is comparative in obvious 
ways) the fact that virtually the entire first generation of AJE staff brought with them 
significant experience from other news broadcasters, where most of them they had 
worked until relatively shortly before the research interviews for this thesis were 
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conducted, added a comparative dimension to their interpretations and perceptions of 
AJE and its relation to the wider field. 
 
In the following, I will outline the foundations of my methodology, including 
research questions, choice of methods and the analytical status of the quantitative and 
qualitative data generated for this research. The subsequent section of this chapter 
will address methodological decisions and processes regarding the comparative 
content analysis. In the third part of the chapter I will consider the specifics of 
fieldwork and conducting research interviews in the Doha, London and Kuala 
Lumpur offices of AJE, and focus on thematic analysis as a means of understanding 
patterns and tensions within the interview data. 
 
 
4.2 Methodological Foundations 
 
In order to make informed methodological choices, it is vital first to formulate a set 
of research questions (Hansen et al., 1998: 99), bearing in mind that ‘different 
methodologies may be suited to examine different aspects of a research question, and 
not necessarily in the same empirical domain’ (Jensen, 2002: 272). Research 
questions in turn are informed and guided by the theoretical framework of the study 
as outlined in the previous chapters. In the context of this study, they were devised to 
interrogate questions of news flows from a relational perspective taking into account 
intra- and inter-organisational factors and their mediation through journalistic 
practices, both habitual and reflexive. The overarching question guiding this research 
can be summarised as follows: 
 
In how far and in what ways does AJE deliver on the channel’s declared aim 
to challenge asymmetric global news flows and how is this aim aided or 
obstructed by the interplay of agential forces and structural mechanisms 
residing both within the organisational field and the wider professional field? 
 
This question will be discussed in the context of the early years of Al Jazeera 
English, which as an empirical case study offers the rare opportunity to research the 
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formative years of a media organisation that simultaneously aimed at reversing 
‘conventional’ news flows and had the financial backing to pursue its aims on a scale 
that allowed it to compete with well-established channels.  
 
 
4.2.1 Research Questions and Choice of Methods 
 
On a more detailed level, a range of sub-questions emerge from the theoretical 
framework. These can be grouped into three categories. The first category concerns 
questions of representation. The second category concerns questions of journalistic 
practices, the unequal dispersion of specific kinds of professional habitus and 
journalistic agency. And the third category concerns questions of journalistic habitus 
and agency with regard to AJE’s position in the journalistic field, as expressed 
through the relative weight of cultural and economic capital. The three empirical 
chapters of this thesis will be guided by these three sets of questions.  
 
In order to answer questions of representation (Chapter 6), I conducted a comparative 
content analysis that looks at AJE’s news content both in relation to the 
organisation’s remit and in relation to the news content of BBCW. This analysis has 
both quantitative and qualitative elements (with a strong emphasis on the first) and 
serves to give a sense of some of the potential effects of the structural mechanisms 
addressed in the interview-based empirical chapters to follow. Questions to be 
answered in Chapter 6 include: 
 
1. Does AJE fulfil its remit of being a ‘voice of the South’ by representing the 
global South to a greater degree than its competitors in its news programmes? 
a. If so, how consistent is any emphasis on the global South relative to 
other broadcasters? 
b. And how is AJE’s remit reflected within the structures of the news 
programmes in terms of the time allocated to items from the global 
South as opposed to items from the global North, and the number of 
items not carried on other networks? 
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2. Does AJE fulfil its remit of being a ‘voice of the voiceless’ by representing in 
its news programmes those who are comparatively under-represented in the 
field of international news to a greater degree than its competitors, including 
non-Western voices, female voices or people speaking in their capacities as 
‘ordinary people’ and from other positions outside the realms of power? 
3. Are there any correlations and/or overlaps between different under-
represented groups that would weaken or strengthen AJE’s claim of 
providing a difference in its news profile? 
 
As stated earlier (4.1), I agree with Sayer (1992: 193) that ‘if [quantitative] methods 
are to gain any plausibility they must be supplemented by realist appraisals based on 
qualitative structural analysis’. Therefore, in-depth interviews and their qualitative 
analysis are indispensable for some of the questions raised in this thesis, because 
they allow a look into potential generative mechanisms that are impossible to infer 
from a quantitative analysis of news content. And so, in order to answer questions 
with regard to professional habitus and agency (Chapter 7) and capital (Chapter 8), I 
conducted in-depth interviews with AJE staff, drawing on their extensive experiences 
within the wider professional field as well as their motivations to join AJE and their 
experiences in actively seeking out change and pursuing difference in international 
news.40 Research questions for Chapter 7 include:  
 
4. How do factors specific to the professional field affect the channel’s capacity 
to challenge – both in the sense of being on a par structurally and contesting 
editorially – established international news channels? 
                                                
40 There are of course many methods one could hypothetically apply in a qualitative 
analysis of mechanisms within the organisation. As I will discuss in more detail later 
in this chapter, in the case of research on AJE that choice was somewhat restricted, 
since the organisation’s management tended to be comparatively cautious in deciding 
to whom and under what conditions to grant access. As Zayani and Sahraoui (2007: 
9) note, even superficial and ‘benign’ questions about the basic structure of the 
organisation frequently resulted in prolonged negotiations and vague answers. And 
so it is hardly surprising that ethnographic approaches or other observational 
methods were not an option for this thesis for practical reasons. As Figenschou’s 
(2010b: 964) experience confirmed, ‘[…] researchers visiting Al Jazeera are not 
authorized to observe production processes and therefore rely on interviews alone’. 
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a. More specifically, what is the role of professional habitus in AJE’s 
aim to ‘rebalance’ international news? 
b. And how does the unequal global dispersion of a particular 
professional habitus associated with the field of international English-
language news and current affairs broadcasting impact on AJE’s aim 
of challenging historically grown asymmetric structures within the 
industry? 
5. How is AJE’s aim of redressing the ‘current typical information flow’ 
reflected on an organisational level in terms of professional habitus and 
journalistic agency? 
a. More specifically, what are the mutual influences between AJE’s 
remit and its staff profile? 
b. And to what degree does journalistic agency impact on the emerging 
habitus of the organisational field as an environment devised 
specifically to challenge existing practices? 
 
The second interview-based chapter, Chapter 8, addresses questions regarding AJE’s 
position within the field and the significance of cultural capital: 
 
6. How does AJE’s position within the journalistic subfield of international 
English-language news broadcasting – as demarcated by the relative 
significance of cultural vis-à-vis economic capital within the organisational 
environment – impact on the channel’s ability to ‘rebalance’ unequal news 
flows? 
 
7. How does AJE’s position in the field affect the channel’s ability to impact in 
turn on the wider field? 
 
8. And in what ways is AJE’s position mediated by journalistic habitus and 
agency? 
 
As the nature and range of the above outlined questions signifies, finding answers to 
them necessitates different methodological approaches, including both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. Importantly, ‘quantitative and qualitative methods may 
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be subsumed under the same theoretical framework’ (Jensen, 2002: 258). 
Furthermore, ‘the realist framework is of special interest in a convergence 
perspective’ (2002: 269), since generative mechanisms and empirical manifestations 
inhabiting different analytical strata of reality require different methods in order to 
investigate them in a meaningful way. As such, descriptive statistics and a qualitative 
exploration of powers, liabilities and causal mechanisms (which may or may not 
result in actual events or even empirically measurable data) are not mutually 
exclusive on epistemological grounds. Rather, while on their own not very 
informative, quantitative methods may ‘usefully supplement qualitative descriptions’ 
(Sayer, 1992: 191, emphasis added) – and in the present case be used to record some 
of ‘the effects associated with the exercise of causal powers’ (1992: 180, emphasis 
added). 
 
 
4.2.2 The Analytical Status of the Data – A Critical Realist Approach 
 
Across the social sciences and media studies, the analytical status of research data 
has been a matter of debate with regard both to researcher-generated ‘texts’ (such as 
interviews) and to ‘texts’ existing prior to the research process (such as news output). 
While the assertion that a text is a resource for data that refers to something that 
exists independently of its interpretation is comparatively unchallenged in some 
areas of quantitative traditions, qualitative approaches have largely departed from 
this position, becoming ‘ideologically more separate from quantitative research’ 
(Platt, 2002: 50-51). This ideological departure, also referred to as a ‘linguistic turn,’ 
constituted ‘a major shift in social science research’ from a focus on reality existing 
independently of language to ‘studying the world as a language-mediated process 
that exists in discourse’ (Chouliaraki, 2008: 676). In terms of methodology, this shift 
manifested itself in a focus on the subjective and interactive41 aspects of data 
                                                
41 While the interactive character of a semi-structured interview situation is 
immediately obvious (and to a slightly lesser degree in qualitative interrogations of 
pre-existing ‘texts’ like news output), the way in which the actions of the researcher 
interact with and therefore affect data also apply to data generated in quantitative 
content analysis. As Sayer (1992: 179-180) highlights in his discussion of 
quantitative methods, the choice of the researcher of dependent and independent (or 
so-called ‘explanatory’) variables is an inherently qualitative decision that impacts 
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generation. Some qualitative researchers went one step further by claiming that all 
that can be extracted from the data is information about the data itself and its 
subjective interpretation, but not the topics it references. Dismissing the referential 
aspects of data in relation to an external reality, methodologies based on these 
foundations are concerned with how people negotiate and create accounts of ‘their’ 
reality in the process of decoding news texts or in interview situations. The text itself 
becomes the (sole) topic of research.  
 
This ideological departure in social sciences and media studies towards approaches 
that appreciate the constitutive nature of the data (an appreciation that is indisputably 
vital to the conceptualisation of social aspects of reality) led some to overdraw the 
dichotomy between constructivist approaches and realist approaches. Symptomatic 
of this condition is, for example, the crude juxtaposition in methodological literature 
on content analysis of (outlasted) positivist ideas in social science with assumptions 
that media texts ‘have no objective – that is reader-independent – qualities’ at all 
(Krippendorff, 2004: 22, emphasis in original). In literature on research interviewing 
specifically, this ‘paradigm war’ (Bryman, 2008: 625) likewise plays out in a 
tendency to present decisions regarding the analytical status of the data as a 
dichotomy between two mutually exclusive approaches, whereby postmodern 
constructivist accounts tend to be juxtaposed with ‘positivism’, ‘naïve objectivism’ 
or even foundationalism (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995; Gillham, 2005; Warren, 
2002).42 I am aware that such accounts may serve to outline extremes as a shortcut to 
explaining a range of approaches, but this is exactly what they ultimately do not 
provide.  
 
Instead, the extreme positivist position routinely serves as a prop to highlight the 
advantages of constructivist methodology in complex social settings without 
                                                                                                                                     
on the data that will emerge from the sample, since it implies a causal relationship 
that a) cannot be inferred from the quantitative data itself and therefore depends on 
factors external to the ‘text’ and b) cannot be confirmed by the data, which at best 
reveals correlations, but by definition never causes.  
 
42 It is precisely this refusal to acknowledge the simultaneously constitutive and 
constituted nature of social aspects of reality that Bourdieu argues against from his 
structuralist constructivist position. As Everett points out, Bourdieu was ‘dismayed 
by the dualistic nature of sociological thinking’ (Everett, 2002: 57). 
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qualifying how far the latter could be compatible with other realist approaches. As 
Warren contends, ‘unlike the survey interview, the epistemology of the qualitative 
interview tends to be more constructionist than positivist’ (Warren, 2002: 83, 
emphasis added), as if ‘positivist’ was the only viable alternative to ‘constructivist’, 
the rigidity of the first serving to highlight the advantages of the latter in the realm of 
‘real life’ data. In this context constructionist accounts are seen as doing justice to the 
complexity of the data through in-depth interpretation (with limited claims of 
superiority to alternative interpretations). ‘Positivist’ accounts, on the other hand, are 
seen as prone to perceiving interview participants as passive conduits for retrieving 
information from an existing vessel of answers (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995: 83) 
and to taking ‘a very surface approach’ (Gillham, 2005: 6).  
 
In contrast to this position, I agree with Seale (1998: 215) that treating data as 
resource and as topic are not mutually exclusive approaches. In the realm of social 
aspects of reality, both what is said and how it is said are relevant resources. What is 
missing from much of the methods literature, then, is an indication that interpretative 
and realist approaches do not have to be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, I would 
argue, only an approach that allows an accounting for the contingencies of social life 
is apt to constitute a realist approach to the analysis of social phenomena. In the 
following I will address these issues with reference to the theoretical framework of 
this study, arguing that critical realism offers a way of bridging what has in many 
cases been an overdrawn dichotomy between objectivist and subjectivist approaches.  
 
In order to exemplify the ways in which a critical realist approach can serve to 
mediate between these two positions, I shall present a critical realist critique of 
Kvale’s metaphorical illustration of what he describes as two divergent models of the 
researcher’s role in the context of research interviews (1996: 3-5). The first metaphor 
is that of the researcher as miner, while the second likens the researcher to a traveller. 
According to Kvale, the second metaphor ‘understands the interviewer as a traveller 
on a journey that leads to a tale to be told upon returning home.’ Through his own 
interpretation, the traveller reconstructs for his audience the stories he encounters. 
Through interpretation, ‘the tales are remoulded into new narratives, which are 
convincing in their aesthetic form and are validated through their impact upon the 
listeners’ (Kvale, 1996: 4, emphasis added). The metaphor of the miner portrays the 
  105 
interviewer as somebody who digs for the knowledge ‘waiting in the subjects’ 
interior to be uncovered, uncontaminated by the miner’ in the course of this stripping 
‘the surface of conscious experience’ (1996: 3). The terminology continues to evoke 
inhuman machinery: facts are being ‘purified’, ‘knowledge nuggets’ dumped on the 
‘conveyor belt’ that is transcription, meanings are ‘moulded’, their value determined 
by their ‘degree of purity’ (3-4). 43 
 
I would think that anybody would be hard pressed not to prefer ‘roaming freely’ and 
the ability to ‘enter conversations with people encountered’ to insulting the dignity of 
their interviewees by attempting to excavate knowledge out of the ‘subjects’ 
interior’. However, there are a number of ways in which Kvale’s two opposing 
metaphors and the methodological assumptions they represent fail to convince. The 
most important critique is that the approaches illustrated by both these metaphors 
reduce ontology to epistemology. By so doing they commit what Bhaskar calls an 
epistemic fallacy or ‘the analysis or definition of statements about being in terms of 
statements about our knowledge (of being)’ (Bhaskar, 1993: 397), albeit with very 
different theoretical implications. The traveller’s ‘new knowledge’ reduces 
encounters and landscapes to the subjective narratives that are ‘validated through 
their impact upon the listeners’ (Kvale, 1996: 4), thereby equating what can be 
known with what there is. The metaphor of the miner also conflates epistemological 
and ontological issues by suggesting that ‘knowledge nuggets’ reside within the real 
objects to be collected by the researcher, thereby confusing the acknowledgment of 
an external reality with claims of direct and straightforward access to it.  
 
As I will argue, a clear analytical distinction between epistemological and 
ontological issues, as outlined in critical realist accounts, helps to resolve the rigidity 
of both approaches and to arrive at a position where the complexity and constitution 
of knowledge is adequately taken into consideration and statements are taken to have 
referential relations to reality.44 Or, as Bryman (2008: 590) puts it, ‘critical realists 
                                                
43 This again resonates with metaphors used in the context of content analysis of text 
as a ‘container’ (Krippendorff, 2004: 22) for content ‘waiting to be separated from its 
form and described’ (2004, 20). 
 
44 In addition, methodological approaches associated with the metaphor of the 
traveller are often implicitly presented as the more ethical choice, while approaches 
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occupy a middle ground between positivism and postmodernism by claiming that an 
entity can exist independently of our knowledge of it, while also asserting that access 
to the social world is always mediated and thus subjective’.  
 
As this example shows, the distinction between real objects and thought objects 
(Sayer, 1992: 46-49) is paramount for the conceptualisation of knowledge, whereby 
thought objects include any kind of statements about real objects. Bhaskar 
distinguishes between intransitive objects of knowledge that do not depend on any 
kind of human activity for their existence (e.g. the shape of the earth or the 
movement of tides) and transitive objects of knowledge that are social products (such 
as antecedently established scientific facts and theories) (Bhaskar, 1998). Sayer 
expands this notion to cover a kind of knowledge central to social sciences: 
knowledge about the objects of knowledge of others. In his words: ‘While natural 
scientists necessarily have to enter the hermeneutic circle of their scientific 
community, social scientists also have to enter that of those whom they study’ 
(Sayer, 2000: 17). Consequently, in the double hermeneutic of social science, 
thought objects include theories about other thought objects. While in the case of this 
particular research the object of study is the (itself transitive) object that is AJE as an 
organisation, both data (in the shape of news content and interview texts) and written 
analysis take the form of thought objects that relate to – but are distinct from – that 
object.  
 
Being key to the realist framework of this study, this distinction enables me to 
appreciate the constituted and constitutive relation between texts (as thought objects) 
and their objects. In the case of content analysis, this means that I understand the text 
to transport information and meaning that (however multi-layered and subjectively 
constructed) relate to various aspects of an external reality that concerns AJE’s 
editorial profile. And, in the case of research interviews, this means that 
interviewees’ comments, for example on themes of organisational identity, are not 
conflated with organisational identity or (mis)taken for unproblematic evidence of 
                                                                                                                                     
associated with the metaphor of the miner are likened to ‘human engineering’ 
(Kvale, 1996: 4). Critical realists have made the opposite point. Positioning discourse 
within the materiality that affects it, they argue, is a matter of doing justice to the 
individuals’ perspectives in that material restrictions and needs are not being reduced 
to perception and rhetoric (Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007: 103-4). 
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the character of this identity, but that a reciprocal relationship between that identity 
and the way it is being talked about is assumed. 
 
 
4.3 Comparative Content Analysis 
 
In order to tease out some of the intricacies involved in ‘reporting back’ and to show 
some examples of potential45 on-screen expressions of the competing causal powers 
of journalistic habitus and agency (as advanced in Chapters 7 and 8), I conducted a 
detailed comparative content analysis of AJE and BBCW news programmes. Being 
arguably the most straightforward method of analysing aspects of a news 
broadcaster, content analyses of AJE’s news programmes have been conducted in a 
range of contexts (see also 5.4.2), but these have largely been directly linked to 
coverage of a particular issue and/or region (Barkho, 2007; Kolmer & Semetko, 
2009; Azran, 2010; El-Ibiary, 2010; Lawson, 2011; Mellese & Mueller, 2012). What 
I seek to do here, in contrast, is to assess AJE’s aims on the more generic level. 
Notably, there are two previous studies with similarly broad objectives (Painter, 
2008; Figenschou, 2010a). In relation to this thesis their respective results provided 
invaluable groundwork from which I could proceed to add several new aspects that 
closely match the objective of my content analysis (see Chapter 6), which is to 
further understand to what degree and with respect to which categories AJE 
provides, relative to one of its main rivals (and in the specific context of the news 
programmes analysed), the editorial difference enshrined in its corporate profile.   
 
In terms of methodology, the two examples mentioned above can be characterised 
respectively by their comparative focus (Painter, 2008) and their non-comparative 
                                                
45 Here, I use the modification of the term ‘potential’ to once more indicate that I am 
not assuming a straightforward causal relationship between underlying mechanisms 
of journalistic practice and the particular content I analysed, but rather regard the 
latter as one of many possible expressions of a set of underlying mechanisms that are 
not necessarily simultaneously activated and therefore may, without forfeiting their 
explanatory value, produce different results in different situations. This lack of a 
strictly repeatable pattern is precisely what makes it so difficult to ‘predict’ social 
outcomes, but for that very reason has to be addressed (as is the case in critical 
realism) in a theory of causation that does not hinge on reproducibility if it is to make 
sense in the context-dependent realm of social aspects of reality.  
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but very nuanced approach (Figenschou, 2010a). Therefore, the aim of the content 
analysis in this thesis is add to and to go beyond previous results by combining a 
wide range of variables with a comparative element in order to allow for a robust 
evaluation of AJE’s news content in direct relation to my research questions. For this 
content analysis, the comparative element is important not least because it reflects 
the implicitly comparative element within the research interviews with journalists, a 
majority of whom – at the time of interview – had relatively recently joined AJE 
from one of the major Western broadcasters and who often compared their 
experience at AJE with their previous work. This is provided by relating AJE’s news 
content to correlating news broadcasts on BBCW.46 The inclusion of BBCW footage 
serves as a backdrop against which examples of relative difference and similarity in 
AJE’s content become discernible. 
 
In addition, I included several new aspects in order to explore issues not covered in 
previous research. New elements included, for example, analysing the proportion of 
original items not covered by the other channel and the inclusion of variables 
regarding actors’ geo-cultural backgrounds (or primary habitus) as a potential 
contribution to difference in international news (for a more detailed delineation of 
variables, see 4.3.2). Another example is the differentiation between (percentages of) 
numbers of news items and the airtime allocated to these. In order to assess whether 
stories from particular regions were systematically being allocated greater amounts 
of time, I decided to measure the percentages both of items47 and of airtime48 in order 
                                                
46 The latter was chosen because the UK location of BBCW’s headquarters matched 
most closely the methodological parameters of the overall data I generated for this 
analysis, which also include several interviews with AJE staff based in London (as 
well as in Doha and in Southeast Asia, but not in the United States). A more fully 
comparative study including content of other competitors, most notably CNNI, as 
well as interviews with staff of rival organisations, proved to be beyond the scope of 
this study.  
 
47 Where the news item was the unit of analysis, I defined ‘item’ for the purpose of 
this analysis as all the constituent parts of the coverage on one issue as introduced as 
a new topic by the anchor. According to this distinction, a news item could include 
an introduction by the presenter, on its own or accompanied by footage or graphics, 
packages from correspondents, studio guests, recorded interviews or live two-ways. 
 
48 Airtime was measured in seconds.  
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to be able to see whether the comparison between these different units of analysis 
confirmed tendencies observed elsewhere in the sample or added new insights.  
 
Moreover, cross-referencing some of the variables in ways that had not been 
explored before (for example by juxtaposing the socio-political roles of protagonists 
with gender to see whether any patterns surfaced from this particular sample) 
allowed me to further point out correlations and discrepancies, which I found to add 
a deeper understanding of potential effects of the dialectic of similarity and 
difference pervading different aspects of AJE. In order to further contextualise the 
quantitative variable-driven elements of the content analysis – and to assess Painter’s 
findings (2008: 44, emphasis in original) that despite an emphasis on the global 
South ‘at times the treatment of stories out of those countries does not differ widely’ 
– I supplemented the results for Questions 1 and 2 with short examples of particular 
news items, which allowed me to consider some of the more qualitative differences 
and similarities between the news output of the two channels analysed. 
 
 
4.3.1 Sampling, Reliability and Validity 
 
The sample for the comparative content analysis consisted of eight hours of news 
content, four hours from each channel. In order to limit potentially distorting effects 
of stories dominating the news for several days without, over a longer period, being 
representative with regard to the factors analysed, I chose programmes spread over 
the course of one year. For this purpose, I selected a starting date and then analysed 
programmes at intervals of three months – a ‘sampling strategy’ employed to help 
achieve a ‘reasonably representative’ (Hansen et al, 1998: 102-103) sample and to 
increase content (or face) validity (Holsti, 1969: 143). The days selected were 15th 
August 2007, 15th November 2007, 15th February 2008 and 15th May 2008. This 
timeframe was chosen to coincide with the majority of the interviews I conducted 
with AJE staff for the purpose of this study. In terms of AJE’s organisational 
development, these covered the period from the run-up to the channel’s first 
anniversary and reached half way into the editorially more consolidated second year 
post launch. I analysed one hour each per channel and sampled date from 18:00 
GMT on AJE for the channel’s flagship news programme, Newshour, and from 
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19:00 GMT on BBCW News to coincide with the start of World News Today.49 The 
most apparent difference between the two hours of news is the respective 
components of World Business Report [WBR] on BBCW and the sports section of 
AJE’s Newshour, neither of which has an equivalent during that hour on the other 
channel. In order to make sure that results were not skewed by this apparent 
inconsistency and to make explicit any potential effects this particular difference in 
scheduling could have had on the results, I included both outcomes including and 
outcomes excluding the respective business and sports sections of the news 
programming analysed.  
 
In order to assess the reliability of the overall analysis, inter-coder reliability was 
measured using Cohen’s kappa (to gauge coding consistency with a formula that 
accounts not merely for the percentage of inter-coder agreement observed in the data, 
but also the impact of chance agreement) (Riffe et al., 2005: 151). A resilient test of 
inter-coder reliability further served to underscore the validity of the analysis. For 
this purpose, 12.5% of the sample were coded, as well as by myself, by an advanced 
law student familiar with the purpose of the study, trained and instructed in how 
individual variables were defined in its context. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a couple of 
clear-cut variables such as ‘gender’ and ‘region’ were consistent between the two 
coders in 100% of cases, while other variables variously displayed a kappa ranging 
from 0.81 (for the variable ‘global South / North’), to 0.82 (for the variable ‘news 
genre’), 0.92 (for the variable ‘socio-political role’) and 0.94 (for the variable ‘geo-
cultural background’). According to Bryman (2012: 280) ‘a coefficient of 0.75 or 
above is considered very good’. In the following I shall outline the main 
characteristics of the variables chosen in relation to the research questions outlined 
earlier in this chapter. 
 
                                                
49 The time of day has an impact on the geographical emphasis on both channels (see 
also Painter, 2008: 28, 36), for the simple reason that editors take into account that it 
will always be the middle of the night for parts of a potentially global audience. In 
the case of the news programmes in my sample, Asia was probably less focused upon 
than it would have been earlier in the day, particularly in the case of AJE, which 
during the timespan analysed used to broadcasts news anchored live from the 
Malaysian capital in the morning (for later changes in the role of AJE’s four 
broadcast centres, see 9.4.1).  
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4.3.2 Code Development and Analysis  
 
In developing the variables for the coding process, I followed the directions outlined 
in the research questions, which in turn had been inspired by the theoretical 
framework of the thesis (see also 4.2.1). In addition, preliminary results from the 
qualitative elements of the research further informed the delineation of variables. For 
example, instead of merely taking into account the official editorial remit and 
mission statements of the channel, I also considered journalists’ interpretations of 
AJE’s remit in order to assess the degree to which AJE delivered on providing 
difference in international news by its own standards. I then ‘tested’ the variables by 
applying them to parts of the sample to see a) whether they generated significant 
results and b) whether further familiarising myself with the footage in this way 
brought up relevant aspects that I had neglected before. This process of refining 
variables was repeated several times until I was confident that the coding structure 
did justice to the data and was apt to address the issues outlined in the research 
questions. These variables then formed the basis for the development of a codebook50 
and for the ultimate analysis.  
 
To answer Research Question 1 – whether AJE fulfilled its remit of being a ‘voice of 
the South’ by providing a greater emphasis on the global South relative to the 
equivalent news content on BBCW (see also 4.2.1) – I coded news content for being 
from or about the ‘global South’ and from or about the ‘global North’ and compared 
the results with regard to a range of factors. Apart from the overall emphasis on 
stories on the global South and North respectively, these factors included degrees of 
consistency and variation across the sample, ‘original’ items not carried by the 
respective other channel and the relative distribution across different news genres.  
 
The delineation of a global South is, of course, as Williams et al. (2009: 27) point 
out, just one way of grouping global regions that, as a concept, has ‘nothing natural’ 
about it, although it ‘continues to be a common practice’ to construe the world 
                                                
50 The codebook can be accessed in Appendix 2.  
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through this lens.51 Encompassing hugely diverse regions, it is not surprising that the 
concept can be, as Painter puts it, ‘notoriously nebulous’ (2008: 24). However, the 
concept does retain some ‘cartographic continuity’ (Rigg, 2007: 3). 52  It also 
subsumes shared experiences of domination of a political and economic nature. In 
short, ‘what does link the regions [of the global South] is that these are parts of the 
world that have been commonly described for many decades now as developing 
areas’ (Williams et al., 2009: 8, emphasis in original). Commonly, regions subsumed 
under the category of the global South include Asia, Africa and Latin America, with 
further differentiations that variously list the Caribbean (Williams et al., 2009: 27) or 
the Middle East (Painter, 2008: 30; Figenschou, 2010a: 91) as distinct categories. For 
the purpose of the content analysis in this thesis I followed previous studies on AJE 
in defining the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America as the geographically delineated constituents of the ‘global 
South’.  
 
In addition, the terminology of ‘global South’ – as opposed to ‘the South’ – is 
suggestive of an acknowledgement of the fact that processes of globalisation have 
further complicated any such categorisation and rendered strictly geographical 
interpretations inadequate. Given that the variables of ‘global South’ and ‘global 
North’ therefore supersede simplistic geographical definitions (for more detail on 
this question, see also the introduction to Chapter 6), there is not a one hundred 
percent correlation between all the coverage coded as concerning issues from the 
South and the sum of all the coverage located in countries of the South. Coverage 
coded as being about the South, while geographically belonging to the North, 
included for example an item on Roma refugees in Italy and an item on Native 
Americans in the US. Again, this corresponds with working definitions of the global 
                                                
51 Historically, the terminology of the North/South divide is frequently associated 
with a commission chaired by the former German chancellor, Willy Brandt, which 
published a report called ‘North-South: A Programme for Survival’ in 1980 
(Williams et al., 2009: 1). 
 
52 Notwithstanding the circumstance that this ‘cartographic continuity’ is 
complicated by the fact that not every country of ‘the North’ lies in the Northern 
hemisphere and ‘the South’ is equally difficult to define geographically, with Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand frequently cited as defying simplistic North/South 
categories (Rigg, 2007: 4). 
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South as employed by AJE staff. Where an item featured more than one country, I 
divided item and time between all main locations mentioned in the report (which 
explains the occasional decimals in the category of items). For example, a sports 
news item on two Spanish tennis players reaching the semi-final in a tournament in 
China is split between Asia and Europe, if the coverage focused on both China as a 
host country and the status of the sport in Spain.  
 
To answer Research Question 2 – whether AJE fulfilled its remit of being a ‘voice of 
the voiceless’ (see also 4.2.1) – I first distinguished between different on-screen 
‘roles’ or functions of those having a voice in the news, such as journalists, 
protagonists in news items and guests invited for interviews. 53 54  When 
operationalising AJE’s official remit including the rather abstract notion of ‘the 
voiceless’, I was again guided by the interpretations of this remit by AJE staff.55 As a 
result, I looked at three categories for the position from which an actor might speak – 
what could be called the geo-cultural background, the socio-political position and 
the gender. Crucially, this is not to reduce the person in question to her or his 
association with one of these particular variables, but rather to highlight the position 
that the actor (inadvertently and inevitably) comes to represent on screen in this 
particular context. While for a quantitative analysis the category of gender is fairly 
straightforward, the categories of geo-cultural and socio-political positions warrant 
                                                
53 I decided that with regard to presenters the sample of four news programmes per 
channel was not sufficiently representative to provide meaningful results. Suffice it 
to say that when Henery compared presenters’ backgrounds on AJE, BBCW and 
CNNI news programmes she came to the conclusion that in terms of on-screen 
diversity ‘AJE’s mix was moderate’ (Henery, 2010: 31).  
 
54 As for staff working out of sight of the viewer, there are obvious limitations when 
it comes to content analysis. It is worth considering in this context, however, that 
there may well be interesting variations between different on- and off-screen roles. 
For example, the precise linguistic requirements for on-screen jobs in English-
language news make it arguably more likely that one will find greater diversity 
amongst ‘behind-the-scenes’ newsroom staff. On the other hand, it has been noted 
elsewhere that while there were relatively high levels of  ‘diversity in the AJE 
newsroom’, there were concerns ‘that the uniform management group represents “the 
North” rather than “the South”’, prompting ‘a call for more diversity in the top 
management from executive producers and up’ (Figenschou, 2012: 365). 
 
55 For a more detailed description, see Chapter 6.  
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further explanation (and had to be further broken down to work as variables for 
coding the news programmes.)  
 
The socio-political position was divided into one variable for establishment 
members, in other words those inside ‘the realms of power’ such as for example 
representatives of authorities, industry or politicians. Another category described 
those ‘outside the realms of power’, including actors appearing in their capacity as 
ordinary members of the public, citizens and illegal immigrants, those affected by 
poverty, conflict or disasters or in other ways being in a position juxtaposed to the 
powers that be. As Manning noted (2001: 139), ‘the sociology of journalism and 
news production has long distinguished between “official” and “non-official 
sources”’, but this distinction had to be expanded to encompass socio-economic 
dimensions in addition to the political dimension of bureaucratic officialdom, if it 
was to reflect a more inclusive ‘theory of dominance’ (Manning, 2001: 140). By 
grouping state authorities and industry leaders in the same category, I followed 
Grant’s distinction, as appropriated by Manning (2001: 140f), of ‘insider groups’ 
with access to the realms of power and ‘outsiders’ who do not enjoy privileged 
access to policy makers and other powerful positions and actors. The subdivision of 
‘outsiders’ into ‘potential insiders’, ‘outsiders by necessity’ and ‘ideological 
outsiders’ (Manning, 2001: 141) is likewise reflected in the division of the variable 
into individual categories or values.  
 
Thus, in the content analysis, the category of ‘ordinary citizens’ and others outside 
the realms of power includes ‘outsiders by necessity’ (such as victims of man-made 
or natural disasters, economically disadvantaged groups in society or those denied a 
legal status) as well as ‘potential insiders’ and ‘ideological outsiders’ (either of 
which can apply to opposition movements, depending on their stance in relation to 
positions of power). However, ‘ideological outsiders’ can also potentially accumulate 
sufficient cultural capital to allow them to become part of what has been recently 
described as an ‘independent elite’ (Figenschou, 2010a: 99). Therefore, for the 
present study, a third value serves to describe those who are not in official or 
economically sanctioned positions of power, but who nonetheless wield varying 
degrees of symbolic power, such as independent academics, researchers, writers, 
artists or representatives of NGOs.  
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Other than gender and socio-political variables, analysing news programmes with 
regard to the geo-cultural backgrounds of those appearing in them is deeply vested 
with a host of ambiguities and problematic questions. First of all, it is inherently 
superficial and reductive. It immediately warrants the question of how representative 
anyone conceptualised as a representative of a region or culture can ever be, or even 
just would consider him- or herself to be. (For example, I am a German national, but 
at the time of writing, after having lived for long periods in the UK and Southeast 
Asia, I would probably not consider myself as being particularly representative of my 
home country). In short, any such distinction disregards peoples’ experiences of 
living in more than one country or region at different times and the range of cultural 
as well as organisational settings that actors may have encountered in the course of 
their personal and professional lives. This goes for Western journalists with 
extensive experience of living and working in the South as well as for non-Western 
journalists who received their training from, for example, the BBC. It goes for the 
US-based non-Western commentators as well as for the Western aid worker in the 
Philippines. In other words, the position someone speaks from is so complex, and his 
or her ability to speak for or from the perspective of a group of people is informed by 
so many factors, professionally and personally, that constructing a perspective 
around a particular geo-cultural background - let alone a Western / non-Western 
dichotomy - does not appear to do anybody justice.  
 
However, given AJE’s self-proclaimed aim of reporting back from the South and 
giving a voice to the voiceless, it is virtually impossible to ignore, in any 
organisational study of AJE, the question of whose voices are supposed to speak on 
behalf of ‘the South’ and ‘the voiceless’. In the sense that ‘the question of “who 
speaks” can be posed in terms of the access of nations and cultures to a “voice in the 
world”’ (Tomlinson, 2002: 12), AJE’s remit is intrinsically related to the question of 
who has a physical presence in their news programmes, in terms both of protagonists 
and of journalists. Being a visual medium, superficial criteria of visual representation 
do matter in television. Furthermore, as Tomlinson remarks in relation to the 
academic side of the news flow debate, ‘the issue of “who speaks?” is of peculiar 
sensitivity’ in the context of unequal media flows, because without attention to this 
aspect of representation (whether it concerns academic debates about cultural 
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imperialism or journalistic efforts to rebalance international news) ‘there is a danger 
of the practice of cultural imperialism being reproduced in the discussion of it’ 
(Tomlinson, 2002: 11, emphasis added). Consequently, as has been remarked 
elsewhere in a comparative study of AJE, BBCW and CNNI: 
 
One very important test of “global perspective” arguably is a diverse makeup 
of staff. The more culturally diverse the make-up of each network’s staff, the 
more substance each could then have to claim that they offer a “global 
perspective”. It would be more difficult to assert the claim of offering a 
“global perspective” without such a mix’ (Henery, 2010: 30). 
 
This left me with the question of how to define geo-cultural backgrounds for reliable 
coding under circumstances so multifaceted that reducing these to quantitatively 
measurable variables was virtually impossible to accomplish in any satisfactory way. 
Short of ignoring the question – and in order to arrive at a viable methodological 
compromise – I decided that the criterion for coding ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ 
backgrounds of protagonists in news items had to be less the actual primary habitus 
of a given actor – which just as any other viewer I often had no way of verifying 
beyond the information given in the report - but the background that the person came 
to represent on screen. For example, I would code a protagonist speaking as a 
representative of a local community in a rural neighbourhood in China as having a 
‘non-Western background’ and a protagonist who spoke on behalf of French 
expatriates in Singapore as coming from a ‘Western background’, with the 
assumption that there would be a substantial correlation – if incomplete, fallible and 
superficial in its quantitative nature – with the actual backgrounds of the protagonists 
represented. In addition, in the case of journalists and representatives from the 
establishment or independent elites, staff webpages and online biographies were 
usually available to help determine whether their primary habitus had predominately 
been shaped in a Western or a non-Western context.  
 
To answer Research Question 3 – whether there are any correlations and/or overlaps 
between variables that would weaken or strengthen AJE’s claim of providing a 
difference (see also 4.2.1) – I cross-referenced the variables described above as 
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follows. In relation to AJE reporters, protagonists in news items and studio guests, I 
cross-referenced geo-cultural backgrounds with socio-political positions and gender 
to see whether different aspects of power were doubly inscribed in patterns of 
representation. In addition I also cross-referenced the categories of ‘global North’ 
and ‘global South’ with the type of news content (conflict/disasters, political 
processes, culture, business, sport etc.), the relative weight given to official 
statements and press conferences, as well as to (original) items not featured on the 
respective other channel. 
 
 
4.4 Interviews with AJE staff 
 
Research interviews formed the core element of the data for this thesis. The majority 
of interviews conducted for this thesis coincided with the timeframe for the sample 
of the content analysis, but follow-up interviews and background conversations 
continued until early 2013, when I travelled to Doha for a last time as part of this 
study in order to complete my research and update any contextual information about 
the organisation.  
 
I conducted 28 semi-structured in-depth interviews in three of the four locations 
where AJE had set up its main offices (London, Doha and Kuala Lumpur). 
Interviewees included a range of news and programme editors, researchers, 
producers and presenters, political analysts, correspondents, promotions producers 
and management staff. I tried to achieve the greatest possible symmetry of interview 
samples at the various offices, as well as to balance on and off-screen, journalistic 
and management personnel. However, it is also important to note that the choice of 
interviewees was neither representative within these categories (which would not 
have been feasible given that the channel does not release statistics about its staff 
profile) nor established entirely by myself, but emerged out of negotiations with 
media relations personnel (in the case of the Doha sample) and the bureau chief’s 
office (in the case of London and Kuala Lumpur). In addition, the fact that a 
significant share of staff frequently travel at short-notice meant that replacements for 
interviewees who had to rush off prior to an interview or mid-interview at times 
volunteered spontaneously on location.  
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Over the course of my research for this thesis I travelled to the channel’s Kuala 
Lumpur office for two weeks in 2009 and four times to the channel’s headquarters in 
Doha, including two weeks of fieldwork in 2008 and follow-up trips in 2009 and 
2010, as well as a three-week trip in 2013 to conclude my research with a final fact 
check and update. Being London-based for most of the research period, interviews I 
conducted at AJE’s London office were spread over the entire time of fieldwork. 
Levels of access did not seem to be fixed at any given time, but rather had to be 
continuously negotiated throughout the research period. In all, the level of access that 
enabled me to arrive at this particular sample was extremely generous and enabled 
me to draw in my analysis on about 30 hours of recordings (the equivalent of 
approximately 500 pages of transcript).  
 
 
4.4.1 Getting Access to AJE 
 
Researching AJE was a rewarding and challenging experience, which, as with any 
fieldwork environment, brought with it specific circumstances that influenced the 
direction and scope of the study. One of the main challenges began long before the 
first interview or even the first face-to-face contact (and to a lesser degree stayed 
with me throughout the research process): getting into the door. In the course of my 
research I enjoyed generous access without which this project would not have been 
feasible. However, prior to getting to the stage of the first interview there was a 
sustained period of trying to secure the degree of access that I envisioned for this 
project. In retrospect, the main obstacle seemed, maybe counter-intuitively, to stem 
from the novelty of the channel. Unlike long-established news organisations, AJE in 
its early days did not have tried-and-tested procedures for dealing with research 
requests. Furthermore, the massive endeavour of starting a 24/7 news channel 
simultaneously on four continents meant that keeping the organisation up and 
running occupied resources arguably to a greater degree than it did during later 
stages. Requests from academic departments understandably were not a priority 
during that time. In addition, during the first few months after the launch, which was 
around the time I started the project, the channel saw itself confronted with intense 
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academic and public attention, which naturally made gaining access more 
competitive.  
 
Researching AJE in any depth is only possible in cooperation with the channel’s 
media and press relations office. This is in part due to the mundane fact that 
conducting research about an organisation operating from offices equipped not only 
with front desks but with multiple security gates makes it a very different experience 
from studying a more or less dispersed social phenomenon or profession: it is 
difficult to imagine how one would get the degree of access I required for this thesis 
without the organisation’s endorsement. This characteristic is one that my study 
shares with many research designs across various disciplines and that was first 
conceptualised in political science as what is now commonly referred to as ‘elite 
interviewing’. Arguably the most distinctive feature of elite interviewing is that it 
provides a set of tools designed for gaining access to a professional environment that 
in many ways shields its employees from the curiosity of outsiders (Goldstein, 2002). 
Hence, interviewees are usually ‘in a position to control or facilitate the researcher’s 
access to their network or institution’ (Gillham, 2005: 54).  
 
As Gillham notes, for many the term ‘elite’ carries uncomfortable connotations, yet 
the term ‘elite interviewing’ is merely meant to indicate a ‘shorthand for a kind of 
interviewing which has a distinctive value’ (2005: 54). Elite interviewing is often 
described as consisting of a combination of existing practices, rather than a fully-
fledged method in its own right. It is precisely the flexibility of this definition that 
carries elite interviewing beyond the limitations of interviewing those traditionally 
defined as an elite. According to Odendahl & Shaw ‘elite’ – as opposed to class – 
signifies ‘specifiable groups’, often in terms of particular professions (2002: 301). In 
a study categorising elites by occupation, Lerner et al. describe the cultural sectors, 
and the media specifically, as complementing traditional businesses and political 
functions (Odendahl & Shaw, 2002: 302). If we accept that the media wield power, 
then those who contribute to its production participate in realising this power in 
meaningful ways. This power is unequally distributed between different industries 
and organisations as well as within any one organisation – managers exercise a 
different kind of power than editors or creatives – but some of the protection 
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mechanisms that accompany the institutional power of any given organisation 
necessarily extend to everybody working for that organisation at a given time.  
 
Ironically, given that the dispersion of information is the core business of a media 
organisation, researchers have found that ‘getting media organizations to trust the 
researcher in a culture that is information averse is not always easy’ (Zayani & 
Sahraoui, 2007: 7). With regard to AJE, Zayani and Sahraoui note that ‘an 
independent researcher is usually received cautiously unless introduced and 
recommended by inner circles or members of the network. Even so, it is hard for 
researchers to scratch beyond the surface […]’ (2007: 7). Figenschou (2010b: 961) 
describes this paradox as follows: 
 
On the one hand, Al Jazeera has been a catalyst for freedom of speech, 
breaking taboos and promoting openness in the Arab world […], but on the 
other hand the channel itself has remained closed to the outside world. 
 
This caution on the part of the channel, which has extended to the lack of availability 
of any kind of ‘hard data’ (such as data regarding the channel’s budget, diversity of 
its staff profile or even basic organisational charts), has been a challenge for 
academics researching Al Jazeera (Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007: 7; Figenschou, 2010b: 
967). In part, this has to do with AJE’s autonomous position due to its business 
model (not being dependent on advertisers means that the organisation is under no 
pressure to make data available to present itself to the market, while not being 
accountable to any license-fee paying public means there is no political pressure to 
disclose organisational data either). And in part this is likely to be related to ‘a lack 
of independent, critical social research in the Arab Gulf, and thus a limited 
understanding of the research methodology for both local and visiting researchers’ 
(Figenschou, 2010b: 967). Whatever the (combination of) causes, the result is that 
researchers depend on the information they obtain through informal conversations 
and formal interviews arguably to a greater degree than would be the case in the 
fieldwork context of research on many other broadcasters.  
 
Depending on information from interviews and conversations also means that 
questions of access continue after ‘getting a foot in the door’. During my fieldwork – 
which began around AJE’s first anniversary in late 2007 – the channel went through 
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an intense time of various transitional phases as management took stock, resulting in 
extensive personal and structural changes.56 In early 2008, a resulting assimilation in 
salaries between AJA and AJE, a lack of communication within the organisation, as 
well as long periods of contractual uncertainty and transition led to disenchantment 
in some quarters. Newspapers, notably The Guardian, wrote about AJE’s ‘staffing 
crisis’ (Holmwood, 30/01/2008), analysing potential motives and scanning the mood 
for any ideological changes in AJE’s editorial leadership. At the time of writing a 
number of different potential directions for the channel continue to be envisaged by 
different parties. On the ground as much as at management levels, a rally to shape 
this redefinition is still under way and is set to continue. Understandably, the 
readiness on the part of the journalists to talk on and off the record in times of 
transition – even if this transition is not the sole or even main subject of the interview 
– unsurprisingly varied, ranging from very supportive and forthcoming to acutely 
cautious. 
 
 
4.4.2 ‘Elite Interviewing’ and Interview Design  
 
These factors not only impacted on securing interviews, but also on the interview 
design and situation itself. In the case of ‘elite’ interviewees, who are usually well 
‘aware of the problems that could follow from any statement they make’, offering 
anonymity puts people in a position where they can be ‘less cautious and more 
helpful, not least because it reflects the researcher’s awareness of the “elite” 
interviewee’s position and responsibilities’ (Gillham, 2005: 55). In the interviews I 
conducted I offered anonymity to interviewees regardless of their position within the 
channel, but (where this information did not interfere with anonymity requirements) I 
indicate their position and location in order to add explanatory context to their quotes 
and paraphrases. Another common (though by no means exclusive) theme that runs 
                                                
56 For example, while the creation of the network (which had been designed to bring 
Al Jazeera’s Arabic, English, Sport and Documentary channels under one 
administrational roof) formally took place as early as March 2006, many of its 
effects were felt only after the launch in November 2006. As late as August 2008 
new shared departments – such as human resources and finance – were still being 
created, transferring responsibility for administrational matters from the individual 
channels to the overarching organisational structure of AJN. 
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through the different approaches to elite interviewing is that it necessitates a semi-
structured approach to interviews, since interviewees with potentially similar 
academic backgrounds to the researcher will seldom appreciate being ‘taken by the 
hand’ and guided through a preconceived or even standardised interview. However, 
far from being perceived as a restriction, it is emphasised that there are many 
advantages in letting an expert interviewee in part set the agenda of the conversation 
(Dexter, 1970). Thus, allowing the interviewee to spend more time with certain 
themes than with others, while retaining a basic structure that grants a certain level of 
comparability makes it possible to ‘preserve [the] narrative element in the 
developmental sequence of the questions, even if the framework is more categorical 
in character’ (Gillham, 2005: 72). Secondly, this is the most appropriate technique 
for interviewing people who are reflexive in relation to their own role and 
knowledgeable about the area of research, since it gives the interviewees the chance 
to lead the interview into directions that the researcher may not have been able to 
conceive of prior to the conversation.  
 
Lastly, ‘elite’ interviewees tend to be alert to the implications of questions: being 
told that one is asking the wrong question is ‘a typical index of this phenomenon’ 
(Gillham: 2005: 54), as is getting return questions as responses or being asked to ask 
more questions or to ask them differently – all of which happened at some point 
during my research as various participants simultaneously took part in the interview 
and commented on the activity of being interviewed.  In some cases this meta-
discourse appeared to be driven by genuine interest in the research, while in others it 
took the slightly more aggressive tone of a power game and at times it appeared to 
assume a deflective function. The latter frequently expressed itself in a tendency to 
stick to the official line and language as much as possible, given the critical and in 
part damning reception that Al Jazeera had received from all directions since its 
inception (see also Chapter 5). As a result, as Figenschou notes, many of ‘the 
channel’s management and editorial members of staff have become experts in 
deflecting critical questions with well-rehearsed statements’ (Figenschou, 2010b: 
970).  
 
One important achievement of qualitative approaches to interviewing has been to 
acknowledge its interactive character. With a method that generates data, rather than 
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analysing ‘naturally occurring’ data, the traces that this process leaves in the data 
need to be recognised as such. An important aspect of this position, associated with 
feminist approaches amongst others, is the issue of power imbalances between 
interviewer and interviewee, which one seeks to reduce as much as possible by being 
explicit about the purpose of the study and using a more conversational and non-
directive interviewing style. Building on establishing trust and familiarity between 
the researcher and the interviewee, these approaches serve to reduce alienation 
caused by the staged setting of the interview. Interviewing journalists means, by 
default, choosing some of the methodological practices associated with this kind of 
qualitative interviewing and discarding others.  
 
As indicated above, interviews will necessarily be more conversational than pre-
structured, not because of a deliberate effort on the part of the researcher to empower 
the interviewee, but because the interviewee is likely to be as used to this kind of 
power as is the academic. On the contrary, as Figenschou outlined in illuminating 
detail (2010b: 974), being a young, female Western researcher in the patriarchal 
context of the Arab Gulf at times meant that some of the senior male managers who 
agreed to interviews made no secret of the fact that they perceived the power balance 
to be tipped in their favour. In this context, any efforts to make the interviewee feel 
more ‘at ease’ not only seem unnecessary, but may very well prove 
counterproductive. Furthermore, in the case of interviewing editorial staff, it would 
be difficult to argue that the interview situation had an alienating effect on someone 
who was himself constantly using this method professionally, albeit with a different 
objective. 
 
 
4.4.3 Media Scholars and Journalists – Ambiguous Relations 
 
Another aspect potentially affecting interview situations was the fact that relations 
between media scholars and journalists have not been without tensions in the past. 
Given that members of these two professions share at least superficially some of the 
aspects of their trades, and most importantly are dealing – although in very different 
ways – with the subject of the media, dialogue between media scholars and 
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journalists should be a matter of course. However, there is ample evidence that this 
cannot be taken for granted. In Foreign News: Exploring the World of Foreign 
Correspondents, a work in which he stresses the value of ‘studying sideways’, 
Hannerz (2004: 8) shares his impression that ‘indeed journalists often have a 
reasonable suspicion that academics generally are inclined to be critical of news 
work’. Yet, given that critical engagement is an ideal shared by both professions, it is 
hard to imagine that a critical attitude is the sole reason for what some go as far as 
describing as mutual suspicion.  
 
One of the contributing factors thus may stem from very specific theoretical 
assumptions that coincided with a time when news sociology was in its heyday. This 
strand of media studies was characterised by prioritising structure and its links to 
dominant social forces over journalistic agency, which of course from a journalist’s 
perspective carries the implicit accusation not only that  their work was secondary to 
the system they worked in, but also that they were blind to that system’s ideological 
character. News sociologist Schudson (1989: 263), in a slightly partial attempt to 
reduce the apparent mutual ‘mistrust’ to a problem of (mis)understanding on the part 
of the journalists, concludes that ‘social scientists who study the news speak a 
language that journalists mistrust and misunderstand’. The 1996 interview between 
Noam Chomsky and the BBC’s Andrew Marr is a case in point. Marr repeatedly 
enquires why Chomsky appears to allege that journalists (‘people like me’) are ‘self-
censoring’, while Chomsky is at pains to explain that the bias to which he refers is 
not a matter of self-censorship on the part of individual journalists, but of an 
inherently biased social system, which is profoundly different than alleging self-
censorship (Chomsky & Marr, 1996). Indeed, language is part of the problem, but, as 
I would argue, in a more mutual fashion than members of both professions at times 
allege.  
 
On the one hand, as Murdock (1994: 110) explains, social scientists (other than 
scholars of the natural sciences) are confronted with the problem that the 
terminology that intuitively lends itself to describing the phenomena they study is 
already burdened with a plethora of colloquial usages and connotations. 
Consequently, these either warrant further definition or need to be abandoned in 
favour of ‘specialist’ terminology that signifies a distinct phenomenon or structure in 
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less uncertain terms. When interviewing social scientists, journalists often come to 
regard these kinds of terms (for example, habitus, heteronomous tendencies, fields, 
causal liabilities, to name a few used in this thesis) as fuzzy and drawn-out, despite 
them being more precise and shorter than their colloquial explanations, because they 
get in the way of their job, which is to make the information accessible to a broad 
audience. However, breaking these terms down into colloquial language would, if 
done properly, in most cases lead to longer rather than shorter explanations (that is 
why they are used as ‘shortcuts’ in academic discourse), for which of course there is 
rarely space and time in journalism. The exercise therefore often results in variously 
grave degrees of imprecision, leaving journalists annoyed by the process and 
academics baffled by the product (for numerous examples of misrepresentations of 
social scientists’ accounts in the media, see Haslam & Bryman, 1994).  
 
On the other hand, academics at times succumb to the fallacy that colloquial 
‘journalistic’ language is by default indicative of a lack of in-depth analysis. As a 
result, they sometimes crudely underestimate the extent to which journalists engage 
with their topics, because, as one producer explained, journalists measure their 
success by how well they manage to simplify issues without losing the shades of 
grey. Not using academic terminology is part of that skill, and therefore not 
indicative of being either aware or unaware of underlying complexities and  
discourses. In one particular incident, an AJE producer recounted how, after 
thoroughly studying and debating a topic for a prolonged period of time and 
subsequently succeeding in breaking it down and ‘translating’ abstract terminology 
into colloquial language for a documentary piece, she felt offended by an academic’s 
ready judgement that underlying her report were deeper theoretical issues that she 
had allegedly unknowingly ‘stumbled upon’ (personal interview, London, 
24/10/2007).  
 
These are just a few examples that show how ambiguous relations are at times 
between the related professions of journalist and media scholar. This condition stems 
in part from previous encounters and resulting bias – and it is a condition that neither 
media academics who engage with journalism on a theoretical level nor journalists 
who value precision in their journalistic products can afford to uphold. Here, I agree 
with Gans (2011: 11) that ‘both would gain from a properly designed division of 
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labor; journalists would enable empirically inclined academics to be more topical, 
and thus more relevant to the general public, and researchers could help to sharpen 
the journalists’ analytic skills and repertoires’. It is precisely in this context that 
Archer’s contribution to theories of agency and practice comes to bear and provides a 
vital corrective to some aspects of Bourdieu’s work. While Bourdieu stresses 
reflexivity mostly as an academic disposition ‘open to certain agents’ that treats 
academia as ‘a world apart’, Archer (2007: 46) conceptualises reflexivity as a core 
human characteristic, maintaining that ‘most people are potentially reflexive subjects 
whose deliberations can help them to make their own way through the world’. As I 
will argue, recognising journalists’ reflexivity in this way is a first step to addressing 
some of the causes of an at times ambiguous relationship between two professions 
that need not be ‘a world apart’ (Archer, 2007: 46). Here, the way in which the 
academic language of asymmetric ‘news flows’ has been appropriated by AJE 
journalists to consciously and reflexively aim to ‘report back’ and ‘balance’ 
international news can be seen as testament to the potential of academic-journalistic 
dialogue. 
 
 
4.4.4 Thematic Analysis  – Patterns and Tensions 
 
For the purpose of identifying wider themes within the data that allow me to analyse 
(tensions between) groups of arguments around various aspects of the channel’s 
organisational environment, I will conduct a qualitative thematic analysis of the 
interview data. The process of organising several hundred pages of transcripts around 
themes was supported by use of the qualitative analysis software NVivo. However, 
as the software is only as good as the themes entered, I only began to apply the 
software at a later stage, after having familiarised myself with the data and developed 
the initial themes. Thematic analysis has been described broadly by Braun & Clarke 
as a qualitative analytical tool that focuses on analysing recurring themes throughout 
the data. Themes are identified by locating regularities in the data that occur above 
the level of the clause. Boyatzis defines a theme as ‘a pattern found in the 
information that at the minimum describes and organizes possible observations or at 
maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon’ (1998: vii). Themes can be located 
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at a manifest or at a latent level within the data. Naturally, the number and variety of 
patterns identifiable in the data is limited, but extremely high – too high certainly to 
be exhausted in this study. The question of how one is to look for patterns therefore 
significantly influences the direction of the research. A number of approaches are 
possible and can be broadly divided into inductive data-driven and deductive theory-
driven approaches. For the purpose of this study, themes will be identified as 
‘patterned response’ to research questions, following Braun & Clarke’s (2006: 82) 
emphasis of the centrality of the research question in relation to theme development. 
Here, the centrality of the theme is not necessarily being derived from its 
pervasiveness throughout the data, but from its relevance in relation to research 
questions, while maintaining sensitivity towards themes emerging outside their 
immediate focus.  
 
Furthermore, thematic analysis is characterised by an epistemological flexibility that 
makes it applicable within a variety of theoretical frameworks. According to Braun 
& Clarke, thematic analysis is compatible with both realist and constructivist 
accounts, as well as with what they refer to as a ‘contextualist’ method, which 
acknowledges ‘the ways individuals make meaning of their experience, and, in turn, 
the ways the broader social context impinges on those meanings, while retaining 
focus on the material and other limits of “reality”’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 81). 
Boyatzis goes even further by claiming that thematic analysis as a method is 
uniquely positioned to allow ‘interpretative’ and ‘positivist’ social scientists to 
mutually benefit from their respective approaches to data interpretation (Boyatzis, 
1998: viii). In this judgement he fails to explain by virtue of what view of reality they 
could make use of their respective methodological advantages. However, his 
appreciation of the potential of thematic analysis to reconcile themes of ‘discovery’ 
and ‘construction’ in qualitative analysis gives an indication of the appropriateness of 
this approach in the context of the critical realist framework of this study. 
 
Braun & Clarke describe the six stages of thematic analysis as familiarisation, 
generation of initial codes, generation of initial themes, reviewing themes, defining 
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and labelling of themes and writing the analysis.57 The first stage of the analysis – 
familiarisation with the data – is a process that begins during the actual interview and 
continues throughout the engagement with the data. Transcribing the interview 
recordings is one of the early phases of actively engaging with the data. Therefore, 
even if ‘thematic analysis […] does not require the same level of detail in the 
transcript as […] discourse analysis’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 88) and other forms of 
analysis that focus on language at the level below the clause, attention to detail in 
order to create a rigorous verbatim written account of the interview is essential for 
later analysis. Subsequent re-reading of the transcripts further enhances the level of 
acquaintance and the ability to ‘navigate’ within the sample. The second step, the 
initial coding of the data, involves systematically creating shorthand descriptions of 
cohesive segments for each individual transcript before collating matching extracts 
across the sample under the label of a common code. Codes remain more descriptive 
than fully developed themes. In a third step these codes are aggregated into themes. 
For example the theme ‘The Network: AJA & AJE’ emerged from the following 
codes:  
 
• Sharing administrational functions within AJN  
• Mutual support in foreign bureaus 
• Sharing equipment and footage 
• Little or no organisational overlap editorially 
• AJE staff’s respect for AJA’s accomplishments 
• AJE not a ‘translation’ of AJA 
• AJE staff accused of thinking of themselves ‘more international’  
• AJE staff accused of thinking of themselves as more professional 
• AJE staff alleged to be ignorant about cultural sensitivities and historical 
detail of Middle Eastern affairs 
• More ‘descriptive’ explanation of context on AJE – More in-depth analysis 
and debate on AJA 
                                                
57 A terminological difference between this approach and Boyatzis’s model is that for 
Braun & Clarke a code is a basic description of extracts of relevant data to be 
condensed into coherent themes at a later stage, while in Boyatzis’s model a code is a 
detailed description and definition of a fully developed theme that can be applied 
across the data (Boyatzis, 1998: 31).  
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• Appealing to different audiences 
• Allegations that AJE has ‘piggy-backed’ on AJA’s success 
• Fear that AJE dilutes the brand AJA journalists created 
• Metaphors of family members to describe relationship between AJA and AJE 
 
Other initial themes included vocational trajectories and staff profile, organisational 
identity an editorial remit, international journalistic practice, objectivity and 
professionalism, journalistic ethics, and alternative vs. mainstream concepts of AJE. 
At this stage of the analysis potential overlaps between the themes are considered 
and the themes are stratified into overarching themes and sub-themes (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006: 89-90).  
 
The fourth phase of the analysis was to review these initial themes. In the case of this 
particular study this involved refining themes in the process of entering the interview 
into NVivo by applying the initial themes and amending and streamlining them, as 
new links between themes emerged from the data collations assembled by the 
software. These collations also helped to identify sub-themes and to improve internal 
homogeneity and external heterogeneity (that meant making sure that themes were 
internally consistent and there were no significant overlaps between themes). Once 
the thematic map has thus been refined, the fifth step is to label, define and describe 
the themes.58 At the end of this process, the following three main themes emerged: 1) 
AJE’s editorial remit, 2) journalistic practice, habitus and agency and 3) the relative 
importance of cultural and economic capital for journalistic performance. These three 
themes will be discussed in the empirical chapters 6, 7 and 8 of this thesis. In 
addition, I collated a range of themes emerging from the data that were not directly 
related to one of the three main themes under so-called ‘free-nodes’ (as opposed to 
so-called ‘tree-nodes’ which signify relations between themes), which I could then 
consult for relevant context during the process of the analysis. The three main themes 
were divided into sub-themes as follows: 
 
 
                                                
58 This process has a function equivalent to what is being defined as ‘coding’ in 
Boyatzis’ model (1998: 29-53). 
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Main theme Sub-themes 
Editorial remit  ‘Rebalancing’ international news flows 
Sustained commitment in the global South 
Grassroots approach to news 
Covering stories that others do not report 
Covering the same stories differently 
Ignoring stories that other networks run 
Lack of soft news 
Alternative vs. mainstream 
Being ‘truly international’ by ignoring domestic angles 
Role of Middle East coverage 
Reporting on the North from a Southern perspective 
Journalistic 
practice, habitus 
and agency 
Adapting to AJE’s editorial remit 
Primary habitus South 
Primary habitus North 
Professional habitus 
Circulation of staff between broadcasters 
Shared international practice 
Clash of professional habitus within organisational environment 
Motivations for joining AJE 
Relative 
importance of 
cultural vis-à-vis 
economic capital 
for journalistic 
performance 
Financial dependence and questions of editorial independence  
Cultural capital 
Economic capital 
Internal decision-making processes 
Plans to become commercially more viable 
(Perceived) audiences 
AJE’s position in the field vis-à-vis other major networks 
AJE’s position in the field vis-à-vis recent ‘alternative’ 24/7s 
AJE’s potential to impact on the field in the mid- / long-term 
Table 1.1: Thematic Analysis – Main themes and sub-themes  
 
At this stage the analysis moves beyond paraphrasing and grouping data extracts, as 
it includes describing a theme’s relation to the research question and its explanatory 
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value for the study. It also includes analysing the relations between themes and sub-
themes and establishing a ‘hierarchy of meaning’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006:92). The 
sixth and final step of the thematic analysis is to ‘tell the complicated story of the 
data’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 93) in a way that elucidates how the data contributes to 
addressing the research question and theoretical positions that this study is endorsing.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter served to outline the empirical context of this study and some of the 
gratifications and challenges involved in the pursuit of original data about AJE. 
Combining interview data and content analysis allows me to conceptualise difference 
both in terms of the channel’s mission as an intellectual exercise by AJE staff and of 
the production of difference as a practical activity. And it allows an analysis of 
underlying mechanisms in line with a critical realist understanding of causation 
(Elder-Vass, 2012b). As I have argued in this chapter, the very possibility of relating 
the data to the material and social reality of AJE’s organisational culture, in 
particular with regard to the qualitative and interactively generated interview data, 
depends on avoiding the epistemic fallacy of conflating what is said with the object 
of that talk. However, I assume that the two are engaged in a relationship of mutual 
influence: journalists’ work limits what they can meaningfully say about it and the 
way that working routines and editorial lines are being talked about potentially feeds 
back into practice. Furthermore, the combination of distinct methods to approach 
different aspects of the research questions serves to increase the validity of the 
findings presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
 
Each method carries a number of opportunities and liabilities. Analysing AJE’s news 
content in relation to news on BBCW provides a picture of actual differences in 
covering the world between AJE and one of its main competitors in relation to AJE’s 
remit of ‘reporting back’ from the global South (with the methodological caveat that 
whether or not structural mechanisms manifest themselves in observable patterns is 
dependent on context, so that what the content analysis can offer is but a ‘snapshot’ 
of a given moment at which certain mechanisms were ‘active’ and had effects on 
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news output while others, no less real, did not). What focussing on the relations and 
tensions between themes emerging from the interview data allows me to explore is 
the (under-researched) link between organisational factors such as the channel’s staff 
profile, the organisational culture of the channel, editorial decision-making processes 
and the scope for difference that AJE can potentially sustain within the wider 
ecology of international news. 
 
Furthermore, each method is endowed with comparative elements that help to 
elucidate the inherently relational character of questions of news flows. While the 
content analysis is comparative in obvious ways, juxtaposing the news programming 
of AJE and BBCW News, the less explicit comparative aspects of the interviews 
with AJE staff lie in the particular circumstances of AJE as a new organisation at the 
time. As I have argued, at the time of fieldwork journalists to an overwhelming 
extent had just joined AJE from other international and regional broadcasters – a 
necessity for a new entrant that launches on the scale AJE did – adding a 
comparative dimension to their interpretations of AJE and its relation to and position 
within the wider field.  
 
This chapter has not been about telling ‘the complicated story of the data’ (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006: 93). It has been about telling the story of how the ‘story of the data’ 
came about. Researching AJE has been a fascinating journey, and one that came with 
unexpected obstacles as well as unexpected gratifications. This chapter therefore also 
served to provide an understanding of the particular fieldwork context within which 
the data was obtained – in part collected and in part generated – in order to 
understand the limitations and opportunities stemming from this specific research 
framework. It has been about the story of how the data relates to its object – and that 
story is not at all complicated. After all that has been said, the bottom line is simple. I 
do not claim that the data I generated provides me with any kind of direct or even 
privileged access to reality, but I claim that nevertheless it does provide me with 
insights into that reality – insights that are indirect, fallible and valuable.  
 
These insights show a picture of this unusual journalistic endeavour that captures the 
dynamics of its early and formative years. And this is how this chapter lays the 
foundation for all that is to come. It allows me to turn my attention to the detail of the 
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data itself, its complicated and simple stories and its potential to provide answers – 
and some new questions. In the following chapter, before proceeding to the empirical 
chapters, I shall outline how, as a product of a particular historical and geo-political 
combination of factors, the founding of AJE was intricately associated with historical 
and political processes in Qatar and the renowned record of its ‘parent channel’ AJA. 
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Chapter 5 Legacy of Difference: Situating the 
Emergence of AJE Within the Context of 
Qatari Politics and its Parent Channel AJA  
 
 
You have to understand that the Al Jazeera network is by far the most complex media 
organisation in the world today. Not just by the nature of the broadcast centres, but 
the Arabic management and all these international people and the political space 
within which Qatar works and its foreign policy and all of these kind of things. There 
are no easy answers. 
 
Senior AJE journalist (personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009) 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
AJE cannot be fully understood without taking into account Qatar as the country that 
gave rise to and continues to fund the Al Jazeera Network. Similarly, despite being 
editorially separate and staffed by people who in their majority do not have the 
linguistic background to follow Arabic-language news, AJE cannot be fully 
understood without looking at the legacy of its Arabic-language parent channel 
(Powers, 2012: 7-8; Seib, 2012: 188). This is the case in part because AJA’s 
background and infrastructure continue to provide the backdrop for a number of its 
successes, and in part because understanding the not always straightforward 
relationship between these two organisational entities helps to understand the 
circumstances under which AJE, far from being a translation of AJA, came to 
develop its own voice. In other words, while AJE is by no means reducible to 
influences from the state of Qatar or from its parent channel AJA, it continues to be 
shaped by their legacy and would be inconceivable without them. In this vein, this 
chapter serves to give an understanding of the news network’s rootedness in Qatari 
politics, its history of challenging the relationship between media and politics in the 
Middle East by ruffling the feathers of virtually every government in the region, as 
well as the uneasy reception it received in the West, all of which contributed to the 
way AJE was envisioned and designed from the outset.  
 
 
5.2 Ambitions of a Small State and the Rise of Al Jazeera  
 
When Al Jazeera was launched in 1996 it transformed the media landscape of a 
region dominated by state-controlled channels prone to toeing government lines and 
avoiding reporting on contentious issues. While Arab-owned pan-regional satellite 
television had already taken a firm hold in the region,59 the advent of Al Jazeera, 
                                                
59 This had been the case particularly since the years following the 1991 Gulf War, 
when CNN’s dominant presence created a new demand, putting pressure on regional 
media industries to expand into satellite broadcasting (Sakr, 2008: 277; Sreberny, 
1998: 188). The development began to accelerate with the launch of the London-
based Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) under Saudi Arabian ownership in 
1991 (Zayani & Ayish, 2006: 482). In 1994 alone ‘no less than 20 pan-regional 
satellite-delivered television channels’ were launched (Sreberny, 1998: 189). By 
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Arabic for ‘the island’, had pioneered a kind of journalism unparalleled in its 
outspokenness. The channel’s editorial staff reported on everything from political 
corruption to women’s rights, creating a foothold for free expression that ‘would 
forever change the expectations of Arab citizens’ (Powers, 2012: 10). Two 
programmes in particular, ‘The Opposite Direction’ (modelled on CNN’s 
‘Crossfire’) and ‘Religion and Life’ (a programme on religion tackling modern life 
questions ‘from politics to sex’), had been relentless in their frankness, regularly 
triggering heated debates in the studio and beyond (Miles, 2005: 37-46; Miladi, 
2006: 952). In addition, the channel was able to secure access to widespread 
distribution infrastructure not long after its launch by being allocated a slot on the 
coveted C-band transponder on the Saudi-owned satellite, Arabsat, instantly making 
Al Jazeera’s content available to ‘anyone in the Middle East who had a small, cheap 
satellite dish’ (Powers, 2012: 9).  
 
Another intrinsic element of AJE’s outspoken approach and quick rise to prominence 
within the region has been the station’s historic link with the BBC. Shortly before 
AJA’s inception, BBC Arabic TV collapsed after only two years on air. The demise 
of the news service occurred as a result of the breakdown of the BBC’s contract with 
the Saudi Arabian Orbit Communications Corporation (owned by a group that had 
been chaired by a relative of the Saudi king) to carry the channel on its satellite 
network. Orbit’s unilateral decision to terminate the contract was triggered by a 
dispute over a BBC Panorama programme critical of Saudi Arabia’s human rights 
record.60 Seizing the opportunity presented by ‘a surplus of unemployed, BBC-
trained Arab reporters and producers’ (Rushing, 2007: 121), the Qatari Emir wasted 
no time in inviting many of the newly redundant journalists to take part in his ‘bold 
new media project’ (Tatham, 2006: 66). 
 
                                                                                                                                     
2008, competition had expanded from ‘a mere handful of stations a few years ago’ to 
‘more than 450 Arab satellite channels (Seib, 2008: x).’  
 
60 For a detailed narrative of the fraught and short-lived cooperation between the 
BBC and Orbit Communications Corporation (the Saudi partner of pre-merger Orbit 
Showtime), see Ian Richardson’s account of ‘the failed dream that led to Al-Jazeera’ 
(Richardson, 11/04/2003). 
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However, while the rise of Al Jazeera was closely linked to the journalistic traditions 
of the BBC, it would have been inconceivable without a unique combination of 
circumstances specific to the Gulf state of Qatar – in terms both of political 
developments and of economic resources. Qatar is a small country, less than half the 
size of Belgium with a population of about 1.7 million inhabitants, more than three-
quarters of whom are foreign workers or expatriates. In relation to its population size, 
in 2012 Qatar had the highest migration rate in the world, which means the country’s 
overall population change has been affected by migration to a greater degree than 
that of any other country in the world (CIA World Factbook, 17/07/2012).61 At the 
same time, the country’s significant oil and gas wealth has provided its relatively 
small population with one of the highest ratios of GDP per capita in the world (CIA 
World Factbook, 17/07/2012; The Economist, 5/11/2011). Qatar is the world’s third-
largest exporter of natural gas after Russia and Norway and saw the world’s highest 
year-on-year GDP growth in 2011, with an increase of 18.8 % (CIA World Factbook, 
17/07/2012). As I will further outline later in this chapter and in more detail in 
Chapter 8, the country’s deep pockets are fundamental to the existence of Al Jazeera, 
since the news network’s remit and reception within the region and beyond have so 
far made financial self-sufficiency virtually impossible.  
 
                                                
61 Within the past two decades, Qatar’s population has more than tripled, largely due 
to massive growth in the foreign workforce (Cochrane, 05/10/2011). Concerns about 
a ‘dwindling participation of Qatari citizens in the labour force’ (Al-Kuwari, 2012: 
86) have to be understood in the context of a labour market where nationality is a 
strong indicator of status and ‘tends to be linked closely to occupation’ (Nagy, 2006: 
123). With ‘a near-guarantee of public sector jobs for nationals’ (Romar & Toppa, 
2013: 27), Qatari citizenship is ‘a key predictor of both higher wages and shorter 
working hours’ (Forstenlechner & Rutledge, 2011: 30), while the private sector is 
largely run by the non-national majority. The government pursues a nationalisation 
programme known as ‘Qatarization’ in an effort to increase the number of nationals 
in the private sector. For non-nationals, entering the country is contingent upon a 
residence visa applied for through their Qatari employer or ‘sponsor’, a system that 
has widely been seen to provide ‘ample opportunities for legal and illegal arbitrage’ 
(Forstenlechner & Rutledge, 2011: 33). Many of the low-skilled labourers and 
domestic servants working in the country are victims of human traffickers delivering 
them into forced labour arrangements. According to the Trafficking in Persons 
Report 2012, the Qatari government is showing ‘increasing efforts to address human 
trafficking’, but it does not yet ‘fully comply with the minimum standards for the 
elimination of trafficking’ (U.S. State Department, 2012, emphasis added).’ 
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5.2.1 Al Jazeera in the Context of Political Change in Qatar 
 
Since the bloodless coup d’état in which Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani62 ousted 
his father in 1995, Qatar’s political outlook has changed substantially. The youngest 
leader in the Gulf at the time he took power, the new Emir modernised court 
proceedings, simplified royal protocol and introduced to government a ‘team of 
young, Western-educated technocrats […] more open to political and social ideas 
from the West’ (Miles, 2005: 14-15). At home he initiated a string of political 
reforms shortly after assuming power. He took the crucial step of formally ending 
state censorship of the media by abolishing the Ministry of Information, considered a 
very ‘unusual move for an Arab country’ (Tatham, 2006: 65). As Mostefa Souag63 
described this decisive moment in the country’s history: 
 
When we heard the Emir planned to abolish the Ministry of Information, we 
said to each other, this has got to be a joke […] This could not happen in the 
Arab world. When we first heard about Al-Jazeera, we thought this was 
another joke. Then we saw it and we finally realized that this administration, 
this elite which came with the new Emir, had genuinely decided to do 
something different. These are people who had been educated in the West, 
know what is going on in the world and wanted to apply their ideas in real life 
rather than be tied down by tradition” (Mostefa Souag in Miles, 2005: 30). 
 
 
Abolishing the Ministry of Information as the body in charge of censorship no less 
than paved the way for Al Jazeera and was seen as symbolic of the new 
government’s progressive stance. Amongst other reforms implemented by the ruler 
was the decision to separate the powers of the prime minister and the Emir, 
previously concentrated in the hands of the Emir (Lambert, 2011: 90), establish a 
new constitution in 2003 and introduce democratic elections for a range of 
authorities (Miles, 2005: 16), including the board of the Qatar Chamber of 
                                                
62 Father of the current Emir, Sheik Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and founder of Al 
Jazeera. 
 
63 In 2005 Mostefa Souag became Editor-in-Chief of AJA’s London Bureau. He later 
moved on to become Adviser to the Chairman of AJN and in 2010 was appointed 
Director of News at AJA. In 2013 he became acting Director General when Sheik 
Ahmed bin Jassim Al Thani left Al Jazeera to join the new government of Sheik 
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani after a short time at the helm of the network.  
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Commerce (Lambert, 2011: 92). Democratic municipal elections have been held 
every four years since 1999 and have seen women become engaged in the political 
process both as voters and as candidates. In addition to the championing of female 
candidates notwithstanding their marginal electoral successes 64 , several strong 
female figures have emerged amongst Qatar’s hereditary ranks, including the current 
Emir’s mother Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser Al Missned, (Lambert, 2011: 92; Miles, 
2005: 16), Sheikha Ahmad al-Mahmoud, who in 2003 was appointed Qatar’s first 
female cabinet minister and Supreme Council of Education member Sheikha Aisha 
bint Faleh bin Nasser Al-Thani (Schleifer, 2011: 123). 
 
However, the process of democratising some of the political structures within the 
monarchical country is far-removed from being comprehensive. Notwithstanding 
substantial reforms, Qatar remains an absolute monarchy with little tolerance for 
opposition. Elections on a national level, which would see the appointed Advisory 
Council or Majlis as-Shura be converted into a partially elected body, have been 
promised over a decade ago but kept being postponed to this day.65 Decision-making 
power on home and foreign affairs essentially lies with a handful of people at the 
core of the ruling family (Khatib, 2013: 429), with little or no accountability or 
transparency with regards to their motivations and long-term objectives (which of 
course includes questions about the financial commitment to the AJN).66 A national 
ban of political parties, trade unions and other bodies dealing with public affairs, 
coupled with monetary disincentives to dissent including ‘huge welfare subsidies’ 
                                                
64 At the time of writing a single candidate, Sheikha Yousef Hassan al-Jufairi, won a 
seat on the Central Municipal Council (CMC) in 2003 and successfully defended it in 
the 2007 and 2011 elections. 
 
65 The constitution provides that thirty of the Council’s 45 members will be directly 
elected, while the remaining fifteen will continue to be appointed by the Emir 
(Lambert, 2011: 94). However, until elections are actually being conducted, article 
150 of the constitution stipulates that the current appointed Council will remain in 
power, effectively ‘suspending the “legislative authority”’ until such a time as the 
ruling monarch sees fit (Al-Kuwari: 2012: 101).  
 
66 As Khatib (2013: 429) observes, in addition to lacking in transparency this 
centralization of power also means that while decisions can be reached quickly and 
efficiently, follow-ups and implementation of decided-upon policy measures are 
often inadequate due to ‘the lack of departmental deliberations, coupled with a 
limited foreign policy infrastructure.’ 
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(Lowe, 05/04/2013) and ‘significant salary increases’ in the public sector (Khatib, 
2013: 431), effectively render civil society ‘all but inexistent’ (Lowe, 05/04/2013).  
 
Given the lack of a legal system that is fully independent from the executive, 
publicly disagreeing with the political system comes at great personal risk in Qatar 
and in several cases at the cost of personal freedom. In a recent example of the 
hardnosed approach of Qatari law towards any signs of potential dissent, the poet 
Muhammad Ibn al-Dheeb al-Ajami has been given a life sentence in late 2012 
(Khatib, 2013: 430), later reduced to 15 years of imprisonment, for reciting a poem 
allegedly critical of the Qatari Emir at a private gathering in his flat. There is no 
doubt that despite the restrictions imposed on public debate about politics, Qataris 
are discussing these issues. As calls for democracy gained momentum across the 
region in the early months of the Arab Spring, a group of Qatari citizens regularly 
met to discuss political reform during the so-called Monday Meetings. A book 
resulting from these meetings entitled ‘The people want reform in Qatar too’ has 
been banned by the authorities (The Economist, 08/06/2013). This is notwithstanding 
the fact that its author Ali Khalifa Al Kuwari, far from advocating any kind of 
uprising, describes himself as an academic rather than an activist and has been clear 
about seeking political and economic reform conducted by and with the government.  
 
Such systemic dichotomies – reform that is both substantial and selective, a 
constitution that states that ‘the people are the source of power’ (Al Kuwari, 2012: 
89) while maintaining a firm grip on top-down policymaking, encouraging civil 
rights abroad and withholding them at home – are also evident in the mediasphere. 
This is apparent particularly when comparing the editorial freedom enjoyed by Al 
Jazeera with the situation of the local media. Critics argue that there remains a 
palpable difference between the kind of freedom enjoyed by Al Jazeera and the need 
to self-censor felt by journalists working for local Qatari media, maintaining that ‘in 
reality, by Western standards, freedom of speech and a free press are severely 
restricted in Qatar’, and that ‘public criticism of the ruling family or of Islam is 
forbidden’ (El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003: 75). In this vein, Da Lage points out that 
when it comes to local journalism in Qatar, abolishing the Ministry of Information 
did ‘not necessarily mean that journalists can write whatever they want,’ but instead 
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triggered a shift from state censorship to self-censorship within the local media (Da 
Lage, 2005: 53).  
 
A further example of Qatar’s contradictory stance on media freedom – on the one 
hand taking for granted the local media’s acquiescence with unwritten rules while on 
the other hand giving free rein to Al Jazeera – is the case of the Doha Centre for 
Media Freedom (Figenschou, forthcoming: 38). The centre was an initiative in 2008 
by the royal family, in cooperation with Reporters Without Borders, to provide 
refuge for threatened journalists across the region. As Figenschou reports 
(forthcoming: 38), ‘although the centre […] helped over 250 endangered journalists, 
they encountered difficulties when they criticized Qatari conditions’, culminating in 
the resignation of the centre’s director-general, Robert Menard, and the withdrawal 
of Reporters Without Borders from the project. Although the centre has since been 
re-opened and ‘promised to push for greater media freedom in Qatar’ (Figenschou, 
forthcoming: 39), the contradiction of initiating media freedom campaigns and 
backtracking on these when they get ‘too close to home’ further demonstrates the 
contradictory character of Qatar’s relation to media freedom.   
 
As the examples above show, to understand AJE and the journalistic risks and 
opportunities it entails, it is essential to recognise the role of the political sphere in 
Qatar that underwrites its very existence. The creation of AJA and reforms initiated 
by Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani are often mentioned in the same breath. Both 
have been portrayed as pragmatic efforts on the part of the Qatari government to 
increase its legitimacy within the international community (Figenschou, forthcoming: 
34). And both have been presented as examples indicating that Sheik Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al-Thani has been serious about creating a progressive political climate. As 
Sheik Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, chairman of the Al Jazeera Network, pointed out 
in an interview with Abdallah Schleifer and Sarah Sullivan, ‘the direction of AJA is a 
natural one that corresponds with the strategy Qatar is taking at this phase’ (Sheik 
Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani in Zayani, 2005a: 12). Many have argued that it is not 
least this bellwether function of Al Jazeera that sets the news network apart and 
largely insulates it from political interference in editorial matters, but given that 
public deliberation plays no role in any ‘strategy Qatar is taking’, it is worth 
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considering in more detail some of the implications of Al Jazeera’s financial 
dependence on the state, as I will do in the following. 
 
 
5.2.2 Financial Reliance on Qatar and Questions of Editorial 
Independence 
 
Al Jazeera is not merely founded, but continues to be funded, by the government of 
Qatar. Commentators have always been divided about whether or not Qatar’s overall 
ambitions can be seen as an indication of Al Jazeera’s potential editorial dependence. 
In the following I will discuss a set of arguments frequently employed in relation to 
this question. At the one end of the spectrum, there are those convinced that Al 
Jazeera is inevitably and inadvertently implicated in Qatar’s politics to a degree that 
renders genuine independence an illusion. At the other end of the spectrum, there are 
those convinced that journalists at Al Jazeera have the freedom and leeway to make 
their editorial decisions on journalistic and professional grounds only. Between these 
two poles, a plethora of positions has evolved.  
 
In this context, three points are worth making. Firstly, as Da Lage (2005: 49) pointed 
out early on in the debate, ‘though seemingly contradictory, these two claims are not 
irreconcilable’. Diplomatic fallouts complicating the Emirates domestic or foreign 
policy in the short term as a result of critical coverage may well be considered to be 
outweighed by the long-term advantages associated with the international acclaim 
and legitimacy attached to the project of Al Jazeera. In a nutshell, there is not 
necessarily an inherent contradiction in the subsistence of an editorially independent 
news channel and the fact that its existence affords the sponsoring government with 
long-term political clout. What there is, however, is a persistent inherent risk of 
overstepping on the part of the government and of self-censorship on the part of 
journalists67. Secondly, given that motivations and actions of the Qatari government, 
                                                
67 As I will detail in the following, Al Jazeera journalists have time and again shown 
their resolve and ability to report about Qatar in a critical fashion and there is no 
doubt that the network gets away with stories that local Qatari media could not get 
away with. However, a story directly questioning actions and motives of members of 
the ruling family would be a different matter. Here, Seib (2012: 3) finds that ‘in that 
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including the funding of Al Jazeera, are not subject to public debate or supported by 
publicly accessible data, hard evidence is a scarce commodity across the spectrum of 
the debate. There are ample examples supporting one side or the other of the 
argument, and I will present the most prevalent ones in the following, but given the 
overall low levels of transparency, these often fall short of being strictly conclusive 
from an empirical perspective. And thirdly, even where limited evidence is available, 
past performance is not a reliable indicator if structural liabilities remain. Therefore, 
what is important in this context is to highlight structural enablements and liabilities 
of the way AJE is funded to gain an understanding of inherent and persistent risks of 
(self)censorship as well as opportunities to prioritise a kind of journalism under 
severe pressure elsewhere in the industry (see also Chapter 8).  
 
One way of analysing Al Jazeera and its embeddedness in Qatari politics is through 
the perspective of ‘regional power play(s)’ (Figenschou, forthcoming: 31). Since the 
early 1990s, large sectors of the region’s satellite broadcasting have been linked to 
the royal family of Saudi Arabia, Qatar’s geographically sizeable and influential 
neighbour. Notably, under the reign of Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Qatar 
moved away ‘from his father’s acquiescence to Saudi hegemony’ (Cooper & 
Momani, 2011: 117), giving further weight to the view that Al Jazeera had been 
created in part ‘in opposition to the Saudi media dominance’ (Figenschou, 
forthcoming: 31). From a geo-political perspective, Al Jazeera has proven to be a 
valuable asset to the Qatari government, right from the early days of the Emir’s rule, 
when the channel was the first to give a voice to dissidents from across the region, 
including those opposing the governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, at a time when 
the Emir’s legitimacy as head of state had been challenged in the press of those 
countries (Powers, 2012: 10). In this context, the circumstance that Qatar is a 
relatively small country wedged between larger and geo-politically influential 
                                                                                                                                     
regard this media empire is like those elsewhere in the world that are loathe to carry 
stories that might offend heir proprietors or commercial sponsors.’ Accordingly, 
some journalists admitted adopting the pragmatic position that a limited degree of 
self-censorship with regard to the royal family is an acceptable compromise given 
‘the wider impact they have had in stirring up debate among an audience that reaches 
from Bedouin tribes to Saudi millionaires’ (Beckett, 03/10/2006).  
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neighbours, had the effect – calculated or not – of directing attention away from 
domestic issues.  As Shawn Powers puts it:  
 
The simple fact that the Qatari population was amongst the smallest in the 
region meant that there was always more demand for news about corruption 
and political scandals in almost any other country in the region, where there 
were more interested citizens and more well-known, controversial leaders than 
those located in Qatar (Powers, 2012: 10).  
 
 
Under the rule of Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Qatar also began actively 
pursuing the role of mediator in disputes across the region – a role enabled not least 
by the fact that the government has ‘never followed simple alliance structures’ in its 
diplomatic efforts (Cooper & Momani, 2011: 113-114), thus rendering it acceptable 
for actors from opposing camps to engage with the Emirate. With a growing 
reputation as ‘the country that can talk to anyone’ (Connolly, 27/01/2012), Qatar has 
repeatedly acted as a mediator between Israel and the Arab states and is widely 
known to entertain close relations with the US, as well as with the resistance 
movements Hamas and Hezbollah – euphemistically described as ‘a far cry from a 
coalition of common interests’ (Cooper & Momani, 2011: 127). More recently, Qatar 
facilitated the opening by the Taliban of an office in Doha, which provides Western 
powers including the US, whose biggest regional military base is also situated in 
Qatar, with an opportunity to ‘openly contact legitimate Taliban intermediaries’ to 
discuss Afghanistan’s future (Rosenberg, 03/01/2012). As a result, Qatar’s foreign 
policy has been described as at the same time moderate and maverick, even eccentric 
(Da Lage, 2005: 61). 
 
In this context, the relative scarcity of coverage of Qatar itself (Zayani, 2005a: 9-10; 
Altermann, 1998: 24), combined with the observation that the existence of Al Jazeera 
provides Qatar with political leverage, means that the network has been perceived by 
some primarily as a diplomatic instrument. Allegations of potential tampering with 
the channel’s output for political gain reached a climax when, in 2010, WikiLeaks 
published confidential US cables suggesting that ‘the station could be used “as a 
bargaining tool to repair relationships with other countries”’ (Booth, 6/12/2010), 
which was seen by some as proof that Al Jazeera’s editorial independence had been 
compromised. Indeed, the connection between Al Jazeera’s coverage and Qatari 
  145 
diplomacy is stated in the cables in a manner that is persuasive in its casual 
bluntness. Others took the view that the cables had to be read in the context of the 
fact that ‘representatives of numerous diplomatic missions regularly bring lists of 
complaints to Al Jazeera, but that doesn't mean they are heeded or given undue 
weight’ (Chatriwala, 19/09/2011). Al Jazeera itself vigorously denied any allegations 
of political interference in editorial matters, pointing out that the leaked documents 
were assessments by US embassy staff (AJE, 06/12/2010). 
 
Allegations of bias again intensified during the Arab Spring, as Qatar’s direct 
involvement – giving financial and political support to protesters, supplying fighter 
jets to support the no-fly zone in Libya and from early 2012 repeatedly calling for 
Arab intervention in Syria – began to change its image from that of a ‘detached 
mediator’ (Khatib, 2013: 420) to that of ‘a bold and assertive player’ (Connolly, 
27/01/2012). This increasingly active role on the global political stage had direct 
implications for Al Jazeera, since it made the strategy of ignoring news implicating 
Qatar on the grounds that they are not significant for an international audience –
thereby sidestepping questions of potential self-censorship – somewhat less 
applicable (see also 9.4.1).68 As a result, the relative weight given to coverage of the 
uprising in Bahrain on Al Jazeera and the coverage of stories relating to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, both issues where Qatar pursues discernible interests of its own, came 
under increased scrutiny.69 
                                                
68 In many cases a degree of confusion is added to the debate by a failure to explicitly 
distinguish between the editorially distinct Arabic- and English-language channels, 
though some have been careful to point out differences, for example in their 
readiness to be ‘openly critical’ of Qatar (Lowe, 05/04/2013) – a stance I am not in a 
position to verify as the analysis of news content in this study compares AJE to its 
English-language counterparts rather than to AJA.  
 
69 Allegations of bias based on drawing links between Qatari foreign policy and Al 
Jazeera’s editorial outlook have been with the network from the very beginning (see 
5.2.3).  In the particular context of the uprisings, observers expressed concerns that 
Qatar ‘used Al Jazeera to express public support for the [Muslim] Brotherhood’ 
(Khatib, 2013: 432) and linked the GCC’s concerted effort, supported by Qatar, to 
‘quell the rebellion’ in Bahrain (Khatib, 2013: 419) with the comparatively limited 
coverage of the uprising in the fellow Gulf state on Al Jazeera (Lynch, 2012: 20; 
Hashem, 03/04/2012). Al Jazeera did carry coverage critical of the Bahraini 
government, however, with regard to the question of whether or not the emphasis (or 
lack thereof) on Bahrain as compared to, for example, the uprisings in Syria or Libya 
was proportionate, opinions are likely to remain divided (Hasan, 07/12/2011). 
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Not entirely incompatible with arguments presented above, but certainly 
characterised by a decidedly different perspective, are arguments supporting the 
assumption that AJE has been allowed to operate freely editorially. Evidence in 
favour of this side of the argument is based on the fact that issues and opinions 
critical of the Qatari government have been given airtime on the channel throughout 
Al Jazeera’s history. As Hugh Miles points out, when plotters in a failed coup against 
the Emir appeared in court in 1996, ‘Al Jazeera's viewers had a front-row seat […] 
when a spokesman from Amnesty International […] attacked the Qatari criminal 
justice system’ (Miles, 12/06/2006). In debates on Al Jazeera’s talk shows, 
particularly during the height of the Second Intifada, on-air guests repeatedly 
attacked Qatar for hosting an American air base (Miles, 12/06/2006). Likewise, the 
exploitation of foreign workers in Qatar has recurrently been discussed on Al 
Jazeera, at the time of writing most recently in coverage citing a Human Rights 
Watch report criticising Qatar for prohibiting unions, not enforcing labour laws to 
protect those who fall prey to human traffickers and not having signed ‘key 
international human rights agreements’ (AJE, 12/06/2012). In terms of foreign 
policy, it has likewise been pointed out that Al Jazeera time and again has caused 
unwelcome diplomatic fallouts for the Qatari government both within the Middle 
East (Sakr, 2007: 128) and vis-à-vis Western powers (Sakr, 2007: 121). Indeed, 
coverage ‘often incompatible or at least out of sync with Qatar’s foreign policy’ 
(Zayani, 2005a: 13) has been indicative of independent editorial decision-making on 
the basis of journalistic merit rather than political convenience.  
 
Furthermore, the hiring of journalists with professional histories of working for 
broadcasters rooted in traditions of independent journalism meant that once Al 
Jazeera was up and running it instantly, at least in some ways, moved beyond the 
control of its creator, particularly as the channel’s output was sanctioned by massive 
popular success.70 In addition, structural deficiencies are at least partly counteracted 
by the structural advantage inherent in the fact that interfering with the content of 
                                                
70 Egyptian political analyst Amr Choubaki made this point quite strongly when he 
maintained: ‘Qatar created Al Jazeera. Now Al Jazeera creates Qatar. It’s like when 
you build a robot and eventually lose control of it’ (Choubaki in Powers, 2012: 11).  
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coverage would run counter to Qatar’s medium- to long-term interests. Al Jazeera is 
frequently portrayed as a means for a small country to punch above its weight and ‘to 
give Qatar prominence which is disproportionate to its size, military power and 
economic strength’ (Zayani, 2005a: 13).  
 
This effect hinges, however, on the network’s international reputation as an 
independent journalistic enterprise. In this context, state intervention would not only 
be against the spirit of the organisation, but would also quickly prove to be 
counterproductive for Qatar because it would threaten the very cultural capital to 
which AJE owes much of the international recognition that in turn reflects positively 
on the country. As Da Lage concludes, ‘The Emir has no longer free reign as his 
hands are tied with the very success of Al Jazeera […] taming Al Jazeera can only 
bring trouble [to him] without significantly receding the margin of freedom that has 
contributed to its existence’ (Da Lage, 2005: 64-65). Put differently, Qatar has much 
to gain from protecting the journalistic integrity of the global news channel it 
created, since any long-term political advantage the country may gain from hosting 
the channel is conditional on a reputation built on journalistic independence.  
 
As I have maintained earlier, none of the points presented here for either side of the 
argument does conclusively prove AJE’s editorial independence (or lack thereof). 
The undeniable increase in diplomatic muscle Qatar gains from hosting the channel 
does not prove actual state interference in editorial matters. Meanwhile, pointing 
towards instances of coverage critical of Qatar, although these are a healthy sign, 
does not prove that (self)censorship does not happen in other cases, nor does it say 
anything about the proportionality of coverage critical of conditions at home and 
abroad respectively. More importantly, these arguments only address part of the 
story: they only deal with potential symptoms of the nature of the relation between 
the news network and the state of Qatar. One of the main causes of recurrent 
expressions of scepticism about the organisation’s editorial independence is that – 
unlike financially independent commercial channels or public service broadcasters 
subjected to and protected by regulatory frameworks defining their precise relation to 
the government of the day – Al Jazeera is effectively a state-broadcaster dependent 
on the goodwill of one head of state in a country ‘not known’ for having had ‘a long 
history of free press’ (Da Lage, 2005: 49). Plans for becoming financially self-
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sufficient have periodically been discussed and publicised,71 but so far remain rather 
unrealistic.72  
 
Overall, Al Jazeera’s editorial independence is contingent on a number of factors, 
including structural considerations as well as the courage of individual journalists in 
continuing to assert their professionalism vis-à-vis potential pressures from political 
or economic considerations. Within the current set-up, the channel’s financial 
dependence on the state will remain both an inherent risk, independently of whether 
or not its independence has been compromised in the past, and a protection 
mechanism against interference from neighbouring fields. This also means that Al 
Jazeera’s editorial independence will continue to be the ultimate measure by which 
its credibility and influence are assessed as the channel matures. In the following I 
will give examples of some of the reactions that the creation and coverage of this 
‘quasi-governmental international broadcaster’ (Powers, 2012: 25) evoked 
internationally and the impact it had on the fields of journalism and politics in the 
region and beyond. 
 
                                                
71 There has periodically been talk over the years of selling the network (The 
Economist, 19/06/2003; O’Carroll, 16/08/2004; Weisman, 30/01/2005). In 2003 a 
spokesman said that they ‘would consider any proposal that guaranteed editorial 
independence’ (The Economist, 19/06/2003). In the lead-up to AJE’s launch, Ernst & 
Young were commissioned to carry out a feasibility study of ways to privatise the 
network (Sakr, 2007: 126). Similar ideas were revived in mid-2008, when Wadah 
Kanfar, Director General of the network, said that it was hoped that a subscription-
based premium sports service would eventually generate sufficient income to make a 
sell-off ‘a medium-term option’ (Sabbagh, 26/08/2008). At the time of writing there 
are no indications that privatising the network is on the agenda or has become more 
realistic in terms of financial self-sufficiency.  
 
72 For AJA, seemingly paradoxically, its success has proven detrimental to its 
commercial ambitions. Since the popularity of the channel has appeared to rest on 
the outspokenness of its journalists and their readiness to confront political elites, the 
very attributes that made the channel popular with audiences have been precisely 
what has scared away cautious advertisers who feared financial repercussions in a 
region then dominated by authoritarian regimes (and elsewhere in the world, where 
Al Jazeera Arabic was perceived as an anti-Western voice) (Tatham, 2006: 68; 
Powers, 2012: 10). Furthermore, this tendency has been exacerbated by a general 
lack of reliable data about audiences in political contexts where ‘systematic surveys 
of public opinion, whether for ratings or other purposes, meet resistance from the 
politically powerful who fear that results will be detrimental to their interests’ (Sakr, 
2004: 153).  
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5.2.3 AJA’s Impact in the Region and Beyond 
  
When AJA started out, it sparked reactions ranging from enthusiasm to outright 
hostility. Its sudden success and its ability to set the media agenda across the region 
immediately attracted competition.73 Importantly, what Al Jazeera initiated in an 
unprecedented way, as Marc Lynch has argued, was the formation of a pan-Arab 
public sphere promoted by hiring journalists from across the region and championing 
freedom of expression (Lynch, 2006). For Lynch, this evolving public sphere did not 
lead to less disagreement between opposing factions. Lynch’s core argument is rather 
that a greater degree of pan-Arab identification, on the one hand, combined with a 
greater degree of expression of disparities, on the other hand, signified an important 
shift in public perception. By promoting this kind of debate, he further argues, AJA 
showed that disagreement does not stand in the way of a common Arab identity, 
hence strengthening an emergent Arab public sphere. It was this kind of argument 
that later led Mustafa Souag to state that Al Jazeera’s ‘real impact’ as a broadcaster 
on the Arab Spring had been not only the channel’s output during the uprisings, but 
its coverage in the years prior to the uprisings: ‘“We provided Arab citizens with 
knowledge and information, [political] positions and ideas… when you give people 
the right information you empower them”’ (Mustafa Souag in Hasan, 07/12/2011).  
 
                                                
73 News channels emerging in the wake of AJA’s success include Iranian Al-Alam, 
which launched as the Iraq war began to unfold in 2003, and the Saudi Arabian 
channel Al-Ikhbariya, launched in 2004. The year 2003 also saw the launch of 
Dubai-based Al Arabiya, primarily sustained by Saudi investment, as arguably the 
most prominent competition to AJA (El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003: 215-216; 
Tatham, 2006: 71; Seib, 2012: 191; Zayani & Ayish, 2006). Other Arabic-language 
news services that have since been launched include a host of channels run by 
broadcasters based outside the region, such as Deutsche Welle’s Arabic-language 
service (launched in 2002), the US-funded Al Hurra (launched in 2004), France24’s 
Arabic-language service (launched in 2006), Russia Today’s Rusiya Al-Yaum 
(launched in 2007), BBC Arabic TV (re-launched in 2008) and CCTV Arabic 
(launched in 2009). In May 2012 a co-operation between British Sky Broadcasting 
and Abu Dhabi Media Investment culminated in the launch of Sky Arabia (Pfanner, 
30/10/2011). Another news channel in the making is Alarab, to be hosted in Bahrain 
and based on a partnership between Saudi Arabian media mogul Prince Walid bin 
Talal (Cochrane, 2007) and Bloomberg (Pfanner, 30/10/2011).  
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In AJA’s early years, the channel’s reputation as the voice of the Arab street was also 
notably shaped by its coverage of the Second Intifada, which stood out for the 
unreserved and unprecedented way in which it depicted the human cost of the 
conflict. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has long been a central issue for the entire 
region and, as Zayani points out, ‘images of the brutality of the occupation, which 
had never been seen before in any significant way, directly touch the heart of Arab 
viewers and shape Arab public opinion’ (Zayani, 2005b: 173). AJA also provided 
locals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with information about what was 
happening that could be difficult to obtain amidst curfews and other restrictions on 
the ground (Zayani, 2005b: 175). The emotionality of the images broadcast by Al 
Jazeera was often criticised as exacerbating the conflict by fuelling resentment, while 
at the same time Al Jazeera was criticised for giving airtime to Israeli officials 
(Zayani, 2005b: 180) – a decision that distinguished it from much of its regional 
competition.  
 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, AJE also attracted opposition throughout the thoroughly 
heterogeneous74 region and beyond, demonstrated in a long history of disputes over 
its coverage. To name just some examples, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco and 
Libya all withdrew their national representations from Qatar on different occasions 
as a direct response to AJA programmes, Algeria allegedly cut the power in several 
cities in order to prevent the reception of an Al Jazeera report on the country’s civil 
war, and the PLO accused AJA of partiality in editorial matters when the channel 
reported on its role in the Lebanese civil war (Tatham, 2006: 66-68). Famously, 
Hosni Mubarak, then Egypt’s president, was heard to exclaim ‘all of this noise from 
a tiny matchbox’ (Tatham: 2006: 69), when first laying eyes on the comparatively 
humble appearances of AJA’s offices in the media compound in Qatar, thus 
inadvertently creating a catch-phrase that came to characterise the underdog image 
that the channel had created for itself. In addition, for some, Qatar’s close 
relationship with the US has provided further grounds for doubting the integrity of 
                                                
74 As Srebreny points out, the fact that the term ‘Middle East’  (which originated in 
colonial times and reflects the geo-political thinking of Western powers at the time) 
continues to be used ‘should not lead to assumptions about similarities between these 
countries’, revealing as they do ‘remarkable differentiation along almost any 
indicator one cares to choose’ (Sreberny, 1998: 180). 
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AJA’s reporting (Sakr, 2007:124-125). The combination of hosting on Qatari 
territory both a channel that is outspoken about human rights violations and political 
scandals of various Arab governments and the largest US military base in the region 
has meant that ‘for some critics, AJA probes the affairs of other Arab countries to 
distract viewers from its host’s own internal politics and its arrangements with the 
US’ (Zayani, 2005a: 10) – a sentiment in sharp contrast with the fierce opposition 
that AJA encountered from US officials over its reporting in the wake of 9/11. 
Overall, by 2005 there had been over 450 occasions on which foreign governments 
officially complained to the Qatari authorities about Al Jazeera’s coverage (Powers, 
2012: 11), as well as numerous unofficial expressions of disapproval.  
 
 
5.2.4 US Opposition after 9/11 
 
In most of the Western world, AJA first achieved international recognition in the 
wake of 9/11 and during the ensuing war in Afghanistan. When US and British 
forces began the aerial bombardment of the country in the early hours of the war, Al 
Jazeera was the only network broadcasting from within Afghanistan. El-Nawawy and 
Iskandar recall the events as follows: 
 
Al-Jazeera’s grainy footage of black sky with firefly flickers of white light […] 
represented some of the most significant news on a day when the American 
media struggled to monitor the rapidly unfolding events during the first hours 
of war. In fact, it was that very day – one marked by images of war action in 
Afghanistan, the video cloaked in surreal green haze – that heralded Al 
Jazeera’s breathtaking rise to international acclaim (El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 
2003: 144). 
 
Al Jazeera’s exclusive access allowed its reporters to expose the human tragedy of 
the conflict, showing civilian victims in ways not seen on other international 
channels.75 However, AJA’s decision to broadcast exclusive statements and tapes of 
                                                
75 The channel’s function of bearing witness to otherwise unreported suffering was 
one explicitly appreciated by fellow journalists. BBC World presenter Nik Gowing 
defended Al Jazeera after their Kabul office had been hit by a US bomb, arguing that 
their ‘only crime was that it was “bearing witness” to events that the US would rather 
it did not see’ (Wells, 19/11/2001). 
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Osama bin Laden, who very quickly had become the prime suspect in relation to the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, particularly irritated and angered both Western politicians 
and large parts of the Western media. Having had exclusive access to the Al-Qaeda 
leader in the past, AJA also made use of its archive, repeatedly replaying an 
interview one of the channel’s reporters had conducted with Osama bin Laden in 
1998 (Zayani, 2005a: 24). All of this triggered accusations that AJA was turning 
itself into ‘bin Laden’s mouthpiece’ by offering him a platform – something Western 
media, in particular US media at the time, were exceptionally wary and ambivalent 
about, even though once AJA had broadcast the exclusive material they were 
‘extremely keen to use Al-Jazeera’s pictures’ (Miles, 2005: 115). Despite this 
ambivalence, condemnation of AJA in the Western media was unequivocal. The New 
York Times called AJA’s coverage ‘deeply irresponsible’, CBS anchor Dan Rather 
contemplated on air whether there was ‘any indication that Osama bin Laden has 
helped finance this operation’ and the New York Daily News explained to its readers 
that Al Jazeera was ‘an Arab propaganda outfit controlled by the medieval 
government of Qatar that masquerades as a real media company’ and concluded that 
‘dealing with Al Jazeera is a job for the military’ (Miles, 2005: 150-151). For many 
critics of the network, Al Jazeera was guilty of ‘igniting the anger of Arabs and the 
fury of Muslims against the US’ (Zayani, 2005a: 23).  
 
This backlash was by no means restricted to critique from fellow journalists. US 
politicians, in particular members of the Bush administration, were also on the case. 
Then US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, repeatedly described Al-Jazeera’s 
coverage as ‘propagandistic and inflammatory’ and accused the channel of faking 
footage of civilian victims (El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003: 181).76 Colin Powell, then 
US Secretary of State, asked the Emir of Qatar to tone down Al Jazeera’s coverage, a 
proposition the Emir made public, announcing that the Americans were asking him 
to interfere with editorial decision-making at Al Jazeera (Miles, 2005: 123). Labels 
like ‘Bin Laden TV’ (Miles, 2005: 113) and ‘Terrorist TV’ (Rushing, 2007: 154) 
                                                
76 In 2011, several years after having sharply dismissed Al Jazeera as ‘vicious’, 
Donald Rumsfeld came to publicly revise his opinion when he told David Frost in an 
interview that ‘[AJE] can be an important means of communication in the world and 
I am delighted you are doing what you are doing’ (quoted by Lucas Shaw for 
Reuters, 30/09/2011).  
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stuck with the network, particularly in the US, making it virtually impossible for Al 
Jazeera to gain a foothold in the US market for years to come. 
 
By the time the Iraq war started, reporters from Al Jazeera were seen as persona non 
grata by much of the US administration. AJA journalists felt disadvantaged and even 
put at risk when travelling with US forces: ‘Those few Arab media that did embed 
with US troops left within days, believing themselves not only to have been cut out 
of the briefing process – a US officer explained to an Al Jazeera team that it would 
not be briefed because theirs was a “channel with a reputation” – but in at least one 
instance to have been exposed to danger’ (Tatham, 2006: 10). This atmosphere of 
mutual distrust escalated on 8th April 2003, when Al Jazeera reporter Tarek Ayoub 
died when the channel’s Baghdad office was hit by an US bomb despite AJA having 
publicly provided US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with the coordinates of 
its Baghdad office in a move to prevent such an incident after a similar, though not 
fatal, bomb attack on its offices in Kabul less than 18 months earlier. The United 
States military insisted that both incidents had been mistakes.77  
 
Therefore, when the English-language AJE launched, the network’s reputation, 
particularly in non-Arabic speaking circles in the West, had been heavily influenced 
by public spats between Western governments and AJA over the channel’s 
Afghanistan and Iraq war coverage. At the same time, the network had a high 
standing globally as the media outfit that had changed the culture of broadcast 
journalism in an entire region while also enjoying access that frequently surpassed 
that of Western news organisations. One core assumption of the new channel’s 
management had been that broadcasting in English for the first time would 
significantly reduce the risk of international opposition based on misapprehensions 
of what Al Jazeera was about. As a consequence, notwithstanding the experiences of 
its parent channel in terms of some of the reactions it had received over its coverage 
on Afghanistan and Iraq, when AJE started, the channel’s explicit goal of showing 
                                                
77 On the same day, a Reuters cameramen and a Spanish cameramen working for 
Telecinco were killed in a tank attack on the Palestine Hotel, the preferred location 
for journalists in Baghdad since the 1991 Gulf War (Tatham, 2006: 180-181). 
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‘the other side’ was perceived by many as having a conciliatory effect rather than a 
confrontational one (El-Nawawy, 2012).  
 
 
5.3 An Al Jazeera for the English-speaking World 
 
Given the prominence that AJA had achieved by the time the English-language 
channel was being set up, AJE enjoyed a high international profile before it even 
went on air. At the same time, AJE from the start entered an entirely different media 
environment from the one that AJA had encountered in its early days. Firstly, having 
a high profile prior to broadcasting a single programme meant that AJE was 
confronted from day one with all the expectations and reservations that the network’s 
legacy raised in various parts of the world. Secondly, while AJA had fulfilled a 
pioneering function in the Middle East, its English-language counterpart entered a 
mature market and faced from the outset comparisons with successful and long-
standing channels. And thirdly, while AJA had created a global brand with a distinct 
focus on – and leading role within – one particular region, AJE’s exceptionally 
diffused target audience of non-native and native English-speakers across the world 
essentially included anyone on any continent with a sufficient understanding of 
English to follow their programmes. This global approach was reflected 
organisationally, during the main period of fieldwork conducted for this study78, in 
the fact that AJE was specifically designed to operate out of four main locations, 
which in addition to Doha included Washington DC, London and Kuala Lumpur – a 
structure that instantly distinguished it from its competitors and that was further 
supplemented by about 65 smaller bureaus around the world (Amin, 2012: 29). 
 
5.3.1 Initial tensions between AJA and AJE 
 
In order to succeed in this very different setting, AJE had to differentiate itself from 
AJA. Shawn Powers describes early conversations in 2003 about launching an 
English-language service as motivated precisely by the realisation that a mere 
                                                
78 The organisational structure of AJE kept evolving throughout the research period 
and this particular element was subject to restructuring in 2011 (see also 9.4.1) 
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translation of AJA would not be able to penetrate certain markets, in particular the 
US, because ‘cultural sensibilities’ would prevent it from meeting the increasing 
demand for a different perspective on events in the Middle East (Powers, 2012: 12-
13). Previous experiences with Al Jazeera Net, the network’s English-language 
website launched in March 2003, gave an indication of just how sensitively Western 
audiences and officials in particular could react to Al Jazeera’s attempts to fill 
information gaps in the English-language market (Powers, 2012: 13-18). 
Furthermore, this move towards an English-language outlet came at a time when the 
US, which in the past had been a close ally of Qatar despite critical coverage on 
AJA, was increasingly putting pressure on the Qatari government to step in and tone 
down some of AJA’s coverage, putting ‘the Qatari ruling family […] on the 
defensive in a way that seems to have altered the nature of the Al-Jazeera project’ 
(Sakr, 2007: 129) and contributing to the decision to launch an English-language 
channel that was editorially independent of AJA. In other words, there was a 
realisation within the Qatari establishment that Al Jazeera International (AJI), as AJE 
had been called until about a month prior to its launch, had to become something 
other than a translation of AJA if it was to stand a chance of satisfying ambitions of 
becoming one of the world’s major English-language news channels.  
 
One of the ways in which this differentiation manifested itself was that, with rare 
exceptions, there was virtually no overlap between AJA and AJI in terms of editorial 
staff. Among those driving the set-up of the English-language channel were 
Managing Director Nigel Parsons, formerly head of APTN and a former BBCW 
journalist, and Director of News Steve Clark, who had also trained at the BBC and 
previously held senior management positions at MBC, ITN and Sky News. Other 
high-profile hirings included Sir David Frost, who left Sky News to join Al Jazeera; 
Riz Khan, with extensive experience at CNNI and the BBCW; Sue Phillips, who in 
the past had held managing positions at CBC as well as ABC News, and Nightline 
journalist David Marash (Powers, 2012: 20). As late as the end of 2005, almost a 
year after the channel was originally supposed to launch, AJI’s pre-launch line-up of 
journalists and presenters did not include Arab staff in any of the high-profile 
management positions (Powers, 2012: 20).  
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Given the initial lack of formal or informal integration and the years of hard work 
and risk-taking invested by journalists working for AJA, the relationship between the 
two channels was not going to be without tensions. Journalists working for what had 
been labelled ‘the British boys’ networks’ enjoyed the latest technology as well as 
substantially higher salaries than their counterparts at AJA (Powers, 2012: 21). 
Moreover, repeated assurances by AJI staff vis-à-vis the international media that the 
English-language service would differ editorially from AJA and ‘won’t be anti-
Western’ were perceived by AJA staff as thinly veiled allegations of bias from within 
their own organisation (Powers, 2012: 19; Figenschou, 2012: 366-367).  
 
A mere eight months before the launch of AJE, Al Jazeera’s board of directors 
decided to counter the growing animosity by structurally incorporating all of Al 
Jazeera’s channels79 into the Al Jazeera Network. As Director General of the new 
superstructure they appointed AJA’s director, Wadah Khanfar, a clear signal that 
AJA’s achievements were to be honoured amidst the hype that had already formed 
around the English-language channel. This approach was further underpinned by the 
appointment of Ibrahim Helal, who prior to joining the English-language team served 
as editor-in-chief at the Arabic-language channel, as AJI’s Deputy Managing 
Director under Nigel Parsons (Powers, 2012: 22). According to Powers, it was Helal 
who, on behalf of his colleagues at AJA and just weeks before the launch, requested 
the change in the channel’s name from AJI to AJE in order to reflect the fact that the 
label ‘international’ in fact applied to both Arabic- and English-language channels 
and should not be used by one of them as a means of differentiation (Powers, 2012: 
23). On 15th November 2006, after several delays and almost exactly ten years after 
AJA first went on air, AJE was launched.  
 
 
5.3.2 Covering Gaza Under the Media Ban 
 
Since AJE’s launch a number of researchers have looked at the channel’s output in 
order to gauge the degree to which it has brought genuine difference into the 
                                                
79 Apart from AJA and AJI (as AJE was then called), these at the time included Al 
Jazeera Net, Al Jazeera Sports and Al Jazeera Documentary. 
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English-language news market (Barkho, 2007; Painter, 2008; Kolmer & Semetko, 
2009; Figenschou, 2010a; Lawson, 2011; see also 4.3). Many found that the most 
straightforwardly identifiable points of differentiation were a moderately divergent 
geo-political perspective combined with a distinctively divergent geographical angle 
– at times, following in the footsteps of its parent channel, due to better access to an 
underreported aspect of a global story. One of the most prominent examples of AJE 
managing to live up to the expectations raised by AJA’s access in the Middle East, 
however, had been the channel’s coverage from Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009.  
 
Arguably for the first time after the launch of the English-language channel, the 
network’s on-the-ground presence prompted comparisons with its coverage from the 
beginning of the war in Afghanistan. As in 2001, Al Jazeera had been the sole 
international network with correspondents on-the-ground prior to the war. And with 
the Israeli government preventing international media from getting into Gaza as the 
military assault code-named ‘Operation Cast Lead’ unfolded, Al Jazeera, with 
correspondents from both its English- and its Arabic-language teams already 
stationed inside Gaza, provided valuable raw footage, packages, live interviews and 
otherwise inaccessible information (Bigalke, 09/01/2009). This footage was 
broadcast not only on Al Jazeera’s TV and online platforms, but also picked up by 
other broadcasters as well as by numerous websites around the world.80 The ensuing 
focus on the then relatively young English-language channel in particular has widely 
been considered a milestone for AJE (Merriman, 2012: 121-122).  
 
Not everyone approved of the emphasis on civilian casualties that resulted from 
AJE’s journalists being locked in with the population of Gaza during the air strikes 
(Gilboa, 2012), but for many, like Figenschou (2012: 360), ‘AJE’s editorial 
distinctiveness was epitomized in the channel’s coverage of the Gaza war […] 
documenting and exposing the humanitarian crisis and the direct consequences of 
war and occupation for the people of Gaza’. Once again, Al Jazeera had been in a 
                                                
80 As the first international broadcaster to take this route, Al Jazeera had decided to 
release exclusive footage under the most permissive Creative Commons licence 
available (Creative Commons 3.0 Attribution), making it free to publish, broadcast, 
remix and share their footage from Gaza on any commercial or non-commercial 
platform (Nanabhay, 13/01/2009). 
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position to provide first-hand accounts of a conflict that literally would have looked 
very different to international audiences without the channel’s exclusive footage. 
This time, though, it did so in English as well as in Arabic, speaking directly to 
audiences who before the launch of AJE would only have heard about the coverage 
through the filter of other English-language media.  
 
 
5.3.3 The ‘Al Jazeera Effect’ – AJE and the Arab Uprisings 
 
When the Arab uprisings began in late 2010, the four-year-old AJE news channel (as 
well as its already well-established parent channel) became closely associated with 
the unfolding events. While in later stages of the uprisings, the ‘initial surge in 
popularity’ began to wane again in some quarters (Khatib, 2013: 428) 81, the early 
days particularly of events in Egypt were marked by a rare level of unanimity 
amongst ‘English speakers around the world’ about Al Jazeera’s role as ‘the 
indispensable, go-to source of information’ (Seib, 2012: 1). Headlines such as ‘The 
Al Jazeera Revolution’ and ‘Voice of the Arab Spring’ emphasised the channel’s 
prominence in covering the events, but also in providing a stream of information for 
the people on the ground (Hasan, 07/12/2011; Pintak, 02/02/2011; Seib, 2012). Marc 
Lynch has described Al Jazeera’s role as the ‘central node for public discourse and 
debate at arguably the most crucial moment for such discussions in recent Arab 
history’ (Lynch, 2012: 20). Shawn Powers has declared that ‘when the history of the 
Arab Spring is written, it will be noted that it was Al Jazeera that first broadcast the 
protests and violence in Tunisia that its reporters saw on Facebook, and it was Al 
Jazeera that drew the world's attention to Tahrir Square while Western networks 
were hesitant to parachute their reporters into Egypt’ (Powers, 2011). In February 
2011, Lawrence Pintak wrote: ‘There is no chance that the world would be watching 
these extraordinary events play out in Egypt if Egyptians had not watched the 
Tunisian revolution play out in their living rooms and coffee shops on Al Jazeera’ 
(Pintak, 02/02/2011). For many, this was the ‘Al Jazeera moment’ that shaped the 
                                                
81 For example, for divergent opinions about AJE’s role in covering the uprisings in 
Bahrain, see 5.2.2.  
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network’s image and future development as much as, if not more than, events that 
unfolded in 2001 in the wake of 9/11 (Burman, 04/02/2011).  
 
Journalists and academics, with reference to the ‘CNN effect’,82 increasingly referred 
to the network’s impact as ‘the Al Jazeera effect’ (Seib, 2008; Zingarelli, 2010; 
Miles, 08/02/2011; Ricchiardi, 2011). However, it is important to note that neither Al 
Jazeera nor the social media, which likewise have been hailed as a decisive force in 
the process (Cottle, 2011; Nanabhay & Farmanfarmaian, 2011; Khanfar, 
19/01/2011), would have had any impact or anything to report if it had not been for 
the courage of the people on the streets. As Sreberny and Khiabany (2010: 175) 
demonstrate in the context of the so-called ‘Green Revolution’ in Iran in 2009 (which 
likewise had been discursively linked to particular media platforms, in this case 
Twitter): ‘the “real” action remained on Iranian streets and rooftops, examples of the 
powerful “somatic solidarity” that had also driven the events of 1979’. 
 
It is also important to note that, hyped or actual, Al Jazeera’s perceived role had very 
real effects both within the region and in the West. The most palpable effect was felt 
on the ground, where a great number of people actively engaged with Al Jazeera 
through social media platforms. AJE correspondent Alan Fisher recounts, with 
reference to a camera attached to a satellite phone which provided 24/7 coverage of 
Tahrir Square during the uprisings in Egypt: ‘People on Facebook and Twitter 
contacted the channel urging it not to switch it off. One tweet said if the screen goes 
blank, “the world will no longer be watching and they will kill us”’ (Fisher, 2011: 
154). Moreover, when people contacted the channel saying they wanted to be able to 
show the world what was happening where they were, Al Jazeera started distributing 
flip video cameras in order to help fill gaps in the coverage and to contextualise the 
                                                
82 News organisations’ histories and their (perceived or actual) power often become 
inextricably linked with their coverage of certain events and conflicts. Arguably the 
most frequently evoked example for this phenomenon is CNN’s emergence as a key 
international media player during the 1991 Gulf War (Robinson, 2002; Gilboa, 
2005). 
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reporting provided by professional journalists in ways that would otherwise not have 
been possible (2011: 156).83 
 
However, the channel’s reporting was also accompanied by unprecedented violence 
against Al Jazeera journalists. Far from being welcomed by all factions, Al Jazeera 
journalists have been harassed, arrested and put on trial in the course of reporting 
(Hasan, 07/12/2011; Fisher, 2011; Sultan, 16/05/2012). In Libya, cameraman Ali 
Hassan al-Jaber was killed when an Al Jazeera team was ambushed on their way 
back to the rebel-held city of Benghazi after reporting on an opposition protest 
(Wells, 14/03/2011). Al Jazeera was banned from reporting from Tunisia. In Egypt, 
Hosni Mubarak’s government first closed the Al Jazeera office in that country, then 
blocked the channel’s signals. Al Jazeera teams were targeted by regime supporters 
when they ventured into the streets. Fisher describes how ‘knife wielding mobs’ 
pursued Al Jazeera teams in Alexandria (Fisher, 201:154). He recounts how a 
colleague from a UK network confided in him that ‘it was the first time he was 
happy to admit in a Middle East country he was not from Al Jazeera when 
confronted with an angry crowd’ (Fisher, 2011: 153). The risks to the life and well-
being of its staff, as well as the technological obstacles, were considerable, even for a 
network that was no stranger to opposition.  
 
Meanwhile, some 5000 miles away from the uprisings, another effect quickly 
became apparent: Al Jazeera’s superior on-the-ground presence, especially in 
relation to other English-language media, meant that Al Jazeera’s virtual absence 
from large parts of the American television market84 suddenly became the subject of 
                                                
83 Given Al Jazeera’s active role, ‘many complained that it had veered from 
journalism into advocacy’ (Lynch, 2012: 20-21). This was an advocacy that, 
according to Pintak, ‘journalism purists in the West may object to’, but that 
constituted ‘a vast improvement’ on the information available on state-controlled 
channels and, at times, to Western networks with limited manpower and access in the 
region (Pintak, 02/02/2011).  
 
84 In the past, image problems combined with a reputation for straightforward hard 
news made distribution an even more difficult undertaking than it would have been 
in an already crowded market under the best conditions (Macleod & Walt, 
27/06/2005; Stroehlein, 20/11/2007; Manly, 26/03/2006). More than two and a half 
years after its launch the channel had still not been carried by any of the major cable 
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debates within the United States (Grim, 30/01/2011; Youmans, 2012) – something 
that had not happened to the same extent when Al Jazeera reported exclusively from 
Gaza during the 2008/09 Gaza war, despite a reported global increase in the 
channel’s online viewership at the time of 600%, sixty percent of which originated in 
the United States (The Guardian, 26/01/2009). However, this time the debate was 
accompanied by a palpable shift in the tone and attitude of the US administration 
towards Al Jazeera. News of President Barack Obama watching Al Jazeera as events 
unfolded in Egypt in January 2011 (MacNicol, 29/01/2011) and Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton praising Al Jazeera as ‘real news’ during a US Senate committee 
meeting on American foreign policy in early March 2011 made Al Jazeera 
acceptable in ‘official’ discursive contexts in the US (Youmans, 2012, Powers, 2011) 
and therefore helped pave the way for the network’s latest ambitions (see also 9.4.1). 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter served to show the intrinsically connected nature of the political 
development of the state of Qatar, of AJA’s successes and the controversies they 
sparked across the world and of the establishment of AJE as a journalistic endeavour 
with the ambitious aim of redressing the ‘current typical information flow’. As such 
it served to give an indication of the historic circumstances under which Al Jazeera 
has variously been subjected to accusations of being the ‘mouthpiece of Osama bin 
Laden’ (Bessaiso, 2005: 153) and the ‘mouthpiece of the US government’ 
(Chatriwala, 19/09/2011).  
 
As I have shown in this chapter, the same frankness and often unrivalled level of 
access in the Middle East that provoked these contradictory and stark reactions also 
meant that Al Jazeera was uniquely positioned to cover some of the biggest stories of 
the past fifteen years, reporting on many issues that would otherwise not have had 
nearly the same kind of media exposure. The price of this unique position, as I have 
further outlined, has been the lack of any in-built structural mechanism to guarantee 
                                                                                                                                     
or satellite operators in the US and was only distributed by ‘two tiny cable systems in 
Vermont and Ohio (Farhi, 29/04/2009).’  
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non-interference by the state, making a continuous scrutiny of Al Jazeera’s editorial 
independence all the more important. At the same time, Al Jazeera’s media muscle 
and its overall positive reflection on Qatar is precisely what potentially protects the 
news organisation’s editorial freedom, since state interference would lessen the long-
term positive impact that the network generates for Qatar. 
 
As I have further pointed out in this Chapter, the Arabic-language channel had not 
initially been conceived as a counter-hegemonic project, but rather as a project 
pioneering a ‘widely accepted model of pluralistic reporting’ in the regional 
broadcasting environment. Over the years, however, the focus had shifted ‘from its 
initial purpose of delivering news in Arabic according to criteria of newsworthiness 
widely accepted in the West […] to include […] reporting the “other side of the 
story” from that covered by dominant news media’ (Sakr, 2007: 129). This shift in 
purpose meant that AJA began to be perceived as providing a counter-balance to the 
dominant Western news narrative. Its exclusive coverage from Afghanistan had 
rendered the network globally recognisable. At the same time, pressure from the US 
administration and being associated – often by audiences reliant on English-language 
(and therefore secondary) accounts of AJA’s coverage – with being ‘anti-Western’ 
made it nearly impossible to gain real traction in the Western world.  
 
Therefore, what ultimately came to shape the mission of the English-language 
channel was an effort to demonstrate that, far from taking sides and being ‘anti-
Western’, the channel’s aim was to address an apparent discrepancy in international 
English-language TV news stemming from the predominance of news originating 
from Western-based news organisations. And it is precisely this subtle yet crucial 
differentiation between (perceived) opposition and efforts to add a different 
perspective that Roger Silverstone (2007: 3) threw into sharp relief when he wrote 
shortly before the launch of AJE: 
 
The continuing dismay with which Al Jazeera is received in Western societies, 
most especially in the United States, is not only because of the graphic horror 
of some of its images (we provide those on a daily basis) or the ferocity of its 
political rhetoric (likewise). It is much more fundamental. It is based on the 
breaking of a media taboo and the reversal of the taken-for-granted nature of 
media representation, in which we in the West do the defining, and in which 
you are, and I am not, the other. 
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When AJE was launched, from the very beginning the channel was positioned as a 
counter-hegemonic channel, setting out to reverse ‘the taken-for-granted nature of 
media representation’ that Silverstone alludes to. Its explicit aim was to replicate the 
strength of AJA’s local expertise in the Middle East85 in other global regions, in 
particular in the developing world, as well as to focus on those not often heard or 
seen in international news.  
 
In the next chapter, I will gauge the degree to which AJE lived up to these aims, in 
relation both to its own remit and to the interpretation thereof by its own staff, and 
vis-à-vis one of the main channels that it set out to challenge: BBCW News. In so 
doing, I am aware of the limitations that a comparative analysis of (a limited volume 
of) news content presents, in particular since mechanisms inherent in the 
organisation’s structure or in journalists’ reflections are contingent on context and do 
not always play out in the same way in actual news content, which renders the results 
in the upcoming chapter an example more than anything else, although, I hope, an 
insightful one. Therefore, in addition to the content analysis, I will analyse in-depth 
interviews I conducted in London, Doha and Kuala Lumpur with AJE staff in 
relation to Bourdieu’s and Archer’s works on the journalistic field and on reflexivity 
respectively in Chapters 7 and 8. Combined, the following three empirical chapters 
are designed to highlight the relational character of questions of news flows as well 
as the existing margins of difference within the highly consolidated field of 
international English-language news broadcasting. 
 
  
                                                
85 AJA’s level of local expertise also stemmed from the fact that the channel had 
from the start been operating a multi-national Arabic-language newsroom, something 
managers at AJE were keen to develop further by locating journalists ‘in the farthest 
confines of the earth’, as AJN’s former managing director Wadah Khanfar put it in a 
official AJN publication (2006: 15-16). For more on AJE’s recruitment strategy, see 
also Chapter 7. 
  164 
Chapter 6 Degrees of Difference: Examples of the 
Implementation of AJE’s Remit in its News 
Content Compared with BBC World News  
 
 
We have in the sphere of politics become accustomed to equating ‘voice’ with the 
expression of opinion or, more broadly, the expression of a distinctive perspective on 
the world that needs to be acknowledged. This political use of the word ‘voice’ 
continues to be useful, especially in contexts where long-entrenched inequalities of 
representation need to be addressed. 
 
Nick Couldry, Why Voice Matters, (2010: 1) 
 
We defined ourselves as the voice of the South […] but in actually crystallizing that 
as a definition people have issues. What exactly is the voice of the South? […] We 
are still figuring that out. 
 
AJE Journalist (Personal interview, Doha, 08/02/2008) 
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6.1 Introduction – Developing a Voice 
 
Editorially AJE was still finding its feet when I first began my interviews. Years later 
that process of editorial evolution is very much ongoing, not least because there have 
continued to be substantial organisational and managerial changes, but it has moved 
on from a process of developing an editorial profile from scratch to a process of re-
defining and refining. It is safe to say, however, that in the early years post launch 
the development of AJE’s editorial profile was to a significant degree contingent on 
the collective imagination of its first generation of journalists. Their deliberations 
and daily discussions formed the basis for a set of shared assumptions that came to 
be associated with the channel’s remit. Without a precedent to fall back on for 
guidance in their task of creating a journalistically competitive, geo-culturally 
distinct alternative to the two dominant international English-language networks, 
BBCW News and CNNI, there was palpable excitement about the possibility of 
being part of the formative years of an enterprise that proposed no less than a 
different way of reporting global news. As a Doha-based producer described her 
experience of joining the network: ‘We are the other and all of a sudden we’re telling 
the story and that’s wonderful and brilliant and it is complicated’ (personal 
Interview, Doha 13/02/2008). ‘We do not quite know what our remit is, that is why it 
is exciting, that is why there are many debates and arguments’ (personal interview, 
Doha, 08/02/2008), a presenter told me.  
 
Described by virtually all interviewees as a welcome professional challenge, this lack 
of clarity, however, also brought with it high levels of uncertainty about how 
everyone was to go about their work. To my question about how they decided which 
stories and angles fitted AJE’s remit of providing an alternative perspective, a senior 
journalist replied: ‘How do you do it?  Well, we spend most of our time wracking our 
brains as to how we do it differently’ (personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). A 
reporter explained: ‘We defined ourselves as the voice of the South […] but in 
actually crystallising that as a definition people have issues. What exactly is the 
voice of the South? […] We are still figuring that out’ (personal interview, Doha, 
08/02/2008). Similarly, a presenter asked about her definition of the South replied: 
‘It is a great line, isn’t it?  I’m not entirely sure what it means […] Everyone got a bit 
confused by that’ (personal interview, Doha, 07/02/2008). And a senior manager told 
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me about two and a half years after AJE started broadcasting that ‘[the concept of 
The South] is one that we're trying to narrow down in terms of our editorial focus 
[…] I think there's too much vagueness in what that means’ (personal interview, 
Doha, 16/03/2009). This uncertainty resurfaced regularly when it came to the 
question of how best to distinguish themselves from their competitors. As a senior 
manager explained:  
 
I think a lot of people were struggling [with] how to go about competing with 
CNN and BBC – do we do it by doing the same kinds of things as they do, or 
we used to do when we worked there, but do it better? and then if so what 
does better mean? Or do you take a totally different approach? […] It’s 
gradual, an evolution. 
 
Senior manager (personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009) 
 
This ‘evolving’ transformation of AJE’s relatively abstract remit into concrete 
journalistic preferences and practices can be analysed with regard to two main 
interrelated aspects of its  remit. Firstly, there is the aim of being the ‘voice of the 
South’, as interviewees frequently put it, which is referred to in AJE’s corporate 
profile as ‘reporting from the developing world back to the West and from the 
southern to the northern hemisphere’ (AJE Website, Corporate Profile, 04/09/2008). 
And secondly, there is the element of being a ‘voice of the voiceless’ by ‘providing a 
unique grassroots perspective (Corporate Profile, 2008).’  
 
One of the challenges faced by AJE staff in their task of operationalising these core 
elements of their remit stemmed from the fact that there is a significant overlap 
between these two concepts. This overlap stems in part from the fact that both 
concepts are concerned with power imbalances and can be interpreted as going 
beyond geographical delineations, since the term ‘global South’ has become 
interchangeable with geo-political concepts ‘also known, variously, as the Third 
World, the poor world, the less developed world, the non-Western world, and the 
developing world’ (Rigg, 2007: 9). There quickly emerged a consensus amongst AJE 
staff that any concept of a ‘global South’ meant that, as one journalist put it, ‘not all 
of it is a geographical line’ (personal interview, London, 19/05/2008).  
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Interviewees emphasised that the concept of the South is related to power and, more 
specifically, to peoples’ relative proximity or distance to political and economic 
power. ‘The South could be America, the South is everywhere. In London there is a 
South’ (personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008), explained a senior manager. One 
correspondent said that his take on the South was that it ‘is more often than not the 
underdog, politically the underdog and economically the underdog’ (personal 
interview, Doha, 08/02/22008). For others, it was ‘more than the developing world, 
but […] the world that exists outside the European and American power centres’ 
(personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009) or simply ‘the margins’ (personal interview, 
London, 20/12/2007). In as far as the aim of ‘reporting back’ references older 
debates on media imperialism (as outlined in Chapter 2), these descriptions 
correspond with Boyd-Barrett’s (1998: 173-174) suggestion of extending the 
‘metaphor [of media imperialism] to media fostering of inequalities between men 
and women, different ethnicities and between capital and labour’, arguing it had in 
the past not sufficiently addressed the ‘systematic patterns […] that help to explain 
the extraordinarily limited opportunities for access to the means of production and 
transmission for addressing mass audiences’. In other words, just as the definitions of 
the ‘global South’ and the ‘global North’ have superseded geographical delineations 
of power, scholars are seeking to adapt the concept of media imperialism to a more 
complex geo-political context of asymmetries in global media.  
 
However, as a result of this broadening of the definition of the South to include 
socio-political and economic factors, the concepts of ‘the South’ and ‘the voiceless’ 
inevitably become more intertwined. Notwithstanding such interrelations and 
overlaps, however, they are not synonymous. Most evidently, the concept of the 
global South, even without interpreting it in a literal geographical sense, ‘happens to 
have some cartographic continuity’ (Rigg, 2007: 3)  or ‘spatial resonance of where 
the countries concerned are situated’ (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009: 11), whereas the 
notion of being the ‘voice of the voiceless’ carries an evident reference to individuals 
rather than geography. Consequently, in the following, I will discuss AJE’s ambition 
to be the voice of the South with reference to the geographical emphases in its news 
programmes – albeit in a slightly adapted way where appropriate to fit the less 
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geographically rigid understanding of the South86, as interpreted by AJE staff. 
Subsequently, I will elaborate on the degree to which AJE represents the ‘voiceless’ 
by looking at the question of who gets to speak on the channel’s flagship news 
programme.  
 
In the following I will add to existing research by juxtaposing themes emerging from 
my interview data with a quantitative comparative analysis of a selection of AJE and 
BBCW news programmes. 87  As the interview data formed the basis for the 
development of the variables for the content analysis, juxtaposing both types of data 
allows me to contrast conceptualisations of difference as an intellectual exercise by 
AJE staff and actual difference to the (limited) degree that it becomes visible (and 
measurable) as part of the channel’s news output at a given time. While in the first 
part of the chapter I will look at news content with respect to channel’s much evoked 
aim to address existing imbalances in international news by focussing on the South, 
the second part of the Chapter focuses on AJE’s claim to be a ‘voice of the 
voiceless’. 
 
 
6.2 Implications of AJE’s Aim to be the ‘Voice of the South’ 
 
There is a strong belief within AJE that, geographically speaking, the channel 
reflects issues from the South to a greater degree than its competitors. As a senior 
manager maintained: 
 
We reflect the South and we reflect the fact that we are in the South by the 
significantly higher percentage of stories that are told from the South. 
Whether it is Latin America, Africa, Asia or the Middle East, I think that we 
do give prominence to a lot of stories that are truly neglected by our 
competition. 
  
Senior manager (personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009). 
 
                                                
86 For details of how news items were categorised as being about the South and/or 
the North, see Chapter 4.3.2. 
 
87 For details regarding the sample and coding process see Chapter 4.3.1. 
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In the following I will outline how far and in what ways AJE delivered on its 
ambition to be the voice of the South in relation to BBCW News. I do so with regard 
to the overall balance of news from the global South and the global North, as well as 
the relative representation of various regions. In addition, I also explore divergences 
between percentages of the number of items from the South and North, on the one 
hand, and percentages of airtime allocated to items from the South and the North, on 
the other hand, which will further point towards potential differences. This 
comparison (between the number of items and the time allocated) goes beyond 
questions of news selection, since it shows whether items from the global South and 
the global North, once they had passed the selection stage, were being allocated 
equal airtime or whether there were discernible patterns of disproportionate 
allocation of time to items from specific regions. Other factors I considered in 
relation to geographical focus in AJE’s news programmes included the relative 
distribution of specific news genres and the number of stories not covered by the 
equivalent programme on BBCW News. Finally, I will illustrate some of the 
similarities and differences between AJE’s and BBCW’s news programmes with 
examples that (at the expense of being less representative) provide a more qualitative 
insight into the treatment of stories on the programmes analysed for this study.  
 
 
6.2.1 Emphasis on Global South and Global North Respectively 
 
To get a first overall impression, I looked at the number of news items (and the 
airtime these were being allocated) concerning issues from the South and from the 
North. AJE carried more coverage on the South than on the North on every single 
programme in the sample – adding up, as can be seen in Figure 2.1, to a significantly 
greater percentage of coverage on average of the global South than was carried on 
BBCW.  
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Figure 2.1 – Proportion of airtime spent on items from the global South / North 
respectively on AJE and BBC World (excluding sports and business news) 
 
Excluding the sports section, the airtime spent on AJE on items from the South 
across the entire sample was just over 76%, with just under 24% of airtime spent 
covering issues from the North. In contrast, in the sample analysed, BBCW spent a 
little more than 54% of its airtime on stories concerning the global South, with nearly 
46% on stories concerning the North (excluding WBR).  
 
Furthermore, on all four days there was a discrepancy between the percentage of 
items and the percentage of airtime allocated to these that indicated that journalists at 
AJE allowed on average more airtime for an item from the global South than for an 
item from the global North, further emphasising the channel’s geo-political profile. 
On BBCW this discrepancy between the percentage of items and the percentage of 
airtime spent per programme was almost reversed, in that on three out of four days 
the average time spent on an item from the global North exceeded the average time 
spent on an item from the global South. On average across the entire sample, as can 
be seen in Figure 2.2, news items from and/or about the global South on BBCW were 
allocated almost precisely the same amount of on-air time as items on the global 
North. Whereas, on AJE, an item on the global South was on average allocated 
slightly more airtime than an item from and/or about the global North.  
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Figure 2.2 – Difference between the percentage of the number of items and the 
percentage of airtime spent on news from and/or about the global South on AJE and 
BBC World (excluding sports and business news) 
 
These results correspond to shared assumptions expressed by AJE staff in interviews 
suggesting that, in the case of AJE, stories from the South are perceived to be of 
more value (and therefore worth more airtime) in relation to the channel’s remit than 
stories from areas that are perceived to be well covered by the competition. As a 
London-based correspondent put it, ‘stories that perhaps get big play in Europe, 
won't get such big play on the Al Jazeera network and I think that's right’ (personal 
interview, London, 01/04/2009). The results also help to explain discrepancies 
between the outcomes of Painter’s and Figenschou’s respective analyses (see also 
4.3). Painter (2008: 30) arrives at a higher percentage of coverage from the global 
South than does Figenschou (2010a: 91-92), which, as the results shown in Figure 
2.2 substantiate, matches my findings of a corresponding variance between 
measuring the percentage of airtime (as Painter did in his analysis) and measuring the 
percentage of number of items (as Figenschou did in her research). As such, the 
above results help to build a common basis for content analyses of AJE that, however 
slightly, increases the comparability of existing and potential future research.  
 
Furthermore, observing the percentage of airtime spent on items on the global South 
over the course of the nine months that made up the sample, it becomes clear very 
quickly that there were much greater swings in the balance of coverage from the 
South on BBCW than there were on AJE – a point to my knowledge not empirically 
validated in previous content analyses. Excluding sports and business news, the 
percentage of airtime spent on issues from the South on BBCW ranged from as little 
as 18% (16th Feb 2008) to a staggering 93% (16th Aug 2007) across the sample – a 
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difference of 75 percentage points.  In contrast, on the day with the least coverage of 
the South (16th February 2008), AJE still allocated 65% of its airtime to issues from 
the South,88 while the highest percentage of airtime spent on the South by AJE was 
87% (15th May 2008) – a difference of 22 percentage points.  
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Variation in proportion of airtime spent on items from the global South 
between August 2007 and May 2008 by AJE and BBC World (excluding sports and 
business news) 
 
In other words, as can be seen in Figure 2.3, another indicator that AJE delivered on 
its mission of ‘reporting back’ from the South is that it was comparatively consistent 
in its emphasis on the South, while BBCW displayed greater variance across the 
sample, depending on major stories. 89  This finding is of particular relevance 
considering that authors analysing the relative neglect of foreign news in general, and 
news from the South in particular, have pointed towards a link between scarcity of 
foreign news and its (relatively more pronounced) dependency on large-scale events. 
As Franks (2004: 426) points out in the context of international coverage on UK 
                                                
88 The highest and lowest percentages of airtime spent on the South in the sample, 
excluding sports on AJE and the business programme on BBCW, are highlighted in 
Table 1.1.  
 
89 It is important to note that BBCW’s tendency to run fewer stories in any one news 
programme than AJE further contributes to this relatively high volatility in 
geographical emphasis. While AJE’s tendency to have a greater number of overall 
items within the hour arguably helps to balance its geographical profile, BBCW’s 
tendency to ‘go big’ on a comparatively small number of main stories makes it more 
susceptible to focussing on events of scale, although the number of items per 
programme does not suffice on its own to explain the differences that emerges from 
the data. 
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television, the relative airtime given to foreign news ‘[…] depends on what is 
happening’ more than it does for national news. This is logical, because if the news 
values by which events are selected are skewed in favour of issues geo-politically 
more proximate to the global North, issues from the South only ‘score highly’ in 
terms of news values in the context of big events, leading to a higher volatility in the 
amount of airtime allocated. In contrast, AJE’s more consistent coverage was 
indicative of a recalibration in favour of issues from the global South of what was 
considered newsworthy.  
 
It is important to recognise that this is not simply a question of editorial preferences, 
but also a structural issue. This becomes particularly obvious when breaking news 
triggers coverage from different locales on different channels, because the 
immediacy of the news event forces journalists to rely on pre-existing arrangements 
for their first reactions, revealing glimpses of otherwise less visible structures within 
each news organisation.90 But it applies more generally in the sense that those 
organisations that do not already have journalists based in a country or region, will 
have to think twice before investing in sending a team when events emerge, while 
organisations with permanent presences on the ground will seek to continuously 
produce stories from the location, so as to make the most of their investment.  
 
Dividing the coverage by region further elucidates this phenomenon. Looking at the 
percentage of airtime spent on items across the entire sample helps to understand 
some of the ways in which individual events affected the regional emphasis on 
BBCW and AJE in different ways. For example, on 15th November 2007 as well as 
15th February 2008, the coverage of Europe shows two very significant spikes. These 
can be explained by extensive coverage on both channels of the imminent 
independence of Kosovo in late 2007 and early 2008, but it is worth noting that this 
had a significantly greater impact on the overall regional balance on BBCW than it 
did on AJE. Similarly, the shooting of five people at Northern Illinois University 
largely accounts for the sudden increase of coverage of North America on BBCW 
from 0% during the first two days of the sample to 35% on day three of the sample, 
                                                
90 For an example of such a case, see Lawson’s comparative study of the coverage of 
the death of Osama bin Laden on 2nd May 2011 (Lawson, 2011).  
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whereas coverage of North America on AJE ranged comparatively consistently 
between approximately 6% and 10% on any given day.  
 
An example from the South is the spike of coverage from the Middle East on BBCW 
on 15th August 2007 due to the deadliest bombing attack in Iraq for four years and, 
on the same day, a sharp increase in airtime spent on Asia as a direct result of the  
60th anniversary of India’s independence, which helps to explain the fact that BBCW 
broadcast a greater percentage of coverage from the South than AJE on that day (see 
Figure 2.3). Again, these particular events did receive considerable attention on both 
channels, but did not shift the overall balance of the regional distribution of news 
nearly as dramatically on AJE as they did on BBCW. In addition, across the entire 
sample, the average regional emphasis differed noticeably between the two channels. 
As can be seen in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, AJE spent less airtime on North America and 
Europe and more on Sub-Saharan Africa91, Asia and Latin America, with North 
Africa and the Middle East featuring strongly on both channels. These results 
broadly correlate with previous studies of AJE’s television content (Painter, 2008; 
Figenschou, 2010a).  
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Proportion of airtime spent on different global regions on AJE (excluding 
sports news) 
 
                                                
91 A region particularly neglected by international news organisations in recent 
decades (see Franks, 2005).  
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Figure 3.2 – Proportion of airtime spent on different global regions on BBC World 
(excluding business news) 
 
It is worth noting here that research on coverage of Sub-Saharan Africa specifically 
suggests that further breaking down of the region into countries and sub-regions 
reveals relatively similar geo-graphical patterns between AJE and BBCW (Mellese 
and Mueller, 2012) – something I can neither corroborate nor contest through my 
study, given a sample that does not include any coverage of the region in question by 
one of the channels analysed (BBCW). In their account of analysing coverage on the 
respective websites of AJE and BBC, Mellese and Mueller (2012: 203) point out that 
more than half of the countries in the region were not mentioned on either channel, 
with BBC reporting on only seven countries in over 65% of their coverage and AJE 
devoting all of 69% of its coverage to just five of the region’s 47countries. Suffice it 
to say that, in the sample I analysed, AJE reported on nine countries in the region 
(Sudan, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Tanzania), with repeated emphasis on Zimbabwe and Nigeria.  
 
 
6.2.2 Geographical Emphasis in Terms of Original Stories and News 
Genres 
 
In order to further assess degrees of difference and congruence between news on AJE 
and on BBCW, I looked at the geographical foci of news items that ran on only one 
of the two channels. I called items based on stories that ran on only one of the two 
channels within a given day ‘original items’, rather than ‘exclusives’, for the sole 
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reason that the term exclusive is commonly used for stories that do not run on any 
other channel, which is something that a comparison of just two channels does not 
show. In essence, BBCW had more extensive coverage of comparatively few main 
stories, many of which also ran on AJE, while AJE had a greater range of original 
items on any given day. Comparing the percentages of items on the South and on the 
North out of the original items on each channel again indicated significant 
differences in terms of their geo-political foci. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, AJE 
dedicated on average nearly 66% of all its original items to issues from the South, 
with over 34% on issues from the North. Meanwhile, on BBCW the analysis 
revealed an almost inverted ratio, with an average of a little over 39% of all original 
items dedicated to issues from the South and nearly 61% to issues from the North. To 
summarise, while major international events did have a certain levelling effect in 
terms of overall airtime spent on certain regions, AJE did report on a greater range of 
issues within its programme, a majority of which concerned the South. 
 
Proportion of Original Items on Global South / North 
  
Figure 4.1 – Proportion of original items (not covered by the other channel) from the 
global South / North on AJE and on BBC World (excluding sports and business news) 
 
Having a greater percentage of original items and not being so much led by major 
stories (which apart from elections and anniversaries often included high levels of 
destruction, conflict and disaster) could lead to the assumption that, as one 
correspondent put it, AJE did not cover the South ‘just in times of war and death and 
disasters or famines’ but ‘all the time – in times of sorrows, in times of happiness’ 
Interview with author, Doha, 11/02/2008). However, as can be seen in Figure 5.1, the 
percentage of items on AJE on the Global South concerning conflict, crime, poverty 
or natural disasters far outstripped the number of items on political processes and 
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diplomacy. In contrast, coverage from the North, both on AJE and on BBCW, on 
average entailed a greater percentage of items on political processes than on disasters 
or conflict. In relation to the context of other content analyses (which likewise based 
their sample on a period of time rather than analysing specific events or subjects), 
Figenschou’s research corroborates the finding that news items on the global South 
significantly more often concerned internal political crises or armed conflict than did 
stories on the global North (Figenschou, 2010a: 97-98), but her research did not 
extend to comparing this result with that of a Western broadcaster, while Painter’s 
comparative analysis (2008) did not consider questions of genre. Consequently, in 
my analysis I was interested to see how questions of genre with regard to different 
global regions played out on AJE and on BBCW respectively.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 – Proportion of items in different news genres consisting of coverage from 
and/or about the global South on AJE  
 
 
Figure 5.2 – Proportion of items in different news genres consisting of coverage from 
and/or about the global South on BBC World 
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One of the unexpected results was that in BBCW’s coverage of the South, items on 
political processes slightly exceeded those on disasters (see Figure 5.2), in sharp 
contrast to AJE’s emphasis on conflict and disasters in its coverage of the South (see 
Figure 5.1). Again, when comparing the percentages of the number of items and of 
airtime respectively, this discrepancy increases rather than diminishes (with about 
62% of the airtime AJE spent on items on the South concerning stories about 
conflict, poverty and disasters, while only about 33% of airtime spent on stories from 
or about the South on BBCW matches this category). This correlates with Mellese 
and Mueller’s findings (2012) that AJE carried slightly more negative online 
coverage than the BBC of Sub-Saharan Africa, and (taking into account a 
significantly higher percentage of coverage coded neither negative or positive in 
tone) a vastly lower percentage of coverage of positive developments in the region 
(Mellese & Mueller, 2012: 206) – contradicting their expectation that ‘given the self-
proclamation of [...] Al Jazeera as “the voice of the South,” our first hypothesis […] 
is that we will find less negatively toned news on the non-Western Al Jazeera 
website than on the Western BBC website’ (Mellese & Mueller, 2012: 198). The lack 
of ‘positive’ news from the global South has not gone unnoticed in AJE’s executive 
ranks. According to one senior manager: 
 
Palestinians coming from Gaza and Ramallah said to media people in Al 
Manar and Al Jazeera “you are drawing a dramatic image of us. We 
Palestinians, we have festivals, we dance, we love, we have cinema, we are 
not only people who suffer from Israeli aggression. Yes, Israeli aggression 
affects us every day, but even Israelis and Palestinians, they talk to each 
other, there is some ‘festival’ side.”  
 
Senior manager (personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). 
 
This further strengthens the claim that AJE’s focus on the South, which was evident 
in the channel’s overall emphasis and which my analysis has also shown to be more 
consistent and less event-driven, was not coupled with a less conflict-driven 
approach, as some expected given the channel’s ambition of resetting not just the 
volume of coverage but also the outlook on what constituted newsworthiness in the 
South.92  
                                                
92 Again, it would be interesting to have further research on AJE’s signature current 
affairs programmes, because long-form reporting entails more time to focus on 
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A different expression of this tendency, and one that immediately distinguishes AJE 
from its competition, was the categorical dismissal of celebrity journalism and other 
kinds of so-called ‘soft news’. While well over a quarter of all news items within the 
hour on BBCW (17.5%) fell into the categories of entertainment, culture, science or 
technology, not a single item on AJE fitted these categories. These findings confirm 
observations by AJE staff. As a producer/presenter pointed out: 
 
Consider for a minute what you’re not seeing. You are not seeing Paris 
Hilton, you’re not seeing Britney Spears, you’re not seeing – I was watching 
the channel on the day that Tom Cruise and Katie Holmes got married. CNN 
had a […] helicopter! […] It was a weekend.  I watched Jazeera all day, not a 
frame of video. 
Producer/presenter (personal interview, Doha, 15/03/2009). 
 
This penchant for hard news has become a trademark of the channel that has also 
been recognised in other studies. According to Painter (2008: 42-43), ‘AJE rarely – if 
ever – runs stories about royalty or celebrities from the developed world in its news 
programmes’ – a practice that, as Painter recounts, included ignoring the diamond 
wedding anniversary of Queen Elizabeth, which BBCW covered live. 93  And 
Figenschou (2010: 97a) found that, out of 1,324 news items analysed, only three 
fitted the ‘soft news’ category – including coverage of the funeral of Yves Saint 
Laurent and music and fashion launches by the Indonesian president and the Thai 
king respectively, again highlighting AJE’s relative emphasis on the global South. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
processes.  However, at the time of writing, no study on AJE’s non-news 
programming had been published.  
 
93 In recent years there are indications that the channel’s news editors may have 
become less persistent in ignoring celebrity events, though this observation remains 
anecdotal rather than empirically tested. One example is the wedding of Prince 
William and Katherine Middleton in 2011 in London, which did receive some 
attention on AJE. 
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6.2.3 Example 1: Coverage of Two Natural Disasters in Asia 
 
To complement the quantitative results outlined above, two news stories on 15th May 
2008 are worth looking into in more detail, since they provide examples where 
differences in the treatment of stories are particularly evident. They concern 
coverage of the aftermaths of a cyclone in Myanmar / Burma94 and an earthquake in 
China, both devastating natural disasters resulting in serious humanitarian crises. 
AJE opted, after an opening piece from Nigeria, for comparing the responses to the 
two disasters in China and Myanmar. BBCW treated the two stories separately, with 
China as their opening story and the item on the cyclone aftermath in Burma fifth in 
the running order. Both AJE and BBCW had correspondents on the ground not only 
in China, but in Myanmar as well, and both stressed that this kind of access was rare 
and special. Broadcast more than two weeks after the cyclone hit in Myanmar and 
four days into the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake in China, coverage on the 
two channels had already begun to explore different political angles to the stories in 
addition to reporting the devastating humanitarian situation. On 14th May 2008, the 
day before the programme was broadcast, I spoke to one of AJE’s political analysts 
about a range of issues, including internal editorial discussions about what angle to 
take in their coverage of the two natural disasters in Asia that were dominating the 
news across the networks. His remarks are worth quoting in full: 
 
If I was BBC or CNN, the first thing would be […] by an almost natural 
instinct [to] dump on the Chinese government, but because we are Al Jazeera 
and because we broadcast from Southeast Asia as much as the Middle East, 
we don’t have a first instinct just to dump on China. We have a first instinct 
to compare China and other countries. We think perhaps the Chinese do have 
a better response than the Americans to [Hurricane] Katrina. We want to see 
how the response is on a humanitarian level before making judgments on the 
Chinese government, not because we want to release the Chinese government 
from its responsibility, but [because] our take will always be different from 
the other satellite networks.  
 
Political analyst (personal interview, London, 14/05/2008). 
                                                
94 AJE referred to the country as Myanmar, while BBCW called it Burma. Officially 
the country’s name had been changed from Burma to Myanmar by the ruling military 
junta in 1989. The change had been recognised by the United Nations and several 
countries, but not by the UK or the US. At the time of writing, CNNI used the term 
Myanmar, as did Reuters, AFP and AP. The New York Times used ‘Myanmar, 
formerly known as Burma’ (Reuters, Editors Blog, 23/10/2007). 
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Indeed the most pronounced difference between the coverage on AJE and on BBCW 
was the fact that AJE focussed on criticising the international community, the UN in 
particular, for letting ‘diplomacy get in the way of saving millions’ in Myanmar and 
in contrast reported positively on China’s rescue efforts. In contrast, BBCW attacked 
the Chinese government for alleged negligence in enforcing appropriate safety 
standards during the country’s recent construction boom and blamed the Burmese 
generals, and not the UN, for abandoning the people on the ground in Myanmar.  
 
While there were sharp contrasts in the way the disasters were covered by the two 
rival channels, it is worth noting that the divergent accounts of AJE and BBCW were 
not necessarily contradictory. There is no inherent contradiction in stating that the 
Chinese rescue efforts were resolute and coordinated (AJE) and suggesting that some 
of the buildings worst affected by the earthquake had been built by people for whom 
profit was more important than safety standards (BBCW). Neither is there 
necessarily a contradiction in maintaining that the Burmese authorities were harming 
their own people by denying them international aid (BBCW) and maintaining that 
the international community was not exploring all legal routes available to them for 
helping the victims of the cyclone (AJE). This seemingly obvious point is worth 
making, because it again highlights the fact that this difference is a matter of 
perspective rather than one of accuracy. It therefore throws into relief the benefit of 
having a range of broadcasters with diverging geo-political emphases to cover 
different angles of a very complex reality, in particular with regard to the relatively 
limited format of news (limited to a much greater degree than other programming in 
its ability to accommodate complexities and therefore prone to picking one particular 
aspect and focussing on that).  
 
As demonstrated in this chapter so far, overall, AJE delivered on its aim to 
emphasise the South in terms of the number of items, airtime, ratio of original items 
and treatment of stories, with the caveat that more extensive coverage of the South 
was not coupled with a less conflict-driven perspective. However, this constitutes 
only one component of AJE’s remit. In the next part of this chapter I will look into 
the related concept of aiming to be, in AJE terminology, ‘the voice of the voiceless’. 
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6.3 Who Speaks for the ‘Voiceless’?  
 
The second core theme in the way AJE’s remit is perceived amongst its journalists is 
that of giving a ‘voice to the voiceless’. As with the concept of the South, over time 
shared assumptions of a common definition developed that encompassed 
geographical as well as economic, political and social elements. In its broadest sense 
this interpretation was based on people’s relative proximity to or distance from 
power. In this context, giving voice to the voiceless meant giving on-air presence to 
people who were disadvantaged in their comparatively limited access to capital (both 
economic and cultural) because of existing geo-cultural, political, economic and 
social inequalities.  In other words, to reverse the global news flow, it was considered 
important ‘to give equal if not more airtime to those outside the realms of power to 
be equally influential’, as one journalist put it (personal interview, Doha, 
08/02/2008). A senior AJE manager based in Doha offered an analogy that is worth 
quoting in full since it epitomises a shared assumption about the purpose of this 
particular aspect of the channel’s editorial remit:  
 
Conceptually what I imagine is that the world runs as a consequence of 
decisions being taken by decision-makers, and there is a stage on which these 
decision-makers work, and up until recently they have been dominated by a 
particular kind of narrow class of decision-makers coming from a certain part 
of the world or reflecting certain elites. […] People want to climb onto that 
stage and want to be a part of this decision-making. Al Jazeera English sees 
itself as an enabler of that. So when we say we want to give voice to the 
voiceless, we’re essentially saying we want to come up with ways of aiding 
and abetting the voiceless to get onto that stage.  
 
Senior manager (personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009). 
 
 
This characterisation of AJE’s remit begs the question of who is meant by these 
‘voiceless’ who are to be helped to disrupt outdated power structures and get onto the 
‘stage’ of global decision-makers. My interview data suggests that, throughout 
journalistic and managerial levels at AJE, there appeared to be a consensus that the 
concept of ‘the voiceless’ should not be limited to specific groups of people, but 
flexible to encompass any group of people currently underrepresented in other media 
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due to their relative lack of influence in the wider sphere of politics, cultural or social 
life – whether they were ‘people who are affected by conflict’ (Reporter/presenter, 
personal interview, Doha, 08/02/2008), ‘people in the South’ (Senior manager, 
personal interview, London, 19/05/2008), ‘the people politicians are talking about’ 
(News editor, personal interview, London, 20/12/2007) or ‘women’ (Political 
analyst, personal interview, London, 14/05/2008). ‘In Al Jazeera English, nobody is 
underreported’ a Doha-based correspondent told me (personal interview, 
11/02/2008). Whilst absolute statements like these are always susceptible to 
criticism, this chapter is concerned with finding out in more detail 1) to what degree 
and 2) in what ways this far-reaching definition of the ‘voiceless’ (as any group of 
people systematically underrepresented in the international media) applied to the 
AJE’s news programmes in my sample relative to the representation of the 
‘voiceless’ in the equivalent BBCW programmes. Consequently, the following 
questions emerging from AJE’s remit (as well as interpretations by AJE staff of that 
remit) guided my quantitative enquiry: 1) Do news programmes on AJE focus to a 
greater extent than their equivalents on BBCW on people on the ground as opposed 
to politicians, industry representatives or independent experts? 2) Do news 
programmes on AJE focus to a greater extent than their equivalents on BBCW on 
non-Western actors? 3) Are women represented in a proportionally more adequate 
fashion on news programmes on AJE compared to their equivalents on BBCW?  
 
As discussed in greater detail in the methodology chapter (Chapter 4.3.2), it is 
important to note that people’s identities are far too complex for them to be reduced 
to being a representative of any one of these categories, let alone the more complex 
issue of geo-cultural representation. In addition, as I have pointed out, it is important 
to avoid the cultural relativist assumption that there is something integral to being a 
member of a particular culture that enables people to fully grasp certain local 
specificities in ways that others cannot. In this regard, the results of the content 
analysis remain somewhat superficial, inevitably and inherently, a trait they have in 
common with the very nature of televised news in the sense that audiences and 
researchers (as a particular part of the audience) have in common that many of the 
audio-visual signifiers they encounter cannot be scrutinised or appraised beyond the 
appearances they convey on screen. This makes it epistemologically unfeasible to tell 
whether differences identified in some of the categories are differences of substance 
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and/or of appearance. But it does allow to argue that the significance of appearances 
is in itself of some relevance in the context of television news – and in particular in 
the context of structurally uneven chances of being given a ‘voice’ on international 
news. I therefore understand any such categorisation to mean nothing more than that 
a protagonist, guest or reporter within a particular news programme and in a 
particular instant appears in the capacity as one of many possible representatives of a 
given geo-political, economic or social strata.  
 
Furthermore, the question of whether or not people can be considered to have a 
presence or ‘voice’ in television news applies to a range of roles that can potentially 
serve to amplify the ‘voice of the voiceless’: protagonists in news items, interview 
guests and experts in the studio, presenters, correspondents, and of course the 
numerous people working out of sight of the camera lens in the newsroom and in the 
field. When coding the data, I addressed these questions with regard to three forms of 
on-screen presences: reporters, protagonists in edited news reports or packages and 
interview guests, both on location and in the studio. 
 
 
6.3.1 Patterns of Reporters’ On-Screen Presences and Absences 
 
As can be seen in Figure 7.1, on average more than half (54%) of AJE’s 
correspondents appeared to have ‘non-Western’ backgrounds,95 compared with only 
about 10% of correspondents on BBCW – an average that in the case of BBCW 
included one particular news programme (15th February 2008) with a cast of 
correspondents that did not include anyone associated with a ‘non-Western’ 
background. As mentioned above, results like these have to be read bearing in mind 
that such an analysis is always complicated by the inherently superficial and 
imprecise factors that accompany the inevitably reductive nature of quantitative 
variables with regard to peoples’ backgrounds. However, given the unambiguous 
results shown in Figure 7.1, it is safe to say that when it comes to fulfilling its remit 
of providing an alternative to Western networks by representing the global South, 
                                                
95 The numbers for correspondents on AJE on 15 May 2008 exclude one 
correspondent in a report from Myanmar who remained unidentified in the 
programme for safety reasons.  
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AJE’s conscious effort to recruit non-Western journalists delivered a marked 
difference on screen. In this regard, then, AJE was clearly living up to its self-
professed aims. 
 
               Geo-cultural Association of Reporters 
    
Figure 7.1 – Differences in patterns of geo-cultural background of reporters on AJE 
and BBC World 
 
However, cross-referencing this variable with the category of gender gives an 
interesting twist to these results. Firstly, what becomes immediately obvious is that 
female reporters were significantly outnumbered by their male colleagues on both 
BBCW and AJE (with an average of female reporters of 26% on BBCW and 39% on 
AJE). Secondly, and perhaps even more significantly with regard to AJE’s remit, 
while the dominance of male correspondents was fairly consistent (around 75%) on 
BBCW news programmes (see also Figure 8.1), my analysis shows that AJE did 
much greater justice to its self-declared aim of representing those underrepresented 
by its competitors – in this case women – within the category of reporters associated 
with a ‘non-Western’ background than amongst the sample of ‘Western’ reporters. 
To be precise, as can be seen in Figure 8.2, amongst correspondents with non-
Western backgrounds on AJE, women were not just proportionally represented; they 
were in the majority, with an average of 68% across the sample. In sharp contrast, 
their Western colleagues were men in over 95% of cases.  
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Figure 8.1 – Proportion of women amongst BBC World reporters with different geo-
cultural backgrounds  
 
 
Figure 8.2 – Proportion of women amongst AJE reporters with different geo-cultural 
backgrounds  
 
 
The results outlined above relate directly to AJE’s remit in several ways. Firstly, the 
overall under-representation of women – while slightly less marked on AJE than on 
BBCW – is at odds with AJE’s aim of giving a voice to the ‘voiceless’ (see also 
Figenschou, 2010a: 101). The circumstance that women were under-represented in 
Western international news and current affairs has been a routine subject of study 
and a well-established condition by the time AJE launched (De Swert & Hooghe, 
2010: 69, see also 2.3.2 above). Consequently, gendered inflections of power 
imbalances (and their implications for AJE’s remit) were actively pointed out to me 
in personal interviews with senior AJE staff. As a senior journalist emphasised in an 
interview: ‘The South could be women, […] it could be children, it could be the maid 
next door, it could be minorities’ (personal interview, London, 14/05/2008). This 
awareness, coupled with aims to give ‘a voice’ to those traditionally 
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
"non-Western" background "Western" background 
75.00% 74.29% 
25.00% 25.71% 
Gender of BBC World Reporters by Geo-Cultural 
Background 
women 
men 
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
"non-Western" background "Western" background 
32.00% 
95.24% 
68.00% 
4.76% 
Gender of AJE Reporters by Geo-cultural Background 
women 
men 
  187 
underrepresented in international news, however, fell short of producing an on 
overage balanced gender ratio amongst reporters.  
 
Importantly, one unexpected and significant finding is that on AJE specifically, this 
imbalance was not evident across the cast of reporters appearing in the sample 
analysed. Instead, the results clearly showed that under-representation of women as 
prevalent throughout the wider professional field was a non-issue amongst AJE 
reporters associated with non-Western backgrounds. However, it is the striking 
contrast with the prevalence of men amongst AJE’s Western reporters, a dominance 
which exceeds by some length the already imbalanced gender ratio on BBCW in the 
sample analysed, that is at odds with AJE’s remit. The juxtaposition of a largely 
female set of reporters with non-Western backgrounds with almost exclusively male 
Western colleagues indicates that short of tempering with the persistent male 
dominance in the field of Western-based international English-language broadcasting 
news, AJE’s corrective was to complement it with a predominantly female cast of 
non-Western reporters. In other words, stark gender imbalances amongst reporters 
associated with Western backgrounds were at best left intact and at worst even 
further pronounced.  
 
As media scholars have argued for decades, representational imbalances thrive in 
particular where they go unnoticed and become naturalised, or, where they do 
surface, are dismissed as an inevitable product of practicalities rather than intent.96 
As I will outline in more detail in the following chapter, successfully balancing the 
geo-cultural backgrounds of journalists at AJE took decidedly conscious and 
sustained efforts vis-à-vis an inherently unbalanced international news ecology. 
Similarly, if AJE management wanted to do the same for women as another 
significantly underrepresented group in international news, they would 1) have to 
acknowledge the existing imbalances in the wider field and the specific nature of 
gender imbalances within their own organisation and 2) to replicate the conscious 
effort they had made with regard to journalists with non-Western backgrounds in 
                                                
96 It is also worth noting that some researchers established a link between gender 
imbalances amongst reporters and gender imbalances in news sources, suggesting 
that ‘female journalists tend to use more female sources than do male journalists’ 
(Rosenstiel & Mitchell, 2005: 17). 
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order to engage the female half of the world’s population in a more representative 
fashion.  
 
 
6.3.2 Patterns of Protagonists’ On-Screen Presences and Absences 
 
In the following I will discuss the question of whether or not the tendencies observed 
with regard to correspondents were replicated when it came to protagonists in news 
items. Here, in addition to Western or non-Western backgrounds and gender, the fact 
that protagonists also serve to represent certain socio-political strata increased the 
number of variables necessary in order to capture the degree to which AJE, as 
compared with BBCW, represented the ‘voiceless’.  Consequently, in relation to 
protagonists, I looked at the variables of geo-cultural backgrounds (Western / non-
Western), gender (men / women) and socio-political positions (establishment / 
‘ordinary people’ and grassroots opposition movements / independent elite).97 
What can be seen in Figure 9.1 is that AJE in general delivered on its aim to give a 
greater voice to the voiceless when the voiceless overlapped with geo-cultural 
interpretations of the global South. A total of approximately 68% of all protagonists 
represented a non-Western background, both in terms of the frequency of individual 
on-screen appearances and in terms of the overall airtime allocated to them. At 
BBCW only about 47% of protagonists in reports represented a non-Western 
background and these were on average given less airtime than protagonists with a 
Western background, accounting only for about 35% of the total airtime given to 
protagonists. This is important not least because, as discussed earlier (see 2.3.2), the 
question of ‘who speaks’ and whether or not there are groups which are systemically 
‘disadvantaged in the scramble to secure access to the news media […] has an 
important bearing upon the question of just how diverse are the perspectives and 
interpretative frameworks that are presented through the news media’ (Manning, 
2001: 1, emphasis added). 
 
 
                                                
97 For a more detailed delineation of these categories, see also 4.2.3. 
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Figure 9.1 – Percentages of number of appearances and airtime allocated to 
protagonists with ‘non-Western’ and ‘Western’ backgrounds on AJE and BBC World. 
 
Another shared assumption amongst AJE staff about what it means to give a voice to 
the voiceless is that on AJE ‘you see many more sound bites of […] ordinary people 
than you do on other stations’ (Reporter/presenter, personal interview, Doha, 
08/02/2008). As Figure 10.1 shows, on AJE half of the airtime and therefore the 
single largest proportion of airtime given to protagonists, was allocated to people 
speaking in their capacity as ‘ordinary people’, as members of an opposition group or 
as those affected by conflict, closely followed by protagonists representing 
authorities or industry, with 44%98. In contrast to AJE, on BBCW the largest 
category, accounting for about 46% of total airtime allocated to protagonists, was 
that of officials and industry representatives. BBCW also featured a significantly 
higher percentage than AJE of independent experts and NGO representatives, leaving 
approximately 30% of allocated airtime for ‘ordinary people’ and others outside the 
realms of power. In terms of the socio-political backgrounds of protagonists in news 
items, AJE did therefore broadly fulfil the channel’s aim of emphasising the presence 
of those relatively distanced from the centres of power and of moving ‘further away 
from being stenographers for public officials’, as Gans (2011: 4) had recently 
appealed for in his work on news journalism and representative democracy. 
                                                
98 For a detailed delineation of categories applied in the coding process, see 4.3.2. 
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Figure 10.1 – Proportion of airtime allocated to protagonists representing different 
socio-political positions in news items on AJE and BBC World. 
 
However, as can be seen in Figure 10.2, exploring the data in more detail by cross-
referencing the variables of geo-cultural and socio-political background also reveals 
that this emphasis on ‘ordinary people’ and those affected by the decisions of the 
powers that be is asymmetrically distributed between protagonists with ‘non-
Western’ and ‘Western’ backgrounds, which is particularly apparent on AJE. In 
terms of airtime allocated to these, on AJE 67% of the airtime allocated to Western 
protagonists featured people speaking in their capacity as official or industry sources, 
while only about 35% of the airtime allocated to non-Western protagonists featured 
people speaking in their capacity as representatives of authorities or industry. In turn, 
a majority of the time allocated to protagonists with non-Western backgrounds (close 
to 62%) featured representatives of those outside realms of power, including citizens 
or those opposing the government of the day. Meanwhile, less than 29% of airtime 
went to protagonists with Western backgrounds falling into the same category with 
regard to their relative proximity to political or economic power.  
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Figure 10.2 – Patterns of socio-political associations of protagonists with different geo-
cultural backgrounds expressed in airtime allocated to these on AJE and BBC World. 
 
As with the question of gender, this disparity throws into relief an interpretation of 
the global South that carries the risk of further reinforcing traditional power 
imbalances by linking geo-cultural interpretations of the South with relative distance 
from positions of power – an association that contradicts AJE’s strive to reset the 
parameters born out of Western imaginations guiding international coverage. As can 
be seen in Figure 10.2, this disparity also existed on BBCW, but was slightly less 
pronounced than on AJE (although the fact that a significantly higher percentage of 
independent elite representatives in the category of protagonists associated with a 
‘Western’ background means that the difference between the relative attention given 
to ‘ordinary people’ again was significantly higher in non-Western contexts). 
Furthermore, as with reporters, the area where AJE and BBCW turned out to be 
remarkably similar was in their considerable under-representation of women overall, 
who made up between 16-20% of all protagonists on both channels and overall were 
given even less airtime (under 15%). And, as with reporters, this under-
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representation was significantly more pronounced amongst protagonists with 
‘Western’ backgrounds. Unlike with reporters, this was the case in news programmes 
on AJE and on BBCW. On both channels the percentage of female protagonists with 
‘Western’ backgrounds ranged between approximately seven and eleven percent, 
while the percentage of women amongst protagonists with ‘non-Western’ 
backgrounds ranged between about seventeen and twenty-six percent.  
Cross-referencing gender and other socio-political variables also shows that the 
general pattern of under-representation of women was significantly more pronounced 
amongst protagonists who spoke in their capacity as professionals, be they officials 
or independent experts, than amongst protagonists who spoke in their capacity as 
‘ordinary people’ or others considered to be outside the current realms of power – a 
trend reminiscent of similar findings in relation to Western news broadcasters (Cann 
& Mohr, 2001: 171). More specifically, as represented in Figures 11.1 and 11.2, 
amongst the category of those speaking outside the realms of power, men and 
women were almost equally represented on BBCW, with a less balanced picture on 
AJE, where women only received about 25% of the overall airtime given to 
protagonists in that category. However, this picture turns out to be far less balanced 
when it comes to the category of independent elites. Here, all protagonists on BBCW 
were men and on AJE only about 21% of the airtime given to those representing 
independent elites was allocated to women. Meanwhile, in the category of official 
and industry representatives, nowhere in the entire sample across both channels did 
the percentage either of number of appearances or of airtime allocated to women rise 
above a meagre 3%.  
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Figure 11.1 – Proportion of airtime allocated to women and men representing different 
socio-political positions as protagonists in news items on AJE.  
 
 
Figure 11.2 – Proportion of airtime allocated to women and men representing different 
socio-political positions as protagonists in news items on AJE. 
 
It is of course methodologically impossible to evaluate in a content analysis how far 
this unambiguously unbalanced picture emerging from the data results from a 
relative neglect in international news of those women who do hold positions of 
power, or how far this imbalance is the by-product of a reality where women are, on 
a global scale, still relatively scarce in positions of power. Whether one of these 
scenarios or, as I would be inclined to argue, a combination of the two applies, 
however, has little relevance for AJE if the channel’s remit and the interpretation 
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thereof by its staff is the yardstick against which its news programmes are to be 
evaluated: If women were sufficiently represented in official and economically 
powerful positions, then a failure to represent them as protagonists in news items 
would expose a gendered bias in favour of traditionally more empowered groups of 
society and would be at the very least at odds with AJE’s remit.  
If, on the other hand, there is an argument to be made that this bias reflects a reality 
in which women in many places and professions are effectively still under-
represented (an under-representation that, as this data throws into sharp relief, 
evidently encompasses the field of international news journalism) then AJE’s remit 
of giving a ‘voice to the voiceless’ should have the effect of promoting conscious 
efforts to give more airtime to women in general and in their capacities as experts 
and officials specifically – in particular if AJE management and journalists are 
serious about wanting to ‘come up with ways of aiding and abetting the voiceless’ 
(Senior manager, personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009) and to ‘give equal if not 
more airtime to those outside the realms of power to be equally influential’ 
(Reporter/presenter, personal interview, Doha, 08/02/2008), as another interviewee 
put it.  
 
6.3.3 Patterns of Interview Guests’ On-Screen Presences and Absences  
 
Similar tendencies can be observed in Figure 12.1 when looking at the channels’ 
respective profiles in terms of people invited as interview guests in the course of the 
programmes. Guests appear much less frequently and are allocated a much greater 
share of airtime than people appearing in reports as protagonists. And it is because of 
this function of guests as ‘experts’ that people speaking as ordinary members of the 
public or victims of violence are much less likely to be selected. Therefore both 
channels had a guest profile largely consisting of either officials and business people 
or independent experts and NGO representatives.  
 
However, AJE and BBCW differed fundamentally with regard to which of these two 
dominant categories they emphasised. On AJE the single largest group of guests 
(more than 70%) were representatives of what Figenschou (2010a: 99) called the 
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‘independent elite’, meaning experts not affiliated with governing bodies or industry 
representatives. In addition, as can be seen in Figure 12.1, independent elite experts 
were on average given more time than others, taking up close to 84% of all airtime 
allocated to guests. Interestingly, unlike BBCW, AJE did not on any of the four news 
programmes sampled invite guests from the category of grassroots or opposition 
members, who in the category of protagonists within news items were the largest 
group on AJE. Consequently, 29% of guests on AJE represented official or industry 
voices, but they were only given a total of 16% of the airtime. Taken together, these 
results confirm AJE’s strong emphasis on non-official sources – with potential 
implications in terms of, as Gans (2011:6) puts it, ‘perspectives other than those of 
the party hegemons and ideologues who dominate television and cable news panels’ 
– although, other than within news items, this was expressed by an emphasis on 
independent experts rather than on ‘ordinary people’ or grassroots opposition 
members.  
 
 
Figure 12.1 – Percentages of number of appearances and airtime allocated to interview 
guests speaking from different socio-political positions on AJE and BBC World. 
 
Meanwhile, on BBCW the single largest group of interview guests (more than 53%) 
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disproportionate time on air, with close to 56% of the time allocated to all guests. 
Unlike on AJE, representatives of ‘ordinary people’ and grassroots opposition 
members were given a presence as guests, if only a marginal one, with about 7% of 
appearances and 9% of airtime. Independent sources were invited as guests in 40% 
of cases, but were only allowed approximately 35% of the overall time. Compared to 
AJE, this provides a picture of more emphasis overall on official sources, in terms 
both of guest selection and of the time they were given on air. To summarise the 
results regarding socio-political factors in source selection with regard to both 
protagonist and interview guests, AJE featured a much smaller percentage of 
protagonists who fell into the ‘independent elite’ category than did BBCW, 
emphasising ordinary people and grassroots opposition above all other categories, 
closely followed by officials – but where and when the requirement of the potential 
for in-depth discussion makes experts, official or independent, more likely 
contenders than ‘ordinary people’, as it does with interview guests, AJE opted for 
independent experts and NGO representatives to a greater extent than did BBCW.  
 
 
Figure 12.2 – Patterns of socio-political associations of interview guests with different 
geo-cultural backgrounds expressed in airtime allocated to these on AJE and BBC 
World. 
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Again, going into more detail indicates patterned asymmetries in source selection on 
both channels, if in different ways. For example, as can be seen in Figure 12.2, cross-
referencing the categories of geo-cultural backgrounds and socio-political position 
shows that on AJE, in terms of airtime, there was a higher percentage of 
establishment sources amongst guests with ‘Western’ backgrounds than amongst 
guests with ‘non-Western’ backgrounds.  
 
Although it is important to recognise this apparent pattern, which echoes the results 
described earlier with regard to protagonists, it is also important to note that even 
within the category of interview guests with ‘Western’ backgrounds, establishment 
sources were in a clear minority (making for only just over 30% of the airtime given 
to interview guests in this category), while the category of interview guests 
associated with ‘non-Western’ backgrounds was almost entirely taken up by 
members of the independent elites, leaving scarcely more than 3% of airtime within 
the category to those holding positions political or economic of power. In contrast, 
on BBCW establishment sources were the single largest category for interview 
guests (reaching approximately 55%), independently of their geo-cultural 
background, while ‘ordinary people’ and those representing grassroots politics had a 
chance to speak only in the category of interview guests with ‘non-Western’ 
backgrounds, where they accounted for about one fifth of the interview guests.  
 
As with protagonists, the contrast becomes more pronounced when cross-referencing 
socio-political positions with gender. As can be seen in Figures 13.1 and 13.2, on 
both channels 100% of guests speaking in their capacity as representatives of 
authorities, industry or business were men. Women were given a voice as 
independent experts on about 31% of the allocated airtime on AJE and about 21% on 
BBCW. 
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Figure 13.1 – Proportion of airtime allocated to women amongst interview guests with 
different geo-cultural backgrounds on AJE. 
 
 
Figure 13.2 – Proportion of airtime allocated to women amongst interview guests with 
different geo-cultural backgrounds on BBC World. 
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matter of avoiding official language and press conference quotations where possible. 
The expressed aim was to give less voice to those who already had the means to get 
their message across to the media, particularly in the case of ‘governments, who 
attempt to define and manage the flow of information’ (Tumber, 1999: 215), as had 
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of AJE (see also 2.3.2).99 Going ‘beyond the official language and official positions’, 
as a political analyst and presenter at AJE put it, was widely seen as a key 
distinguishing factor for the channel (personal interview, London, 14/05/2008). In 
the words of a Doha-based presenter, ‘one of the things Al Jazeera said was that it 
would not just be spoon-fed news from state departments, from government press 
offices and politicians, and to a large extent we have managed to stay true to that’ 
(personal interview, Doha, 07/02/2008). And a news editor explained that while this 
was ‘a difficult thing to do’ and they sometimes had to ‘cover men in suits […] 
making announcements’, their ‘stated aim – more than with any other channel – is 
that we won't tell the story of the conference, we'll tell the story of the people whom 
the conference is designed to discuss’ (personal interview, London, 20/12/2007).  In 
my analysis I found that on average AJE made use of sound bites from press 
conferences100 in a marginally lower percentage of items than did BBCW, with both 
channels ranging between a quarter and a third of items. However, AJE did on 
average use sound bites from official statements slightly more in terms of airtime 
attributed to them in proportion to the overall airtime of all items in a programme.  
On balance, then, the presence of official language on AJE turned out to be rather 
similar to that on BBCW when looking explicitly at the use of official statements, 
even though it was far less prominent when looking at the profiles of protagonists 
and guests (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3 above).  
 
 
6.3.4 Example 2: Coverage of Northern Iraq and China 
 
A comparative example of two of the main stories covered by both channels on the 
same day further illustrates this tension. On 15 August 2007 the first news item on 
both channels, the bomb attack in Northern Iraq with record numbers of casualties, 
                                                
99 The increasing media-savviness of NGOs and humanitarian organisations that has 
been discussed elsewhere (Franks & Seaton, 2009: 18) calls into question 
assumptions that pro-active PR strategies and attempts to influence the media are 
confined to officials and industry, but in the case of AJE press statements and 
conferences appeared to be largely associated by journalists with government press 
offices and official language.  
 
100 In my analysis I only included official statements and sound bites from press 
conferences and not footage of a conference accompanied by the journalist’s voice.  
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used the same press conference footage of a US military official and the same Al 
Jazeera archive material from a mountain stronghold of the Yezidis, who were the 
single most affected community. They both recounted the story of previous tensions 
between local Muslims and the Yezidis over the stoning of a Yezidi girl who had 
wanted to convert to Islam in order to marry a Muslim man. However, while BBCW 
only summarised the case in a voice-over showing AJ footage, AJE then went on to 
show an exclusive interview with the Yezidi’s religious leader about that case, both 
reaffirming its reputation as the channel of reference for the Middle East and letting 
people in the South speak for themselves.  
 
However, while AJE is in a unique position that allows it, with more people on the 
ground, to make a more conscious and pronounced effort to give more voice to the 
voiceless, the idea and ideal behind this mission is far from being unique to the 
channel. And for some items on some days this is shown very clearly. The same 
news programmes that opened with the attack on the Yezidi community in Iraq 
included items further down the running order on a worldwide recall of toys 
produced in China, which it was feared were painted with dangerous substances. On 
AJE the report appeared to depend largely on archive and agency material of generic 
images of toyshops and company buildings and on footage from press conferences 
given by the US Consumer Products Safety Commission and by Mattel, the company 
at the heart of the scandal. In addition, the reporter quoted statements from 
government and industry bodies. The AJE report also contained an interview with the 
Managing Director of another industry body, China Knowledge. In stark contrast, 
and conceptually much closer to what AJE officially regards as its own strength, was 
BBCW’s coverage, provided by a correspondent on the ground in China sending 
back a report investigating the factories in question, speaking to laid-off workers 
perplexed by the developments and looking into the effects of the recall on the local 
community. 
 
 
6.4 Conclusion – Differences and Similarities 
 
In essence, both of AJE’s organisational aims – providing a ‘voice of the South’ and 
a ‘voice of the voiceless’ – are reflected to varying degrees in the data generated in 
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the quantitative comparative content analysis. In addition, exploring the data in more 
detail at times revealed that, as a Doha-based correspondent observed in one of the 
interviews, ‘it is very easy in terms of rhetoric to claim that you are representing the 
underdog – in practice it is very difficult’ (personal interview, Doha, 11/02/2008). 
 
With regard to representing the South, AJE displayed a greater overall percentage of 
coverage of the South than did BBCW and a greater proportion of original items on 
the South. Going into more detail, the data also suggests that BBCW was more 
strongly influenced in its geo-political balance by large-scale events, in part because 
it had a lower overall number of items within the hour than AJE. Therefore one main 
finding of this chapter is that AJE displayed a comparatively more consistent geo-
political profile, which was influenced to a lesser degree by the presence or absence 
of big international stories. AJE’s strive to provide a different perspective was also 
reflected in its treatment of the coverage of the two natural disasters in Myanmar and 
China, but failed to manifest itself with regard to a less conflict- and disaster-driven 
approach to news from the South.  
 
With regard to ‘giving a voice to the voiceless’, the results were more mixed. AJE 
did deliver on its remit when looking at some of the variables in isolation. The 
channel provided a greater emphasis than BBCW on people with non-Western 
backgrounds, as well as on people speaking in their capacity as ‘ordinary citizens’ or 
those affected by conflict, rather than giving a voice to politicians or industry 
representatives. With regard to studio guests, AJE showed a strong inclination to 
invite independent experts much more often than official spokespeople and allowed 
these to speak for longer on average. However, while the South and those socio-
politically removed from the centres of power did have a voice on AJE, this was 
barely the case for women. The results from the analysis clearly show that AJE and 
BBCW differed fundamentally in their overall geo-cultural emphasis, and to a more 
limited degree in their socio-political outlook, but when it came to the category of 
gender I found that AJE seemed to echo the tendency of the wider industry to 
considerably and consistently under-represent women.  
 
Moreover, cross-referencing various variables further revealed how deep-rooted 
inequalities present within the wider field of international news were at times 
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reproduced or even amplified on AJE. Cross-referencing gender and geo-cultural 
backgrounds of reporters provided a very unbalanced picture of a majority of women 
amongst correspondents with non-Western backgrounds vis-à-vis a nearly 
exclusively male cast of Western colleagues. Cross-referencing gender and socio-
political backgrounds of protagonists (and to a lesser degree studio guests) showed 
that the only area where women came close to being represented equally on either 
channel was the category of those who were affected by the decisions of the 
powerful while themselves residing outside the realms of power. With regard to 
protagonists, on both channels, people featuring in their capacity as officials or 
industry representatives were men about 98% of the time, a percentage only 
surpassed by that of officials and industry representatives invited as studio guests, 
which in this sample of four days, spread over nine months and including two TV 
stations, did not include a single women.  
 
Likewise, cross-referencing geo-cultural and socio-political backgrounds with regard 
to people featuring in news items revealed that the majority of Western protagonists 
appeared in their capacity as representatives of authorities or industry, while the 
majority of non-Western protagonists appeared in their capacity as those outside the 
realms of power. All in all, the results across different groups of actors 
(correspondents, protagonists and guests) were broadly consistent in their general 
emphasis, suggesting editorial preferences rooted in the professional habitus 
prevalent within the wider field as well as conscious attempts by AJE journalists to 
counter at least some of them. In the following chapter, I will look into these two 
divergent influences in more detail.  
 
The differences and conformities described above – both between the two news 
organisations and between AJE’s perception of itself and the results from the sample 
– give an indication of the dependence of any editorial difference on managerial 
choices as well as a shared awareness amongst AJE staff of exactly how and with 
regard to which factors they were striving to depart from the underlying professional 
assumptions prevalent throughout the industry. In this context, the data discussed in 
this chapter is suggestive of (without explaining) an ongoing process within AJE of 
negotiating degrees of difference and similarity that delivered on the channel’s remit 
in some areas very effectively and less so in others. As I will argue in the following, 
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this process is also symptomatic of the dynamics at play at an organisation aiming to 
carve out space for genuine editorial difference while operating within a heavily 
interconnected industry within which organisations constantly relate to one another 
through competition as well as through shared professional values. The following 
chapters will discuss the organisational environment out of which shared 
assumptions about AJE’s editorial characteristics emerged, as journalists joining the 
comparatively young channel began to negotiate ways of achieving editorial 
difference within the set-up of the journalistic (sub)field at the time.  
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Chapter 7 Employing Difference: Professional 
Habitus and Journalistic Agency 
 
 
The hiring function I think is one of the biggest challenges that a station 
like this faces. 
 
Senior journalist (personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009) 
 
 
I think who the channel chooses to recruit, from where, defines their 
editorial policy. 
 
Producer (personal interview, London, 20/12/2007) 
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7.1 Introduction  
 
 
In this Chapter, I will address the question of how employing difference – in the 
senses both of recruiting and of applying difference – situates AJE as an organisation 
within the wider realm of the international news ecology during its early years. This 
chapter is primarily about the juxtaposition of journalistic habitus (in the form 
associated with the field of international English-language news and current affairs 
broadcasting) and journalistic agency, and not about cultural backgrounds of 
journalists or crude dichotomies of ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ voices.101 However, 
I found there to be an overlap between these two different issues – not due to any 
essentialist assumptions about people’s personal powers, but due to widespread 
perceptions about an unequal distribution of a particular journalistic habitus across 
the world102 – that to ignore would be to ignore precisely the asymmetries in 
international news AJE was set up to challenge. This intersection directly links 
                                                
101 It is important to state that, as with definitions of ‘the global South’ and ‘the 
global North’, categories of ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ ‘are complex, deeply 
contested, dynamic and changing’ (Hardy, 2008: 1). However, as with those earlier 
definitions, these concepts are frequently employed with regard to Al Jazeera by 
observers both within and outside the news organisation and therefore become 
immediately relevant to the way Al Jazeera is being positioned within the field of 
international news.  
 
102 It is beyond the empirical scope of the present study to assess the actual 
distribution of the particular professional habitus specific to the field of English-
language news broadcasting that is dominated by the likes of BBCW and CNNI in 
different regional and national contexts. Instead, the interviews conducted for this 
study serve as an indication of the perceived imbalance in the distribution of this 
particular kind of journalistic habitus on a global scale. Here, two points need to be 
made: Firstly, seeing how this perception was widespread amongst AJE 
management, it would have had actual effects on the organizational environment 
even if reality on the ground differed in some contexts, as it was one of several 
factors informing decision-making processes. And secondly, existing academic 
research tentatively supports this perception in that several empirical studies suggest 
that despite tendencies of convergence and an abstract notion of ‘a general cultural 
understanding that is shared by most journalists around the world (Hanitzsch et al., 
2011: 287)’, notions of professionalism differ significantly both in ideological and 
practical terms across different regional contexts (Weaver, 1998; Deuze, 2005; 
Hallin, 2009; Pintak & Ginges, 2009; Pintak & Setiyono, 2011; Weaver & Willnat, 
2012), with a broad distinction between journalistic environments leaning towards 
the ‘western journalism culture’ and those closer to traditions associated with 
development journalism (Hanitzsch et al., 2011: 287). 
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questions of habitus and agency to questions of news flows in that it highlights the 
structural challenges that AJE encountered in its aims of rebalancing international 
news.    
 
At the centre of AJE’s striving to ‘challenge established perceptions’ (AJE Website, 
Corporate Profile, 04/09/2008) 103  is the channel’s recruitment strategy, which 
consists of two central tenets. The first central criterion was that of being 
journalistically on a par with BBCW and CNNI. In this context, the extensive 
poaching of high-profile international staff from rival channels made it clear from the 
beginning that the aim was to enter the field of international news with the highest 
possible initial impact. The second part of the strategy was to employ local staff in as 
many parts of the world as possible, not just as fixers and producers, but as local 
reporters and correspondents, which was seen as an intrinsic element of the channel’s 
aim of reversing the flow of information. In the context of news flows, the first part 
of AJE’s strategy meant that despite their ‘counter-hegemonic’ properties 
(Carpentier, 2005), alternative models of professionalism such as development 
journalism or peace journalism were rejected from the outset for the project of AJE. 
This in turn had consequences for the second part of AJE’s recruitment strategy, 
since it substantially reduced the number of journalists matching the channel’s 
requirements across the world, but arguably disproportionately so in some areas of 
the global South (see also Hanitzsch, 2011; Pintak & Setiyono, 2011; Pintak & 
Ginges, 2011).  
 
In the words of a senior manager, ‘the recruitment strategy that evolved from the 
very outset of the English channel was a combination of experience and local talent’ 
(personal interview, Doha, 24/05/2010). As I will argue, the fact that ‘experience’ 
and ‘local talent’ was frequently juxtaposed in interviews tells something about the 
perceived composition of the field, because, needless to say, there is nothing about 
‘Western’ journalists per se that allows them to be more experienced in a particular 
kind of journalistic practice, and there is nothing about local journalists in non-
Western countries that by default allows them to better explain news events in non-
                                                
103 The profile has since been marginally amended on the website. However, to arrive 
at a coherent picture I am using the version that correlates with the time-frame of my 
fieldwork.  
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Western contexts. As Khiabany (2010: 3) points out in the context of attempts to ‘de-
Westernise’ media studies, there is a danger that cultural differences may be 
invoked, ‘whether intended or not’, to deflect from the real issues and differences 
that lie in the global asymmetries of distribution between ‘rich and poor, haves and 
have nots, developed and underdeveloped, North and South’. Instead, what this 
juxtaposition of ‘experience’ and ‘local talent’ makes clear is that there is a strong 
perception that ‘experience’ in a particular subfield of international journalism is 
decidedly unequally dispersed globally, with direct consequences for newsroom 
diversity.  
 
In the previous chapter I outlined areas of similarity and difference with regard to 
AJE’s news output in relation to both a rival channel and its remit as interpreted by 
its staff. In this chapter I shall explore the dialectic of similarity and difference that 
characterises AJE through the lens of a Bourdieusian analysis that relates 
organisational themes emerging from the data (such as recruitment patterns) to 
themes characteristic of the wider journalistic environment (such as the dispersion of 
specific journalistic habitus internationally). Questions include: To what degree does 
industry-specific habitus constrain and enable editorial difference? And to what 
degree does agency impact on the emerging habitus of the organisational field in an 
environment devised to challenge existing practices (see also 4.2.1)? This approach 
will be complemented by a focus on journalistic agency as a means of explaining 
difference and change vis-à-vis the wider professional field.  
 
As I have argued earlier, taking into account individual agency is crucial when 
looking at practices at AJE, particularly in its early years. Firstly, the channel’s 
reflexive remit of challenging established perceptions encouraged a break with 
dominant routines within the field. And secondly, as I will outline in more detail in 
the third part of this chapter, people made deliberate decisions to join a channel with 
a given remit and by doing so to actively engage with questions of editorial decision-
making processes in relation to their individual dispositions. Many joined, amongst 
other reasons, because they anticipated the structural enablement of working in a 
relatively autonomous journalistic environment that at the time encouraged breaking 
out of routines – something that could not result purely from a clash of different 
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kinds of habitus within the organisational field, since it preceded the exposure of the 
individual journalist to the organisational working environment of AJE.  
 
In the first part of this Chapter, I will explore the impact of the inter-organisational 
context that constrained and enabled what AJE could achieve in the period analysed. 
Notwithstanding the channel’s aspirations of ‘reporting back’, the simultaneous aim 
of becoming a major player subjected AJE to limitations of the field. These 
limitations were exacerbated by the rush of the launch, which meant that instead of 
training people from scratch, AJE management relied to a significant extent on 
journalists with experience working for major Western-based broadcasters and news 
agencies for their recruitment of staff with ‘non-Western’ backgrounds. In short, in 
terms of ‘employing difference’ AJE depended on the pre-existing composition of an 
already imbalanced field.  
 
In the second part of the chapter I will describe how similarity in terms of practices 
achieved by prioritising a certain kind of journalistic habitus carries both the causal 
power to increase the initial impact on the field (which is why this particular kind of 
professionalism was embraced by AJE) and the causal liability to encourage 
similarity in terms of editorial decision-making practices to a potentially greater 
degree than AJE’s remit warrants. At the same time, as I shall argue, similarity was 
to a certain degree a precondition for pursuing the ambitious aim of changing the 
‘current typical information flow’ (AJE Website, Corporate Profile, 04/09/2008) – 
because it created a shared approach that could serve as a basis on which editorial 
difference could be meaningfully evaluated vis-a-vis the dominant players in the 
field. In other words, for difference to have an impact and to change some of the 
‘rules of the game’ there needed to be sufficient similarity to qualify as a viable 
player in the first place. As Benson notes (1998: 468): 
 
‘[…] entry into the journalistic field requires acceptance of the basic rules of 
the game, which themselves are a powerful force of inertia. Thus, while the 
opposition of “old-new” has the potential to transform the power between 
heteronomy-autonomy within the field […] it is only under certain 
conditions.’  
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In this vein, my interview data suggests that there was an awareness within AJE that 
similarity with Western networks in terms of a particular kind of shared professional 
habitus could not be separated entirely from the liability to arrive at a greater degree 
of editorial similarity than AJE staff was trying to achieve in pursuit of fulfilling 
AJE’s remit of ‘reporting back’.  
 
However, while these factors had a very real impact on the organisation in the sense 
that they had the power to aid or complicate AJE’s aims, they do not determine what 
journalists do. As I discuss in the third part of this chapter, such constraints were 
mediated and in part mitigated by journalists’ motivations and reflexive powers. The 
degree to which this kind of agency inspired difference is important not least because 
practices adopted during these formative years established precedents for later 
practice and became constitutive parts of the emerging habitus of the organisational 
field. A senior Doha-based manager described this process of an emerging shared 
understanding of editorial matters as follows: 
 
It’s only when you’re on air that you kind of realise that ah, this is what this 
means, and this is how this turns out, and this is how we deal with Kosovo or 
this is how we deal with that. 
 
(Personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009). 
 
In the following I will provide examples of structural challenges and implications 
both of journalistic habitus and of agency from the interviews I conducted between 
November 2007 and May 2010 and discuss some of the potential repercussions of 
this dialectic of similarity and difference for AJE’s ability to live up to its remit of 
‘reporting back’.  
 
 
7.2 Structural Challenges: Combining Local and International 
Experience 
 
The aim of becoming the ‘voice of the South’ found its organisational expression in a 
conscious effort by AJE’s management to hire as many local journalists as possible – 
in particular in areas underlining AJE’s commitment to the global South. Since this 
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was an official part of AJE’s identity, interviewees across the channel time and again 
emphasised the relevance of this effort. A senior manager recalled: 
 
When I set about hiring our staff I was very conscious that we needed black 
journalists to cover black Africa, we needed Asians to cover Asia, we needed 
Latin Americans to cover Latin America […]. It is important to us that 
wherever we are in the world we have local people reporting local issues.  
 
(personal interview, Doha, 10/02/2008). 
 
A presenter and programme host said he loved the fact that ‘Kenyans cover Kenya, 
we have a Somali who is based in Somalia, we don’t have to fly people in every time 
[something happens]’ (personal interview, Doha, 15/03/2009). And a London-based 
correspondent described it as an achievement that others were beginning to draw 
inspiration from:  
 
 I think people have watched Al Jazeera [English] and realised that if you want 
to call yourself a global channel you need to have more than white, Western 
European faces. That you do actually need to represent the world. […] And 
other broadcasters who looked at that thought yes, we want a bit of that.  
 
 (personal interview, London, 01/04/2009) 
 
It is important to stress at this point that there is considerable evidence that this 
element of AJE’s organisational identity has had palpable on-screen effects. As 
outlined in the previous chapter (6.2.1), over half of the reporters featuring in the 
sample of news I analysed appeared to have a ‘non-Western’ background, as opposed 
to only a little over ten percent in the same period on BBCW News.104 Likewise it is 
important to point towards areas that resisted the deliberate efforts of AJE’s senior 
                                                
104 Of course, AJE was hardly the first news channel looking to diversify its staff 
profile. International broadcasters have likewise come increasingly to recognise the 
value of local journalistic expertise (Sambrook, 2010: 49). National public service 
broadcasters in the UK and other countries have for many years sought to represent 
more adequately the culturally diverse profile of their respective viewerships 
(Baracaia, Guardian Online, 23/11/2009), albeit with varying success (see also 
Phillips, 2008). However, as the first international news channel expressly dedicated 
to developing countries and under-represented voices, AJE had particularly high 
stakes in managing to reflect in its staff profile its ambition of being a channel where 
– as one programme editor put it – ‘internationality overrides anything’ (personal 
interview, London, 12/12/2007).  
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managers to create a workforce that reflected on an organisational level the channel’s 
remit of ‘giving a voice’ and a presence to those underrepresented in international 
news.  
 
Firstly, it is necessary to point out that diversity on screen does not by default match 
diversity off screen. Statistics on the backgrounds of people working off screen are 
less accessible and have not been released by AJE or Qatar. In this context 
interviewing senior management provided me with the opportunity to get access to 
informed estimates, although these have to be read with caution as I have no means 
of verifying them independently. And, given the lack of statistical evidence, they are 
potentially more prone to being influenced by divergent opinions and strategies 
within management ranks at the time. According to one source, between 30% and 
40% of the journalists working for AJE in the Doha newsroom in 2008 were ‘either 
from the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand or the USA’. At the same time 
another source estimated that the ratio of Western journalists throughout the channel 
(including other offices) was more likely to be as high as 70%.105  
 
From the very beginnings of AJE, diversity was a central theme. Critics frequently 
voiced concerns for the ‘potential for Western influence to be exerted through 
recruitment choices’ (Sakr, 2007: 125).106 A related concern about a potential 
perpetuation of global asymmetries was conveyed through the impression that an 
unequal distribution of primary habitus was also reflected in hierarchical terms. As 
one interviewee acknowledged, ‘most of the managers and the editorial staff are 
                                                
105 The difference might reflect the circumstance that the Doha office is arguably 
most likely to employ former staff from its parent channel AJA as well as other 
journalists from the region, but again, this cannot be verified. And, as mentioned 
earlier, if it could be established that it was a factor, it may not be the only reason for 
the significantly different estimates presented to me in personal interviews with AJE 
management at a time of transition within AJE (see also 4.4.1). 
 
106 A concern widely commented upon in the press across the world around the time 
of the launch. Pintak cautioned in the Turkish Daily News that there was a risk that 
the channel ‘could turn out to be a CNN retreat, whose staff has traded Western 
corporate masters intent on the bottom line for Eastern masters’ (15/11/2006) and the 
New York Times warned that a ‘perception that despite the Middle Eastern base, 
Westerners once again are dictating the news’ posed a very real threat to the channel 
(26/03/2006).  
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Westerners and Western journalists’ (Presenter, personal interview, Doha, 2008) – a 
claim sustained by Figenschou (2012: 365-366), who found indications that 
‘although hiring local correspondents is one of the key editorial strategies of the 
channel […] the executive producers are still the same professional elite (middle-
aged, white men) that runs mainstream, global newsrooms’. In addition, as outlined 
in the previous chapter (6.3.1), gender imbalances prevalent throughout the field of 
international news journalism were also reproduced in highly asymmetrical patterns 
amongst AJE’s reporters, with a majority of female reporters in the sample analysed 
being associated with a ‘non-Western’ background, while over 95% of ‘Western’ 
reporters in the sample were men.  
 
In short, without wanting to detract from evident achievements and the explicit 
appreciation for local expertise prevalent in AJE’s newsrooms, it becomes clear that 
in their efforts to create a staff profile sufficiently diverse to reflect AJE’s remit in 
organisational terms, senior staff faced some apparent challenges. And that their 
actions were limited by these challenges in significant ways. As I shall argue, this is 
worth addressing, not least because these challenges go beyond the particular case of 
AJE. As such, they help to understand some of the wider and continuing difficulties 
faced across organisations in overcoming historically established asymmetries 
within the professional field of international English-language news broadcasting.  
 
 
7.2.1 Limitations of the Field 
 
The tendencies described above led to a perception by some within AJE’s 
management ranks that there was a difficult balance to be struck between employing 
local journalists in as many parts of the world as possible and employing expertise 
specific to Western news channels that was perceived as necessary in order to make a 
mark within the industry. A London-based news editor found that ‘there will 
definitely be countries where there won't be many people who can cut it on an 
international channel, because it will stand out’ (personal interview, London, 
20/12/2007). And a senior journalist explained that maintaining international 
standards meant that the ‘default position’ could not be avoided altogether: 
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There is not a universe of English speaking journalists in the world who do 
not come from [a Western] background, or there's not a big enough universe 
of them that we can hire in an organisation like this such that we can avoid 
the default position.  
 
(personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009). 
 
Of course, with the ‘global South’ being a term that was used to cover extremely 
diverse regions across several continents, the picture across the South was far from 
homogenous. As a Doha-based manager remarked: ‘There are some countries you 
can go to, Kenya, Venezuela, China, and get some fantastic journalists who’ve 
already worked in the international marketplace […] Then there are other countries. 
If you want to recruit in Afghanistan it’s a challenge to find someone who is at the 
level of storytelling’ (personal interview, Doha, 14/05/2010). In AJE’s Kuala 
Lumpur office, staff found that it was ‘very difficult coming to Malaysia and saying 
right, let's bring in people with Malaysian experience or Southeast Asian experience. 
In most cases they simply are not there’ (personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 
05/06/2009).107  
 
Put differently, given the prioritisation of a particular kind of professionalism within 
AJE,108 the ‘differential distribution of practices’ (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008: 27) 
within the field was constituted in such a way that ‘reporting back’ in the sense of 
employing local journalists across the world – and across the South in particular – 
was constrained by precisely those structures that people joining AJE were 
                                                
107 In his comparative analysis based on 1,800 interviews with journalists from six 
continents and different political and economic contexts, Hanitzsch (2011: 478) 
argues that difference within the journalistic field is expressed in ‘professional 
milieus’ that are unevenly distributed across the globe. His findings support the 
perception that there was a tendency amongst journalists in the particular national 
contexts of some developing countries to diverge from the dominant ‘detached 
watchdog’ model that ‘represents the professional mainstream of news people in 
most parts of the western world’ (2011: 491). 
 
108 Notwithstanding the implicit and near complete consensus within AJE about the 
choice to prioritise a certain kind of professionalism as well as the function this 
fulfilled in terms of ‘being on a par’ with other major networks, it is important to 
point out that this was not a ‘natural’ choice without alternatives, as discussed in the 
second chapter of this thesis (2.4). 
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determined to challenge. More specifically, there were several factors that 
constituted ‘preconditions of choice’ (Vaughan, 2008: 78) for those aiming to recruit 
local journalists to AJE – all of which were contingent on the existing makeup of the 
field of English-language international news and its (asymmetric) dispersal in terms 
of production across the globe. It is also important to note that, as with some of the 
other structural constraints, these preconditions of choice were a limiting, but not 
determining factor, as their influence was in turn contingent on the agential powers 
of the individual people who encountered them.  
 
Firstly, the demands of the medium of television, not only for basic mastery but for 
fluency and enunciation of spoken language, inevitably meant that AJE as an 
English-language service depended to a substantial degree on English native 
speakers. In the words of a senior manager involved in the recruitment process, 
‘because we are an English language channel, we do have a huge number of 
journalists whose first language is English, so they may be British or American or 
Canadian or Australian or New Zealanders’ (personal interview, Doha, 10/02/2008). 
Another interviewee went on to argue: ‘If you were Reuters, because you are not 
going to straight to air, you don’t need the same standard of written English. But we 
have got to have the highest standard of written English’ (personal interview, Doha, 
13/02/2008).109  
 
For example, in the Middle East, AJE profited enormously from the wealth of 
professionalism and expertise that its parent channel AJA had built up over more 
than a decade. Even there, however, it was felt that, as a senior Doha-based journalist 
put it, ‘there are not that many people out there who can write, broadcast and analyse 
the Middle East in English […]. There’s a handful of them’ (personal interview, 
Doha, 13/02/2008). Likewise, speaking from the London office, one news editor said 
that there was ‘a very English bias in Europe, unsurprisingly, because we're an 
English-language channel’ (personal interview, London, 20/12/2007). This is despite 
the fact that AJE’s European office in the United Kingdom serves a immensely 
diverse region of which the UK is only one element. Particularly on the continent, 
                                                
109 Richard Sambrook also remarks that news agencies ‘may be exceptions’ in that 
they ‘have a long history of employing local staff, often reporting in their own 
languages’ (2010: 49). 
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English is fairly prevalent as a second and third language, but only spoken as a first 
language by a minority of people, making it more challenging to find local 
journalists who were perceived to have the linguistic skills to match the English-
language field of international news production.  
 
A second factor was the lack of press freedom in many regions from which AJE 
sought to recruit. This posed a structural problem in two ways. Firstly, there is the 
issue of safety. Particularly when it comes to investigative stories, local journalists 
are inevitably more vulnerable. A few months before our interview, one journalist 
had been to Sri Lanka to make a film about the country’s civil war. Before that, she 
had been to the Niger Delta, investigating corruption and violence ahead of the 
general elections that marked Nigeria’s first transition from one elected government 
to another. Neither film, she explained, could have been made by local journalists 
without serious concerns for their safety: ‘They could not have said what I was 
saying, so there is a role for an external reporter going in’ (personal interview, 
London, 24/10/2007). As Sambrook (2010: 51) writes, ‘local journalists will 
inevitable be directly affect by the issues they report in a way “foreign” 
correspondents are not’.  
 
The second (related) way in which lack of press freedom structurally impinges on the 
field is that it inevitably limits the number of journalists in some regions who are 
socialised within the confrontational media culture characteristic of international 
broadcasting. In the words of a London-based programme editor: ‘In a lot of 
countries there is no press freedom, so we're not going to get them to express and tell 
their stories this year.  Maybe not next year.  It's a long term game’ (personal 
interview, London, 12/12/2007). This structural problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that broadcasting media can be more vulnerable to censorship and control than other 
media. Southeast Asia is a case in point. While critical and relatively independent 
media are comparatively accessible in large parts of the region, critical voices are 
more likely to be found within sections of the print and online media than in 
broadcasting. In Media and Politics in Pacific Asia, Duncan McCargo (2003: 6) 
writes: ‘In times of crisis, broadcast media across the region have proved easier to 
muzzle’. As a presenter in AJE’s Malaysian newsroom explained, ‘the sort of media 
culture here is not necessarily confrontational. Not the kind of journalist that they 
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want in Al Jazeera, but there are people who could do it’ (personal interview, Kuala 
Lumpur, 05/06/2009).  
 
At the same time, prioritising professionalism over local experience was part of this 
medium- to long-term strategy. A Doha-based journalist explained that, although 
employing local journalists was one of AJE’s main objectives, it was thought that 
this should not be pursued at the expense of a particular kind of professionalism. 
Often, this kind of professionalism was discursively linked with notions of ‘good’ 
journalism, as in the following example: 
No compromise, you need the best. If it means that if there is, god forbid, a 
civil war in Papua New Guinea, and we cannot for the moment find someone 
who is good enough for a correspondent in Papua New Guinea then we send 
in someone who is diverse and intelligent enough to go in and grasp the story 
well enough to tell it. You are not just going to pick up somebody from 
Papua New Guinea and say “it is your country, you know, go and report on 
it”. 
 
(personal interview, Doha, 08/02/2008). 
 
In other words, while actively seeking to employ as many local journalists as 
possible, where it was perceived to collide with the emphasis of a particular 
professional habitus, the latter was the dominant factor. A senior London-based 
manager reiterated the stance that ‘we have only ever hired anybody for their 
experience, not for any other reason’ (personal interview, London, 19/05/2008).  
 
These factors were amplified by a third factor: The pressure of getting ready to 
launch simultaneously in four continents. In 2007 a London-based journalist 
observed that AJE was still ‘too new to get young journalists with no experience, we 
had to start an international news channel, which means that everybody needs to 
pretty much know what they are doing’ (personal interview, London, 12/12/2007). 
The then Director of Media Development for the AJ Network maintained that ‘you 
couldn’t put a brand new channel there today and get people from their regions and 
have a respectable channel, because there is a difference in experience in the 
markets’ (personal interview, Doha, 24/05/2010). AJE’s Managing Director at the 
time put forward a similar explanation: 
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As a viewer of Al Jazeera English, before it even occurred to me that I would 
one day work for it, I used to scratch my head and wonder why is this news 
channel so conventional, when it doesn’t have any of the pressures on it that 
force other broadcasters, including public broadcasters like CBC and BBC? 
It mystified me, and I think part of it has to do with […] the turbulence of the 
launch. 
 
(personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009). 
 
As Vaughan observed with regard to the adaptation of habitus in a different context, 
‘schedule […] concerns had a subtle but powerful effect’ (2008: 75).110 In the case of 
AJE, these concerns also meant that the initial team of a handful of Western 
journalists turned to people they knew from their previous work places, deepening 
the channel’s dependency on existing patterns within the wider industry. In short, 
AJE’s ambition to emulate and be on a par in terms of professional practices with 
leading Western networks presented a rare opportunity for a broadcaster based in and 
with an emphasis on the global South to actually have an impact in the field, but it 
inevitably also limited AJE’s scope for difference in crucial ways. Ultimately this 
meant that it was arguably more likely for media professionals with ‘Western’ 
backgrounds to be employed than otherwise might have been the case given the remit 
of the channel.  
 
 
7.2.2 The Disconnect between Primary and Professional Habitus 
 
However, as Jenkins observed, people encounter a number of different fields in their 
lives. As they do, they may both appropriate the habitus specific to the field they 
enter and  bring to the field a habitus acquired in other fields (Jenkins, 1992: 90). A 
Western journalist may have lived for extensive periods in non-Western countries, 
learning to distinguish nuances of local and regional knowledge and adapting his or 
her habitus to the cultural sensitivities of the location. As Sambrook (2010: 48) 
observes, ‘by painting Western correspondents as underinformed and transitory it 
                                                
110 As in the case of the project Vaughan had been analysing in her study, at AJE 
there was also added pressure due to the fact that the channel’s launch had been 
repeatedly delayed over the course of 2006, for which the channel cited technical 
problems. 
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overlooks genuine journalistic or specialist expertise, talent to communicate and 
bridge cultures, and deep experience, which many of them possess’. Likewise, a 
journalist may well have acquired her or his primary habitus in a non-Western 
environment and a specific or professional habitus in the particular environment of a 
Western media organisation.111As Figenschou (2012: 364) observes with reference to 
her research on AJE, ‘also those employees of non-western ethnic backgrounds that 
have worked with Anglo-American news channels emphasize the necessity of 
unlearning the practices and perspectives adopted from mainstream newsrooms’. 
 
Quite simply, in an increasingly interrelated world it is increasingly common for there 
to be a geographical and cultural disconnect between people’s early lives and their 
working lives – unsurprisingly this is particularly the case in the realm of 
international news. One result was that AJE managers were looking for Western 
journalists with professional experience in the regions the channel wanted to focus 
on. As a London-based manager explained: 
 
[…] English journalists, directors and lower down, who have come from Sky, 
they come from ITN, they come from BBC, CNN, all kinds of organisations, 
[…] have worked internationally within their own organisations before they 
joined AJ. So they were chosen as good leaders for AJ, but they in turn have 
bought on a host of other people from other organisations around the world. 
 
(personal interview, London, 19/05/2008). 
 
Another result was that many of the local journalists were originally hired from other 
international broadcasters. A London-based news editor explained that ‘there are 
people who to us seem like old faces because they've come from our rivals, like 
Kamal Hyder in Pakistan’ (personal interview, London, 20/12/2007). And both 
journalists and managers reflected on the fact that hiring local journalists often meant 
hiring them from other international broadcasters. 
 
                                                
111 Here, primary habitus can be seen as an expression of intuitively understanding 
the rules of the game in the cultural and social setting of a person’s early life, while 
specific habitus in the context of AJE is made up of journalistic practices shaped by 
working for one or several media organisations (for a theoretical discussion of the 
differentiation between primary and specific habitus, see also 3.3.1). 
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 A lot of people we have hired – including people from the Middle East, from 
the Subcontinent and the other places – have actually come to us from 
international broadcasters. So they aren’t all stepping out of local TV, most 
aren’t. Most have worked for AP or Reuters or Al Jazeera or somebody. 
 
 Senior journalist (personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). 
 
We have more than 40 ethnicities. That means a lot, but it does not mean that 
we brought people from 40 different countries, because many of them came 
from one country, from the UK […]. We have the UK way of thinking, the 
British journalism way of covering. 
 
 Senior manager (personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). 
 
In this sense, the aim of ‘reporting back’ may well be(come) compatible with 
historically Western forms of specific habitus. As a Doha-based producer remarked: 
‘I question the whole notion that the style of reporting that has become dominant in 
global television is Western.  […] By that logic […] every form of global media that 
we have is really Western at the end’ (personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). From 
that perspective, reducing the Western dominance of the particular specific habitus of 
international TV news to its historical role was precisely what people working for  
AJE implicitly endeavoured to achieve. The vision of AJE, in other words, was not 
so much one of altering the kind of professional habitus practiced by Western 
broadcasters, but of challenging their claim to this particular habitus and adjusting it 
to encompass less geographically and geo-politically asymmetrical definitions of 
news values.  
 
This shows that, when it came to the specific professional habitus, notwithstanding 
the manifold influences of diverse professional experience within various AJE 
newsrooms, journalists with diverse geo-cultural backgrounds and experiences 
tended to have in common a set of basic principles specific to the field of 
international English-language news. From the perspective of AJE’s emphasis on 
editorial difference, this shared specific habitus came with both causal powers (of 
having an impact on the field) and liabilities (of potentially ending up with higher 
degrees of editorial similarity to other channels than originally envisaged). In the 
following I will address the implications of shared elements of a habitus derived 
from Western news broadcasters – implications that are contingent on the balance 
between habitus and reflexivity, as I will demonstrate in the third part of this chapter.  
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7.2.3 The Causal Powers and Liabilities of Inter-organisational Habitus  
 
Links between the practices of different institutions can be difficult to conceptualise 
empirically (as I outlined in the methodology chapter), but can be analysed on the 
level of individual journalists migrating between organisations within a particular 
journalistic subfield. Here, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus – which ‘only exists in, 
through and because of the practices of actors’ (Jenkins, 1992: 75) – offers a 
conceptual bridge between the social structures of inter-organisational journalistic 
practices and the daily routines of individual journalists at AJE. As Emirbayer and 
Johnson remark in the context or organisational practices, ‘each member of an 
organization brings to it a habitus formed under specific past conditions’ (2008: 4). 
For a new organisation starting out on a sizeable scale, such as AJE, the fact that 
initially virtually all staff had to come from other institutions meant that the 
professional habitus, including internalised interpretations of news values, could be 
expected to be influenced by the habitus specific to the rival organisations from 
which it had emerged.  
 
This link between practices specific to the professional field and practices specific to 
the organisational field of AJE112 was underscored by responses of journalists I 
interviewed for the purpose of this thesis. As a London-based presenter put it, 
‘journalists […] expect that the practices that they take from one place will transfer 
ultimately into their next job’ (personal interview, London, 12/12/2007). In the 
words of a reporter working in programming in the London office: ‘I regard myself 
as an individual entity, who gets hired for what I come with’ (personal interview, 
London, 24/10/2007). Here, the specific habitus that ‘came with’ the individual 
journalists who joined AJE was not primarily seen as a risk of reproducing similarity 
by emulating the implicit rules of a set of organisations from which AJE wanted to 
differentiate itself. Rather, it was seen as an asset that allowed AJE to function in a 
way that created a level playing field.  
 
                                                
112A link that obviously does not presuppose uniform practices across the industry, 
but merely establishes a connection between the practices of organisations within the 
same field, reproduced through competition, shared standards and staff circulation 
across the field. 
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Consequently, despite what Pintak called the channel’s ‘self-conscious – sometimes 
excruciating – emphasis on being the non-Western voice’ (Pintak, Der Spiegel, 
16/11/2006) not being different from Western broadcasters in terms of practices and 
professionalism was generally regarded as an achievement. On the basis that AJE 
was not attempting to revolutionise the profession, but rather to alter some of the 
rules from within a given field, this insistence on similarity in terms of practice 
provided a common ground on the basis of which difference could became 
meaningful. According to Bourdieu, ‘struggles [within fields] are always based on 
the fact that the most irreducible adversaries have in common that they accept a 
certain number of presuppositions that are constitutive of the very functioning of the 
field’ (Bourdieu, 2005: 36). As managers at AJE realised from the beginning, 
entering the field ‘on a par’ in terms of journalistic practices was the precondition for 
editorial difference to have an impact within the field’.113  
 
Accordingly, journalists working for AJE emphasised the ways in which they were 
applying the specific habitus they brought from other organisations. News editors 
said they would ‘choose the stories that I want to do in the same way that I would 
choose stories if I was at Sky, if I was at the BBC, if I was at anywhere, [which is to] 
tell people things they didn't know (personal interview, London, 20/12/2007). 
Presenters explained that their interviewing styles were ‘not dependent on the station 
at which I find myself’ (personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009). And a 
senior journalist asserted that had she been producing the programme for BBCW, ‘I 
would have done the exact same thing’ (personal interview, Doha, 11/02/2008). 
There was a general assumption that on some level, in the words of one presenter, ‘if 
you’re a journalist you’re a journalist’ (personal interview, London, 12/12/2007).  
 
However, this strategy was not without challenges, given that the remit of AJE was 
based on difference, because it inevitably carried some risk of becoming similar to a 
                                                
113 This is in part what distinguishes AJE from several of the other relatively novel 
news channels positioning themselves as a counter-balance to the ‘BBC/CNN 
approach’ (such as Russia Today, Chinese CCTV-9, Venezuelan Telesur or Iranian 
Press TV). As Painter noted in a Financial Times article, amongst these channels 
AJE is one of the few organizations that genuinely embraces the concept of 
impartiality as an ideal, a concept that is being rejected by others as a ‘cover for 
western hegemonic power (Financial Times, 05/09/2008).’  
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greater degree than had initially been envisioned by inadvertently following, in the 
words of a senior AJE manager, ‘conventional news paths’ (personal interview, 
Doha, 10/02/2008). Accordingly, there was a perception amongst journalists that 
there was a relation between degrees of similarity to other channels and the habitus 
that journalists from these organisations brought with them. As one interviewee put 
it, ‘people come with their own experiences and ways of doing things and ways of 
reporting the news’ (personal interview, Doha, 08/02/2008).  
 
A London-based presenter reflected on the homogenising force of habitus when he 
said that ‘unfortunately a lot of people who are here have come from other 
organisations that do things in the stereotypical way’ and commented that ‘I don’t 
believe after a year on air, that we are different enough’ (personal interview, London, 
20/12/2007). Reflecting the channel’s first couple of years on air, a senior Doha-
based manager argued that to a certain degree it was ‘inevitable that this would have 
happened. Coming into the organisation, until you really get immersed in it, you are 
still bringing your past with you’ (personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009). Given the 
perceived prevalence of Western journalists at AJE, this liability of reproducing 
professional practices reminiscent of the dominance of Western broadcasters, was 
frequently discursively linked by journalists I interviewed with questions of culture 
rather than with the unequal dispersion of habitus across the professional field. As a 
Doha-based journalist noted: 
 
[Western journalists] have been covering news in their own cultures […] for 
years and years. Of course they are faced with challenges. When you come 
from, let’s say Australia, New Zealand or Western Europe, where you’ve 
been working for twenty years, and you come to Doha to cover news with Al 
Jazeera English, you would have your own set of patterns that determine the 
way you think about reality. 
 
(personal interview, Doha, 11/02/2008). 
 
A British journalist who had previously worked for AJA described initial clashes of 
habitus between journalists from different cultural backgrounds with regard to 
questions of terminology: 
 
In one of the first weeks […] the term “Israeli Defence Force” was used. I 
know immediately that that is a term that should not be used. We should just 
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say Israeli Army. […] Once you say Israeli Defence Force, you are using the 
language of one of the protagonists. And yet, in the Western media the term 
Israeli Defence Force is used many times. It is being used so much that many 
people regard it as normal. [It is] a term they will use, because it is a term 
they have heard quite often. […] Some people here, because they do not have 
such experience with the Middle East, might editorially use something like 
this for want of better knowledge. Not deliberately, innocently. 
 
(personal interview, Doha, 14/02/2008). 
 
Here, the link between habitus (‘the term […] is used so much that people regard it 
as normal’, ‘it is a term they will use, because […] they heard it quite often’) and the 
unconscious aspect of its reproduction (‘for want of better knowledge’, ‘not 
deliberately’) is made quite strongly. Specific habitus, being derived from previous 
work experience and modified in present working conditions, intrinsically links 
practices of one institution to those of other institutions. As a result, people will use 
the kind of terminology that ‘they hear quite often’ even where it conflicts with 
AJE’s remit, albeit ‘not deliberately’. Again, the novelty of the channel further 
increased this particular challenge. A journalist based in Kuala Lumpur partially 
attributed the structural problem to the fact that the unifying force of habitus was 
potentially more dominant in the environment of a sizeable, yet young, organisation 
that had yet to establish mechanisms for internally reinforcing its aims in a consistent 
and continual way:  
 
In the absence of any continual reinforcement of the fact that we're trying to 
do this slightly differently, the people that we have on board – being white, 
middle-class, Western-educated people – would tend to default to their 
previous positions as employees of the BBC and CNN and various other 
English-language news organisations. And so the gloss, if you like, the angle, 
the interpretation, the choice of stories that we began to move towards was 
beginning to show increasingly that we'd fallen into this pattern of reflecting 
the cultural background of the people who were working here. And that was 
not necessarily in line with the kind of aims we had articulated at the start. 
 
(personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009). 
 
This causal liability of specific professional habitus – a habitus which had been 
courted as an entry ticket to a highly specialised field – did not escape AJE’s 
management ranks. As became apparent in the interviews I conducted, there was an 
awareness that there could be no quick solution to the inequalities inherent to the 
wider field. And that one way to address (and simultaneously to reduce the 
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dependency on) these asymmetric structures in the long term would be to reduce the 
near complete dependency on already fully trained broadcasting journalists by 
focussing on training within AJE, thereby considerably widening the pool of people 
they could recruit from. For example, a senior journalist based in Kuala Lumpur 
recalled that when Tony Burman joined as Managing Director in 2008 and first 
visited the Malaysian office, ‘one of the issues that came up was the absence of local 
people in this office. It is a problem. And Tony was very aware of this and very 
committed to the idea of training’ (personal Interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009). 
 
Another effort of AJE’s management was the creation of a working group114 
assembled from a cross-section of staff that focussed on staff development and 
suggested, as one possible way forward, creating a network-wide structure where 
‘each center has a dedicated team for Training and Development to address the needs 
of the individual and the region concerned’ (Al Jazeera Network, 2009, Working 
Group Nr. 5: 5, emphasis added). With this suggestion they recognised the benefits 
of region-specific training for the remit of AJE. During the time of the fieldwork for 
this study, however, the focus remained on training programmes in Doha for existing 
staff. In short, the tasks – first of the launch, then of training existing staff – still at 
that stage consumed a lot of the attention of those managing and guiding the 
organisation. As a senior Doha-based manager had pointed out earlier, ‘we have 
enough burden, we have enough journalists to train’ (personal Interview, Doha, 
13/02/2008). Another senior manager emphasised the need to train existing staff, 
‘because so many people were in positions they had never been in before’ (personal 
Interview, Doha, 16/03/2009). Setting aside resources to systematically and 
proactively train aspiring journalists from the developing world who had not yet had 
the opportunity to work with international broadcasters would have helped to address 
                                                
114 This group was one of several groups that were part of the so-called Al Jazeera 
Renewal Project (Al Jazeera Network, 2009), designed to identify structural 
problems and draw on a cross-section of staff to come up with potential solutions. 
The project was initially intended to be ‘a permanent feature of life at this channel’. 
After Burman left in 2010 the project was not formally continued, even though, in a 
conversation conducted five months before replacing Burman as Managing Director, 
the then Director of Media Development for the AJN told me the Renewal Project 
had helped to focus discussions and would continue ‘to push us forward’ (personal 
interview, Doha, 24/05/2010). 
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the causes of some of the structural inequalities within the field, but was not part of 
the measures felt to require instant attention.  
 
 
7.3 Examples of Agency: Journalists’ Motivations for Joining AJE 
 
However, the unifying force of habitus is not the only factor impacting on AJE’s 
editorial line. And in and of itself, it would not allow to explain the degrees of 
difference I did identify between AJE’s and BBCW’s news content (see Chapter 6). 
As Sakr (2007: 126) reports from a private conversation with a senior executive in 
2005, one of the reasons AJE attracted high-profile journalists from across the field 
was that ‘many Europeans had grown bored and disillusioned in their former 
working environments and were eager for a more innovative news agenda’. Surely, 
striving to be different – deliberately and reflexively – will have some kind of 
impact. The motivations of people who actively chose to join AJE, as I will argue, 
are a factor that should not be underestimated. After all, the specific habitus of an 
organisation, other than for example primary habitus, is acquired in a community of 
one’s choosing – even if, as with any career choice, this choice is contingent on a 
number of external factors. It is this element of (limited) choice that makes some 
kinds of collective identities – and this I would argue includes those based on the 
specialised settings of international broadcasting news – ‘reflexive in the sense that 
members of the new communities are typically quite aware of the symbols central to 
the creation of the new identities (Lash, 1993: 205)’. Or as Dickinson (2009: 522-
523) argues, journalists’ practices are ‘co-produced’ by organisational and 
professional structures on the one hand and journalistic agency on the other.  
 
In addition, the balancing act between the twin ambitions of achieving similarity in 
terms of journalistic standards and difference in terms of content necessitated a 
constant negotiation of how to be different and how to be similar that promoted a 
high level of conscious deliberation and reflexivity for everybody involved – a 
circumstance reflected in many of the interviews. In other words, the measure of 
instability that was an inevitable side effect of this balancing act carried the causal 
power – and by that I mean the potential, not a predictable effect – to promote 
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editorial difference. In a new environment, particular one that had not yet established 
all of its ground rules, ‘journalists may potentially come to understand how their 
social experiences and positions unconsciously shape their work, and thus 
consciously compensate for such influences’ (Benson, 2006: 195). This awareness of 
the force of habit in turn promoted reflexivity that led people to question their 
habitus. A senior Doha-based journalist explained: 
 
I think we all definitely changed our views of how the world looks, because 
the world looks different from the Middle East than it does from the West. 
And remember most of the managers here and journalists are from the West. 
And our views changed, you know. […] Sitting here the Israel-Palestine 
conflict looks different, the role of the US looks different, the power games 
that go on, you know, poverty in Africa, looks different. You question your 
own assumptions. 
 
(personal Interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). 
 
Furthermore, many felt that it was precisely the centrality of the subject of habitus 
that meant that journalists more actively tapped into the local expertise of their 
colleagues. The two examples below are drawn from interviews with a Doha-based 
presenter and a London-based reporter respectively: 
 
 They learn from each other. […] Here you have Arabs, you have the British, 
you have Americans, you have Chinese, you have people from Latin America, 
and [when there is] a Hugo Chavez story, we go to our Latin American 
experts and say okay, what does this mean? So they steer each other in the 
right direction. 
 
 (personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). 
 
 
  We have a wide spread of nationalities, I think that's quite refreshing, because 
it tempers the way you write something. Sometimes I will pipe up to someone 
across the room, “if I said x or y, would you understand it?” And he'll say 
“no, that's a British colloquialism, it's not a good idea”. So that helps.   
  
 (personal interview, London, 01/04/2009). 
 
This awareness was heightened by the fact that virtually everybody was starting out 
in a new role. As Elder-Vass (2007: 342) points out, ‘when we adopt a new role, we 
may have to think carefully about how to perform it, and this may be guided not only 
by the dispositions arising from our previous social positions, but also by consciously 
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absorbed new information’ (emphasis in original). In the following I will discuss 
journalists’ motivations for joining AJE as specific accounts of agency with 
reference to different modes of reflexivity as identified by Archer.115 
 
 
7.3.1 Motivations for Joining – Accounts of Agency 
 
As the content analysis in Chapter 6 demonstrated, despite efforts to emulate 
international journalistic practices and to be on par with BBCW and CNNI, there 
were important editorial differences between AJE and BBCW. These differences 
went beyond a mere geographical approach, as illustrated by the example of the 
coverage of the cyclone in Myanmar and the earthquake in China.116 And while 
journalistic standards and practices do potentially have a levelling effect, it would be 
precipitate, not to mention determinist, to presume that they are the only factors 
involved and on their own have the power to enforce conformity. As Archer (2003: 
7) points out, ‘influences of constraints and enablements will only be tendential 
because of human reflexive abilities to withstand them and strategically to 
circumvent them’. In other words, human projects are not reducible to the objective 
circumstances that enable or constrain them. In order to understand AJE and the 
editorial difference described in Chapter 6, it is crucial to take into account other 
organisational factors.  
 
One of these factors was the way in which journalists joining the channel saw the 
launch of AJE as a structural enablement of reflexive personal projects. In fact, in the 
interviews I conducted, greater scope for individual agency was itself one of the 
reasons most frequently given for joining the channel. In other words, they joined 
because they wanted to ‘help shape a new global news channel’ (News editor, 
personal interview, London, 20/12/2007), ‘put my mark on something from the start’ 
(Member of the creative division, personal interview, Doha, 12/02/2008) or ‘be 
                                                
115 For a discussion of the ontological compatibility of Bourdieu’s and Archer’s 
theoretical concepts, see Chapter 3.5. 
 
116 Both disasters were part of the coverage of BBC World and AJE on 15th May 
2008 and were discussed as part of the content analysis in Chapter 6.2.3. 
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involved in how the editorial direction would be shaped even in a small way’ 
(Correspondent, personal interview, London, 01/04/2009). Scope for individual 
agency therefore played an important part in decision-making at AJE from the start. 
In the following I will discuss journalists’ motivations for joining AJE as examples 
of reflexivity that help to understand relative difference in AJE’s editorial output.  
 
Archer distinguishes between four modes of agency (Archer, 2007: 93). These modes 
are not mutually exclusive. In contradistinction, ‘the four modes overlap’ and 
individuals tend to practice all of these modes to varying degrees at different times. 
However, within Archer’s sample of interviewees, ‘the vast majority (93 per cent) 
showed an inclination towards one mode in particular’ (Archer, 2007: 94). Two of 
these modes – ‘communicative reflexives’ and ‘fractured reflexives’ – do not fit very 
closely the data from the present study. They are both described as modes of 
reflexivity that result in people refraining from purposeful causes of action, which 
does not resonate with the context of having left a previous job to join a newly 
founded organisation. Elements of the two other modes of reflexivity identified by 
Archer were more clearly present in the interview data and suggested strategic as 
well as (sometimes at the same time) reflexively idealistic motivations for deciding 
to join the organisation (for a delineation of Archer’s modes of reflexivity, see also 
Chapter 3.4.2).  
 
 
7.3.2 Taking ‘Reporting Back’ Seriously 
 
The first mode of reflexivity, ‘meta-reflexivity’, as the term suggests, ‘entails 
reflecting upon one’s own acts of reflexivity’ (Archer, 2007: 95). The main 
characteristic of meta reflexives is ‘the importance they attach to living up to an 
ideal’ (Archer, 2007: 230). Archer uses the term largely to describe individuals who 
are prone not only to change jobs within a professional field in search of new 
challenges, but to change jobs between professional fields (Archer, 2007: 229). 
These lateral changes are often fuelled by ‘the impossibility of realizing their value-
commitment in a given structural context’ (Archer, 2007: 305). In short, they are 
looking for a vocation, not ‘just’ a job. Despite the fact that Archer uses the term to 
  229 
describe changes between different professional fields, it does in many ways fit 
essential motivational aspects described by journalists joining AJE. One aspect was 
that there often was a strong belief in AJE’s vision of representing underrepresented 
voices and providing a different perspective on world news. A journalist based in 
Kuala Lumpur described himself as being ‘one of those who believe that the CNN, 
BBC and the broader world of English-language news had become so formulaic and 
so anodyne and so one-sided that the promise of a fresh perspective was very 
appealing’ (personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009). A London-based 
programme editor said that peoples’ reasons for joining AJE were at times 
‘horrendously idealistic’:  
 
Many people who joined at the same time as I did and still do join are very 
idealistically driven in terms of what AJE represents politically, which is this 
other voice, a different point of view. And then we sort of stuck in to guide it 
and to make sure that it happened. 
 
(personal interview, London, 12/12/2007). 
 
More specifically, the notion of ‘reporting back’ was central to many people’s 
motivations for joining AJE. A senior promotion producer said that he had been 
motivated to join by AJE, because he shared the organisation’s core concerns: ‘What 
excited me was […] very much the […] democratisation of the media, giving voice 
to the voiceless and reverse flow from South to North. It is an important thing to me’ 
(personal interview, Doha 12/02/2008). In a similar vein, a Doha-based field 
producer said ‘I genuinely believe in what we’re doing, as a journalist and as an 
Arab. I think that it’s very important to diversify the mediascape’ (personal 
interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). As a result, many reflexively perceived AJ’s mission 
as an enablement of personal projects that existed long before AJE was conceived. 
As a Doha-based programmes editor described his transition from working for 
various Western-based media organisations to joining AJA before moving to the 
English-language channel: 
 
I joined because I felt it was more in tune with my experience and my 
mindset at the time. I had been very disillusioned by Western media over the 
years. Particularly during the difficult days in Beirut: I was in Beirut when 
there were hostages, civil war, car bombs, killings, kidnapping. And I had a 
lot of experiences when I was working with Western media where I became 
sick and disillusioned by what I saw was their distorted view of Lebanon. 
  230 
That stayed with me many years and so I was very happy to join AJA. 
Having worked for the Western media and having lived in the Middle East 
[…], I guess when I joined AJA I was in the kind of mindset of Al Jazeera. I 
do believe it is a kind of mindset. […] It is the sort of missionary mindset of 
wanting to present things in a different way. 
 
(personal interview, Doha, 14/02/2008). 
 
Here, the point is made very clearly that joining AJ was seen as something that was 
aligned with previous perceptions. As Archer (2003: 6) points out, ‘reflexive agents 
[…] may anticipate the ease with which [some] projects could be advanced, and the 
benefits they would accrue, and thus be encouraged to adopt them’ (emphasis 
added). Similarly, a senior journalist working in programming in the London office 
answered my question about what it was like to adjust to the organisational 
environment and remit of AJE: ‘Like a breath of fresh air really, very easily, it was 
like coming home’ (personal interview, London, 12/12/2007). For some, then, the 
motivation for joining was based on anticipation of the ways in which AJE’s remit 
would be in tune with their own convictions and projects in life. 
 
 
7.3.3 Embracing a Challenge  
 
The second or ‘autonomous’ mode of reflexivity is present in practitioners who 
‘display confidence in relying upon their own mental resources’, prone to pursuing 
actions that are ‘often innovative’ and ‘risky’ (Archer, 2007: 95). This mode of 
reflexivity emerged from many of the conversations and interviews and it fitted 
decisions to join a channel that declared its intention to ‘challenge established 
perceptions’117 in its corporate profile.118 As a London-based presenter said, ‘some 
people said it was a bit of a gamble, [but] I didn’t think it was a gamble’ (personal 
interview, London, 12/12/2007). The preparedness to take a risk was also evident in 
that these decisions frequently entailed leaving another job and in many cases 
                                                
117 Corporate Profile on AJE website, updated 04/09/2008. 
 
118 It is important to remember that at the time AJE was a new entrant with a novel 
approach that had yet to prove itself in an international environment that in parts 
thought it to be rather radical (with diverging, at times strong opinions whether that 
was a thing to be welcomed or not). 
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moving to a different continent. A Doha-based programmes producer recalled her 
decision as follows: 
 
I had to be part of it. I left the BBC to come here, which is not peanuts, it’s 
not something you do on a daily basis, but I did it.  I was working in some 
pretty good current affairs programmes then and I sort of came here without 
a job description. The person who hired me is in London and she said we’ll 
give you the title of producer […] one day you’re going to be stuffing 
envelopes and sending back DVDs to freelancers, the other day you’ll be out 
in the field with a cameraman and you’re just going to have to wing it.  And I 
said okay and that’s what I did. 
 
(personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). 
 
This mode of reflexivity was also coupled with a strategic approach to career 
planning (Archer, 2007: 293), where people took into consideration issues of pay or 
promotion. In the specific case of AJE, the attractive salaries and benefits that were 
offered in order to draw high-profile journalists to Doha, which in many cases 
included uprooting their families and moving with them to another continent, 
undoubtedly played a role amongst other factors. Likewise, the newness of the 
channel offered certain career opportunities, and so the circumstance that a job ‘came 
along kind of at the right time’ (personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009)’ or 
that ‘you don’t get that opportunity more than once perhaps in a career’ (personal 
interview, Doha, 14/02/2008) was another factor for some.   
 
However, according to Archer (2007: 290), what is most important to autonomous 
subjects is ‘intrinsic satisfaction’. This desire was expressed by interviewees who 
felt that ‘you do get a bit sick of being spoon-fed stories, of cutting endless agency 
pictures to some lines that have come out on wires. And you want to go and make 
some proper news and cover some proper issues, and that’s the motivation for a 
large number of staff here’ (personal interview, Doha, 07/02/2008). In a similar vein, 
a presenter based in Kuala Lumpur described how the fact that some people ‘made a 
very convincing argument about how Al Jazeera English would go down to the brass 
tacks of journalism’ (personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009) contributed to 
her decision to join the channel. Following this description, one important factor in 
her decision was the anticipation that the job would offer the intrinsic satisfaction of 
an engaging task and a potential for professional expression (Archer, 2007: 291). 
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According to Archer’s definition of the autonomous mode of reflexivity, this 
reflexive striving to be good at the job was related to a continuous search for new 
challenges and the intention to avoid ‘finding themselves in a cul-de-sac named 
boredom’ (Archer, 2007: 290-1). Avoiding repetitive work patterns clearly was part 
of the motivation for joining for many journalists to whom AJE appealed: 
 
You spend eleven years at ABC News or however many years in Canada and 
you come to this place, it’s like you’re in a new relationship. 
 
(personal interview, Doha, 15/03/2009). 
 
I'm not here by default. I think I have a low boredom threshold, like most 
journalists. And I'd been around sort of a long time. And this was supposedly 
the pariah of international broadcasting.  […] The fact is, nobody had seen it 
in the West. 
 
(personal interview, London, 20/12/2009). 
 
 
To summarise, a relatively high degree of autonomy was what attracted many 
journalists to AJE. At a time of shrinking budgets AJE had the financial freedom to 
launch a large-scale operation focussing precisely on the kind of geographical, 
political and social areas that more heteronomous media found increasingly hard to 
sustain. A London-based senior manager expressed this niche as follows: 
 
Those people who joined us were so excited at joining a new challenge […] 
AJ was a completely open page. And they had come from – no disrespect – 
BBC, Sky, and they were very set in their ways in some of those 
organisations and they wanted the freedom to join an organisation that said: 
‘Yes, go cover that, go cover this, we cover everything around the world, we 
don’t have restraints, we are lucky, because the funding is there and we are 
able to spend the money on the journalism. 
 
(personal interview, London, 19/05/2008). 
 
 
In the following chapter I shall therefore look at the constitution of the field in 
relation to another of Bourdieu’s core concepts – capital. There, I will discuss the 
impact that AJE’s relative autonomy has on the kind of content it literally can afford 
from a financial and professional perspective.  
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7.4 Conclusion – Institutional Spaces for Reporting Back 
 
As outlined in this chapter, AJE’s scope for employing difference – as an 
organisational expression of AJE’s aim of being the ‘voice of the South’ and 
providing a ‘voice for the voiceless’ – cannot be understood fully without relating it 
to the structural and agential forces within the journalistic (sub)field within which 
the channel was set up to compete. What AJE’s management and editorial staff 
experienced was that being a novel channel coming ‘without baggage’, as a Doha-
based presenter put it (personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008), did not mean that the 
‘baggage’ of the field was not structurally impinging on the organisation. In the 
words of Emirbayer and Johnson (2008: 5), ‘organizations must always be situated 
within the matrices of relations, the relational contexts, within which they are 
constituted […] and with which they are ever dialogically engaged’.  
 
In particular, as described in the first part of this chapter, decision-makers at AJE 
found that, from a recruiting perspective, aims of rebalancing the information flow 
were complicated by imbalances within the wider field. These ‘preconditions of 
choice’ (Vaughan, 2008: 78), even if mitigated by conscious efforts that led AJE to 
be arguably one of the most diverse news channels in the world, were in part 
reflected in the composition of AJE’s staff profile. In the second part of this Chapter 
I therefore explored the degrees to which similarity in terms of journalistic practice is 
a prerequisite for changing the ‘rules of the game’ or specific habitus, while it is also 
endowed with a liability to replicate cognitive conventions that can be an obstacle to 
going beyond routine.  
 
As described in this chapter, preconditions for both journalistic routines (habitus) and 
reflexivity (agency) co-exist in a field of tension that in turn was influenced by the 
balance of AJE’s twin strategy of seeking a particular kind of professional habitus 
and in-depth local knowledge from areas typically underrepresented in global news. 
This tension can be seen as an organisational expression of the dialectic of difference 
and similarity that lies at the heart of what constitutes AJE – a constant negotiation of 
being similar enough to compare with and different enough to truly challenge 
‘existing paradigms guiding international news broadcasters’ (El-Nawawy & Powers, 
2008). Therefore, in the third part of this Chapter I discussed how journalists at AJE 
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reflexively worked with the constraints and enablements they encountered. Here, the 
nature of the various motivations of journalists poached from Western networks to 
work for the channel – be they strategic, idealistic or a combination of the two – are 
evidence of the intensely reflexive trajectories that brought people into this particular 
organisational environment in the first place.  
 
This shows that questions of ‘reporting back’ become intrinsically linked to relations 
of power within fields. Other than the macro theory of political economy, Bourdieu’s 
field theory (adapted to be compatible with a critical realist understanding of the 
relative significance of agency) provides a theoretical framework that allows an 
appreciation of these structures on the level of experiences and practices of 
individual journalists. What is important about this conceptual step is that it 
highlights the central dilemma of an organisation aiming to address inequalities and 
asymmetries within a given field: the fact that in order to have an impact on the field 
a certain degree of similarity is necessary (if the aim is, short of revolutionising the 
field, to change its composition from within), while in order to alter some of the 
rules within the field, this very similarity potentially becomes a liability.  
 
What this chapter also demonstrated is that the historically Western kind of 
professionalism that AJE employs is, on its own, not inseparably entwined with the 
reproduction of unequal news flows through journalistic routines, but proves flexible 
enough to incorporate at least some alternative interpretations of newsworthiness in 
international news. However, it also showed that the structure of the field is such that 
only long-term strategies can help to address historically asymmetric patterns of 
news. Hiring as many local journalists with experience in international news as 
possible, while guaranteeing some immediate impact, was largely a step based on 
getting the most out of existing conditions. Long-term strategies of training 
journalists in the South irrespective of their previous exposure to English-language 
mainstream news environments (or for that matter non-English native speakers in 
neglected areas of the North) would address some of the causes of the unequal 
distribution of habitus in a way that would be in tune with AJE’s aims to ‘report 
back’ and could benefit the channel and the entire field in the long term.  
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To summarise, this chapter has thrown into relief the degree to which the 
directionality of media flows is bound up with matters of training, professional 
practices and ultimately the presence of organisations that have the will and financial 
ability to provide individual journalists with an institutional space for reflexively 
realising difference. It demonstrated how a desire to change some of the ‘rules of the 
game’ that is international news broadcasting was present well before AJE was 
conceived. And that therefore the launch of AJE was perceived as an enablement of 
pre-existing personal projects by many of its first generation of staff. Both habitus 
and agency are endowed with causal powers – importantly their balance, and 
therefore the question of whether they are being applied to ‘report back’ or to 
reproduce existing inequalities inherent in the wider field, hinges on the presence of 
organisational spaces that allow for a relatively high degree of experimentation and 
journalistic autonomy. In turn, the ability to sustain institutional spaces that allow for 
editorial difference is inadvertently linked to questions of capital. More precisely, it 
is linked to the relation between what Bourdieu termed cultural and economic capital 
respectively. Consequently, in the next chapter, I will explore AJE’s specific position 
within the field through the dynamic of different kinds of capital and the potential 
impact of this dynamic on AJE’s ability to provide and sustain editorial difference.  
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Chapter 8 The Cost of Difference: AJE’s Position in 
the Field and the Chance to Prioritise 
Cultural Capital  
 
 
My feeling is that here we have a perfect opportunity to build a market of our own. 
[…] There was nothing to stop us going to try and create an entirely new paradigm. 
 
Senior AJE journalist (personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009).  
 
 
I don’t even know our reach here in the UK, which is strange for me, 
because at ITN and ITV of course it was ratings, ratings, ratings. 
  
Senior AJE journalist (personal interview, London, 12/12/2007). 
 
 
My focus would be on the content, getting the content right and then the audience 
hopefully comes. 
  
Programmes producer (personal interview, Doha, 14/02/2008). 
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8.1 Introduction – Journalistic Implications of Funding Journalism 
 
News has widely been accepted as difficult to monetise (Utley, 1997). This is even 
more the case with foreign news focussing on countries in the developing world, 
since sending teams abroad is expensive and many have found there to be a ‘near-
universal belief among those working in the industry that international programmes 
get lower ratings than domestic ones’ (Harding, 2009: 6). As a consequence this kind 
of news is particularly vulnerable where commercial principles outstrip journalistic 
considerations, a growing tendency in a field where competition has increased 
dramatically in the past years and decades. Public service broadcasting finds itself 
under mounting pressures to redefine its reason d'être in a multi-channel and multi-
platform environment. Commercial broadcasters are reducing the number of foreign 
bureaus and are arguably drifting further to the heteronomous pole of the journalistic 
field. State broadcasters like AJE depend more than ever on the generosity of their 
benefactors, with all the uncertainty that encompasses for the long-term future. In 
this environment, many are wondering on the basis of which business models 
journalism (and not least the particularly vulnerable subfield of international news) 
can secure its financial basis going forward. This is a pressing question that 
practitioners and academics have been asking for many years without coming up 
with obvious answers.  
 
At the outset of this chapter I therefore want to be unambiguously clear that this 
thesis is not about attempting to find solutions to this question. It is not an economic 
analysis, it does not suggest alternative business models, nor does it aim to pick and 
choose between existing ones. If anything, the (in many ways unusual) example of 
AJE helps to highlight two matters related to the debate, namely 1) that journalistic 
practices are affected by whatever business model underpins their financial survival 
and 2) that, in addition, journalistic practices are affected by the forces of the wider 
professional field, which in turn are driven by the dominant form of field-specific 
capital in ways that go beyond the specific model of the individual organisation. 
These factors may not be the only or even the main ones for those who are in a 
position to contribute to decisions on future steps for funding journalism – nor, in my 
opinion, should they be – but it is important to explicitly acknowledge their impact 
on the nature of international news and to take their effects seriously. In this vein, 
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this chapter is an exploration of the journalistic implications of the way the AJE is 
being funded.  
 
In the first part of this chapter, I will outline some of the particularities of AJE’s 
position in the field. This includes the comparatively marginal role of commercial 
imperatives as well as the lack of the availability of ratings. This absence sharply 
distinguishes the channel from any comparable broadcaster within a field where 
ratings play a role even within the most autonomous of organisations. Not having 
ratings as a yardstick by which to judge and adjust content on a daily basis therefore 
immediately distinguishes the channel’s evolving journalistic culture from that of its 
competitors.  
 
In the second part of this chapter, I will look into the ways in which this position 
interacts with elements of both habitus and agency within the organisational 
environment of AJE. Again, this will highlight some of the roots of the ‘structural 
contradictions’ of AJE Figenschou (2012:354) identified in her research. Following 
the empirical data emerging from the research interviews, I will argue that, on the 
one hand, there was a sense amongst journalists that in order to compete they needed 
to be similar enough to compare. As a result, practices reminiscent of business 
models that depend on ratings continued to be effective even within an organisation 
that did not provide, as part of its journalistic practice, the data necessary for 
measuring success by ratings. Here, causal mechanisms inherent in the habitus of the 
professional field effectively countered in part the causal mechanisms inherent in the 
organisational field. In this context I shall give examples of how the role of 
commercial thinking at AJE – encouraged by some and eschewed by others – was 
subject to ongoing developments and change within the relatively young 
organisational culture of the channel.  
 
On the other hand, there was a contrasting influence to habitus reminiscent of more 
ratings-oriented environments. As I will argue, the early years of AJE in particular 
served as a platform for journalistic agency, in that the channel’s position offered a 
space for experimentation where journalists dissatisfied with the limitations of the 
field could try and put their desire for change into action. The formative years of AJE 
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were characterised by a reflexive awareness on the part of many journalists that at 
times the only things standing between them and journalistic innovation were shared 
assumptions cultivated in other corners of the industry. This awareness on the part of 
many AJE journalists did not in itself determine which direction the channel should 
take in terms of content (in this regard perhaps causing more chaos than consent), but 
it certainly created debate and high levels of journalistic autonomy within a weakly 
autonomous field. In this context I will discuss how the way that AJE is funded 
created an opportunity to prioritise cultural over economic capital, journalism over 
commercial considerations. In short, being able to, for example, put people on the 
ground in as many ‘under-reported’ places as possible without having to follow 
ratings-oriented judgements in the short term, gives the channel a competitive edge 
journalistically.  
 
Lastly, the fact that AJE’s economic capital is not being expressed in the 
conventional currencies of the field  – in the case of broadcasting most commonly 
ratings and audience shares – makes it harder for AJE to have an impact on the field, 
because other broadcasters dependent on ratings have no means of ‘assessing’ AJE’s 
output vis-à-vis the market. In other words, managers at more ratings-oriented 
channels may, for example, like what they see on AJE, but still doubt that this kind 
of content would work in the contexts of their respective business models. As BBCW 
producer Richard Lawson cautions, ‘Al Jazeera English […] is in a position to be 
able to provide a fundamentally international product. […] All the same, it will be 
interesting to see how Al Jazeera English’s editorial agenda develops once it has a 
better sense of who its real audience is’ (Lawson, 2011: 56). Therefore, without 
indicators such as ratings and a ‘sense of who the real audience is’, economic capital 
(invested in purportedly substantial amounts by AJE in order to, for example, create 
permanent journalistic presences in the field) may not translate readily into the kind 
of symbolic power that the channel might otherwise wield.  
 
What does translate into symbolic power, however, is whatever cultural capital AJE 
can cultivate in the absence of market pressure. For a channel aiming to ‘reverse 
current dominant news flows’ this is particularly relevant, because in order to defy 
conventional wisdom and take creative risks the organisation requires financial 
staying power that is not reliant on short- or medium-term financial imperatives. And 
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while AJE’s unprecedentedly autonomous position may complicate its ability to 
influence other organisations, over time its presence may help, however slightly, to 
pull other international broadcasters closer to the autonomous pole of the field. In the 
final part of this chapter, therefore, I shall look at the way in which the channel’s 
potential impact on the industry has been perceived both within the organisation and 
by outside observers.  
 
 
8.2 AJE’s Position Within the Professional Field 
 
The issue of funding had immediate consequences for AJE’s very ability to serve as 
a journalistic counterweight to what it calls ‘conventional news flows from the North 
to the South’ (AJE Website, Corporate Profile, 04/09/2008). In the realm of 
international news and current affairs money can translate into access in that it allows 
a journalistic presence to be established in regions where other networks only fly in 
journalists when a crisis has reached the status of breaking news. Explicit 
acknowledgement of this evident link was fairly common amongst journalists at 
AJE, who explained that ‘the attention we give to stories [that] you don't see 
[elsewhere] unless you are regionally based, is a function of our design as well as 
money’ (personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). The public perception, reiterated by 
fellow journalists and academics, that the channel’s budget was ‘healthy’ (Sabbagh, 
04/06/2005), ‘purportedly substantial’ (Guider, 07/10/2005) or even ‘what amounts 
to […] unlimited’ (Daily Variety, 16/08/2005) created immense pressures to deliver, 
or at least to get close to an idealistic vision of what journalism should be like in a 
world without commercial imperatives. As Stroehlein (20/11/2007) reported, AJE 
staff ‘realize this opportunity also saddles them with a great responsibility: If they 
cannot get television news right with this amount of money and such top staff, then 
perhaps no one can’.  
 
As I will argue, this focus on the (purported) size of AJE’s funding119 – while an 
absolutely vital aspect – led some to become distracted from another crucial factor 
                                                
119 AJE’s budget was the subject of much speculation (Lawson, 2011: 19-23). In the 
run-up to the launch of the English-language service and since, and in line with my 
fieldwork experiences (see Chapter 4.4.2), AJE’s budget was ‘a closely guarded 
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regarding the relation between funding and journalism at AJE. Its relatively 
autonomous position within the field means that the channel could afford to spend 
whatever budget the organisation does have at its disposal in a way that is much 
closer to a purely journalistic understanding of organisational priorities. From a 
journalistic viewpoint, this freedom from commercial considerations means there are 
greater chances of getting the green light for journalistically worthy stories, 
irrespective of concerns for market share and ratings. In other words, what sets AJE 
apart as an organisation within the industry is that funding – not just in terms of the 
size of the budget, but crucially in the way it is provided – eradicates any immediate 
pressures to conform to established industry wisdom. 
 
 
8.2.1 Relative Autonomy in a Weakly Autonomous Field 
 
Given that AJE derives its funding virtually entirely from the state of Qatar,120 in 
effect making it a state broadcaster, there are two main points to be made about the 
way that this business model potentially impacts on the kind of journalism that the 
channel can sustain. What comes to mind immediately is that direct state sponsorship 
without an accompanying regulatory framework comes with the inherent risk of state 
censorship, since there is no structural mechanism in place to help ensure that 
                                                                                                                                     
secret’ (Macleod et al., 27/06/2005), which the channel consistently ‘declined to 
disclose’ to the international media (Guider, 07/10/2005; Sabbagh, 26/08/2008.) 
Some estimates of numbers did nonetheless emerge – it has been estimated that the 
set-up cost between 2006 and 2009 was approximately £670 million (Henery, 2010: 
17; Lawson, 2011: 20). The Morning Herald referred to a suggestion in the New 
York Times of ‘a budget of more than $US1 billion’ (Coultan, 01/04/2006), a number 
reiterated in El-Nawawy and Powers’s study of AJE’s potential for mediating 
conflict (2008: 33) and said to be supplemented by an annual grant of approximately 
$100 million (Powers, 2012: 8) – but these vary significantly and given the lack of 
transparency in terms of state-funded projects in Qatar in general and AJN 
specifically, there is no way of confirming them independently.  
 
120 At the time of writing, the channel is estimated to generate about 15-20% of its 
budget through revenues, according to Al Jazeera sources (see also Figenschou, 
forthcoming: 39). 
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financial and editorial matters are always dealt with separately.121 This risk exists 
independently of whether or not there has so far been any form of censorship (see 
also Chapter 5.2.2). In critical realist terms, this is a liability that may or may not 
become effective in what Bhaskar (1975: 13) calls the ‘domain of actual’, and hence 
may or may not lead to actual events. What makes the question of whether or not 
there have been cases of governmental influence on editorial matters difficult to 
answer with any element of certainty is of course that, even if such censorship does 
occur, it would not necessarily become part of the ‘domain of empirical’ (1975: 13), 
being very difficult for outsiders to observe, let alone to prove. Conversely, it is 
possibly even more difficult to conclusively prove the absence of state influence on 
editorial matters. As a result, precisely because the structural liability inherent in 
AJE’s funding is part of reality and therefore poses a persistent structural risk, 
academics and journalists have highlighted the issue time and again (Lawson, 
2011:21; Figenschou, 2012: 368). 
 
Secondly – and this aspect is much less fully explored in the context of AJE – what 
this funding enables is an opportunity to place journalistic principles before 
commercial considerations. This is possible to a degree that would be very difficult 
for other broadcasters to afford, including public service broadcasters who depend on 
being able to justify public funding in ways that AJE does not (Lawson, 2011: 42). It 
is this second aspect that I intend to focus on in the following122 in order to look at 
the unique position that AJE occupies within the journalistic field as a direct result of 
the way it is being funded, as well as of the kind of journalism this opportunity 
(potentially and actually) enables.  
 
In doing so, Bourdieu’s concept of the journalistic field offers a useful way of 
understanding some of the limitations and opportunities that AJE’s particular 
position presents in relation to other broadcasters. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
                                                
121 As Duval reminds us, ‘the flipside of independence with respect to political forces 
is almost always dependence on economic forces’ (Duval, 2005: 136) and vice versa. 
In the case of AJE, independence from commercial pressures is a direct result of the 
funding it receives from the Emir of Qatar. For a debate on the channel’s dependence 
on the state see also Chapter 5.  
 
122 Without in any way wanting to diminish the ongoing importance of scrutinizing 
AJE’s editorial independence from the state. 
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according to Bourdieu the journalistic field oscillates between a heteronomous pole 
that marks the field’s associations with other fields, notably the economic field, and 
an autonomous pole that indicates the journalistic rules and standards intrinsic to the 
field. The position of any media organisation within that field can be described in 
relation to ‘two forms of power’ – autonomous ‘cultural capital’ (indicated for 
example by attachments to journalistic traditions, levels of training of journalists, 
geographic locations of offices) and heteronomous ‘economic capital’ (expressed in 
the case of broadcasting in ratings and audience shares) (Benson, 2006: 190). 
Bourdieu saw a real danger in what he observed to be an increasing dominance of 
economic capital over cultural capital in journalism – a trend towards 
commercialisation pulling media organisations ever closer to the heteronomous pole 
of the field and even threatening the autonomy of related cultural fields, such as 
literature, politics and arts. What is particularly relevant in the context of this study is 
that AJE’s relative autonomy from the economic field positions it closer to the 
autonomous pole of the journalistic field than any of the news organisations it aims 
to challenge.  
 
 
8.2.2 News Without Ratings 
 
One of the most striking manifestations of AJE’s position in the field – and one of 
the most tangible differences between AJE and its competitors in organisational 
terms – is that there are no audience ratings as a means of gauging the channel’s 
success.123 In his televised lecture, ‘On Television’, Bourdieu once emphasised that 
‘even in the most independent sectors of journalism, ratings have become the 
journalist’s Last Judgement’ (Bourdieu, 1998b: 27, emphasis added). AJE is a rare 
                                                
123 All editorial staff I interviewed assured me that they had not seen any ratings for 
the programmes they produced. The media relations office in Doha recently 
maintained that audience ‘research has been done and is still being done for current 
and future channels’ (written answer to information request by author, May 2013), 
but, if there were ratings, these were certainly not part of day-to day-workflows of 
editors and mid-level management (with direct and indirect consequences for 
editorial staff) as common as at other networks.  
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exception to this regularity of the field. 124  However, interviews with AJE 
management consistently suggested that this exception did not come about because 
an absence of ratings was actively encouraged as a kind of experiment in 
autonomous journalism. A senior Doha-based manager explained that audience 
ratings would be desirable but had not been introduced, ‘because [audiences] are 
scattered in so many places in the world, it would cost us more than we’re spending 
on programming’ (personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009). AJE managers frequently 
emphasised that audience research would be particularly costly for AJE, because in 
its assumed core markets outside the Anglo-American markets there was 
comparatively little infrastructure in place for assessing audience ratings. Many of 
the developing regions that AJE considers to be among those of its main audiences 
had no existing facilities for comprehensive audience research. As a result, in the 
words of another senior AJE manager based in Doha:  
 
If you go to Afghanistan and Pakistan and many African countries, you'll see 
Al Jazeera English in particular being watched, but if you ask me how many 
people are watching and I was honest with you, I'd be sticking my finger in 
the air and guessing’  
 
(personal interview, Doha, 10/02/2008). 
 
It is reasonable to assume that, had ratings been operationally essential to the running 
of the channel, cost would not have been an effective deterrent for long. Instead, as a 
direct result of AJE’s position in the field, ratings (one of the drivers of 
heteronomous tendencies in the field of broadcasting) were simply not considered 
indispensable. In short, the way that the channel was funded happened to make them 
                                                
124 Other than actual ratings, numbers for audience reach are readily available for 
most channels, including AJE, but these merely indicate how many households could 
potentially receive the channel and give no indication whatsoever of how many 
people may in fact be watching. Roughly, at the time of writing AJE was available to 
‘more than 260 million households in more than 120 countries’ (written answer to 
information request by author, May 2013). To put this into context, according to 
Lawson (2011: 23-25), BBC World News has a reach of over 295 million homes in 
more than 200 countries. CNN International has a reach of approximately 275 
million homes in 200 countries. 
 
  245 
expendable (Lawson, 2011: 24). Therefore, despite the fact that senior managers 
repeatedly said they thought it would be desirable to have ratings in my interviews, a 
claim I am in no position to independently verify as I was not privy to decision 
making processes at the helm of the channel, over the course of the period analysed 
no systematic audience research materialised.  
 
Whatever the precise combination of causes, the fact that a sizeable international 
news channel has been operating for years without using audience ratings as a 
measure of success is in itself remarkable. In the context of this thesis, an 
international news channel that operates without the necessary data available to 
express success in terms of concrete ratings for individual programmes creates a 
journalistic sub-field that can provide insights into what international news may look 
like in an environment that is largely shielded from the commercial pressures of the 
field. 
 
This poses questions about how success is measured within the industry, which 
crucially determines the relative value of different kinds of capital. Assessing AJE’s 
chances of success at the time of its launch, BBC Global News Director Richard 
Sambrook cautioned that a ‘Third World focus could backfire’ and that ‘it will take 
some time to see’ whether they could ‘differentiate themselves […] by representing 
developing countries […] and still keep broad appeal’ (Krane, 15/11/2006, emphasis 
added). The issue here is that the specific public value of international news is not 
reflected in the dominant currency of the field, which is expressed in audience 
ratings. In a study commissioned by POLIS, Oxfam and the International 
Broadcasting Trust (IBT), Phil Harding suggests that in order to preserve 
international news in the market one would have to find ways of measuring the kind 
of value it generates. This would require broadcasters to include much more 
stringently in their definitions of what makes a successful programme factors that 
measure programme quality and audience appreciation (as opposed to numbers). 
Adapting the ways in which success is measured to a model less dependent on 
quantitative methodology would in turn have an effect on commissioning patterns 
(Harding, 2009: 33-34). As one senior executive is quoted as saying: ‘The only way 
you will get people to do things is if they have it written down and it is included in 
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the objectives. Too many controllers and commissioners are still judged by audience 
size, share and reach’ (senior executive quoted in Harding, 2009: 29).  
 
In short, there is a perception that international news can therefore only thrive within 
a business model that acknowledges its social, cultural and political value (generated 
through cultural capital) in addition to – or even rather than – its economic value. 
And while public service broadcasting goes a long way towards reflecting a value 
orientation that does not hinge on market-imperatives and considers its output to be 
‘story-driven’ as opposed to purely ratings-driven (Lawson, 2011:23), international 
news appears to be in decline throughout the industry (Figenschou, 2012:364; 
Ricchiardi, 2006; Utley, 1997; DFID, 2000: 4). The most visible organisational 
impact of this has been that, as Lawson puts it, ‘almost all news organisations in the 
“global North” have been rapidly shedding their foreign bureaux’ (Lawson, 
2011:18). 
 
 
8.2.3 Marginal Role of Commercial Imperatives 
 
Another indication of AJE’s unusual position in the field of broadcasting is, for 
example, the relatively low priority given in the months and years around the 
channel’s launch to the establishment of a commercial division. The sales and 
marketing arm, in the shape of a commercial division, was still recruiting and getting 
started when the channel had been on air for months. Although AJE had been in 
preparation for years prior to its launch in November 2006, the commercial division 
‘really started to be pulled together [at the] beginning of 2007’ and as late as 
February 2008 a senior network manager said it was ‘fair to say that [the] process is 
still ongoing’ (personal interview, Doha, 14/02/2008). In May 2008 a London-based 
senior manager described the commercial endeavours of the channel as a 
‘commercialisation thought’ but ‘nothing concrete’ (personal interview, London, 
19/05/2008). Since then, the organisational structure underpinning possible 
commercial approaches has altered several times, but the prevalence of 
organisational expressions of cultural capital over expressions of economic capital 
has persisted as one of many (in part contradictory) currents within the organisation.  
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As with (the absence of) ratings, the overall relatively tentative approach to 
commercial thinking during AJE’s early years did not appear to be based on any 
active decision made at any particular point to discourage a more commercial 
outlook. Rather, it appears, it came about as a combination of the sheer enormity of 
the task of getting the channel on air and the lack of any immediate pressure to be 
self-sustaining. In a personal conversation with AJE’s managing director in May 
2010, he emphasised that there had been a stated aspiration to monetise the channel 
as well as possible. One symptom of the wish to become more commercial is the 
periodically occurring discussions about privatising the channel (for more detail see 
5.2.3). Advertising may be minimal, but continuous attempts to build audiences and 
create potential revenue streams show that Hugh Miles has not been far off the mark 
when he maintained that ‘if Al Jazeera has a bias, it is a commercial one’ and that, 
despite its generous funding, it ‘wants to win audience share and it wants to sell 
advertising’ (Hugh Miles, 12/06/2006). Prioritising cultural over economic capital – 
a tremendous competitive edge from a purely journalistic perspective – therefore 
appeared to be largely a result of AJE’s position in the field rather than a deliberate 
design.  
 
However, triggered by the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, the extemporaneous 
nature of this prioritisation of cultural capital may have temporarily shifted towards a 
more deliberate recognition of the potential long-term value of a non-commercial 
outlook. When AJE’s management was running through potential scenarios of what 
would have to happen if severe cuts were required due to the crisis in mid-2008 
(scenarios that in the end were not substantiated)125 the channel’s emphasis on 
cultural capital over economic capital appeared in a different light. According to the 
then Managing Director, the global financial crisis was a ‘wake-up call’ because it 
made apparent the ways in which content would have to change if they were to 
                                                
125 While other Arab countries had been ‘rattled by the global economic turmoil’, 
Qatar turned out to have bucked the trend (The Economist, 27/05/2010). As the 
financial crisis deepened, Qatar’s growth rate diminished slightly, but overall 
remained far above average, ‘exceeding any of the other emerging market economies 
and dwarfing the troubled but hyped Emirate of Dubai’ (Cooper & Momani, 2011: 
113).  
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increase revenue in the short term (private conversation with author, May 2010). 
This awareness was coupled with a ‘stronger sense’ that keeping ‘commercial 
contamination’ to a minimum could pay off in the long run in terms of journalistic 
reputation and potentially also commercially, since it would give AJE breathing 
space to develop a distinct profile over time.  
 
To the degree that editors realised (and managed to operationalise) the fact that what 
is worthy can be judged to a much greater degree on journalistic than on commercial 
grounds, AJE has the potential to accommodate a comparatively high level of 
journalistic autonomy and ultimately difference on screen. And with plans to break 
even financially not realistic in the medium term, there was an increasingly strong 
sense in some quarters of the organisation that AJE’s financial dependence on the 
state brought with it a rare opportunity to consciously cultivate a journalistic culture 
based on cultural capital. In the words of a Doha-based senior manager: 
 
So we have the fact that we've got a network that has some advertising, but 
not much – to me that is a great thing.  The Emir probably would sit here and 
interrupt me and say: “But don't count on it […] because I think there still is a 
real interest in creating a network that is self-sustaining”. I just think 
practically […] it's not going to turn around in a couple of years. So, if 
anything, I see the pressure is on us to take advantage of that. 
 
(personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009).  
 
In other words, at that time there was a current – though not necessarily the most 
dominant current – within AJE’s senior management which was in favour of 
strategically endorsing the prioritisation of cultural capital as a competitive edge in 
ways they may not have done to the same extent earlier, when the subordination of 
economic capital was largely perceived to be a side-effect of AJE’s position in the 
field.126  
 
 
                                                
126 Even though it is not possible to establish a causal connection here, it is worth 
noting that shortly after this perceived shift in the evaluation of AJE’s journalistic 
strengths, the commercial division ceased to exist in its previous form, as it was 
being restructured and disintegrated into its constitutive departments. 
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8.3 Forces from the Professional Field and Scope for Reflexivity 
 
Whether circumstantial or strategic, the ability to prioritise cultural capital as a result 
of AJE’s funding and position in the field was particularly important with regard to 
AJE’s remit of ‘rebalancing’ international news, since it allowed staff to concentrate 
‘on the journalism first’, as a London-based senior manager put it (personal 
interview, London, 19/05/2008).127 However, while an exceptional case in this 
regard, AJE as an organisation cannot be seen as an isolated entity. As the dominant 
currency of the field, ratings also contribute to shaping the dominant professional 
habitus of the field, which in turn could potentially impact on practices at AJE even 
in the absence of commercial pressure. Interviews from AJE’s early years therefore 
provide a rare opportunity to gauge 1) the degree to which professional habitus 
generated within a ratings-oriented field impacted on the organisational environment 
of AJE and 2) the degree to which journalistic autonomy could emerge in the 
absence of ratings. These two points, while seemingly contradictory, are not 
mutually exclusive. Rather, both elements contributed to the shifting dynamics that 
very much characterised AJE’s early years, as journalists at AJE aimed to produce 
content that was decidedly different from the likes of BBCW and CNNI, yet 
sufficiently similar to be considered to be on a par. 
 
 
8.3.1 Perceived Impact of Ratings-oriented Habitus 
 
Ratings-oriented habitus is so entrenched in television news production that a 
complete lack of ratings can have a rather disorienting effect. Without ratings, AJE 
journalists may have gained enormous professional freedom, but were also left to 
                                                
127 It has to be noted that ‘concentrating on the journalism first’ not only affected 
positively a journalistic environment relatively autonomous from interference from 
non-journalistic fields – at the same time it affected the formation of administrational 
structures in much less positive ways. This became apparent, for example, when 
structural assimilations between AJA and AJE were conducted relatively late in the 
process and unannounced benefit cuts and less than transparent administrative 
processes led to disenchantment in many quarters. As a senior manager put it in 
2008, ‘we made a bit of a mistake. It is no secret. We should have concentrated a bit 
more on our HR and our Finance and our PR and all sorts of things’ (personal 
Interview, London, 19/05/2008). 
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judge their work without one of the most common yardsticks of journalistic 
performance within the industry. An AJE director described the lack of ratings as one 
of the most pronounced differences he experienced at AJE in relation to his previous 
working environment: 
 
At CBC in Canada when I walked in, I would have not only the audience 
figures from the night before but I’d have them minute by minute, so I would 
know that when we moved from this item to this segment the audience 
crashed or the audience didn’t crash or all of a sudden you would see the 
audience shoot up after a commercial and you realise it’s been ten minutes 
after the hour so a lot of people have been watching some entertainment 
show and they’ve just totally gotten bored and moved over to the news.  So 
you do have a sense of it, it’s almost like an orchestra, a conductor, you’re 
able to play with the environment. Whereas here, you have no sense at all. 
  
(personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009).  
 
This uncertainty of ‘not getting a sense’ is indicative of the reliance on ratings in 
other parts of the field. Not knowing who watches, in addition to going against the 
journalistic instinct of wanting to produce content for audiences, 128  also goes 
completely against the grain of the more commercial aspects of professional habitus 
that journalists had acquired in other organisations throughout the industry. Without 
ratings, staff at AJE had to make decisions on an entirely different basis from before, 
whether they worked in management or as editors, producers, reporters or 
researchers. As one presenter previously working for ITV said when asked about 
audiences:  
 
I don’t even know our reach here in the UK, which is strange for 
me, because at ITN and ITV of course it was ratings, ratings, 
ratings. 
  
(personal interview, London, 12/12/2007).  
 
In the increasingly heteronomous field of broadcast journalism, a sensitivity to 
ratings is such a core element of the prevalent professional habitus that it can outlive 
                                                
128 For journalists the assumption that their work has some kind of impact is an 
intrinsic part of the profession just as it forms the basis of many assumptions in the 
discipline of media and communications studies. In the words of a London-based 
producer, ‘what is the point of us doing the best stories if nobody watches?’ 
(personal interview, London, 24/10/2007). 
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the structural limitations that once gave rise to it. Accordingly, a ratings-oriented 
habitus, and the practices generative of it, were perceived by some to be so prevalent 
that they were seen as seriously endangering the ability of AJE to be sufficiently 
different from the channels it set out to counterbalance: 
 
Unfortunately this is part of the existing framework […] Managers come 
from stations where the business model is a key part of how we do things and 
that is a revenue and expenditure model.  
  
(personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009).  
 
 
This perception throws into relief the fact that difference on screen is not merely a 
function of AJE’s position within the journalistic field as a comparatively 
autonomous organisation, but crucially depends on a range of factors that influence 
whether or not this position can be fully used to advantage, one of which is the 
predominance of ratings-oriented habitus in the field of broadcast journalism as a 
whole. In other words, even in the absence of immediate commercial pressures the 
mere fact that the creation and running of a news channel of this size requires routine 
and experience means that practices at times will be reminiscent of the commercial 
imperatives of other organisations.  
 
In addition, I found that there was a degree of concern at AJE that ignoring the logic 
of the current make-up of the field would pose the risk of not being considered to be 
on a par with the established players. This view is supported by Figenschou (2012: 
361), who finds that the spectre of ‘irrelevance’ as a result of being too different was 
one that AJE staff have been wary of from the beginning. Indeed there are 
indications that ‘too much’ difference can be perceived by some as a liability. As 
BBCW producer Richard Lawson (2011: 44) cautions, ‘being able to reflect a broad 
plurality of geographic locations is editorially invaluable, but it is essential that each 
element is focussed and relevant, and I suspect that this is one area where Al Jazeera 
English’s freedom not to think about its audience weakens its output rather than 
strengthening it’. Many AJE journalists therefore disputed the notion that in the 
absence of commercial pressure cultural capital in the form of journalistic autonomy 
triumphed by default over the demands of economic capital. On the contrary, in a bid 
to discard notions that AJE ‘may operate in a more permissive financial environment, 
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where efficiency is not much of a concern’ (Lawson, 2011: 42, emphasis added), they 
felt the need to stress that journalistic practices, including commissioning processes, 
often were not any different from those at other, much more ratings-oriented, 
channels.  
 
Everybody thinks the Emir has these deep pockets and that anything you 
want you can go and do.  It’s not quite like that, you have to go through the 
same process that we had at ITN of saying, well this is the story I want to 
cover, why I want to cover it, and give a pitch. 
  
(personal interview, London, 12/12/2007).  
 
We have checks and balances over whether stories are worth paying for or 
not, and so in one sense it's exactly the same as Sky. You have a certain 
amount of money and if a story is going to cost twenty thousand dollars to do 
one two-minute story, that's not worth doing, but if it's going to cost twenty 
thousand dollars and maybe you'll get five three-minute exclusive stories, 
then yes, let's do it.   
 
(personal interview, London, 20/12/2007).  
 
These examples again demonstrate that, in the absence of an established set of 
practices at the then newly launched channel, journalists applied their experience 
from other organisational environments to making decisions about how to spend 
money on newsgathering at AJE. How prevalent commercially inclined habitus was 
within the organisation therefore also depended on the balance between those for 
whom a more commercial outlook was seen as a matter of staying competitive, even 
where not necessitated by immediate economic considerations, and those wanting to 
focus on protecting and harnessing the cultural potential of AJE’s position at the 
autonomous margin of the journalistic spectrum. In the following I shall give 
examples of the reflexive ways in which journalists engaged with the opportunities 
that AJE’s position provided.   
 
 
8.3.2 The Role of Cultural Capital and Journalistic Agency  
 
However, monetary efficiency as part of the professional habitus does not on its own 
necessarily contradict the idea that unusual projects may have a greater chance of 
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being realised at a channel that does not depend on ratings. The crucial factor for 
AJE was (and continues to be) journalists’ definition of what constituted a story that 
was ‘worth paying for’ in the context of AJE’s remit. As many journalists stressed: 
 
We can do foreign stories by importance irrespective of ratings. I did three 
films on Sri Lanka, which nobody, no BBC, no Channel 4 would ever do. 
 
Producer / presenter (personal interview, London, 24/10/2007).  
 
You’re more likely to get approval for stories that are difficult and expensive 
to cover if they editorially believe it’s a justifiable story, which is just, it’s a 
luxury you don’t get in many organisations. 
 
Presenter (personal interview, London, 12/12/2007).  
 
Here, the additional expense of a ‘difficult […] to cover’ story is described as being 
outweighed by journalistic merit, clearly indicating a prioritisation of cultural over 
economic capital. Indeed, there is evidence that AJE’s organisational environment is 
favourable to a more comprehensive approach to international issues (see Chapter 6) 
that is less driven by concerns for ratings. Reflecting on the first news broadcast on 
the day of the launch, Pintak noted that ‘while it has been refreshing to see reports 
from places like Darfur, Myanmar and Zimbabwe, the channel was crammed with so 
many obscure features from forgotten corners of the world that it was beginning to 
resemble a UN video service. News flash: There’s a reason some of these stories are 
“ignored” by other channels’ (Pintak, 30/11/2006). Polemics aside, he does touch on 
an important point, and one of the reasons for other channels to ignore them, indeed 
one of the reasons these places have been ‘forgotten’ in the first place, is that these 
kind of features are at the autonomous end of the journalistic spectrum and seen as 
interfering with ratings targets and the need of almost any news organisation to 
generate an income, either in the form of securing and justifying public funding or in 
the form of attracting advertising revenue.  
 
In contrast, some were convinced that the unique opportunity for AJE consisted in its 
potential to break out of the circle of short-term, ratings-driven editorial decisions 
and to gradually cultivate an audience that appreciated the non-commercial hard 
news attitude they could afford in the absence of ratings.  
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I don’t want audience research, it is a nightmare. I’ve worked at news 
organisations who spend money on audience research and focus groups and 
then a bunch of guys who are accountants and non-news people say these are 
the stories that you should do in order to pander to your audience.  Why 
would we do that?  Why would we pander to an existing audience instead of 
doing the news and trying to grow the audience?  It’s the absolute wrong way 
to go.   
  
Producer / presenter (personal interview, Doha, 15/03/2009).  
 
 
My feeling is that here we have a perfect opportunity to build a market of our 
own. […] We could have created that audience and there was nothing to stop 
us going to try and create an entirely new paradigm.  
 
(personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009).  
 
 
As the senior xecutive quoted by Harding remarked, ‘there’s a very “purist” view of 
what international coverage should be’ (Harding, 2009: 3, emphasis added). For 
many journalists, then, the transfer from an organisational environment dominated by 
pressures to maintain audience shares to one where they were judged almost 
exclusively on journalistic standards enabled them to focus on this ‘purist’ perception 
of international coverage. As a programme editor put it: 
 
My focus would be on the content, getting the content right and then the 
audience hopefully comes. 
  
 (personal interview, Doha, 14/02/2008). 
 
This prioritisation of cultural capital over economic considerations would not have 
been possible without the unique position occupied by AJE within the journalistic 
field. However, I shall argue that it would be reductionist to understand it purely as a 
result of this position. Habitus reminiscent of commercial priorities was rejected in 
many cases not least because journalists actively and explicitly anticipated the 
subordination of commercial demands to editorial decision-making as an asset. As a 
result they actively looked to AJE as an organisation where they hoped to find 
greater professional autonomy than in other, more established, corners of the 
industry. As with other motivations for joining discussed in Chapter 7, this 
anticipation on the part of journalists could not have been the result of a clash of 
habitus, as it existed prior to their joining AJE and therefore prior to the experience 
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of any difference they may have encountered within the working environment of the 
channel. Indeed, several interviewees expressed how relative independence from 
market pressures, and the journalistic potential this position opened up, had been one 
of their critical reasons for joining the organisation in the first place:  
 
One of the things that really attracted me [to AJE] is [that] we don't spend too 
much time in trying to generate revenue in this station. […] It can't get any 
better than that for a journalist.   
  
(personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009).  
 
Whether a channel like AJE in its early days tended to attract a certain type of 
journalist, or whether reflexivity concerning the limitations of a weakly autonomous 
field such as broadcasting is fairly common amongst broadcast journalists, my 
interviews clearly displayed a strong sense of reflexivity with regard to AJE’s 
position in the field. What is central here, however, is that unless and until a 
professional environment offers the space for manoeuvre to turn this reflexivity into 
agency, very few journalists are in a position to act upon their reflexive awareness. 
AJE’s position in the field offered just that space for manoeuvre, particularly in the 
years when journalists were still establishing amongst themselves how to 
operationalise the channel’s remit in terms of daily journalistic practice and what 
exactly that meant for the stories they could cover. As one journalist recalled:  
 
The people I met from Al Jazeera English made a very convincing argument 
[for joining them] […] I said, if you're not worried about ratings, if you're not 
worried about profits, what is going to be the standard of your success? And 
they said: high quality journalism.  
 
(personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 05/06/2009).  
 
 
Therefore, a more productive way of explaining the relatively high levels of 
journalistic agency and reflexivity of the channel, I shall argue, is to acknowledge the 
multiple ways in which AJE served as a platform for agency in ways that more 
mature rival channels did not, and could not, given their position in the field. This 
agency existed independently of AJE, and in many cases pre-dated its existence, as a 
causal power of individual journalists, but required an environment like that of AJE 
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in its early years to manifest itself in actual practise – and ultimately news content. 
In an industry under increasing pressure in a fragmenting market, some journalists 
found themselves looking to a state-funded broadcaster like AJE as an opportunity to 
escape increasing commercialisation. As a consequence, there was a strong sense in 
some interviews that journalists were hoping AJE could pick up the threads where 
other broadcasters, in their perception, increasingly struggled as a direct consequence 
of a pull across the industry towards the heteronomous pole of the field. One 
interviewee explained: 
 
I never wanted to work for a state-funded broadcaster before, but if you look 
at what’s happened to television [it] has never mattered more than it does 
now, because the commercial guys have never been in as much trouble as 
they are now. They don’t have the resources to open seventy-five bureaus 
overseas, they do not have the money to properly do stories even in the UK or 
the US[…].  
 
Producer / presenter (personal interview, Doha, 15/03/2009).  
 
This tendency within the wider field opened up a niche for AJE to position itself as a 
counterweight to prevailing trends. Asked whether the way the channel was financed 
had an influence on commissioning content, a London-based programme editor 
answered: 
 
Yes it does and I think it’s positively, or at least you have to commission and 
behave as if it was positively. We are in the remarkable position that the sort 
of films that we commission and broadcast in UK broadcasting terms is a 
tough area and there are less of those on UK broadcasters. So the kind of 
documentaries that I commission and that we show on the strand that I work 
on, I know they are under threat in other places.  
  
(personal interview, London, 12/12/2007).  
 
 
This statement not only reiterates the perception that AJE at least had the potential to 
serve as a kind of refuge from the detrimental effects that a dominance of 
commercial imperatives could have on certain kinds of programming. It also 
highlights the precariousness of any potentially positive impact of the channel’s 
unique position in the field: it demonstrates how a potentially positive effect depends 
entirely on the conscious actions – the imagination, trust and belief of the journalists 
working there – for the editorial opportunities presenting themselves. By describing 
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how she deliberately acted on the assumption the effect was positive, the interviewee 
quoted above consciously acknowledges the volatile and constructed nature of the 
practices involved. Yet the reflexive nature of her observation, her realisation of the 
relevance of her and her colleagues’ role in making use of the degree of journalistic 
autonomy that this comparatively young channel provided, shows precisely what 
potentially enables distinctive content in the first place. As such it is one of many 
examples showing the important role that journalistic agency played, particularly in 
the early years of the channel, in creating shared assumptions about editorial 
decision-making. 
 
AJE’s independence from commercial pressures also meant that it was sufficiently 
detached financially to allow journalists to reflect critically on the industry without 
fear of repercussions. Journalistically, this isolated position had an enormous 
advantage. In the following a producer and presenter describes the role that AJE’s 
position in the field played in his consideration of the channel for his media watch 
show:  
 
I was at ABC when I first had the idea [of doing a media watch show] but 
how do you do a no-holds-barred, critical cross section of media coverage 
when the company you are working for is owned by Disney, and they’re 
connected to forty-seven different companies, fifty-five different ways.  [I 
thought] maybe NBC, they have money, although they’re owned by General 
Electric, who, if they’re not making fruit juice and stoves are making 
guidance systems for the Pentagon, that’s not an option. So I started thinking 
about doing it on Al Jazeera. My first reaction was: no, it’s Al Jazeera, so it 
won’t work. And then my second reaction was: maybe it’ll work and then 
gradually my third position evolved to not only can it work, it’s the only place 
where it can work, because they are a standalone organisation that is not 
compromised six ways to Sunday by video deals. 
 
Producer / presenter (personal interview, Doha, 15/03/2009).  
 
 
These examples show that the relation between economic and journalistic 
considerations – expressed in economic and cultural capital respectively – has been 
at the heart of AJE’s ability to attract high-profile journalists from across the world. 
Ultimately, in addition to its promise to develop a different perspective on 
international news and current affairs, it offered an escape in the eyes of many from 
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an environment where journalism suffered from being subjected to increasing 
commercial pressure.  
 
 
8.3.3 AJE’s Impact on the Wider Field – Changing the ‘Rules of the 
Game’?  
 
In the previous parts of this thesis, influences from the wider professional field on 
AJE’s organisational culture have been considered from a range of perspectives. 
Some of these influences led to similarities in practices and content that are 
reminiscent of environments operating under different, in many ways more 
constrained, conditions than AJE. The question remains whether any differences that 
have been cultivated within the organisational environment of AJE potentially 
transfer back into the wider field. This part of the chapter therefore deals with the 
question of how far the professional habitus generated within the organisational field 
of AJE – partially shaped by the channel’s relatively autonomous position and 
(enablement of) journalistic agency – potentially impacts on the professional field.  
 
As I have pointed out throughout this thesis (and in particular in Chapter 6), AJE 
lived up to its ambitious aims of re-balancing asymmetries in international news in 
some regards and less so in others. There is a tendency in media studies to focus on 
the limitations and shortcomings of journalism, which is a vital aspect of the field’s 
critical capability, but, as Cottle (2005: 109) suggests, it would also be insightful ‘to 
develop a sharper sense of “the possible” as well as “the problematic” in our 
evaluation of media performance’. In this spirit, focussing on the potential impact of 
areas of difference in this part of the chapter is not to ignore aspects where AJE falls 
short of its own aims, but to begin to explore how those practises that diverge from 
the dominant journalistic habitus of the professional field in productive ways (for 
example in terms of the relative newsworthiness of countries in the global South) 
potentially affect the composition of the field.  
 
Looking at journalistic implications of the relation between economic and cultural 
capital with regard to AJE, it would be tempting to dismiss the ensuing focus on 
cultural capital as a luxury that bears little meaning for the wider industry, especially 
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since AJE operates under conditions not readily replicable across the field. However, 
while some of the discussions above may have a commercially naïve ring to them in 
the short term, they open up possibilities for genuinely changing some aspects of 
journalistic practice. From a long-term perspective the channel’s position embodies 
an exceptional opportunity, allowing it to develop distinctive content over time 
before subjecting it to market pressures. By resulting in more of the kind of 
journalism that in many competing organisations is under intense financial pressure, 
this difference in priorities that distinguishes AJE from its main competitors could 
help to shift the dynamics in the field, however slightly. 
 
Two main arguments are to be made with regard to potential knock-on effects of any 
changes developed at AJE. Firstly, there is the position that AJE’s lack of ratings and 
relative lack of commercial considerations may mean that their de facto economic 
capital does not readily translate into the kind of currency conventionally associated 
within the industry with success, therefore reducing the chances that others will think 
it worth investing in similar practices. As Michelle Henery points out, ‘critics cite the 
lack of audience research as a major flaw in AJE’s business practice, arguing, how 
can they ever hope to catch up to its competitors if they continue to have little idea 
who its audience is’ (Henery, 2010:21). This line of argument takes a pessimistic 
outlook on the chances of AJE making much of an impact on journalistic practices in 
the wider industry.  
 
Secondly, there is the view that, independently of how AJE came to attain this 
relative independence from market forces, the editorial decisions that stem from this 
lack of commercial pressure will make themselves felt in other organisations. This 
argument is based on the assumption that the mere presence of different content 
invariably changes the international news ecology, compelling others to replicate 
some of the practices in order to stay competitive. Put simply, as a new entrant AJE 
alters the composition of the field, pulling it closer to the autonomous spectrum of 
journalistic practices. Whether this suffices to shift significantly the dynamics of the 
field is very much open to question, but it is safe to say that this line of argument 
assumes a much more optimistic stance on the channel’s chances of making its mark 
in the field as a whole.  
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At the heart of AJE’s dilemma of aspiring to challenge the rules of a system while at 
the same wanting to be part of it is the condition that the very factors that enable 
difference, not least AJE’s autonomous position within the field, potentially slow 
down its impact on other broadcasters. As Benson points out, the likelihood of 
practices from any one organisation being adopted by others is very much a function 
of their position in the field. He maintains that ‘those news organizations that are 
able to accumulate both forms of [economic and cultural] capital, such as the New 
York Times or the Wall Street Journal, are precisely those which […] play a crucial 
role in establishing or modifying the dominant “rules” of journalistic practice’ 
(Benson, 2006: 190, emphasis in original).  
 
And while AJE appears to have generous financial resources at its disposal, it 
employs no conventional measures to assess its economic capital vis-à-vis the 
market. To some extend that means that without ratings and audience shares AJE 
cannot transfer this economic capital readily into the symbolic power that economic 
capital wields under conventional market conditions. In other words, the very 
prioritisation of cultural capital that enables some degree of genuine change is what 
potentially reduces the likelihood that rival, ratings-orientated organisations will feel 
that investing in similar practices is becoming a necessity in order to compete for 
audiences. In short, there is a risk that, while AJE may impress fellow journalists, 
any difference it injects into the industry will not be seen as significantly changing 
the economic imperatives that shape journalistic practice elsewhere.  
 
Judging from interviews and conversations, AJE’s top management was very aware 
of this catch-22. Consequently, one manager hinged his optimism concerning AJE’s 
ability to influence other broadcasters on the assumption that the wider field in its 
current make-up could accommodate more diverse practices than it actually did. 
According to this stance, more diverse practices (for example, changes in news 
values) would not by default run contrary to a ratings-oriented culture, but most 
organisations could not afford the risk or the staying power involved in finding out 
whether or not this was viable in the long run. Therefore, in his response to the 
opportunities and liabilities of AJE’s exceptional yet commercially somewhat 
isolated position, he emphasised AJE’s desire to stay compatible with industry 
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practice as a whole while trying to ‘push the envelope’ and see how much difference 
they could carve out within the limitations of the field:  
 
I would hope that we would be far more experimental and innovative […] and 
I think that there would be a positive influence on other broadcasters, because 
a lot of [it] are things that viewers and audiences would welcome. It is not as 
if we are aspiring at Al Jazeera English to create a kind of a programme 
model that is so unique that no one wants to watch it, we are not idiots here, 
but the fact that we are not kind of in these artificial constraints means that we 
can push the envelope more. And I said this when I was at CBC for years, 
there are a lot of things that “conventional” broadcasters can do that can break 
away from the conventional model and do it in a way that isn’t a disincentive 
to audiences for ratings. 
 
Senior manager (personal interview, Doha, 16/03/2009). 
 
Coming from an organisation occupying a different position in the field, he was 
aware that any influence that AJE potentially exerted had to be compatible with the 
economic imperatives of other organisations to translate audience interest into 
income, be it through public money or commercially. His hope for a knock-on effect 
from what AJE was doing was not so much based on idealistic assumptions that 
journalistically ‘worthy’ practices would prevail whatever the circumstances as on 
the assumption that industry had not been as diverse as it could have been under 
current market conditions, because it was inherently averse to risk. In other words, 
‘by marginalizing international coverage and reinforcing public stereotypes – all on 
the [fallible] assumption that the “public doesn’t care” – many news organizations 
have created a “self-fulfilling prophecy”’ (Burman, 2009: 135). Now that a channel 
not under the same financial pressures has been testing the ground, the assumption 
goes, adaptations to existing editorial conventions may very well be realistic.  
 
This links with the second line of argument, which is based on the assumption that 
the mere presence of another broadcaster offering content that others find difficult to 
afford gives those working in other organisations one more argument in favour of the 
kind of foreign affairs formats that Harding (2009) described as being at risk. In 
other words, different content, however financed, changes the rules of the game for 
everybody in that it changes the composition of the field. Given that ‘most foreign 
news-gathering operations have been shrinking, and news outlets have been closing 
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their overseas bureaus’, hope had been expressed that the fact that ‘Al Jazeera 
English has set out on the opposite course [establishing] a field presence [that is] 
exceptional in the world today, perhaps second only to the BBC’ would over time 
‘offer a healthy challenge to American television news outlets, pressuring them to 
invest in their international coverage once again’ (Stroehlein, 20/11/2007).  
 
As a result, the fact that AJE competes journalistically without for the time being 
competing economically in the market may eventually have an effect – however 
slight – on the way success is measured within that particular journalistic field.129 As 
a London-based correspondent put it: 
 
I think other broadcasters who looked [at AJE] thought “yes, we want a bit of 
that”. They always say there are no new ideas in television, but I think [there 
are] and others are nicking it.  
News correspondent (personal interview, London, 01/04/2009). 
 
One indication that this might be taking place to some degree was the way that CNNI 
in particular was perceived to be monitoring, perhaps even emulating, some of AJE’s 
characteristics. There certainly were shared assumptions amongst AJE staff that they 
were having an effect on other networks, as the following interview excerpts 
exemplify: 
 
I think that CNNI feels particularly threatened by AJ and the proof of that, 
although there is no official reason, is that they just pumped an amazing 
amount of money into stepping up their international coverage. 
  
 News producer (personal interview, London, 12/12/2007). 
 
                                                
129 Emirbayer & Johnson have described this effect as what they call a ‘subversion 
strategy […] on the part of the dominated organizations in which their […] aim is to 
transform the system of authority within the field, including potentially the very rules 
of the game according to which it ordinarily functions’ (2008: 11). In the case of AJE 
time will tell whether any such ‘subversion strategy’ – which is probably too strong a 
proposition for a channel so much at pains to balance difference with similarity and 
compatibility – will work in its favour. If it does, however, the field as a whole 
would benefit from a strengthening of cultural vis-à-vis economic capital, long-term 
rather than short-term thinking in terms of foreign affairs coverage, and a less 
asymmetric approach to news from different parts of the world.  
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If you look at what CNN has done since we’ve been on air, it’s a lot. This is 
just observation, but first of all I think it’s done a concerted effort in the way 
it markets itself to bring down the American aesthetic of it. […] It has also 
deployed a lot of journalists in key parts of the world that we cover. So you 
can already see a shift both within organisations and across, if you look at the 
macro level. 
  
 Programmes field producer, (personal interview, Doha, 13/02/2008). 
 
 
Clearly these strong perceptions give an indication that it was thought within the 
organisation that AJE’s position in the field, rather than isolating the channel, helped 
to create the kind of content that others might feel they wanted to emulate in order to 
stay competitive.130 This perception is cautiously supported by observations made by 
Tony Maddox, Executive Vice President and Managing Director of CNNI. Three 
years into AJE’s on-air presence, he was paraphrased as saying that at CNNI they 
were looking at what AJE was doing as closely as they were looking at what 
happened at the BBC and Sky News. The US National Public Radio reported that 
‘among journalists, Al-Jazeera English has won some respect’ and quoted Mr 
Maddox as saying that AJE was ‘serious in intent, and they've invested in a very 
sizable international infrastructure […] so their presence has been felt from an 
editorial point of view’, adding that ‘certainly, within the industry, there's a 
significant awareness of them’ (Folkenflik, 24/02/2009).  
 
Another indication that AJE’s presence might contribute to shifting the dynamics of 
the journalistic subfield of international news broadcasting away from the 
heteronomous pole of the field are reverberations felt in the political field. When US 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton famously expressed the view that on Al Jazeera 
‘you feel like you are getting real news’ – a significant change of tone in the public 
discourse on Al Jazeera in the United States after the channel had been branded by 
the previous administration as a ‘mouthpiece of Osama bin Laden’ (see also Chapter 
5) – she went on to substantiate her claim with reference to AJE’s distance from the 
commercial outlook of US broadcasting: 
                                                
130 It is important to emphasise that these examples remain anecdotal. An 
investigation into changes in editorial priorities in other organisations as a result of 
the emergence of a new player would need to include fieldwork at other broadcasters 
in addition to researching AJE, and as such is well beyond the scope of this study. 
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You may not agree with it, but you feel like you're getting real news around 
the clock instead of a million commercials […] and the kind of stuff that we 
do on our news which, you know, is not particularly informative to us, let 
alone foreigners. 
 
(Hillary Clinton quoted in the Huffington Post, 03/03/2011, emphasis added). 
 
As this quote again corroborates, AJE’s capacity to ‘report back’ is closely tied to its 
relatively autonomous position in the field and to the channel’s ability to prioritise 
cultural capital over commercial considerations.  
 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I discussed some of the journalistic implications of AJE’s relatively 
autonomous position within a weakly autonomous field. In the first part of the 
chapter, I described AJE’s position with regard to the lack of ratings and the 
marginal role of commercial imperatives. I considered how this position came about 
as a side effect of the scale of the launch and the way the channel was funded, rather 
than as a deliberate experiment in autonomous journalism. However, during the first 
years of AJE there were divergent opinions and currents amongst staff on all levels 
of the organisation as to whether this circumstantial exception to the (to varying 
degrees ratings-oriented) rules of the field was limiting AJE’s advancement or could 
and should be harnessed in order to build a more pronounced and distinctive editorial 
profile and potentially to have a greater impact over time. 
 
In the second part of the chapter, I showed that the balance of a more ratings-oriented 
habitus and journalistic autonomy has very practical implications for day-to-day 
editorial decision-making. I explained how habitus reminiscent of ratings-driven 
organisational environments had an impact on AJE even in the absence of ratings, 
while the channel’s relatively autonomous position presented an opportunity for the 
emergence of shared assumptions that went beyond the current conventional wisdom 
in the field. As a dynamic, mediated by individuals within the objective 
circumstances which they find themselves in, this is precisely what limits or pushes 
the degree of difference AJE as an organisation can sustain.  
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Managers’ and journalists’ views in relation to AJE’s relatively autonomous position 
within the field, and the relevance of practice specific to the wider field, underlines 
how perceptions had a huge influence on the development and direction of the 
organisation, particularly in its early stages when there were no precedents to fall 
back on. In this sense, AJE’s relative independence from the economic field was very 
much part of the channel’s organisational culture and influenced shared assumptions 
about the journalistic scope of the organisation. In addition, I explored how AJE’s 
position in the field potentially affects the degree to which changes to journalistic 
practices, including changes in what is being considered newsworthy, feed back into 
the wider journalistic field. On the one hand, the fact that AJE does not trade in the 
dominant currency of the field – audience ratings – makes it less likely that its 
practices will be taken on board by organisations dependent on ratings. On the other 
hand, the mere presence of AJE affects the dynamics of the field, since others over 
time may feel compelled to adjust, however slightly, in order to compete 
journalistically.  
 
What is certain is that AJE’s position runs counter to the heteronomous tendencies 
within an industry under increasing pressure. It is this presence that eventually – 
even when other broadcasters are currently not in a position in which they can afford 
to follow suit – helps to question, and potentially even alter, some of the ‘rules of the 
game’ in international news and current affairs broadcasting. Despite the structural 
limitations of the field, reflexivity is not limited to organisations where habitus from 
one organisational environment happens to clash with a different organisational 
environment. However, while reflexivity may be an inherent and frequently 
underestimated feature of journalistic practice – in particular in academic literature 
with a focus on structure – it does not result by default in change. Turning reflexivity 
into action can be helped or hindered by the professional environments in which 
journalists find themselves. In an environment that specifically called for deviance 
from established routines, a strong sense of journalistic agency in the early years of 
AJE compelled many to make use of the relative autonomy by providing a news 
profile that went against wider tendencies of domestication and increasing 
commercialisation in news and current affairs.  
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
The objective of this thesis has been to answer the questions of 1) how far AJE 
delivered on its declared aim to challenge asymmetric global news flows and 2) how 
this aim was aided or obstructed by the interplay of agential forces and structural 
mechanisms residing within both the organisational field and the wider professional 
field. As such it addressed the lack of studies looking at underlying mechanisms that 
have been identified with regard to foreign news production (Hanusch & Obijiofor, 
2008: 14) and AJE specifically (Figenschou, 2012: 355). The concise answer to the 
two-part research question above is that AJE has delivered on some of its editorial 
aims (for details see Chapter 6 as well as a summary in 9.2.1). Furthermore, the 
constant balancing act of negotiating structural constraints and agential forces (see 
Chapters 7 and 8) means that difference on screen continues to be contingent on the 
ongoing structural facilitation of translating journalistic agency into actual practice.  
 
The main research question cited above was further divided into three areas of 
investigation: a) representational issues, b) questions of journalistic practices, 
journalistic agency and the unequal dispersion of specific kinds of professional 
habitus and c) AJE’s position in the journalistic field as expressed through the 
relative importance attributed to cultural and economic capital. The first area of 
investigation served to describe AJE’s news content in relation to equivalent 
programmes on BBCW as a ‘snapshot’ of the effects of those causal powers which 
happened to be activated at that particular time and in that particular context. The 
second and third areas of investigation served to explore the balances of structure and 
agency that made certain editorial choices more likely than others. As Sakr (2007: 
117) points out with regard to news flows debate and Al Jazeera, ‘for the contra-flow 
concept to have explanatory value in respect of a phenomenon like Al-Jazeera, it has 
to refer to changing power relations in the production of media messages and not just 
superficial changes in the geography of media flows (emphasis added)’. As I have 
argued, looking into news content, structural mechanisms and journalistic practices 
allowed me to examine macro-level debates around news flows on the level of AJE 
as an individual organisation.  
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Furthermore, the critical realist position advanced in this thesis helped to underscore 
the way in which acknowledging the constructed nature of social aspects of reality – 
a sine-qua-non in the discipline of media studies, which is concerned with analysing 
discursively constructed objects and the way they relate to society – does not exclude 
a realist ontological and epistemological position. Rather, as I argued in line with 
Elder-Vass (2012a), a critical realist position would benefit (certain kinds of) 
constructivist accounts. And conversely, only a realist approach that also 
acknowledges the constructed nature of social aspects of reality, as critical realism 
does, is apt to analyse social phenomena. Again, analysing some of the data through 
the lens of Bourdieu’s field theory and Archer’s account of agency elucidates this 
position. With regard to Bourdieu’s structural constructivism, the interplay of 
objective structures and what he called ‘the social genesis […] of the patterns of 
perception’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 123) plays out in the way that the habitus is 
simultaneously constitutive of socially constructed ‘patterns of perception’ and also 
reminiscent of objective structures specific to the field it emerged from. Archer’s 
work, meanwhile, is explicitly based on a critical realist ontology that recognises 
reflexivity as an inherent causal power of human individuals with a mediating 
function between personal projects and objective enablements and constraints. In 
short, as I have argued, relating data to an external reality and accepting that certain 
aspects of this reality are concept-dependent and have constituting as well as 
constitutive functions are not mutually exclusive positions. With regard to media 
studies this opens up the possibility of reconciling the constructivist leanings of this 
academic (sub)field with realist traditions – without compromising the centrality of 
social construction for the study of media and communication. 
 
In the following I shall summarise the main empirical findings and discuss how the 
theoretical framework, designed to answer the questions above, contributes to the 
theory of news flows. First, however, I shall reflect on methodological issues in 
terms of the merits of combining quantitative and qualitative research, the 
development of original variables for the content analysis, the analytical status of the 
interview data and the implications of theoretical choices for the relation between 
media scholars and journalists.  
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9.1 Reflection on Research Design and Multi-Method Approach 
 
In the field of research on news, several authors have highlighted the need for a 
multi-method approach in order to capture both underlying mechanisms and 
examples of potential effects (Hanusch, 2008; Lavie & Lehman-Wilzig, 2005). In the 
case of this study, content analysis served to identify degrees of differences and 
similarities between the news content of AJE and BBCW – and therefore some of the 
potential manifestations of the structural tension between AJE’s twin aims (of being 
on a par professionally with established Western networks while also providing 
editorial difference). While in-depth interviews conducted in London, Doha and 
Kuala Lumpur enabled an investigation of some of the underlying mechanisms that 
influence editorial decision-making. Combined, these two methods add to an 
understanding of the implications of AJE’s position within the journalistic (sub)field 
of international news broadcasting for the degree of difference that journalists 
working at the channel are able to carve out in an interplay of routines and 
reflexivity.  
 
While the potential empirical merits seem relatively clear, the ontological issues that 
come with combining quantitative content analysis and qualitative research 
interviewing pose a challenge – not least because one is geared towards observable 
patterns and the other towards teasing out underlying mechanisms, which may or 
may not result in observable patterns. In this particular sense, it is precisely this 
challenge that also triggered contestations between empirically-minded and macro-
theory-oriented scholars in the heyday of theories of media and cultural imperialism 
(see 2.2.3). What I have suggested in this thesis is that a critical realist approach 
offers a way of bridging these two perspectives: approaches with empirical and 
theoretical emphases as well as quantitative and qualitative methodological 
approaches. Here, the concept of a stratified ontology that analytically distinguishes 
between the level of observable phenomena (the realm of the empirical) and the level 
of phenomena that may or may not be rendered observable (the realm of the actual) – 
all part of one reality – helps to understand and theorise what appears common-
sensical but might otherwise have been difficult to combine on ontological grounds: 
namely that observing empirical manifestations and theorising about their potential 
causes are not mutually exclusive research options.  
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9.1.1 Comparing Content in Relation to AJE’s Remit  
 
In terms of content analysis, in addition to including variables not featured in 
previous research on AJE, I improved the comparability of existing content analyses 
(which, like the present case, are based on a period of time rather than on specific 
events) by combining a greater range of variables, as seen in Figenschou’s work on 
AJE (2010a) with a comparative approach, as applied by Painter (2008). Variables 
not previously applied in comparative content analysis of a sample of AJE coverage 
based on time (rather than specific events) included, for example, the variable of the 
‘geo-cultural background’ of protagonists. This was challenging methodologically, 
because any empirically workable delineation of the individual values for the 
variable (in this case ‘non-Western background’ and ‘Western background’) were 
bound to be somewhat superficial.  
 
However, given AJE’s remit I felt it necessary to include this variable in the analysis, 
in the least reductive way possible. To acknowledge the potential lack of fit between 
this crude distinction and the complex reality of people’s backgrounds, I decided to 
base my decision on the specific role or function that actors came to represent in the 
instant and context of the particular news item, rather than claiming to have captured 
actual aspects of their off-screen identity.  Incidentally, this put me as a researcher in 
the same position as any other viewer who happens not to personally know the 
people depicted. As the unambiguous results have shown, it apparently continues to 
be necessary to face this challenge in order to expose persistent inequalities in 
international news.  
 
Much less challenging from a qualitative standpoint, but all the more time-intensive, 
was my decision to compare the proportion of news items with the proportion of 
airtime in relation to any given variable. This double coding for time and number of 
items, however, engendered some surprising results and, far from being a futile 
exercise, did much to help generate a more calibrated analysis than would otherwise 
have been possible.  
 
Furthermore, codes for the analysis were developed in relation both to the remit of 
AJE (as outlined in the channel’s editorial profile on the official website) and to the 
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interpretations thereof by AJE staff as these began to emerge from the interview data. 
This was in line with Sayer’s observation (1992: 193) that the analytical value of 
quantitative research needs to be augmented by combining it with ‘realist appraisals 
based on qualitative structural analysis (emphasis added)’. The resulting analysis 
then served as a subtext to the qualitative discussion by providing a tentative 
understanding of degrees of similarities and differences between AJE and BBCW.  
 
 
9.1.2 Interviewing Journalists about their Work 
 
In terms of the interview data (in the form of transcripts of 28 in-depth interviews 
conducted in London, Doha and Kuala Lumpur), the objective of this study was to 
tease out individual motivations of journalists and causal powers both of the 
organisation of AJE and of social entities specific to the wider field. This in turn 
required taking into account the double hermeneutic (Sayer, 2000: 17) of a 
‘transitive’ or ‘thought object’ (interview talk) that at least in part, while also 
addressing extra-discursive elements of AJE, referred to other thought objects (such 
as editorial concepts or the organisational culture of AJE). In line with the critical 
realist framework of this thesis, the thought object of interview talk was not 
conflated with the thought object that was the content or subject of that talk – either 
by taking statements in interviews as straightforward ‘evidence’ of external elements 
of reality or by reducing the issues discussed to their textual representation. Rather, a 
reciprocal relationship between the discussion and the thought objects it referred to 
was assumed in that the latter limits what can be meaningfully said about it, while 
also being susceptible to change through discourse itself.  
 
Another point emerging from this thesis is that the relationship between journalists 
and academics could benefit from theoretical frameworks that acknowledge 
journalistic agency to a greater degree than many news sociologists have been 
willing to concede in the past.131 This is not to negate the fact that both professions 
                                                
131 For calls for a greater appreciation of journalistic agency, see also Dickinson 
(2007), Dickinson & Bigi (2009), Dickinson, Matthews & Saltzis (2013). 
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have accumulated (often justified) reasons for mistrusting the other.132 Rather, the 
point I am making is that appreciating agency as a causal power of human beings – 
and thereby moving away from a position that largely assigns the ability to recognise 
the pull of hegemonic social forces to the realm of social science – not only helps to 
conceptualise change in a more convincing fashion, but also puts journalists (some of 
whom are well aware of the structural and ideological limitations they face) in a 
position that allows them to interact with media scholars in a way that is potentially 
more productive for the respective objectives of both professional fields.   
 
 
9.2 Key Empirical Findings 
 
In the following I shall outline some of the main empirical findings as they emerged 
from the quantitative and qualitative analyses. These include the identification of 
areas of similarity and areas of difference in AJE’s news content in relation to its  
remit and in comparison with BBCW News. As shown in Chapter 6, AJE’s wide-
ranging and complex remit has been subject to debate within the organisation and – 
in the sample analysed for the purpose of this thesis – this remit has been reflected 
decisively in some areas while remaining relatively neglected in others. As shown in 
Chapter 7, another key element of this thesis is to highlight the link between 
(organisational space for) journalistic agency and AJE’s remit (as challenging the 
dominant habitus of the field by definition requires reflexive awareness of existing 
limitations.)  
 
However, the activation of journalistic agency depends on an interplay between a 
desire to be different and a desire to be on a par with leading ‘mainstream’ news 
organisations, which encouraged the perpetuation of pre-existing professional habitus 
characteristic of the wider field. These two aspects were by no means mutually 
exclusive, but rather engaged in constant competition which produced an ongoing 
                                                
132 Academics tend to be weary of the misrepresentations that frequently stem from 
popularised and highly selective extracts of their work. While journalists tend to feel 
patronised by accusations of unwittingly contributing to the perpetuation of 
imbalances inherent in the elite-oriented and routinised character of news production 
practices – and of misjudging their own role in it. 
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state of (re)negotiating degrees of similarity and difference with regard to AJE’s 
remit. As I have argued throughout the thesis, this dialectic of similarity and 
difference became a core characteristic of AJE itself, particular during the channel’s 
early years.  
 
Lastly, the room for (editorial) manoeuvre implied in this dialectic of similarity and 
difference would not have been possible without AJE’s unusual position within the 
journalistic subfield of international English-language news broadcasting. Notably, 
the opportunity to prioritise cultural capital over economic capital, at least in some 
areas of journalistic production, was no doubt conducive to the journalistic freedom 
that helped to alter some of the dominant news values of the field, including, for 
example, the geo-politically informed hierarchy of place employed across the field.  
 
 
9.2.1 Degrees of Difference on Screen 
 
By its own official account, AJE set out to ‘challenge established perceptions’ (AJE 
Website: Corporate Profile, 04/09/2008). The corporate profile does not elaborate 
what such ‘established perceptions’ entail in any detail. For the purpose of this thesis, 
then, I looked into descriptions of recurring themes as identified in academic 
research into news flows (see Chapter 2.4). This includes, for example, a geo-
politically influenced news hierarchy (Miller, 2007; Franks, 2004; Chang, 1998), a 
gendered selection of news sources in a traditionally male-dominated professional 
field (Rosenstiel & Mitchell, 2005; Lavie & Lehman-Wilzig, 2005), a focus on 
disasters and conflict rather than on political processes in particular when it comes to 
news from the global South and a general disposition to rely on official sources 
(Hafez, 1999; Kalyango, 2011; Golan & Wanta, 2003). As shown in Chapter 6, these 
factors broadly correspond with some of the interpretations of AJE staff of what it 
means to challenge ‘established perceptions’, indicating a general awareness of the 
imbalances embedded within their professional field.  
 
Crucially, when analysing AJE’s content in comparison with that of BBCW news 
programmes, I found that some ‘established perceptions’ had been successfully and 
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vigorously challenged, while others had been left almost entirely intact or even 
become more pronounced on AJE than on BBCW News. In addition, some news 
factors were superficially countered, but when cross-referenced were found to 
correlate with other variables in ways that reflected longstanding asymmetries in the 
depiction of the global South.  
 
More specifically, I found that AJE delivered on its promise to cover the global 
South more extensively. One main finding with regard to AJE’s proportion of news 
from the global South was that it was much less affected by the occurrence of large-
scale news events (such as, for example, the 60th anniversary of India’s independence 
or natural disasters in Asia) than were the individual news programmes on BBCW. 
For the qualitative empirical chapters this result in particular raised the question of 
how the primary and professional habitus of AJE staff that had been generated in 
various areas of the global South potentially affected editorial sensitivity towards 
stories from under-reported regions that had not yet assumed breaking news status on 
other channels. In addition, AJE’s focus on the global South was reflected within the 
structures of its news programmes in terms of running order, of time allocated to 
items from the global South as opposed to items from the global North, and of the 
number of stories not carried on other networks. 
 
The channel also delivered on its other core promise to provide a grassroots 
perspective on news events and to be a ‘voice for the voiceless’. However, this 
aspect of AJE’s remit found its expression in some regards more than in others. For 
example, non-Western voices, as well as people speaking in their capacity as 
‘ordinary citizens’, were represented to a significantly greater degree than on BBCW, 
while the prevalence of official statements and gender inequalities prevailing in the 
wider field were left largely untouched by AJE’s ambition to provide a platform for 
those under-represented in mainstream news media. In short, AJE’s aim of re-
dressing geo-political inequalities was more consistently evident in its emphasis on 
stories from the global South than with regard to components of the channel’s remit 
that did not have a geographical aspect.  
 
Particularly strong correlations in AJE’s news coverage were found when cross-
referencing geo-cultural and socio-political backgrounds of protagonists (where a 
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majority of Western protagonists represented authorities and industry, while a 
majority of non-Western protagonists represented victims of violence or disasters, 
‘ordinary people’ or oppositional voices); cross-referencing gender with the 
backgrounds of reporters (where, on AJE, a majority of non-Western reporters were 
women, while reporters with Western backgrounds turned out to be almost 
exclusively male); and cross-referencing gender with socio-political backgrounds of 
protagonists (where on AJE a unambiguous 97% of protagonists speaking in their 
capacity as representatives of authorities, industry or other positions of political or 
economic power were men). These correlations appeared to be specific to AJE as 
they were not reflected with the same intensity in the broadcasts of BBCW News.  
 
It could be argued that such imbalances might well represent unequal realities on the 
ground, in which case the discrepancies between AJE and BBCW could arguably be 
amplified by AJE’s focus on countries lacking long traditions or politically enforced 
mechanisms of social or gender equality. However, I would argue that, in as far as 
AJE journalists perceived the remit of the channel to involve giving equal access to 
those not usually heard or seen, the remit does entail a degree of deliberate disregard 
for inequalities on the ground by giving disproportionate access to those generally 
under-represented in the public realm.  
 
 
9.2.2 Employing Difference, Professional Habitus and Agency  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the transfer of specific notions of professionalism has 
been identified as an inherent part of the dominance of Western organisations in 
international media (Golding, 1977). Challenges to this dominance included 
approaches to journalism that questioned the ‘givenness’ of professional values like 
objectivity, such as development and peace journalism. Notably, as reiterated by 
interviewees cited in Chapter 7, despite the channel’s self-declared counter-
hegemonic remit, it was never in question for AJE’s leadership that the aim was not 
to contest, but to emulate, the brand of professionalism practiced by the dominant 
organisations in the field of news broadcasting. It became clear very early in the 
channel’s development that AJE did not want to radically alter the presuppositions 
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upon which the field of international English-language news broadcasting is based. 
Rather, it was concerned with a struggle to alter some of the rules within this 
journalistic (sub)field. Being similar in terms of professional standards allowed the 
channel to establish areas of disagreement, for example in relation to the prominence 
given to stories from developing countries.  
 
As I argued in Chapter 7, this decision enabled AJE to create a level playing field on 
the basis of which any difference the channel could carve out had a chance of having 
a potentially greater impact on the field as a whole, but it came at the price of having 
to make do with the limitation of the field in terms of the unequal (Western-centric) 
global dispersion of specific professional habitus. In addition, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 7, professional habitus that had been cultivated in the very segments of the 
field that AJE set out to challenge was perceived by some AJE journalists as a cause 
of similarities (some intentional, some inadvertent) between AJE and its Western-
based rivals. Effects of this pull towards more conventional news values materialised 
in linguistic details and editorial perspectives at odds with AJE’s remit, examples of 
which can be seen in the varying degrees of difference and similarity described in 
Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
However, at the same time, AJE did succeed, if perhaps not in employing local staff 
from the global South throughout the hierarchy of the organisation in proportion to 
the ambitions set out in its remit, then arguably in hiring a substantially greater 
overall proportion of local staff from the South than comparable news channels. This 
was perceived by staff as a core characteristic of the channel which helped editorial 
teams to operationalise AJE’s remit by serving as a corrective to the liability to resort 
to ‘default’ positions reminiscent of Western perspectives on international events. 
Moreover, primary and professional habitus, while endowed with causal powers and 
liabilities, do not determine news output. As Jensen (2002: 256) stresses, ‘media 
practitioners […] bring intentions into mediated communication. Hence, it becomes 
necessary to ask specifically how […] their motivated actions are coordinated, and 
become causes’ (emphasis in original). In other words, journalistic agency has the 
causal power to partially counteract the effects of habitus. And the fact that AJE was 
launched as a counter-hegemonic project means that it arguably from the beginning 
attracted in particular those journalists whose personal motivations were already 
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aligned with the demands of reflexively challenging ‘established perceptions’ within 
their profession.  
 
In particular, two modes of agency as identified by Archer were especially 
widespread amongst the AJE staff whom I interviewed for this thesis: 1) ‘meta-
reflexives’, who are characterised by Archer as being idealistically driven and basing 
their ‘occupational projects’ on value-commitments (Archer, 2007: 233) and 2) 
‘autonomous reflexives’, who largely depend on their own judgement and display a 
strategic attitude towards professional choices (Archer, 2007: 214). Both types of 
reflexives, while not immune to purposely and/or unwittingly following routines, are 
arguably less prone than others to complying with the dominant habitus of a given 
field as a default reaction to adapting to a new environment. What the case of AJE 
therefore brought to light was that reflexivity in journalism is not as marginal to 
news production as some news studies focussing on structural limitations would have 
it, but that, in order for dispositions towards certain modes of reflexivity to become 
effective, there needs to be a platform which provides the organisational breathing 
space in which to exercise these powers. To summarise, the concept of habitus 
fundamentally underlines the relevance of questions of practice for the study of news 
flows. The dissemination of specific professional values has to be acknowledged as 
historically Western, but the degree to which these perpetuate the Western-centric 
imbalances of the field is contingent on a range of other factors, including the 
motivations of AJE staff both for getting involved in the first place and for achieving 
difference on screen in their day-to-day work.  
 
 
9.2.3 The Cost of Difference and AJE’s Position in the Field   
 
As another of Bourdieu’s core concepts, the notion of capital complements the focus 
on habitus and agency. Essentially, it underlines the economic dimension of news 
flows in that it allows to demonstrate how heteronomous tendencies in the 
professional field affect even a relatively autonomous organisation like AJE to the 
degree that its staff support degrees of similarity in order to be considered on a par 
with the dominant players in the field. At the same time, the concept of capital helps 
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to explain the substantial differences found in AJE’s news content in Chapter 6, 
because it illuminates how AJE’s position in the field provides AJE staff with the 
freedom to prioritise cultural over economic capital in ways arguably not feasible at 
other large-scale international English-language news broadcasters.  
 
As a structural characteristic of the channel, AJE’s relatively autonomous position 
found its expression in the comparatively marginal role of a commercial rationale 
and the fact that AJE operated without providing ratings statistics as a minute-by-
minute measure of success incorporated into daily decision-making processes. This 
difference immediately distinguished AJE from its competitors. Interviewees 
variously described this phenomenon as causing a lack of orientation and focus 
(compared with their previous experiences at other channels) and/or as a tremendous 
opportunity to put journalism first and to experiment with content not produced by 
other organisations. To the degree that the latter perception ‘won out’, AJE’s position 
in the field has been a critical factor in creating the level of journalistic autonomy 
essential to producing genuine difference on screen. The process of developing a 
shared imagination and shared assumptions about what the channel could look like 
had an immense influence on the degree of difference AJE journalists could carve 
out within the field. It also exemplifies the precariousness and fluidity of a process 
that had been shaped, but not determined, by the channel’s extraordinary freedom 
from commercial pressures and by a desire to be at the same time fundamentally 
different yet similar enough to be compared with the dominant international players 
in the industry.  
 
As I argued earlier, AJE’s potential to prioritise cultural capital does not suggest that 
the channel (or other journalistic endeavours with a remit to challenge dominant 
practices) by definition cannot be self-sufficient as a direct result of a counter-
intuitive editorial remit. It does mean, however, that any channel attempting to be 
both different from the currently dominant make-up of the field as well as 
economically successful (at some stage), requires a great deal of staying power in 
order to try and build audiences over a potentially very long period of time by virtue 
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of its distinctiveness (with uncertain prospects of success).133 The fact that AJE has 
the capacity to go down that road offers a rare example within the current global 
economic climate. By virtue of the inter-related nature of the industry, this throws 
into sharp relief not merely intra-organisational matters concerning AJE, but also 
dynamics and margins of difference within the wider field.   
 
 
9.3 Contribution of Empirical Findings to Theory 
 
I shall argue that, in the case of researching AJE, the apparent association of the 
channel’s remit with debates on unequal news flows triggered two divergent 
conceptual needs. The pull of the existing (asymmetric) conditions of the field (and 
the dominant form of field-specific habitus associated with it) makes it necessary to 
conceptualise potential causes of similarity on screen across organisations. While the 
possibility of breaking the mould and altering at least certain aspects of journalistic 
practice makes it necessary to conceptualise potential causes of difference on screen. 
In order to capture both elements and thus to avoid applying a theoretical framework 
that preconceives AJE’s practices and output either as ‘more of the same’ or as 
radically different, the theoretical framework of this thesis needed to reflect both 
elements.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis the first need is met by applying Bourdieu’s field 
theory to the empirical context of AJE. The second theoretical need is met by 
Archer’s theoretical treatment of the concept of agency. Combined, these two 
approaches serve to complement each other’s emphases on different aspects of 
practice and to capture the dialectic of similarity and difference that came to 
                                                
133 This phenomenon is not unique to AJE’s situation. Historically, CNN, today a 
variously successful part of mainstream news, was once considered ‘revolutionary’ 
(Hirschorn, 02/04/2010) and to be operating ‘against the odds’ (McDowall, 2012: 16) 
(albeit in a much less crowded market space). Despite its different remit, the 
following quote taken from a manual given to CNN newcomers in the early 1980s 
could just as well have been from a manual given to AJE newcomers in 2006: ‘We 
are creating an alternative to the [existing] networks. […] We’ll be putting on news 
when other networks are offering entertainment. We’ll be the alternative for millions 
of viewers. If we attract them and inform them, if we do our job, we will be 
successful. And television will never be the same’ (McDowall, 2012: 11).  
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characterise the organisational environment of AJE. As outlined in Chapter 3, the 
ontological basis on the grounds of which the two approaches can be combined is 
critical realism. While Archer’s work has contributed in important ways to critical 
realist literature, Bourdieu’s framework fits critical realist approaches in that it 
focuses on ‘invisible structures and their effects’ and ‘explanatory mechanisms’ 
(Bourdieu, 1998b: 39) and, as I have argued (see Chapter 3.5.1), is ontologically 
flexible enough to be compatible with a critical realist ontology. The stratified 
ontology of critical realism has precisely the purpose of describing as real 
mechanisms that escape purely empirical observation (because they exist whether or 
not they are activated and therefore become observable), but because of their 
dependence on objective structures cannot be described in constructivist terms either. 
There has been disagreement as to whether or not the two different emphases (on 
structure and agency respectively) present in Bourdieu’s and Archer’s works are 
compatible. However, as I have outlined in Chapter 3, I agree with and follow 
accounts that call for their combination on empirical grounds (Sayer, 2009) and 
demonstrate on what ontological basis they can be combined (Elder-Vass, 2007). 
 
 
9.3.1 Theorising Asymmetric News Flows through Field Theory 
 
By the time the English-language channel launched, the Al Jazeera brand had already 
‘become synonymous with ambitious media innovation on behalf of the global 
South’ (Sakr, 2007: 118). As I have argued, AJE therefore from the outset linked its 
objectives to debates on asymmetric news flows. News flows, however, have often 
been investigated with regard to the macro level of political economy or limited to 
empirical case studies that looked at particular phenomena and, while citing macro 
theory, refrained from theorising the links to wider structural issues. In this thesis I 
addressed this gap by presenting a way of conceptualising some of the wider 
structural issues at stake on the level of journalistic practices. Here, I found that 
Bourdieu’s relational theory helped to span empirically grounded research and 
overarching news flows debates by teasing out links between, on the one hand, 
concrete practices within one (sub)field (in this case the organisational field of AJE) 
and, on the other hand, their influences from and potential effects on fields of which 
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they are part due to the stratified nature of fields  (in this case the professional field 
of international English-language news broadcasting). 
 
As the interview data presented in Chapters 7 and 8 has shown, Bourdieu’s concepts 
of field, habitus and capital are well suited to incorporating relational aspects of 
media flows into the analysis of particular organisations, professions or other 
journalistic sub-fields. In other words, as I have argued, questions of ‘reporting back’ 
have to take into account the fact that, even under near ideal circumstances (such as 
an organisational environment with an editorial remit explicitly designed to address 
inequalities in international news and the near lack of commercial pressures), the 
interconnectedness of organisations through indirect abstract relations (which can be 
made explicit through Bourdieu’s concepts of field, habitus and capital) means that 
relative difference in one concrete empirical case study is always subject to relatively 
durable structures that go beyond the organisational field. This is the case not least 
because, in order to have any significant impact on the field and therefore a chance to 
alter imbalances inherent in the dominant field-specific professional habitus, a 
relatively new organisation like AJE needs to be sufficiently similar to be taken 
seriously as competition and sufficiently successful for others to emulate any new 
practices it may have succeeded in establishing.  
 
As the data presented in this thesis has shown, the issue of asymmetric international 
news flows goes beyond matters of journalists’ good intentions or asymmetric story 
selection processes entrenched in professional routines. The causal powers of 
individual people and individual organisations are limited by the causal powers of 
wider structures, which do not just go away even where, as in the case of AJE, an 
organisation throws considerable amounts of capital (economic and cultural) at the 
problem. However, the relation between structures and practices is not a 
straightforward one (Elder-Vass, 2012b). Structures can change over time as 
practices become increasingly aligned with the project of ‘reporting back’. The 
mechanisms by which this happens were the subject of the other element of my 
theoretical framework: a focus on the causal powers of agency as a mediating factor 
between habitus and actual practices.  
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9.3.2 Theorising ‘Contra-flows’ through Accounts of Agency 
 
Notwithstanding structural constraints, the acknowledgment of increasingly complex 
media flows and contra-flows bears particular relevance with regard to AJE. Again, 
contra-flows have been construed in terms of exports to the North of media produced 
in the South. The simple fact that AJE as an organisation is physically based in the 
global South while being received across the world, including in increasingly 
sizeable sways of the global North, means that it qualifies in this basic sense as 
contra-flow. However, if the question is whether AJE qualifies as a contra-flow with 
counter-hegemonic tendencies, as suggested in the channel’s editorial policy and 
remit (see also 2.2.4), contra-flow becomes a question of countering dominant 
representations of the world. As I have argued, in this sense, counter-hegemonic 
contra-flow is not a mere matter of directionality, but necessarily also concerns the 
presence of an organisational environment within which the causal powers of 
individuals to change geo-politically uneven representations in news have a chance 
to play out (in the realm of the actual) by virtue of being shielded from some of the 
causal powers of structural constraints embedded within the professional field. This 
ability to encourage agency then becomes an emergent causal power of the 
organisation itself – emergent ‘in the sense that [causal powers] are powers that 
would not exist if the parts concerned were not organised into a certain type of 
whole’ (Elder-Vass, 2012a: 10). As a causal power, it ‘can be explained by learning 
the mechanisms’ that produce it, but – and this is what I am arguing in this thesis – 
these do not ‘cease to be a power of the whole thing’ (Elder-Vass, 2012a: 11, 
emphasis in original).  
 
This point is crucial because it contravenes approaches that lay their focus on 
identifying one or several distinct ‘core capabilities’ that ‘distinguish a company 
from its competitors and make it unique’ because it is the characteristic of a core 
capability that it ‘cannot be easily or readily copied’ (Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007: 43). 
In other words, the approach applied in this thesis contravenes views that 
acknowledge difference merely in terms of unique constitutive parts of the 
organisation and not in terms of unique constellations of its constituent parts (which 
may or may not themselves be unique) as being generative of emergent causal 
powers. In their organisational study of AJA, Zayani and Sahraoui use the notion of 
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core capabilities as a starting point, but they conclude from their research that ‘Al 
Jazeera falls short of a distinctive and significant core capability that brands it’ 
(2007: 48). Therefore, they too argue ultimately that Al Jazeera’s distinctiveness 
rests with a combination of non-exclusive ‘attributes’, which ‘can arguably thrive 
only within a certain configuration of these concepts’ (48, emphasis added), but they 
do not proceed to explore potential ontological implications of this claim. What the 
critical realist framework proposed in this study allows to do is to underpin this 
assumption with a cohesive ontological foundation.   
 
Furthermore, Archer’s critical realist approach to agency allows agency to be 
acknowledged as a causal power that is an inherent feature of human action. The way 
this links to Bourdieu’s theory is that the ‘activation’ of this causal power is not a 
matter of course, but contingent on circumstances that may obstruct or enable its 
efficacy. As the case of AJE shows, this is particularly relevant to the study of news 
flows because it highlights the fact that there is an ambition amongst many 
journalists to alter practices reminiscent of wider global power imbalances. While at 
the same time (often for very practical reasons) the realisation of this ambition is at 
least in part contingent on the presence of journalistic environments, be it in the form 
of individual organisations or other structures, that facilitate the activation of this 
particular kind of journalistic agency. This is indispensible for individual reflexive 
powers to bear results in the domain of the actual in the shape of practices (as 
described in Chapter 7 and 8) and potentially in the domain of the empirical – in this 
case, on screen (see also Chapter 6). 
 
9.4 Discussion and Outlook 
 
AJE continues to evolve at a rapid pace. The channel has expanded its reach from an 
initial 80 million to more than 260 million households (written answer to information 
request from AJE Media Relations Office, May 2013). In its sixth year at the time of 
writing, AJE has seen several staff shake-ups across the organisational hierarchy, 
three different Managing Directors and the same number of Director Generals at the 
network level (see also footnote 136). Many of the more recent developments could 
not be included here. This does not mean that the lessons learned from analysing 
AJE’s formative years do not continue to carry relevant implications for the channel 
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going forward – particularly since many of the structural liabilities described in this 
thesis persist and being aware of them helps to activate those causal powers of the 
organisation that might mitigate their effects. It does mean, however, that, 
empirically speaking, there is a steady flow of topics and questions for further 
research (which in turn may encourage the deployment of new theoretical angles).  
 
 
9.4.1 Organisational Change and Suggestions for Further Research  
 
One such question for further research is an analysis of AJE’s distinct focus on 
programming, either on its own or by looking at the qualitative nuances in the 
coverage of a given region or country across news and current affairs. I would argue 
that this would be a particularly relevant field of enquiry, because of the greater 
conceptual leeway programming affords in relation to the rigidity news formats. 
Regrettably, I found that such a focus was beyond the scope of this study. Not least 
given the methodological difficulties in comparing current affairs programmes of 
different broadcasters due to greater dissonances in their formats and in the issues 
addressed, programming has remained under-researched with regard to AJE. 
Addressing this gap empirically and on a theoretical level through research devoted 
to programming has the potential to usefully complement the present focus on news 
in assessing relative difference in international television with regard to AJE.   
 
Another suggestion for further research stems from the continuing change in Qatar’s 
role in the world. AJE journalists’ mantra of not being influenced by Qatar because 
the small Gulf state ‘is of little interest to the world’, and by implication to an 
international news channel (personal interview, Doha, 10/02/2008), arguably 
becomes increasingly difficult to uphold with Qatar’s progressively hands-on foreign 
policy, not least in terms of the Gulf state’s support for various factions during and 
after the Arab revolutions. Not reporting the Emirate’s rising regional influence is 
arguably less of an option than it was just a few years ago. AJE’s ability to critically 
assess domestic Qatari affairs will also be put to the test when international attention 
focuses on the Emirate as the host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, which at the time of 
writing already prompted renewed interest in Qatar’s human rights record in relation 
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to trafficking and working conditions for guest workers (see also 5.2). In addition, 
journalists need to re-emphasise their position vis-à-vis both Qatar’s new political 
leadership134 and changing managers at the top of AJN.135 Again, these developments 
occurred after the empirical data for this thesis had been generated and it is for future 
studies to assess whether or not changes in the composition of the political field 
potentially affect issues of self-censorship or even state interference at AJE. As I 
mentioned earlier, due to the structural liability built into what is essentially a state 
broadcaster behaving like a public-service broadcaster, this question will stay with 
the channel and requires continuous assessment.  
 
With regard to the organisation of AJE itself, one of the most substantial changes, 
occurring after the main period analysed for this thesis, has been the end of AJE’s 
trademark structure of ‘following the sun’, which was characterised by broadcasting 
in turn from Kuala Lumpur, Doha, London and Washington. This structure was 
credited with adding a uniquely international flavour to AJE’s news, since the same 
feed was broadcast across the world and had a distinct regional perspective 
depending on the time of the day. As such, this structure was seen as contributing to 
the channel’s aim of being ‘truly cosmopolitan’, ‘more international’ than its 
competitors (Ackerman, 01/05/2006) and ‘a channel without a nationality’ (Lindsey 
Oliver in Coultan, 01/04/2006). As of early 2011, AJE started to broadcast full time 
out of Doha. For future research it would be interesting to compare the regional focus 
                                                
134 In a statement in June 2013 Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani – who had founded 
Al Jazeera in 1996 and whose nearly two-decade rule transformed the Gulf state’s 
position in global politics – announced the peaceful transfer of power to his son, 
Sheik Tamim bin Hamid Al Thani. 
 
135 After the resignation in September 2011 of the longstanding Director General of 
the network, Wadah Khanfar – who has widely been credited with ‘revolutionising 
the Arab media landscape’ (Black, 20/09/2011) – the post was re-staffed by a 
member of the ruling dynasty, Qatargas executive Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al 
Thani. In a discussion with Jon Snow at the Frontline Club in London on 18th 
January 2012, Khanfar reiterated his confidence that Al Jazeera would be able to 
sustain its editorial independence under a Director General who does not come from 
the field of journalism and is linked through family ties with the government. In July 
2013, Sheik Ahmed bin Jassim Al Thani resigned to join the government of the new 
Emir, Sheik Tamim bin Hamid Al Thani (see footnote 135), as Minister of Economy 
and Trade. At the time of writing, Mostefa Souag, previously Director of News at 
AJA, serves as acting Director General of the network.  
  285 
in AJE’s news programmes before and after this restructuring of offices in order to 
evaluate the impact of organisational structural change on content.  
 
In a written answer to my question about the reasoning behind these changes, AJE’s  
Media Relations office stated that ‘these broadcast studios were changed so that we 
are able to expand out newsgathering presence in other areas’ (Media Relations, 
personal communication, May 2013). Where those ‘other areas’ were located became 
apparent when Al Jazeera announced early in 2013 that it had bought the US channel 
Current TV136 – co-founded by former US Vice-President Al Gore – in order to 
launch a new channel under the Al Jazeera Network called Al Jazeera America (or 
AJAM).137 Buying Current TV was the latest and boldest move in a series of 
attempts to obtain a foothold in the notoriously competitive US market.138 Although 
some at Al Jazeera embraced the channel’s remit of focussing on the South to the 
extent of holding the view that the US market was ‘not crucial’ to their success 
(Waller, 14/11/2006), many observers regarded the penetration of the largest 
English-speaking market as ‘a key factor in the success or failure of Al-Jazeera 
International is distribution’ (Business Day, 21/02/2006). 
 
Reports that AJAM will have a distinctively domestic agenda (Stelter, 26/05/2013) 
create a whole new set of future research questions. (How) will this new focus on the 
United States affect AJE (where journalists had already felt the pressures of 
restructuring) as the only international English-language outfit of AJN in the 
medium to long term? Given the downsizing of AJE’s Kuala Lumpur office and the 
                                                
136 Al Jazeera allegedly paid $500 Million for the channel, a sum that has not been 
confirmed by the network.  
 
137 In addition, at the end of the 7th Al Jazeera Forum held in Doha in March 2013, 
plans were announced for the launch of Al Jazeera UK (AJUK) and Al Jazeera 
France, although at the time of writing no further details or time-frames have 
emerged.  
 
138 In the past, image problems combined with a reputation for straightforward hard 
news made distribution an even more difficult undertaking than it would have been 
in an already crowded market under the best conditions (Macleod & Walt, 
27/06/2005; Stroehlein, 20/11/2007; Manly, 26/03/2006). More than two and a half 
years after its launch the channel had still not been carried by any of the major cable 
or satellite operators in the US and was only distributed there by ‘two tiny cable 
systems in Vermont and Ohio’ (Farhi, 29/04/2009). 
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network’s ambitions in the US, will these developments, as former Managing 
Director Tony Burman (01/06/2013) cautioned, come at the price of jeopardising 
AJE’s hard-won counter-hegemonic character and ‘ “brand” of fearless, provocative 
international journalism’? Or will it – as Al Jazeera journalists in the US ‘are fanning 
out to report news stories from parts of the country rarely visited by camera crews’ 
(Stelter, 26/05/2013) and reporting from ‘bureaus in cities they considered 
underserved such as Nashville and Detroit’ (Baker & Richwine, 20/08/2013) – help 
to implement those very values on a global scale?  
 
Perhaps the most crucial difference between AJAM and all prior Al Jazeera projects, 
including not least AJE, lies in the way its success will be measured. As AJE reporter 
Catch Turner stated in a report about AJAM that ran on AJE on 20th August 2013 at 
21:20 GMT: ‘Money has not been a concern in the past. Now, for the first time, 
executives will have to consider a new set of numbers: ratings’. From the start, 
AJAM received much praise from print media colleagues for its ‘serious’ journalism 
(Stelter, 18/08/2013) and the ‘amount of contextualised information’ (Cox, 
21/08/2013) it offered. In contrast, success as measured in ratings, should it 
materialise, will be hard won: two of Current TV’s former distributers dropped the 
channel shortly before the launch and ratings for the launch hour hovered ‘below 
Nielson’s minimum accuracy threshold’ (Chasmar, 28/08/2013, Washington Post). 
For now AJAM is selling its relatively non-commercial outlook139 as a virtue. The 
question will be: if AJAM manages to attract higher ratings and increases its value 
for advertisers, will this – now necessary – virtue be still seen as such? 
 
What these issues already show is that questions regarding AJE’s positioning in the 
journalistic field are as relevant today as they were when AJE was launched. It also 
means that the observations made in this thesis come at a time when the era of a 
ratings-independent Al Jazeera is coming to an end. Media scholars and social 
scientists cannot usually set up experiments in their field of study, but sometimes, as 
Chomsky (1994) once put it, ‘history was kind enough to set one up for us’. The 
chance to study the formative years of the ratings-free environment of a major 
                                                
139 This means relatively non-commercial compared to other U.S. networks, while 
already significantly more so than AJE with an average of six minutes of advertising 
an hour. 
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international broadcaster certainly felt like just such a rare experiment and an 
opportunity to contribute, however slightly, to the understanding of the margins of 
difference in international broadcasting news.   
 
 
9.4.2 Contra-flow and the Dialectic of Similarity and Difference  
 
As I have argued in this thesis, AJE seems to closely match theories of counter-
hegemonic media, but it also in many ways defies categorisation. As  shown in 
Chapter 2, it would be reductive to categorise AJE as transnational (with a core 
regional base), as geo-cultural (with culturally-specific target audiences) or as global 
(with a near-global audience). In part this is the direct result of the current lack of 
audience research, but it is also, I shall argue, a result of the fact that AJE’s 
organisational composition is generative of a culture (and ultimately of content) that 
does not seem to comfortably fit categories of either North or South, mainstream or 
alternative, conventional or counter-hegemonic. What AJE provides, rather, is a 
combination of conventional practice and new territory (literally and metaphorically) 
and an unconventional, in parts marked, contrast to some traditional news values 
within an overall culture that is still comparable with that of the Western 
broadcasters it initially recruited from.  
 
However, difference is not a given. How and to what degree AJE will provide 
difference in the future, as a relatively autonomous organisation in a weakly 
autonomous field, will depend on a host of variables. These notably include the 
political field in Qatar, management decisions at AJE and AJN, and the courage of 
journalists to defend pockets of journalistic autonomy vis-à-vis precisely those 
dominant conventions of practice that run counter to aims of creating a more 
balanced and more genuinely international perspective in news. As Franks (2004: 
425) argues, ‘the effects of globalisation, the inter-dependent nature of modern 
society and the precarious state of international relations post 9/11 make the case for 
[…] developing an international perspective more important than ever’. And, I would 
like to add, this increases the importance of understanding and holding to account 
media that make it their business to explain the world to audiences around the globe.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Consent Form for Research Interviews 
 
 
Consent FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH 
 
 
Working Title of Research Project  
The Culture of Al Jazeera English 
 
Details of Project 
This PhD project looks specifically at the early years of Al Jazeera English (AJE) and the 
ways in which AJE’s remit of ‘reporting back’ and challenging long established 
geopolitical hierarchies in international news impacted on the channel’s evolving 
organisational culture and vice-versa.  
 
Contact Details 
For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact: 
 
Nina Bigalke 
Doctoral Candidate 
Department of Media and Communications 
London School of Economics and Political Science [LSE] 
ninabigalke@me.com 
 
Confidentiality 
Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. Your contact details are kept 
separately from your interview data. 
 
Anonymity  
Please tick the appropriate box: 
 
 I agree for my full name to be attributed to my statements from the interview(s) 
 
 I wish to stay anonymous when quoted or paraphrased 
 
Consent  
By this, I agree to be interviewed by Nina Bigalke as part of her research at the London 
School of Economics and Political Studies. The content of the interview(s) may be used in 
the context of Nina Bigalke’s research and research-related publications.  
 
 
 
Date of Interview:……………………..     Printed Name:………………………… 
         
 
  Signatures: ………………………….................................................................... 
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Appendix 2: Codebook for Comparative Content Analysis  
 
1) General data about programme 
 
Programme ID 
 
Channel  
Date of broadcast  
Time of broadcast (GMT)  
Overall number of items (incl. sports / business)   
Overall number of items (excl. sports / business)   
Overall time of items in seconds (incl. sports / business)   
Overall time of items in seconds (excl. sports / business)   
 
 
2a) Ratio of news items from ‘global South’ and ‘global North’  
 
 TOTAL incl. sports / business TOTAL excl. sports / business 
 Number of 
items 
Airtime (sec) Number of 
items 
Airtime (sec) 
 
Items ‘global South’ 
 
        
 
Items ‘global North’ 
 
        
 
 
2b) News items from the global South and North respectively, cross-referenced with 
news genre 
 
 Conflict/
Disasters 
Political 
/Process
-driven 
‘Soft’ 
news 
 
Science / 
Tech-
nology 
Economy
/Business 
 
Sport 
 
Other 
 
 
 
Global 
South 
Items 
(No.) 
              
Airtime 
(sec) 
              
 
 
Global 
North 
Items 
(No.) 
              
Airtime 
(sec) 
              
 
 
TOTAL 
Items 
(No.) 
              
Airtime 
(sec) 
              
 
3) Regional emphasis 
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 Including sports / business Excluding sports / business 
Number of 
items 
Airtime 
in seconds 
Number of 
items 
Airtime 
in seconds 
Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) 
 
        
Sub-Saharan Africa (incl. 
Sudan and South Sudan140) 
 
        
Asia (South, Central and 
Asia Pacific) 
 
        
 
Australia and New Zealand 
 
        
 
Latin America 
 
        
North America (US and 
Canada) 
 
        
 
Europe 
 
        
 
 
4) The relative weight given to stories from the ‘global South’ and ‘global North’ 
respectively as expressed in the RUNNING ORDER of the programmes 
 
Items from the ‘global South’ 
Position in running 
order of 1st item 
Minutes into the 
programme of 1st item 
Number of items 
within first 15min 
Airtime of items within 
first 15min 
  
 
      
Items from the ‘global North’ 
Position in running 
order of 1st item 
Minutes into the 
programme of 1st item 
Number of items 
within first 15min 
Airtime of items within 
first 15min 
        
 
 
 
5a) Number and time of items containing original stories, cross-referenced with 
categories of ‘global South’ and ‘global North’ 
 
 TOTAL Items ‘global 
South’ 
Items ‘global 
North’ 
Original stories  
(not part of the comparative 
No. 
 
      
                                                
140 Geographically, Sudan and South Sudan, which gained independence from Sudan 
in 2011, are part of Sub-Saharan Africa. Because of Sudan’s majority Arab 
population, they are however, depending on context, variously considered as being 
part of Sub-Saharan or North Africa. For the purpose of the content analysis, I 
included reports from or about Sudan and/or South Sudan in the geographical 
category of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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programme of the other channel 
in the sample) 
Sec. 
 
      
 
 
 
5b) Number of items containing official statements and on-air time of official 
statements, cross-referenced with categories of ‘global South’ and ‘global North’ 
 
 TOTAL Items ‘global 
South’ 
Items ‘global 
North’ 
 
Press conferences and official 
statements 
 
No. 
 
      
Sec. 
 
      
 
 
6) Reporters – cross-referencing gender and ‘Western’ / ‘Non-Western’ background 
 
 TOTAL Women Men 
‘Non-Western’ 
background 
 
      
‘Western’ 
background 
 
      
 
TOTAL 
      
 
 
7a) Protagonists – ‘Non-Western’ / ‘Western background’, cross-referenced with 
gender and socio-political role in which they appear on screen 
 
 Total ‘Non-Western’ 
background 
‘Western’ background 
Appearances Airtime Appearances Airtime Appearances Airtime 
 
Establishment 
 
            
 
Independent elites  
 
            
‘Ordinary people’ / 
grassroots 
opposition 
            
 
 
Women 
 
            
 
Men 
 
            
 
 
TOTAL 
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7b) Protagonists – ‘Non-Western’ / ‘Western background’, cross-referenced with the 
role in which they appear on screen 
 
 Establishment 
 
Independent elites ‘Ordinary people’ / 
grassroots opposition 
Appearances Airtime Appearances Airtime Appearances Airtime 
 
Women 
 
            
 
Men 
 
            
 
 
8a) Studio Guests and Interviewees – ‘Non-Western’ / ‘Western background’, cross-
referenced with gender and socio-political role in which they appear on screen 
 
 Total ‘Non-Western’ 
background 
‘Western’ background 
Appearances Airtime Appearances Airtime Appearances Airtime 
 
Establishment 
 
            
 
Independent elites 
 
            
‘Ordinary people’ / 
grassroots 
opposition 
            
 
 
Women 
 
            
 
Men 
 
            
 
 
TOTAL 
 
            
 
 
8b) Studio Guests and Interviewees – ‘Non-Western’ / ‘Western background’, cross-
referenced with the role in which they appear 
 
 Establishment Independent elites ‘Ordinary people’ / 
grassroots opposition 
Appearances Airtime Appearances Airtime Appearances Airtime 
 
Women 
 
            
 
Men 
 
            
 
